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Background: Intradermal administration of fractional inactivated poliovirus vaccine (fIPV) is a dose-sparing alternative to the intramuscular full dose. We aimed to compare the immunogenicity of two fIPV doses versus one IPV dose for routine immunisation, and also assessed the immunogenicity of an fIPV booster dose for an outbreak response., Methods: We did an open-label, randomised, controlled, inequality, non-inferiority trial in two clinics in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Healthy infants were randomly assigned at 6 weeks to one of four groups: group A received IPV at age 14 weeks and IPV booster at age 22 weeks; group B received IPV at age 14 weeks and fIPV booster at age 22 weeks; group C received IPV at age 6 weeks and fIPV booster at age 22 weeks; and group D received fIPV at 6 weeks and 14 weeks and fIPV booster at age 22 weeks. IPV was administered by needle-syringe as an intramuscular full dose (0·5 mL), and fIPV was administered intradermally (0·1 mL of the IPV formulation was administered using the 0·1 mL HelmJect auto-disable syringe with a Helms intradermal adapter). Both IPV and fIPV were administered on the outer, upper right thigh of infants. The primary outcome was vaccine response to poliovirus types 1, 2, and 3 at age 22 weeks (routine immunisation) and age 26 weeks (outbreak response). Vaccine response was defined as seroconversion from seronegative (<1:8) at baseline to seropositive (≥1:8) or four-fold increase in reciprocal antibody titres adjusted for maternal antibody decay and was assessed in the modified intention-to-treat population (infants who received polio vaccines per group assignment and polio antibody titre results to serotypes 1, 2, and 3 at 6, 22, 23, and 26 weeks of age). The non-inferiority margin was 12·5%. This trial is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, number NCT02847026., Findings: Between Sept 1, 2016 and May 2, 2017, 1076 participants were randomly assigned and included in the modified intention-to-treat analysis: 271 in Group A, 267 in group B, 268 in group C, and 270 in group D. Vaccine response at 22 weeks to two doses of fIPV (group D) was significantly higher (p<0·0001) than to one dose of IPV (groups A and B) for all three poliovirus serotypes: the type 1 response comprised 212 (79% [95% CI 73-83]) versus 305 (57% [53-61]) participants, the type 2 response comprised 173 (64% [58-70]) versus 249 (46% [42-51]) participants, and the type 3 response comprised 196 (73% [67-78]) versus 196 (36% [33-41]) participants. At 26 weeks, the fIPV booster was non-inferior to IPV (group B vs group A) for serotype 1 (-1·12% [90% CI -2·18 to -0·06]), serotype 2 (0·40%, [-2·22 to 1·42]), and serotype 3 (1·51% [-3·23 to -0·21]). Of 129 adverse events, 21 were classified as serious including one death; none were attributed to IPV or fIPV., Interpretation: fIPV appears to be an effective dose-sparing strategy for routine immunisation and outbreak responses., Funding: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Background: Monovalent type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (mOPV2) and inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) are used to respond to type 2 poliovirus outbreaks. We aimed to assess the effect of two mOPV2 doses on the type 2 immune response by varying the time interval between mOPV2 doses and IPV co-administration with mOPV2., Methods: We did a randomised, controlled, parallel, open-label, non-inferiority, inequality trial at two study clinics in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Healthy infants aged 6 weeks (42-48 days) at enrolment were randomly assigned (1:1:1:1) to receive two mOPV2 doses (each dose consisting of two drops [0·1 mL in total] of about 10 5 50% cell culture infectious dose of type 2 Sabin strain) at intervals of 1 week, 2 weeks, 4 weeks (standard or control group), or 4 weeks with IPV (0·5 mL of type 1 [Mahoney, 40 D-antigen units], type 2 [MEF-1, 8 D-antigen units], and type 3 [Saukett, 32 D-antigen units]) administered intramuscularly with the first mOPV2 dose. We used block randomisation, randomly selecting blocks of sizes four, eight, 12, or 16 stratified by study sites. We concealed randomisation assignment from staff managing participants in opaque, sequentially numbered, sealed envelopes. Parents and clinic staff were unmasked to assignment after the randomisation envelope was opened. Laboratory staff analysing sera were masked to assignment, but investigators analysing data and assessing outcomes were not. The primary outcome was type 2 immune response measured 4 weeks after mOPV2 administration. The primary modified intention-to-treat analysis included participants with testable serum samples before and after vaccination. A non-inferiority margin of 10% and p=0·05 (one-tailed) was used. This trial is registered at ClinicalTrials.gov, number NCT02643368, and is closed to accrual., Findings: Between Dec 7, 2015, and Jan 5, 2016, we randomly assigned 760 infants to receive two mOPV2 doses at intervals of 1 week (n=191), 2 weeks (n=191), 4 weeks (n=188), or 4 weeks plus IPV (n=190). Immune responses after two mOPV2 doses were observed in 161 (93%) of 173 infants with testable serum samples in the 1 week group, 169 (96%) of 177 in the 2 week group, and 176 (97%) of 181 in the 4 week group. 1 week and 2 week intervals between two mOPV2 doses were non-inferior to 4 week intervals because the lower bound of the absolute differences in the percentage of immune responses were greater than -10% (-4·2% [90% CI -7·9 to -0·4] in the 1 week group and -1·8% [-5·0 to 1·5] in the 2 week group vs the 4 week group). The immune response elicited by two mOPV2 doses 4 weeks apart was not different when IPV was added to the first dose (176 [97%] of 182 infants with IPV vs 176 [97%] of 181 without IPV; p=1·0). During the trial, two serious adverse events (pneumonia; one [1%] of 186 patients in the 1 week group and one [1%] of 182 in the 4 week group) and no deaths were reported; the adverse events were not attributed to the vaccines., Interpretation: Administration of mOPV2 at short intervals does not interfere with its immunogenicity. The addition of IPV to the first mOPV2 dose did not improve poliovirus type 2 immune response., Funding: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

In 1988, the World Health Assembly resolved to eradicate poliomyelitis worldwide (1). One of the main tools used in polio eradication efforts has been the live, attenuated, oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) (2), an inexpensive vaccine easily administered by trained volunteers. OPV might require several doses to induce immunity, but provides long-term protection against paralytic disease. Through effective use of OPV, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) has brought wild polioviruses to the threshold of eradication (1). However, OPV use, particularly in areas with low routine vaccination coverage, is associated with the emergence of genetically divergent vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) whose genetic drift from the parental OPV strains indicates prolonged replication or circulation (3). VDPVs can emerge among immunologically normal vaccine recipients and their contacts as well as among persons with primary immunodeficiencies (PIDs). Immunodeficiency-associated VDPVs (iVDPVs) can replicate for years in some persons with PIDs. In addition, circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) (3) can emerge in areas with low OPV coverage and can cause outbreaks of paralytic polio. This report updates previous summaries regarding VDPVs (4).

In 2015, wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission was identified in only Afghanistan and Pakistan (1). The widespread use of live, attenuated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) has been key in polio eradication efforts. However, OPV use, particularly in areas with low vaccination coverage, is associated with the low risk for emergence of vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPV), which can cause paralysis (2). VDPVs vary genetically from vaccine viruses and can cause outbreaks in areas with low vaccination coverage. Circulating VDPVs (cVDPVs) are VDPVs in confirmed outbreaks. Single VDPVs for which the origin cannot be determined are classified as ambiguous (aVDPVs), which can also cause paralysis. Among the three types of WPV, type 2 has been declared to be eradicated. More than 90% of cVDPV cases have been caused by type 2 cVDPVs (cVDPV2). Therefore, in April 2016, all OPV-using countries of the world are discontinuing use of type 2 Sabin vaccine by simultaneously switching from trivalent OPV (types 1, 2, and 3) to bivalent OPV (types 1 and 3) for routine and supplementary immunization. The World Health Organization recently broadened the definition of cVDPVs to include any VDPV with genetic evidence of prolonged transmission (i.e., >1.5 years) and indicated that any single VDPV2 event (a case of paralysis caused by a VDPV or isolation of a VDPV from an environmental specimen) should elicit a detailed outbreak investigation and local immunization response. A confirmed cVDPV2 detection should elicit a full poliovirus outbreak response that includes multiple supplemental immunization activities (SIAs); an aVDPV designation should be made only after investigation and response (3). Since 2005, there have been 1-8 cVDPV outbreaks and 3-12 aVDPV events per year. There are currently five active cVDPV outbreaks in Guinea, Laos, Madagascar, Myanmar, and Ukraine, and four other active VDPV events.

Since the World Health Assembly's 1988 resolution to eradicate poliomyelitis, one of the main tools of the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) has been the live, attenuated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV). OPV might require several doses to induce immunity but provides long-term protection against paralytic disease. Through effective use of OPV, GPEI has brought polio to the threshold of eradication. Wild poliovirus type 2 (WPV2) was eliminated in 1999, WPV3 has not been detected since November 2012, and WPV1 circulation appears to be restricted to parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, continued use of OPV carries two key risks. The first, vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) has been recognized since the early 1960s. VAPP is a very rare event that occurs sporadically when an administered dose of OPV reverts to neurovirulence and causes paralysis in the vaccine recipient or a nonimmune contact. VAPP can occur among immunologically normal vaccine recipients and their contacts as well as among persons who have primary immunodeficiencies (PIDs) manifested by defects in antibody production; it is not associated with outbreaks. The second, the emergence of genetically divergent, neurovirulent vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) was recognized more recently. Circulating VDPVs (cVDPVs) resemble WPVs and, in areas with low OPV coverage, can cause polio outbreaks. Immunodeficiency-associated VDPVs (iVDPVs) can replicate and be excreted for years in some persons with PIDs; GPEI maintains a registry of iVDPV cases. Ambiguous VDPVs (aVDPVs) are isolates that cannot be classified definitively. This report updates previous surveillance summaries and describes VDPVs detected worldwide during January 2014-March 2015. Those include new cVDPV outbreaks in Madagascar and South Sudan, and sharply reduced type 2 cVDPV (cVDPV2) circulation in Nigeria and Pakistan during the latter half of 2014. Eight newly identified persons in six countries were found to excrete iVDPVs, and a patient in the United Kingdom was still excreting iVDPV2 in 2014 after more than 28 years. Ambiguous VDPVs were found among immunocompetent persons and environmental samples in 16 countries. Because the large majority of VDPV case-isolates are type 2, WHO has developed a plan for coordinated worldwide withdrawal of trivalent (types 1, 2, and 3) OPV (tOPV) and replacement with bivalent (types 1 and 3) OPV (bOPV) in April 2016, preceded by introduction of at least 1 dose of injectable inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) into routine immunization schedules worldwide to maintain immunity to type 2 viruses.

Background: After 25 years without poliomyelitis cases caused by circulating wild poliovirus (WPV) in Israel, sewage sampling detected WPV type 1 (WPV1) in April 2013, despite high vaccination coverage with only inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) since 2005., Methods: We used a differential equation-based model to simulate the dynamics of poliovirus transmission and population immunity in Israel due to past exposure to WPV and use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in addition to IPV. We explored the influences of various immunization options to stop imported WPV1 circulation in Israel., Results: We successfully modeled the potential for WPVs to circulate without detected cases in Israel. Maintaining a sequential IPV/OPV schedule instead of switching to an IPV-only schedule in 2005 would have kept population immunity high enough in Israel to prevent WPV1 circulation. The Israeli response to WPV1 detection prevented paralytic cases; a more rapid response might have interrupted transmission more quickly., Conclusions: IPV-based protection alone might not provide sufficient population immunity to prevent poliovirus transmission after an importation. As countries transition to IPV in immunization schedules, they may need to actively manage population immunity and consider continued use of OPV, to avoid the potential circulation of imported live polioviruses before globally coordinated cessation of OPV use., (© The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Infectious Diseases Society of America. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Despite substantial progress, global polio eradication has remained elusive. Indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission in 4 endemic countries (Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, and Pakistan) persisted into 2010 and outbreaks from imported WPV continued. By 2013, most outbreaks in the interim were promptly controlled. The number of polio-affected districts globally has declined by 74% (from 481 in 2009 to 126 in 2013), including a 79% decrease in the number of affected districts in endemic countries (from 304 to 63). India is now polio-free. The challenges to success in the remaining polio-endemic countries include (1) threats to the security of vaccinators in each country and a ban on polio vaccination in areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan; (2) a risk of decreased government commitment; and (3) remaining surveillance gaps. Coordinated efforts under the International Health Regulations and efforts to mitigate the challenges provide a clear opportunity to soon secure global eradication., (Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Infectious Diseases Society of America 2014. This work is written by (a) US Government employee(s) and is in the public domain in the US.)

Background: Despite substantial progress toward eradication of poliomyelitis, the risk of poliomyelitis outbreaks resulting from virus importations into polio-free areas persists. We reviewed the changing epidemiology of outbreaks in the final stages of the eradication initiative., Methods: Available literature on outbreaks of poliomyelitis caused by wild polioviruses between 1996 and 2012 was reviewed., Results: During this period, there were 22 outbreaks involving 39 countries. Outbreaks ranged in size from 1 to 1335 cases. These outbreaks caused 4571 cases, representing 21% of all cases reported during this period. Five outbreaks involved multiple countries. In 76% of outbreaks (16/21) with a known age distribution, cases concentrated among children aged <5 years; in 19% (4/21), most cases were among adolescents and adults. The outbreaks among adolescents and adults were associated with higher case-fatality ratios, ranging from 12% in Albania in 1994 to 41% in the Republic of Congo in 2010. The majority of outbreaks were controlled within 6 months with oral poliovirus vaccine., Conclusions: Importations resulting in epidemic transmission of wild poliovirus caused thousands of cases of paralysis often in countries where poliomyelitis had not occurred for many years. The changing epidemiology, with cases and higher case-fatality ratios among adults, increased the severity of these outbreaks., (© The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Infectious Diseases Society of America. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Since 1988, when the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) began, the annual number of polio cases has decreased by >99%. Only three countries remain that have never interrupted wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission: Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Since 2001, outbreaks have occurred in 31 formerly polio-free counties in Africa, with outbreaks in 25 countries caused by WPV originating in Nigeria (2-4). After the declaration of the World Health Assembly of polio eradication as a programmatic emergency in 2012, efforts to identify areas at high risk for importation-associated outbreaks and to reduce that risk have been intensified. This report updates the 2013 assessment of the risk for outbreaks attributable to importation of poliovirus in 33 countries in Africa, using indicators of childhood susceptibility to poliovirus and proximity to countries currently affected by polio . From January 2013 to August 12, 2014, outbreaks occurred in five African countries. Four of the five (Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, and Somalia) have had recent transmission (cases within the previous 12 months). Based on the current risk assessment, 15 countries are considered to be at high risk for WPV outbreaks, five at moderate-to-high risk, seven at moderate risk, and six at low risk. In 15 of the 33 countries, less than half of the population resides in areas where surveillance performance indicators have met minimum targets. Enhanced, coordinated activities to raise childhood immunity are underway in 2014 to prevent additional WPV spread. Although substantial progress toward polio eradication has occurred in Nigeria, all African countries remain at risk for outbreaks as long as WPV continues to circulate anywhere on the continent.

Objectives: The United States eliminated indigenous wild polioviruses (WPVs) in 1979 and switched to inactivated poliovirus vaccine in 2000, which quickly ended all indigenous live poliovirus transmission. Continued WPV circulation and use of oral poliovirus vaccine globally allow for the possibility of reintroduction of these viruses. We evaluated the risk of a U.S. polio outbreak and explored potential vaccine needs for outbreak response., Methods: We synthesized information available on vaccine coverage, exemptor populations, and population immunity. We used an infection transmission model to explore the potential dynamics of a U.S. polio outbreak and potential vaccine needs for outbreak response, and assessed the impacts of heterogeneity in population immunity for two different subpopulations with potentially low coverage., Results: Although the risk of poliovirus introduction remains real, widespread transmission of polioviruses appears unlikely in the U.S., given high routine coverage. However, clusters of un- or underimmunized children might create pockets of susceptibility that could potentially lead to one or more paralytic polio cases. We found that the shift toward combination vaccine utilization, with limited age indications for use, and other current trends (e.g., decreasing proportion of the population with immunity induced by live polioviruses and aging of vaccine exemptor populations) might increase the vulnerability to poliovirus reintroduction at the same time that the ability to respond may decrease., Conclusions: The U.S. poliovirus vaccine stockpile remains an important resource that may potentially be needed in the future to respond to an outbreak if a live poliovirus gets imported into a subpopulation with low vaccination coverage.

Objective: To characterize the circumstances in which poliomyelitis occurred among three children in Bulgaria during 2001 and to describe the public health response., Methods: Bulgarian authorities investigated the three cases of polio and their contacts, conducted faecal and serological screening of children from high-risk groups, implemented enhanced surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis, and conducted supplemental immunization activities., Findings: The three cases of polio studied had not been vaccinated and lived in socioeconomically deprived areas of two cities. Four Roma children from the Bourgas district had antibody titres to serotype 1 poliovirus only, and wild type 1 virus was isolated from the faeces of two asymptomatic Roma children in the Bourgas and Sofia districts. Poliovirus isolates were related genetically and represented a single evolutionary lineage; genomic sequences were less than 90% identical to poliovirus strains isolated previously in Europe, but 98.3% similar to a strain isolated in India in 2000. No cases or wild virus isolates were found after supplemental immunization activities were launched in May 2001., Conclusions: In Bulgaria, an imported poliovirus was able to circulate for two to five months among minority populations. Surveillance data strongly suggest that wild poliovirus circulation ceased shortly after supplemental immunization activities with oral poliovirus vaccine were conducted.

After >10 years without detection of any cases of wild virus-associated poliomyelitis, a large outbreak of poliomyelitis occurred in Albania in 1996. A total of 138 paralytic cases occurred, of which 16 (12%) were fatal. The outbreak was due to wild poliovirus type 1, isolated from 69 cases. An attack rate of 10 per 100,000 population was observed among adults aged 19-25 years who were born during a time of declining wild poliovirus circulation and had been vaccinated with two doses of monovalent oral poliovirus vaccines (OPVs) that may have been exposed to ambient temperatures for prolonged periods. Control of the epidemic was achieved by two rounds of mass vaccination with trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine targeted to persons aged 0-50 years. This outbreak underscores the ongoing threat of importation of wild poliovirus into European countries, the importance of delivering potent vaccine through an adequate cold chain, and the effectiveness of national OPV mass vaccination campaigns for outbreak control.

From 1980 through 1989, 27,826 cases of pertussis were reported to the Centers for Disease Control, for an average annual crude incidence of 1.2 cases/100,000 population. The incidence of reported disease increased in all age groups during this period, but the increase was disproportionately large among adolescents and adults. Infants between 1 and 2 months of age were at highest risk for pertussis (average annual incidence, 62.8/100,000). Infants less than 2 months of age had the highest reported rates of pertussis-associated hospitalization (82%), pneumonia (25%), seizures (4%), encephalopathy (1%), and death (1%). Rates of complication were generally higher among unvaccinated children than among those who had received three or more doses of diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis vaccine; 64% of children 3 months to 4 years of age who had reported cases of pertussis had not been immunized appropriately for their age. Whereas control of pertussis in the United States may be further improved through increased levels of diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis vaccination among eligible infants and children, the use of acellular vaccines in adolescents and adults may also be needed to reduce the burden of pertussis in very young infants.

State immunization laws which exempt religious groups present difficult problems in disease control in measles epidemics. Two outbreaks are described, 136 cases in a college for Christian Scientists, and 51 cases associated with a camp attended by Christian Scientists. Control measures at the college included immunization and quarantine. An alternative strategy at the camp consisted of dispersal of exposed persons from the camp and their being quarantined in their home States. Three deaths (case-fatality ratio = 2.2 percent) were reported at the college; no serious complications were reported from the camp-associated epidemic. No transmission into the general community occurred in either epidemic. Public health officials are encouraged to be aware of the legal rights and obligations of religiously exempt groups so that outbreaks in these groups can be effectively controlled, even if standard immunization strategies are not possible. Early reporting and rapid case identification, investigation, and quarantine or vaccination procedures by public health workers are necessary for disease control in these settings.

From Jan 1 to Dec 31, 1983, 351 cases of pertussis were reported in Oklahoma. Overall, 59% of the cases were among children 3 months to 6 years of age, the target age group for pertussis vaccination; only 42% of the patients in this age group were appropriately immunized for age with diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and pertussis vaccine (DTP). A survey of 185 households in the neighborhoods of three cases found that only 65% of 57 children 3 months to 6 years of age were appropriately immunized for their age. Aggressive control of the outbreak was attempted in Oklahoma County with recommendations for widespread vaccination against pertussis. However, the effort failed to immunize 82% of the 931 children in the initial target group. Nonetheless, analysis of the reported cases suggested that less than one fourth of the cases were potentially preventable by a single additional dose of DTP, ie, in individuals 3 months to 6 years of age with a history of at least one prior dose of DTP who were not appropriately immunized for age. The optimal solution to outbreak control is outbreak prevention by ensuring that the maximal number of children younger than 7 years of age receive routine age-appropriate DTP vaccination.

To identify risk factors for pertussis in older age groups and to examine the effectiveness of erythromycin therapy and prophylaxis in reducing secondary spread, epidemiologic investigations of two outbreaks involving teenagers and adults were conducted. The first outbreak occurred in 1984 among residents of a facility for developmentally disabled persons (median age 17 years). Rates of culture-and/or serologically confirmed infection ranged from 6% to 91% in exposed wards (42% overall), with transmission continuing over a five-month period. Although residents age 10-19 years experienced the highest rates of infection, they were also more likely to be exposed compared with residents in other age groups. Infection rates were significantly lower on wards where erythromycin treatment and prophylaxis were initiated less than 2 weeks after onset of illness in the index case (overall attack rate = 16% vs. 75% in wards where more than 4 weeks had elapsed; p less than .0001). Early treatment with erythromycin was also effective in reducing pertussis severity. The second outbreak occurred over a six-month period among residents of a 3-county area in central Wisconsin in 1985, with adults accounting for 38% of 161 culture-positive cases. Exposure outside the home was the most important predictor of community-acquired infection (p less than .001), with adolescents being at higher risk than persons in other age groups (odds ratio 3.2; p less than .001).(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

During a pertussis outbreak in a facility for the developmentally disabled, culture- or direct fluorescent-antibody-confirmed cases were identified in 24 residents and 17 staff members; 38 (93%) were culture positive for Bordetella pertussis. An enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) was used to detect serum IgG and IgA to the filamentous hemagglutinin and lymphocytosis-promoting factor of B. pertussis. Using criteria from ELISA values, we identified an additional 83 residents and 28 staff members as seropositive. Among seropositive persons, antibody levels were elevated by the time of onset of respiratory symptoms and, in three of the four assays, remained elevated for 14 mo. In 44 seropositive persons tested within two weeks of onset of symptoms, 80% were culture positive, compared with 33% of 15 tested two to four weeks after onset (P = .003) and none of 15 tested more than four weeks after onset. The most specific (94%) clinical case definition identified only 41% of seropositive persons. Thus, ELISAs are important tools for individual diagnosis and epidemiological studies of pertussis.

In 1985, 69 secondary cases, all in one generation, occurred in an Illinois high school after exposure to a vigorously coughing index case. The school's 1,873 students had a pre-outbreak vaccination level of 99.7% by school records. The authors studied the mode of transmission and the risk factors for disease in this unusual outbreak. There were no school assemblies and little or no air recirculation during the schooldays that exposure occurred. Contact interviews were completed with 58 secondary cases (84%); only 11 secondary cases (19%) of these may have had exposure to the index case in the classrooms, buses, or out of school. With the use of the Reed-Frost epidemic model, only 22-65% of the secondary cases were likely to have had at least one person-to-person contact with the index case during class exchanges, suggesting that this mode of transmission alone could not explain this outbreak. A comparison of the first 45 cases and 90 matched controls suggested that cases were less likely than controls to have provider-verifiable school vaccination records (odds ratio (OR) = 8.1) and more likely to have been vaccinated at less than age 12 months (OR = 8.6) or at age 12-14 months (OR = 7.0). Despite high vaccination levels, explosive measles outbreaks may occur in secondary schools due to 1) airborne measles transmission, 2) high contact rates, 3) inaccurate school vaccination records, or 4) inadequate immunity from vaccinations at younger ages.

During an outbreak of pertussis in residents and staff of a facility for the developmentally disabled, 149 persons had laboratory evidence of Bordetella pertussis infection; 130 (87%) reported respiratory illness. Infection rates (IR) in affected wards ranged from 6% to 91%. Most residents were adolescents and adults and had received a full course of diphtheria-tetanus toxoids-pertussis (DTP) vaccine; IRs increased with increasing time after the last DTP dose in fully vaccinated residents. The IR was lower in residents on wards where erythromycin treatment/prophylaxis was started two or fewer weeks after the onset of illness in the first case on the ward (IR, 16%), compared with four or more weeks after onset (IR, 75%; P less than 10(-6)). Respiratory symptoms were milder in ill residents treated within seven days of onset of illness. Although B. pertussis transmission was substantial, erythromycin treatment of patients and prophylaxis of exposed persons was effective in decreasing transmission and disease severity. Carbamazepine toxicity occurred in seven (19%) of 37 residents when carbamazepine was administered with erythromycin.

FRom September 9, 1981 to January 5, 1982, a measles outbreak occurred in Warren County, Pennsylvania. The outbreak persisted for nine weeks following the implementation of a county-wide outbreak control program primarily consisting of identifying and vaccinating susceptible schoolchildren. Forty-six cases occurred among students more than two weeks after control program implementation. All 46 had a school record indicating adequate measles vaccination; 13 had been vaccinated at control program clinics by one jet-injector team (Team A). A seroprevalence survey demonstrated that persons vaccinated by Team a had a significantly higher rate of vaccination failure than children vaccinated by other teams (37.0% vs. 5.9%, p = 5.7 X 10(-7). A case-control study was undertaken to assess possible additional risk factors for developing measles. Individuals with measles were nine times more likely than control individuals to have records of measles immunization that could not be verified with providers or to have been vaccinated at 12 months of age. The most likely reasons that this outbreak was sustained among persons with adequate vaccination histories were: 1) impotent vaccines and/or improper vaccine administration techniques were used by one jet-injector team; 2) several persons with histories of adequate vaccination were really not adequately vaccinated; adn 3) a substantial number of persons had been vaccinated at 12 months of age. There is no evidence from this outbreak that transmission of measles can be sustained among the 2-10% of individuals expected to remain susceptible following a single appropriate measles vaccination.