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Exploring the emergence of cooperation in the populations of self-interested individuals is of huge challenge. Evolutionary game theory has been utilized to investigate the evolution of cooperation. In recent years, many researchers have paid massive attention on the evolution of cooperative behavior from the perspective of multiple games, especially the transition of games. Nevertheless, not only are the current interactive actions crucial, but also the historical interactive experience is fateful. Motivated by this, the persistence-based game transition mechanism is proposed and introduced to investigate the evolution of cooperation, where both the current pairwise strategies and the persistence of the pairwise strategies determine the game played in the next time step. Through analyzing the evolutionary results of strategies and games, we find that the cooperation can be facilitated by the enhanced network reciprocity as the persistence-based game transition makes mutual cooperators play games with weak dilemma more persistently. • A persistence-based game transition is proposed in multi-games. • In our model, both pairwise interactive strategies and the persistence of pairwise strategies determine the game transition. • The persistence-based game transition can facilitate cooperation through enhancing network reciprocity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• A new framework of multiple public goods games considering the persistence and transition of games is proposed. • The heterogeneous public resource of public goods game evolves with the persistence and transition of games. • Our new model can promote cooperation effectively, especially under the condition with scarce resource. Many various projects may exist in an enterprise in parallel, which leads to distinct group interactions. Team members cooperate in their respective projects, and sometimes it is possible to engage in several concurrent projects. Owing to practice makes perfect, the longer the duration of members participating in an identical project is, the higher benefits will be under same contribution. However, in a fiercely competitive environment, a huge conflict of interest between groups and individuals which results in social dilemma makes projects difficult to proceed smoothly. The experience of direct reciprocity shows that repeated interactions can alleviate this problem, but most multi-person dilemma studies consider a single game scenario, and public resources remain constant. Here we introduce a general framework of multiple public goods games. Taking the public goods game with threshold into consideration, public resource evolves with the persistence and transition of games. Our results suggest although collaborators are at a disadvantage in different game scenarios, our model can still effectively promote the overall cooperation in multiple public goods games. Especially, it performs better when public resource is relative scarce. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• A reputation-based strategy persistence mechanism in evolutionary game is proposed. • Our mechanism illuminates that the scale of reputation fluctuation totally depends on the persistence of last strategy. • A parameter, α , illustrating the impact of strategy persistence on reputation variation, is introduced. • Cooperation can be promoted effectively by our new mechanism. Understanding the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in social dilemma has received a lot of attention. In previous research, many scholars found that the reputation mechanism can promote cooperation, and the variation of reputation is consistent. However, in reality, according to both one's current action and past experiences, every individual's impression from others is modified to varying extent everyday. In other words, the length of duration of the same performance influences the diverse scale of their own reputation fluctuation. Therefore, a reputation-based strategy persistence mechanism, in which the increment of current reputation is determined by the persistence of last strategy, is proposed. Moreover, we introduce a parameter α to illustrate the impact of strategy persistence on reputation variation. The results of simulation show that the new mechanism paves the way for cooperation in evolutionary game, and the smaller α is, the better the mechanism performs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]