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In the context of the revitalized scholarly interest in small and middle powers, we employ a relational network approach to study the role of non-major powers as bridges and hubs. Contrary to prominent conceptions that centre on preconceived country groupings or states' variable attributes, such as the size of their territory, economy, or armed forces, our study foregrounds the influence that states gain from their position in international networks. We begin by developing an ideal-typical theory of bridges and hubs. We then employ these concepts to discuss empirical examples, examining the extent to which our cases embody these ideal types. Our approach sheds light on the rationale for geostrategic relocation and how states can use networks to gain influence in world politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution to the Forum argues the research agenda on diplomacy has to be recalibrated: with a greater focus on how diplomacy is challenged domestically. This turbulence is intertwined with the rise of populism not from the periphery as largely featured in the past, but in the countries at the core of the international system, most noticeable in the Brexit campaign in Britain and the Donald Trump Administration in the United States. The challenge posed is that diplomacy – no less than other institutions – traditionally viewed positively as providing continuity and stability in terms of the national interest and identity has increasingly been stigmatized. Although distinctive national features cannot be ignored, a common feature in terms of generic cause and effect is an association with the concept of disintermediation highlighting a separation of diplomats not only from other components of governmental bureaucracy but citizens at large. The effect of disintermediation is more pervasive because of the use of social media and other means of going around established institutions. In addressing th is serious challenge, the research agenda must extend to comprehensive options for organisational maintenance in which the institution and operational machinery of diplomacy is re-directed towards delivery in the service of citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article develops the concept of 'frontline diplomacy' – what practitioners referring to work in embassies, consulates, and permanent representation as 'the field' –, defined here as all diplomats' activities taking place away from headquarters. IR scholarship tends to focus on Ministries of Foreign Affairs located in capitals. On the contrary, building on the practice turn in IR, we first show that international politics emerge from frontline practices. Adding to criticism against the practice turn, we then explain that it has missed important transformations occurring in frontline diplomacy because it tends to privilege stability over change. We finally discuss two innovations in frontline practices: the action of Sherpas in G20 summits following the 2008 crisis and the use of Twitter by US Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul (2012–14). For each we answer three questions: How do these activities transform traditional modes of operation? How are non-state actors involved in them? What do they tell about transformation of global politics? Because diplomatic practices at the frontlines epitomise international politics, these new directions for inquiry contribute substantively to IR scholarship. At the theoretical level, they enrich the continuing encounter between IR and diplomatic studies through practice theory and help to understand change in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: Public diplomacy has been externally directed via a strategy of assertive reputation-building. In an era of insurgent populism, this model faces strong backlash, driven by the image of public diplomacy being disconnected from domestic publics. Under these conditions, an opportunistic set of ascendant political leaders — even those located at the international system's core — have considerable incentive to diminish 'their' own diplomats as part of a wider campaign to stigmatize the traditional establishment. While more attention needs to be directed to the causes of this disconnection between diplomats and public, this article highlights a number of key ingredients in a menu of adaptation to the populist challenge. Above all, the focus of engagement in public diplomacy should be broadened to include domestic as well as foreign audiences. Disruption, it must be emphasized, does not mean the end of public diplomacy. Rather, public diplomacy must take a domestic turn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article highlights both the differences and similarities between the concepts of entrepreneurial states and middle powers. The use of the entrepreneurial state as the central framing device is distinctive in a number of ways, including reducing the emphasis on hierarchy in the global system. Yet for all the divergences, the two frames are indelibly intertwined, above all in privileging agency over structural positioning. In either case there is an element of constant flux and reinvention, which justifies ongoing research. Just when the elevation of the G20 and the appearance of MIKTA appeared to provide some discipline to the image of a middle power, the notion of entrepreneurial states stretches the number of countries to be included. At the same time, however, attributes that reflect some middle power sensibility are embedded within the entrepreneurial state set of practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that middle power diplomacy can be identified as having gone through three distinct waves. The first is connected with the immediate post-1945 global order, with a focus on multilateralism via the United Nations and related bodies. The second moved to ad hoc bursts of activism related to specific issue area niches. The third and current wave, by contrast, is embedded in the informal institutionalization associated with the G20. Just as the BRICS have used the G20 as a catalyst for differentiated activities both around and independent of the G20, the “missing middle” in the G20 (countries increasingly portrayed as middle powers beyond both the BRICS and the G7) have begun to explore the possibility of collective action. MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea, and Australia), while possibly a significant advance in global governance, has the potential of hardening the categories of countries identified as middle powers. At the same time, the MIKTA countries face a number of serious constraints in terms of this global reach. Institutional elevation is compromised by practice limitations, most notably the hold of regional imperatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is the G20 transforming global governance, or does it reinforce the status quo? In this article we argue that as innovative as some diplomatic practices of the G20 may be, we should not overstate their potential impact. More specifically, we show that G20 diplomacy often reproduces many oligarchic tendencies in global governance, while also relaxing club dynamics in some ways. On the one hand, the G20 has more inductees who operate along new rules of the game and under a new multilateral ethos of difference. But, on the other hand, the G20 still comprises self-appointed rulers, with arbitrary rules of membership and many processes of cooption and discipline. In overall terms, approaching G20 diplomacy from a practice perspective not only provides us with the necessary analytical granularity to tell the old from the new, it also sheds different light on the dialectics of stability and change on the world stage. Practices are processes and as such they are always subject to evolutionary change. However, because of their structuring effects, diplomatic practices also tend to inhibit global transformation and reproduce the existing order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Canadian diplomacy in comparative perspective with respect to the middle power model. This model, although acting as the foundation for Canada’s role in the world for the post-1945 era, came under stress in the late 1990s. On the one hand, there was acceleration away from the fixed pattern of activity through a new mode of initiatives (such as on land mines and the International Criminal Court) with an extended range of like-minded actors. On the other hand, there was a backlash to this process of shape-shifting. Conservative critics contested, in particular, the manner in which the middle power model deviated from the ‘main game’ with a concentration on the bilateral relationship vis-à-vis the US. However, they also argued that the model allowed Canada to play below its weight with an emphasis on symbolism as opposed to delivery. The article concludes that, while there continue to be some echoes of the middle power legacy, Canada has moved beyond this model as a comprehensive guide for its diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is increasingly obvious that Qatar is playing above its weight in the international role. There is no one script that defines Qatar's diplomatic role. It is best seen as a maverick, willing to work with the US as well as Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. It operates a complex form of public diplomacy via Al-Jazeera and other high profile initiatives at the same time as it mediates behind the scenes with Israel and Lebanon. Qatar's role as a unique hybrid diplomatic actor is reinforced by the enthusiastic support it displayed towards the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, including operational support for the UN Security Resolution to place a no-fly zone with respect to the Qaddafi's regime, while being more circumspect on the uprising in Bahrain. Such an extensive, unconventional and differentiated approach creates risks as well as opportunities. Yet, through a combination of resources and vision, it is skilled resilience not vulnerability that defines Qatar. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Summary: This article considers whether the ascendancy of China and India as global economic powers has been matched by a shift in their foreign policy profile and performance. Their individual contribution to, and relationship with, the UN system is the best available measure to gauge China and India’s level of diplomatic activity. The authors argue that China has an entrenched cautious or status quo approach in its diplomacy, while India projects an uneven international persona. The sheer scale of China’s and India’s economies provides them not only with enhanced global weight and options, but is also tied with expectations. Size amplifies both countries’ voice and reach; whether the United Nations will continue to be at the center of this activity remains uncertain. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

As the pattern of interaction between governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) becomes more intense, challenges are posed to both sets of actors operating in policy arenas where the boundaries between issues and roles have become increasingly unclear. Not surprisingly, this changing dynamic has been viewed through a variety of lenses and is the subject of differing interpretations. These interpretative tensions are clearly exhibited in the context of that sub-area of international relations concerned with diplomacy and identified as diplomatic studies. Relating the concerns and activities of NGOs to a concept which, by historical development and common definition, is closely identified with the state and patterns of intergovernmental relations, underscores many of the paradigmatic dilemmas and conflicts inherent in the study of international relations. State and non-state actors are viewed as inhabiting different environments, working to different rule-books and occupying very different positions on the scale of importance in world politics. For those adhering to state-centred assumptions, the role of NGOs is likely to be, at best, of secondary importance to that of national governments. Whatever their activities, they hardly relate to the world of diplomacy whose inherent characteristics are defined in terms of a particular brand of government official, the professional diplomat.