Search

Directly transmitted infectious diseases spread through social contacts that change over time, but outbreak models typically make simplifying assumptions about network structure and dynamics. To assess how common assumptions relate to real-world interactions, we analysed 11 networks from five settings and developed metrics, capturing crucial epidemiological features of these networks. We developed a novel metric, the 'retention index', to characterize the distribution of retained contacts over consecutive time steps relative to fully static and dynamic networks. In workplaces and schools, contacts in the same department formed most of the retained contacts. In contrast, no clear contact type dominated the retained contacts in hospitals, thus reducing overall risk of disease introduction would be more effective than control targeted at departments. We estimated the contacts repetition over multiple days and showed that simple resource planning models overestimate the number of unique contacts by 20%-70%. We distinguished the difference between 'superspreader' and infectious individuals driving 'superspreading events' by measuring how often the individual represents the top 80% of contacts in the time steps over the study duration. We showed an inherent difficulty in identifying 'superspreaders' reliably: less than 20% of the individuals in most settings were highly connected for multiple time steps.

Starting with a handful of SARS-CoV-2 infections in dormitory residents in late March 2020, rapid transmission in their dense living environments ensued and by October 2020, more than 50,000 acute infections were identified across various dormitories in Singapore. The aim of the study is to identify combination of factors facilitating SARS-CoV-2 transmission and the impact of control measures in a dormitory through extensive epidemiological, serological and phylogenetic investigations, supported by simulation models. Our findings showed that asymptomatic cases and symptomatic cases who did not seek medical attention were major drivers of the outbreak. Furthermore, each resident had about 30 close contacts and each infected resident spread to 4.4 (IQR 3.5-5.3) others at the start of the outbreak. The final attack rate of the current outbreak was 76.2% (IQR 70.6-98.0%) and could be reduced by further 10% under a modified dormitory housing condition. These findings are important when designing living environments in a post COVID-19 future to reduce disease spread and facilitate rapid implementation of outbreak control measures., (© 2021. The Author(s).)

The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003 resulted in more than 8000 cases and 800 deaths. SARS was eventually contained by means of syndromic surveillance, prompt isolation of patients, strict enforcement of quarantine of all contacts, and in some areas top-down enforcement of community quarantine. By interrupting all human-to-human transmission, SARS was effectively eradicated. By contrast, by Feb 28, 2020, within a matter of 2 months since the beginning of the outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), more than 82 000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 have been reported with more than 2800 deaths. Although there are striking similarities between SARS and COVID-19, the differences in the virus characteristics will ultimately determine whether the same measures for SARS will also be successful for COVID-19. COVID-19 differs from SARS in terms of infectious period, transmissibility, clinical severity, and extent of community spread. Even if traditional public health measures are not able to fully contain the outbreak of COVID-19, they will still be effective in reducing peak incidence and global deaths. Exportations to other countries need not result in rapid large-scale outbreaks, if countries have the political will to rapidly implement countermeasures., (Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was first reported in Wuhan, China, in December 2019, and has since spread globally, resulting in >95,000 confirmed COVID-19 cases worldwide by March 5, 2020 (1). Singapore adopted a multipronged surveillance strategy that included applying the case definition at medical consults, tracing contacts of patients with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19, enhancing surveillance among different patient groups (all patients with pneumonia, hospitalized patients in intensive care units [ICUs] with possible infectious diseases, primary care patients with influenza-like illness, and deaths from possible infectious etiologies), and allowing clinician discretion (i.e., option to order a test based on clinical suspicion, even if the case definition was not met) to identify COVID-19 patients. Containment measures, including patient isolation and quarantine, active monitoring of contacts, border controls, and community education and precautions, were performed to minimize disease spread. As of March 5, 2020, a total of 117 COVID-19 cases had been identified in Singapore. This report analyzes the first 100 COVID-19 patients in Singapore to determine the effectiveness of the surveillance and containment measures. COVID-19 patients were classified by the primary means by which they were detected. Application of the case definition and contact tracing identified 73 patients, 16 were detected by enhanced surveillance, and 11 were identified by laboratory testing based on providers' clinical discretion. Effectiveness of these measures was assessed by calculating the 7-day moving average of the interval from symptom onset to isolation in hospital or quarantine, which indicated significant decreasing trends for both local and imported COVID-19 cases. Rapid identification and isolation of cases, quarantine of close contacts, and active monitoring of other contacts have been effective in suppressing expansion of the outbreak and have implications for other countries experiencing outbreaks., Competing Interests: All authors have completed and submitted the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors form for disclosure of potential conflicts of interest. No potential conflicts of interest were disclosed.

Identifying the source of an outbreak facilitates its control. Spatial methods are not optimally used in outbreak investigation, due to a mix of the complexities involved (e.g., methods requiring additional parameter selection), imperfect performance, and lack of confidence in existing options. We simulated 30 mock outbreaks and compared 5 simple methods that do not require parameter selection but could select between mock cases' residential and workplace addresses to localize the source. Each category of site had a unique spatial distribution; residential and workplace address were visually and statistically clustered around the residential neighborhood and city center sites respectively, suggesting that the value of workplace addresses is tied to the location where an outbreak might originate. A modification to centrographic statistics that we propose-the center of minimum geometric distance with address selection-was able to localize the mock outbreak source to within a 500 m radius in almost all instances when using workplace in combination with residential addresses. In the sensitivity analysis, when given sufficient workplace data, the method performed well in various scenarios with only 10 cases. It was also successful when applied to past outbreaks, except for a multisite outbreak from a common food supplier., (© The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.)

Singapore implements a school closure policy for institutional hand, foot, and mouth disease (HFMD) outbreaks, but there is a lack of empirical evidence on the effect of closure on HFMD transmission. We conducted a retrospective analysis of 197,207 cases of HFMD over the period 2003-2012 at the national level and of 57,502 cases in 10,080 institutional outbreaks over the period 2011-2016 in Singapore. The effects of school closure due to 1) institutional outbreaks, 2) public holidays, and 3) school vacations were assessed using a Bayesian time series modeling approach. School closure was associated with a reduction in HFMD transmission rate. During public holidays, average numbers of secondary cases having onset the week after dropped by 53% (95% credible interval 44-62%), and during school vacations, the number of secondary cases dropped by 7% (95% credible interval 3-10%). Schools being temporarily closed in response to an institutional outbreak reduced the average number of new cases by 1,204 (95% credible interval 1,140-1,297). Despite the positive effect in reducing transmission, the effect of school closure is relatively small and may not justify the routine use of this measure.

Objectives: Many studies have suggested the effectiveness of single control measures in the containment and mitigation of pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009. The effects of combined interventions by multiple control measures in reducing the impact of an influenza A (H1N1) 2009 outbreak in a closed physical training camp in Beijing, China were evaluated., Methods: Oseltamivir was prescribed for the treatment of confirmed cases and possible cases and as prophylaxis for all other participants in this training camp. Public health control measures were applied simultaneously, including the isolation of patients and possible cases, personal protection and hygiene, and social distancing measures. Symptom surveillance of all participants was initiated, and the actual attack rate was calculated. For comparison, the theoretical attack rate for this outbreak was projected using the Newton-Raphson numerical method., Results: A total of 3256 persons were present at the physical training camp. During the outbreak, 405 (68.3%) possible cases and 26 (4.4%) confirmed cases were reported before the intervention and completed oseltamivir treatment; 162 (27.3%) possible cases were reported after the intervention and received part treatment and part prophylaxis. The other 2663 participants completed oseltamivir prophylaxis. Of the possible cases, 181 with fever ≥38.5°C were isolated. The actual attack rate for this outbreak of pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 was 18.2%, which is much lower than the theoretical attack rate of 80% projected., Conclusions: Combined interventions of large-scale antiviral ring prophylaxis and treatment and public health control measures could be applied to reduce the magnitude of influenza A (H1N1) 2009 outbreaks in closed settings., (Copyright © 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

During November 2012-July 2013, a marked increase of adenovirus type 7 (Ad7) infections associated with severe disease was documented among pediatric patients in Singapore. Phylogenetic analysis revealed close genetic links with severe Ad7 outbreaks in China, Taiwan, and other parts of Asia.

Influenza-like illness (ILI) case definitions, such as those from the European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, World Health Organization (WHO) and United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, are commonly used for influenza surveillance. We assessed how various case definitions performed during the initial wave of influenza A(H1N1) pdm09 infections in Singapore on a cohort of 727 patients with two to three blood samples and whose symptoms were reviewed fortnightly from June to October 2009. Using seroconversion (≥ 4-fold rise) to A/California/7/2009 (H1N1), we identified 36 presumptive influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 episodes and 664 episodes unrelated to influenza A(H1N1)pdm09. Cough, fever and headache occurred more commonly in presumptive influenza A(H1N1)pdm09. Although the sensitivity was low (36%), the recently revised WHO ILI case definition gave a higher positive predictive value (42%) and positive likelihood ratio (13.3) than the other case definitions. Results including only episodes with primary care consultations were similar. Individuals who worked or had episodes with fever, cough or sore throat were more likely to consult a physician, while episodes with Saturday onset were less likely, with some consultations skipped or postponed. Our analysis supports the use of the revised WHO ILI case definition, which includes only cough in the presence of fever defined as body temperature ≥ 38 °C for influenza surveillance.

Introduction: Norovirus gastrointestinal disease (GID) outbreaks occur frequently in closed settings, with high attack rates. On October 16, 2008, a norovirus GID outbreak occurred at a Singapore military camp. This study describes the epidemiological investigations conducted to determine the cause of outbreak and the efficacy of the public health measures implemented., Methods: Epidemiologic investigations included a case-control study of exposure to different food items and an environmental exposure survey. Stool samplings of patients and food handlers for common pathogens, and microbiologic testing of food and water samples were performed. Inspection of dining facilities and health screening of all food-handlers were also conducted., Results: A total of 156 GID cases were reported on October 15-31, 2008. 24 (15.4%) personnel were positive for norovirus. The predominant symptoms were diarrhoea (76.3%) and abdominal pain (69.2%). There was no clinical correlation between any food item and the affected personnel. Testing of food and water samples, dining facility inspections and health screening of food handlers showed satisfactory results. The environmental exposure survey indicated possible transmission due to environmental contamination by vomitus in common areas. Comprehensive environmental decontamination was performed with hypochlorite solution, and personal hygiene measures were enforced. The outbreak lasted 17 days, with a decline in cases post intervention., Conclusion: Timely notification and prompt response can curtail disease transmission. Swift implementation of public health measures, such as emphasis on personal hygiene, isolation of affected cases and comprehensive disinfection of the environment, effectively stopped norovirus transmission and may be adapted for future GID outbreaks.

Background: In the aftermath of the global spread of 2009 influenza A (pH1N1) virus, still very little is known of the early stages of the outbreak in Mexico during the early months of the year, before the virus was identified., Methodology/main Findings: We fit a simple mathematical model, the Richards model, to the number of excess laboratory-confirmed influenza cases in Mexico and Mexico City during the first 15 weeks in 2009 over the average influenza case number of the previous five baseline years of 2004-2008 during the same period to ascertain the turning point (or the peak incidence) of a wave of early influenza infections, and to estimate the transmissibility of the virus during these early months in terms of its basic reproduction number. The results indicate that there may have been an early epidemic in Mexico City as well as in all of Mexico during February/March. Based on excess influenza cases, the estimated basic reproduction number R₀ for the early outbreak was 1.59 (0.55 to 2.62) for Mexico City during weeks 5-9, and 1.25 (0.76, 1.74) for all of Mexico during weeks 5-14., Conclusions: We established the existence of an early epidemic in Mexico City and in all of Mexico during February/March utilizing the routine influenza surveillance data, although the location of seeding is unknown. Moreover, estimates of R₀ as well as the time of peak incidence (the turning point) for Mexico City and all of Mexico indicate that the early epidemic in Mexico City in February/March had been more transmissible (larger R₀) and peaked earlier than the rest of the country. Our conclusion lends support to the possibility that the virus could have already spread to other continents prior to the identification of the virus and the reporting of lab-confirmed pH1N1 cases in North America in April.

We describe incidence and risk factors for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection in healthcare personnel during the June-September 2009 epidemic in Singapore. Personnel contributed 3 serologic samples during June-October 2009, with seroconversion defined as a ≥4-fold increase in hemagglutination inhibition titers to pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Of 531 participants, 35 showed evidence of seroconversion. Seroconversion rates were highest in nurses (28/290) and lowest in allied health staff (2/116). Significant risk factors on multivariate analysis were being a nurse (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] 4.5, 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.0-19.6) and working in pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolation wards (aOR 4.5, 95% CI 1.3-15.6). Contact with pandemic (H1N1) 2009-infected colleagues (aOR 2.5, 95% CI 0.9-6.6) and larger household size (aOR 1.2, 95% CI 1.0-1.4) were of borderline significance. Our study suggests that seroconversion was associated with occupational and nonoccupational risk factors.

Background: From June 22 through June 25, 2009, four outbreaks of infection with the pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus occurred in Singapore military camps. We report the efficacy of ring chemoprophylaxis (geographically targeted containment by means of prophylaxis) with oseltamivir to control outbreaks of 2009 H1N1 influenza in semiclosed environments., Methods: All personnel with suspected infection were tested and clinically isolated if infection was confirmed. In addition, we administered postexposure ring chemoprophylaxis with oseltamivir and segregated the affected military units to contain the spread of the virus. All personnel were screened three times weekly both for virologic infection, by means of nasopharyngeal swabs and reverse-transcriptase-polymerase-chain-reaction assay with sequencing, and for clinical symptoms, by means of questionnaires., Results: A total of 1175 personnel were at risk across the four sites, with 1100 receiving oseltamivir prophylaxis. A total of 75 personnel (6.4%) were infected before the intervention, and 7 (0.6%) after the intervention. There was a significant reduction in the overall reproductive number (the number of new cases attributable to the index case), from 1.91 (95% credible interval, 1.50 to 2.36) before the intervention to 0.11 (95% credible interval, 0.05 to 0.20) after the intervention. Three of the four outbreaks showed a significant reduction in the rate of infection after the intervention. Molecular analysis revealed that all four outbreaks were derived from the New York lineage of the 2009 H1N1 virus and that cases within each outbreak were due to transmission rather than unrelated episodes of infection. Of the 816 personnel treated with oseltamivir who were surveyed, 63 (7.7%) reported mild, nonrespiratory side effects of the drug, with no severe adverse events., Conclusions: Oseltamivir ring chemoprophylaxis, together with prompt identification and isolation of infected personnel, was effective in reducing the impact of outbreaks of 2009 H1N1 influenza in semiclosed settings., (Copyright 2010 Massachusetts Medical Society.)

Background: Individual strategies in pandemic preparedness plans may not reduce the impact of an influenza pandemic., Methods: We searched modeling publications through PubMed and associated references from 1990 to 30 September 2009. Inclusion criteria were modeling papers quantifying the effectiveness of combination strategies, both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical., Results: Nineteen modeling papers on combination strategies were selected. Four studies examined combination strategies on a global scale, 14 on single countries, and one on a small community. Stochastic individual-based modeling was used in nine studies, stochastic meta-population modeling in five, and deterministic compartmental modeling in another five. As part of combination strategies, vaccination was explored in eight studies, antiviral prophylaxis and/or treatment in 16, area or household quarantine in eight, case isolation in six, social distancing measures in 10 and air travel restriction in six studies. Two studies suggested a high probability of successful influenza epicenter containment with combination strategies under favorable conditions. During a pandemic, combination strategies delayed spread, reduced overall number of cases, and delayed and reduced peak attack rate more than individual strategies. Combination strategies remained effective at high reproductive numbers compared with single strategy. Global cooperative strategies, including redistribution of antiviral drugs, were effective in reducing the global impact and attack rates of pandemic influenza., Conclusion: Combination strategies increase the effectiveness of individual strategies. They include pharmaceutical (antiviral agents, antibiotics and vaccines) and non-pharmaceutical interventions (case isolation, quarantine, personal hygiene measures, social distancing and travel restriction). Local epidemiological and modeling studies are needed to validate efficacy and feasibility.

Background: All influenza pandemic plans advocate pandemic vaccination. However, few studies have evaluated the cost-effectiveness of different vaccination strategies. This paper compares the economic outcomes of vaccination compared with treatment with antiviral agents alone, in Singapore., Methodology: We analyzed the economic outcomes of pandemic vaccination (immediate vaccination and vaccine stockpiling) compared with treatment-only in Singapore using a decision-based model to perform cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses. We also explored the annual insurance premium (willingness to pay) depending on the perceived risk of the next pandemic occurring., Principal Findings: The treatment-only strategy resulted in 690 deaths, 13,950 hospitalization days, and economic cost of USD$497 million. For immediate vaccination, at vaccine effectiveness of >55%, vaccination was cost-beneficial over treatment-only. Vaccine stockpiling is not cost-effective in most scenarios even with 100% vaccine effectiveness. The annual insurance premium was highest with immediate vaccination, and was lower with increased duration to the next pandemic. The premium was also higher with higher vaccine effectiveness, attack rates, and case-fatality rates. Stockpiling with case-fatality rates of 0.4-0.6% would be cost-beneficial if vaccine effectiveness was >80%; while at case-fatality of >5% stockpiling would be cost-beneficial even if vaccine effectiveness was 20%. High-risk sub-groups warrant higher premiums than low-risk sub-groups., Conclusions: The actual pandemic vaccine effectiveness and lead time is unknown. Vaccine strategy should be based on perception of severity. Immediate vaccination is most cost-effective, but requires vaccines to be available when required. Vaccine stockpiling as insurance against worst-case scenarios is also cost-effective. Research and development is therefore critical to develop and stockpile cheap, readily available effective vaccines.

Introduction: Non-typhoidal Salmonellae are important causes of bacterial food-borne infection, especially in institutional settings. An outbreak of gastrointestinal infection occurred in a military camp in January 2007, and an epidemiological outbreak investigation was conducted., Materials and Methods: A survey was conducted on soldiers in the camp on their clinical symptoms, and recent meals consumed. After determining the affected meal, a subsequent survey was conducted on those who had eaten the meal. A case-control study was then performed to determine the outbreak's likely food source. Laboratory tests were also conducted to determine the bacteriological cause., Results: Of the 94 responders, 55 (58.5%) met our case definition of gastrointestinal illness. The dinner on 9 January was the most likely affected meal, with the onset of symptoms occurring within 6 to 36 hours. The mashed potato was the most likely food source with an attack rate of 80.7% for those who consumed it versus 32.7% for those who did not (P <0.01). From the multivariate analysis, the mashed potato remained the only food item independently and significantly associated with infection, with a relative risk of infection 9.49 times those who did not consume it (95% CI, 2.73-32.97). Salmonella group E was cultured from 4 individuals. Although no specific contamination was identified, the mashed potato was stored for more than 5 hours before the last serving., Conclusion: Risk during preparation of large quantities of food should be identified a priori, and measures taken to reduce them, to prevent outbreaks.

Introduction: Singapore was substantially affected by three 20th Century pandemics. This study describes the course of the pandemics, and the preventive measures adopted., Materials and Methods: We reviewed and researched a wide range of material including peer-reviewed journal articles, Ministry of Health reports, Straits Settlements reports and newspaper articles. Monthly mortality data were obtained from various official sources in Singapore., Results: The 1918 epidemic in Singapore occurred in 2 waves--June to July, and October to November--resulting in up to 3500 deaths. The 1957 epidemic occurred in May, and resulted in widespread morbidity, with 77,000 outpatient attendances in government clinics alone. The 1968 epidemic occurred in August and lasted a few weeks, with outpatient attendances increasing by more than 65%. The preventive measures instituted by the Singapore government during the pandemics included the closure of schools, promulgation of public health messages, setting up of influenza treatment centres, and screening at ports. Students, businessmen and healthcare workers were all severely affected by the pandemics., Conclusions: Tropical cities should be prepared in case of a future pandemic. Some of the preventive measures used in previous pandemics may be applicable during the next pandemic.

Between 8 August and 9 October 2005, tropical Singapore experienced a national epidemic of acute viral conjunctivitis. We report the epidemiological and virological findings of outbreaks of viral conjunctivitis in military facilities during the same time period, and the outbreak control measures taken. Outbreaks of viral conjunctivitis were identified by medical officers in military medical facilities. Epidemiological and virological investigations were carried out, and a standard set of control measures was instituted for each outbreak upon detection. Eight outbreaks of viral conjunctivitis occurred in the time period, corresponding to the national outbreak. Delayed detection and institution of preventive measures during the outbreaks were associated with delayed effectiveness of the control measures. Every delay in outbreak detection by one day resulted in a delay in terminating the outbreak by 0.82 days (p = 0.01). Coxsackievirus A24 was identified from some of the conjunctival swab samples taken.

Tropical cities such as Singapore do not have well-defined influenza seasons but have not been spared from influenza pandemics. The 1918 epidemic in Singapore, which was then already a major global trading hub, occurred in 2 waves, June-July, and October-November, and resulted in > or = 2,870 deaths. The excess mortality rate was higher than that for industrialized nations in the Northern Hemisphere but lower than that for less industrialized countries in Asia and Africa. The 1957 epidemic occurred in May and resulted in widespread illness. The 1968 epidemic occurred in August and lasted a few weeks, again with widespread illness. Tropical cities may be affected early in a pandemic and have higher mortality rates. With the increase in travel and trade, a future pandemic may reach a globally connected city early and spread worldwide. Preparedness and surveillance plans must be developed to include the megacities of the tropical world.

We used a deterministic SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infectious-removed) meta-population model, together with scenario, sensitivity, and simulation analyses, to determine stockpiling strategies for neuraminidase inhibitors that would minimize absenteeism among healthcare workers. A pandemic with a basic reproductive number (R0) of 2.5 resulted in peak absenteeism of 10%. Treatment decreased peak absenteeism to 8%, while 8 weeks' prophylaxis reduced it to 2%. For pandemics with higher R0, peak absenteeism exceeded 20% occasionally and 6 weeks' prophylaxis reduced peak absenteeism by 75%. Insufficient duration of prophylaxis increased peak absenteeism compared with treatment only. Earlier pandemic detection and initiation of prophylaxis may render shorter prophylaxis durations ineffective. Eight weeks' prophylaxis substantially reduced peak absenteeism under a broad range of assumptions for severe pandemics (peak absenteeism > 10%). Small investments in treatment and prophylaxis, if adequate and timely, can reduce absenteeism among essential staff.

With the increasing concern of an imminent influenza pandemic, Singapore and many other countries have been developing preparedness plans. Influenza affects an estimated 20 percent of the population of Singapore annually, and local outbreaks can last for more than 12 weeks and occur at different periods of the year. The 1968 pandemic in Singapore had a clinical attack rate of about 20 percent and resulted in infections with fever that lasted up to five days. However, absenteeism from work due to seasonal influenza-like illnesses was estimated to be less than one day per person in Singapore. The next pandemic in Singapore is predicted to cause an average of 1,105 deaths and 3,338 hospitalisations, while a severe pandemic will cause more healthcare damage. Preventive strategies include national public health initiatives, vaccination, anti-viral therapy, and hygiene measures. To develop effective preparedness plans, it is important for healthcare workers to understand the disease's epidemiology, outcomes, and treatment and prevention strategies available.

We compared strategies for stock piling neuraminidase inhibitors to treat and prevent influenza in Singapore. Cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses, with Monte Carlo simulations, were used to determine economic outcomes. A pandemic in a population of 4.2 million would result in an estimated 525-1,775 deaths, 10,700-38,600 hospitalization days, and economic costs of 0.7 dollars to 2.2 billion Singapore dollars. The treatment-only strategy had optimal economic benefits: stock piles of antiviral agents for 40% of the population would save an estimated 418 lives and 414 million dollars, at a cost of 52.6 million dollars per shelf-life cycle of the stock pile. Prophylaxis was economically beneficial in high-risk subpopulations, which account for 78% of deaths, and in pandemics in which the death rate was >0.6%. Prophylaxis for pandemics with a 5% case-fatality rate would save 50,000 lives and 81 billion dollars. These models can help policymakers weigh the options for pandemic planning.