Search

Considering the relations between Japan and mainland China from 1952 to 1972, it is possible to say that there were "twenty lost years" in East Asian regional politics, because of no official diplomatic relations between Japan and China, which have been the two biggest powers of East Asia. The research question of this study is how the relations between the two countries developed in this process, when the political power in Japan did not prefer recognizing the communist regime in mainland China instead of its nationalist counterpart in Taiwan due to the Cold War political conjuncture. Accordingly, in this study, the period between 1952-1972 was examined in terms of economic diplomacy. Economics was perhaps the only factor that kept the people of the two countries dependent on each other. Informal and individual initiatives and businesses established during this period, which were sometimes openly supported by politicians behind closed doors, ensured that the threads were never broken in Sino-Japanese relations. In this context, the names, Takasaki Tatsunosuke in Japan and Liao Chengzhi in China, stood out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: In most of the scholarship on diplomacy, whether historical or contemporary, the governmental elite-based perspective has consistently dominated. The societisation of diplomacy is the process of legitimisation of foreign policy deliberations between state and society, both domestically and internationally. This article argues that there are two types of societisation: internal and external. It defines the former as a dynamic political communication process comprising diplomatic policy deliberation and legitimisation between state and society in a domestic context. The internal dimension is yet to receive sufficient academic and practical attention. This article fills the gap in the literature on the internal societisation of diplomacy through an empirical case study of Japan's diplomacy towards China. It shows that the unsuccessful internal societisation of diplomacy has had moderating effects on Japan's diplomacy towards China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's increasingly active economic diplomacy in recent years has often been deeply linked to its geostrategic interests. Japan is said to be watching this development with alarm. Analysts have often claimed that this has resulted in Sino-Japanese rivalry, where the Japanese see any gains made by China in zero-sum terms, and make concerted efforts to counter China's growing influence. This article, however, is critical of such views. While elements of rivalry may indeed be visible in some aspects of Sino-Japanese relations, it would be premature to apply this perspective to economic statecraft, which is inherently multifaceted. This article claims that too much attention has been paid to the strategic aspects of Chinese economic statecraft at the expense of economic/commercial ones that could foster cooperative relations between Beijing and Tokyo. It argues that Japan does not hold a monolithic view that Chinese diplomatic activities in the economic realm are an axiomatic threat to Japanese security interests, and it remains premature to say that Japan and China are 'rivals' in the realm of economic statecraft. Future analysis in this area needs to pay greater attention to the complicating effects that economic interdependence can have in strategic policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study takes the argument that nontraditional security (NTS) diplomacy can provide the essential window of opportunity for China and Japan to move beyond traditional diplomatic history. However, NTS issues have become dominant in reforming bilateral relations between China and Japan, though there is no fixed edge in nontraditional security. To reveal, it explores the NTS diplomacy with the importance of nontraditional security issues as substance for the expansion and development of two leading economies. The non-military and transboundary character of NTS threats have constrained courtiers to pursue more substantial levels of security integration. This study argues that the significance of NTS diplomacy is twofold; first, it avoids sensitive historical hostilities and finds common ground for cooperation on NTS threats that traditional approach of diplomacy apparently is unable to envisage. Second, security interdependence approach can turn traditional diplomatic relations of China and Japan into a more conciliatory and prominent path. While NTS threats like natural disasters, environment degradation, and economy crisis have been taken as case studies to provide empirical evidence and significant opportunities for both rival states. This article, to some extent, describes the dynamic between traditional, nontraditional, and nontraditional security diplomacy through China-Japan relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the outbreak of COVID-19, China and Japan have fought against the epidemic through high-level contacts, donation and so on. The Chinese proverb "mountains and rivers on foreign land, wind and moon under the same sky" gave warmth of friendship to the bilateral relations. However, since Yoshihide Suga won the election, the Sino-Japanese relations have taken a worsening turn. The current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida further takes counterbalancing China as top priority. The "anti-COVID-19 diplomacy" in 2020 had very limited improvement on Sino-Japanese relations. It is clear that since the implementation of the U.S. strategic competition policy against China, Japan, without hesitation, turns to the "national interest theory" and "international contribution theory" by positioning to counterbalance China. Japan has become one of the few Asian countries that have completely sided with US in the China–US strategic competition. Since the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, the principle of "good-neighborhood" has been totally replaced by the seemingly determined approach of "counterbalance" proposed by Japanese politicians. Japan has gone beyond the issue of its neighboring areas, trying to assist the United States' strategic containment of China, which has added a new variable to China's neighboring diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses an episode in the history of Sōka Gakkai that began as alternative youth movement under Ikeda Daisaku who came to advocate "people's diplomacy" (minkan gaikō) as a way to foster goodwill between China and Japan. Why would Sōka Gakkai, a legally constituted "religious corporation" (shūkyō hōjin) be so serious about engaging with a Communist regime that did not recognise religion? The article discusses what "religion" or "religious behaviour" means in Sōka Gakkai, and questions the usefulness of such a classification on a qualitative level. Ikeda's interpretation of Nichiren Buddhism highlights his approach to something seemingly very "unreligious"—namely, the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations. Unlike the more traditional "reactive revolution" of protest movements that constructed politics as primarily a binary, ideological choice to achieve its aims, Ikeda prioritised finding ways to transcend that very ideology-centric, counter-politics approach. By appealing to conviviality, a sense of shared humanity and humility on the part of the Japanese towards their past history of colonialism, a new social imaginary and attitude that differed from politics of opposition between left and right entered as a historical force that continues to be promoted by Sōka Gakkai today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on major practice of regionalism in Japan's diplomacy has undoubtedly been its proposal and implementation of the "Indo-Pacific" concept. Topics include the term "Indo-Pacific" is not only a spatial concept that combines the respective natural and geographical regions of the two oceans, and Japan has been deeply concerned about China's rise in contrast to the U.S. relative decline.

Overcoming the Challenges As seen during the pandemic, the notion that middle powers can somehow fill the US-China leadership void is still fairly remote, especially if the United States seeks to directly undermine middle power efforts. Recent European efforts to engage with the United States on reforming the WHO indicate a more realistic assessment of multilateralism than in the past.[65] By forcefully defending rules-based multilateralism, middle powers have the potential to provide a diplomatic alternative to the US-China global competition paradigm that can also be attractive to other international players. Over the past four years, while the Trump administration doubled down on its "America First" foreign policy and Sino-American tensions continued to sharpen, another trend has been equally pertinent: the growing relevance of middle power diplomacy. During the pandemic outbreak in 2020, as the Trump administration further withdrew Washington from multilateral frameworks and as US-China tensions continued to deteriorate, middle powers increasingly saw themselves as confronting an uncomfortable reality in which they could not really depend on either the United States or China to address pressing challenges like COVID-19 and climate change. [Extracted from the article]

This article examines the importance of the exchange of foreign correspondents between Japan and China from 1964, during a period of the Cold War when the two countries did not have official ties. Favourable political circumstances in the first half of the 1960s led to a brief window of opportunity for an improved relationship between China and Japan, during which this unique exchange took place. The article attempts to shed light on the significance of the exchange within the broader context of Chinese foreign policy and Sino-Japanese relations during the Cold War. Thereby it will clarify the importance of the 1960–1964 period for the longer rapprochement process that would come to fruition in 1972 with the establishment of diplomatic relations. The exchanges of 1964 were seen by participants as an important first step on the way towards official ties. For the Chinese the importance of a relationship with Japan in this period, and, by extension, the importance of the journalist exchange, is shown by the involvement of an unusually high number of journalists from both countries. This article argues that the Chinese leadership's desire for the journalist exchange was rooted in a craving for accurate knowledge about Japan, especially concerning specific political trends and economic developments. This enthusiasm was matched by pro-China politicians in Japan, who also felt that the journalists' presence would enable the Chinese to base their Japan policy on a broader variety of sources, extending beyond information merely gathered through contacts in the Japanese left. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Review of International Affairs (04866096) is the property of Institute of International Politics & Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

No relationship is more important to the future of Asia than the one between Japan and China. PM Abe's visit to Beijing last month put the relationship back on a firmer footing. Yet diplomacy alone will not stabilize Sino-Japanese relations. Popular attitudes in both countries also matter, and will be shaped by the success or failure of leaders to manage the growing complexity of this relationship from food security to fisheries management to national defense and new solutions to China's growing influence over the daily lives of Japanese. Across Asia too, Japan and China will need to coexist without impeding each other's influence. Next year's visit to Japan by President Xi offers ample opportunity for expanding the foundation of this latest round of diplomatic "fresh starts" in the Japan-China relationship. Uncertainty over the US role in Asia, however, has made this a more difficult task. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to analyze why negotiations for the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship were extended for a longer period than expected. Treaty negotiations were protracted largely due to a backlash against the Normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972. Moreover Japan’s diplomacy against China was entwined with political factional strife in the Liberal Democratic Party. Premier Takeo Fukuda’s diplomatic guidance was solid and steady. He created an agreement within the party over time by rejecting an early political settlement that Premier Kakuei Tanaka did in 1972. He also addressed the territorial issue calmly, and steadily advanced negotiations for the treaty. As a result, the Fukuda administration successfully achieved the Japan-China Treaty. Conclusion of the Treaty by Fukuda, who had strong ties with the pro-Taiwan camp, brought an end to the conflict over policy towards China within the LDP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reassesses the 2006 and, tentatively, the 2014 reset in Sino-Japanese relations to argue in favour of an increasingly state-centric understanding of Japanese diplomacy. By making use of a narrative account and a variety of primary sources--including personal memoirs, elite interviews, participatory observation, and leaked State Department cables--this article finds that Abe Shinzo's foreign policy confidante, Yachi Shotaro, embodied the unmatched influence of government actors in Japan's political landscape. The article provides a close-up portrait of Yachi, with an emphasis on his preference for geopolitics, strategy, and secret diplomacy. Yachi and the institutional apparatus he represented sought detente with Japan's main strategic adversary, while pushing for geopolitical initiatives that targeted China. The article concludes by arguing that the Abe administration's insistence on, and institutionalized practice of, conducting public affairs in secret will likely further strengthen the role of the nation-state and of government actors in Japan, also in light of growing geopolitical tensions in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This thesis examines China’s acceptance ofSandakan No. 8andArrestin order to analyze the historical context and its impact, which enabled the cultural movement during the Cold War in Asia. New China pursued a people’s diplomacy policy that separated the Japanese government and the Japanese people in order to promote relationships between the two countries during the Cold War. Japanese Movie Week, which was held to celebrate the China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978, was an outcome made possible throughout the People’s Solidarity between the two countries. Despite the colonial and imperialist war and the animosity created by the Cold War, the Chinese audience accepted Japanese movies without any rejection because of the people’s diplomacy policy.Sandakan No. 8andArrestwere fervently consumed as cultural icons that symbolized the Chinese society in the 1980s. However, the controversies over the profanity and sexual descriptions inSandakan No. 8led individuals to assert self-discretion over their own sexuality. The popular mimicry of the main characters ofArrestin the daily lives of the Chinese overthrew the existing socialist gender norms and reconstructed a new femininity and masculinity that created a fight against the state. The fight against the state was indirectly expressed through sexuality and gender and developed into a criticism against the socialist regime, forming another Cold War logic that was different from that of the Cold War. It was also transformed into a fervent nationalism that advanced the issues of historical responsibility, such as the issue of war reparations. The success of the People’s Solidarity transcended nation-states and ultimately led people to negate its own logic. In this regard, the process of acceptingSandakan No. 8andArrestrevealed the issues of the impossibility of the state accurately representing the people and the contradiction between the state and the people under the Cold War logic. It also urged the contemplation of the complex structure of the Cold War and the post-Cold War that was created by those two entangling forces in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the relations between China and Japan factored by diplomacy, maritime security, and issues on South China Sea and the East China Sea.

The article focuses on Taiwan's foreign relations with Japan and China. It is stated that Taiwan has been a sensitive issue in Sino-Japanese relations; and recognizing the relative importance of China and Japan to Taiwan is very useful in understanding their triangular relations. It is mentioned that China's policy toward Taiwan is an uncertain factor that restrain's Taiwan's diplomacy; and China and Japan have good relations and Beijing, China, and Taiwan may have friendly relations with both the nations. The article also discusses the implications of national identity for foreign relations; and Taiwan's democracy and cultural experiences under Japanese colonization.

The article discusses the diplomatic relations between China and Japan in 2014. Topics covered include the dip in Japanese investment in China in the first half of the year, the incursions by China's Coast Guard into Japan's territorial waters, and how Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo called for specific attention to China's diplomacy and lack of transparency concerning its increasing military budget.

The potential roles played by local governments in Japan regarding Sino-Japanese relations are often neglected. Drawing upon a few representative case studies by highlighting the interaction between local and international politics, the article aims at analyzing the possible impacts of Japan's local governments on Sino-Japanese relations in the future. First, it reviews the theoretical framework of sub-national or paradiplomacy and the relevant literature on Japan's local governments in such framework. Second, through showing how their local leaders attempted to pursue local or personal interests by taking Sino-Japanese relations as hostage, it uses four local governments in Japan that have peculiar interaction with China as case studies. Finally, it previews some patterns as derived from the cases, in order to draw some implications for both Tokyo and Beijing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the repercussions of the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute for bilateral trade. Using interviews with businesses, scholars, and government officials in Beijing, Hong Kong, and Tokyo, and data gathered from policy papers and businesses, this paper argues that the traditional seikei bunri (separation of politics and economics) relationship that existed between Japan and China in the post-World War II period has given way to a more confrontational relationship in which economic pressure can be and has been applied as a means to press Japan on bilateral issues. It argues that understanding the way in which frictions arising from territorial disputes have affected the Sino-Japanese trading relationship may hold implications for the handling of similar disputes across North- and South-East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the significance of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island group in the East China Sea in creating tension in relations between China and Japan. It examines the deterioration of relations between the two nations following the September 11, 2012, purchase of the island group by the Japanese government in agreement with Japanese businessman Kunioki Kurihara. The article discusses the history of contention over the islands, including U.S. administrative responsibilities for the islands, and the Ryukyu Island Chain, following World War II. The article discusses the geopolitical aspects of sovereignty of the islands, particularly the concept of residual sovereignty, negotiations between the U.S. and Japan concerning the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, during the administration of former U.S. president Richard Nixon, and the U.S. neutrality doctrine.

This is a translation of an article that reconsiders the controversy surrounding the Satō Eisaku Cabinet's China policy from 1970 to 1972. Previous studies have not focused sufficiently on how top officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussed China policy during this era. Based on recently declassified but still fragmentary Japanese diplomatic documents, this article, by carefully organizing these fragments and then comparing them with previously published secondary sources and declassified US diplomatic documents, uncovers historical facts of central importance for understanding Japan's postwar foreign policy. In particular, this article finds that the Foreign Ministry failed to formulate a strategic response to the drastic transformation of the international situation in the early 1970s, thereby indicating that discord within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party was not the only reason for Japan's delayed and reactive response. It also finds that the Ministry decided to establish diplomatic relations with China and severe relations with Taiwan as early as immediately after the Taiwanese government was expelled from the U.N. in October 1971, even though Japan waited for nearly another year before acting. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article analyses the strategic dynamics of the Sino-Japanese relationship and argues that the potential for confrontation between China and Japan has been exaggerated. There is an underlying tendency in much of the literature to treat the emergence of rivalry between China and Japan since the end of the cold war as synonymous with an inevitable drift towards bilateral strategic confrontation. This article argues that Beijing and Tokyo are better placed to manage the strategic dimension of their bilateral relationship than many analysts have been willing to acknowledge thus far. To test this argument, the article examines two prominent case studies that lie at the heart of the contemporary and future Sino-Japanese bilateral strategic relationship: the territorial dispute over the East China Sea and Japan's virtual nuclear weapons capability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an historical exploration into the attitudes and policies of the Nationalist Government of China towards the European theater of World War II. Details are given noting the Chinese focus on Japan as the primary enemy and leading priority during the foreign policy of the Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek at the time but also noting the ways in which European alliances were formed in order to support this goal. Further comments are offered asserting how the discrete foreign policies of Chiang Kai-shek led to the victory of China against the Japanese invasion.

The article discusses the 1921 International Conference on Naval Limitation, also known as the Washington Conference, and examines rumors circulating prior to the conference about the relationship between China and Japan. According to the article, the rumors were related to the possibility of direct negotiation on naval limitation between China and Japan. Details are provided about the refutation of these rumors by the Chinese government. The use of the principle of open diplomacy by Chinese foreign minister Yan Huiquing to guide Chinese public opinion during this episode is also explored.