Search

The status of disgust as a sociomoral emotion is debated. We conducted a stringent test of whether social stimuli (specifically, political outgroup members) can elicit physical disgust, as distinct from moral or metaphorical disgust. We employed stimuli (male faces) matched on baseline disgustingness, provided other ways for participants to express negativity toward outgroup members, and used concrete self-report measures of disgust, as well as a nonverbal measure (participants' facial expressions). Across three preregistered studies (total N = 915), we found that political outgroup members are judged to be "disgusting," although this effect is generally weaker for concrete self-report measures and absent for the nonverbal measure. This suggests that social stimuli are capable of eliciting genuine physical disgust, although it is not always outwardly expressed, and the strength of this result depends on the measures employed. We discuss implications of these results for research on sociomoral emotions and American politics.

The present studies examine developmental changes in the elicitors of disgust by examining adults' and children's ideas of what is disgusting. In three experiments, we asked adults and children between the ages of 3 and 12 to report what is "disgusting," what is "gross," or what might have caused someone to make a disgust face. In Study 1, parents of 3- to 12-year-old children ( n = 120) were asked what they thought was disgusting and what they thought their children would find disgusting and completed a picky eating questionnaire to examine the extent to which children's eating habits may be related to disgust. In Studies 2 and 3 ( n = 98 per study), children were asked what they thought was disgusting. In Study 3, children's parents also completed a questionnaire about their child's food pickiness. Typically eaten foods that were not contaminated or spoiled were frequently mentioned in all studies, both by children and their parents. There was considerable diversity in the disgust elicitors that were mentioned across participants, highlighting the importance of examining individual differences in the development of disgust. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Propaganda frequently leverages themes of dirtiness and disease to foster negative attitudes toward marginalized social groups. Although history suggests that this tactic is highly successful, empirical evidence is required to evaluate propaganda's potential efficacy. Inspired by previous evidence that children rapidly form attitudes about social groups, we conducted an exploratory investigation into whether 5- to 9-year-olds' (N = 48) judgments of novel foreign groups could be swayed by visually depicting one of these groups as disgusting in poster-sized illustrations. Across a wide battery of tasks, there was no clear indication that children readily internalize messages from propaganda in evaluating members of novel social groups. This finding held regardless of the type of disgustingness that was depicted in the propaganda, and generalized across the age range we investigated. Overall, our results are encouraging in a practical sense, suggesting that children are not easily swayed by negative misrepresentations of immigrants in propaganda. • We studied how negative depictions of immigrants shape 5- to 9-year-olds' biases. • Propaganda demeaning novel outgroups did not clearly impact children's attitudes. • Children's age did not influence their receptivity to disgust-eliciting propaganda. • There were no differences across three distinct portrayals of immigrants as gross. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evolutionary developmental psychology typically utilizes an evolutionary lens to explain various phenomena that occur throughout development. In this paper, I argue that the converse is also important: Developmental evidence can inform evolutionary theory. In particular, knowledge about the developmental origins of a psychological trait can be used to evaluate theoretical claims about its evolved function. I use the emotion of disgust as a case study to illustrate this approach. Disgust is commonly thought to be a behavioral adaptation for avoiding the ingestion of pathogens. Given this claim, disgust should be expected to develop at a time when humans are especially vulnerable to the dangers of ingesting pathogens, during the immediate post-weaning period from about 3 to 5 years of age. Despite a strong selective pressure at this point in development, research has suggested that the emotion of disgust and the recognition of the "disgust face" do not reliably emerge until later in ontogeny, at 5 years of age or after. Given the late developmental appearance of disgust, I re-evaluate claims about its adaptive role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights: [•] Suicide is unlike many immoral acts, which often involve harm to others. [•] Subjects read and evaluated obituaries describing victims of suicide or homicide. [•] Purity concerns and feelings of disgust account for moral judgments of suicide. [•] Harm-based concerns do not account for moral judgments of suicide, unlike homicide. [•] Explicit justifications do not reflect the underlying source of moral judgments. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The traditional cognitive developmental perspective on moral acquisition posits that children actively construct moral beliefs by assessing the negative impacts of antisocial behaviors. This account is not easily applied to actions that are considered immoral despite lacking consequences for others’ welfare. We studied the moralization of behaviors without tangible impacts, specifically examining the independent and joint roles of feelings and norms in children’s acquisition of purity-based morals. Seven-year-olds were shown pictures of anthropomorphic aliens engaged in unfamiliar activities and were asked to judge whether these actions were wrong or OK. Relative to a control condition matched for valence and informational complexity, children made elevated wrongness judgments when they were either disgusted or led to believe that the behaviors were unnatural. However, it was only in a condition that included both disgust induction and information about unnaturalness that children exhibited robust tendencies to judge the actions as wrong. This research therefore demonstrates that feelings and norms work in concert such that purity morals are most readily acquired when both factors are involved. The implications for accounts of moral development are discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Strohminger (2014) is revolted by McGinn’s (2011) book, The Meaning of Disgust. We argue that her reaction of repugnance highlights one of the greatest mysteries in the psychology of disgust: this emotion is at times elicited by abstract ideological concerns rather than physical threats of infection or contamination. Here we describe the theoretical challenge of accounting for nonpathogenic disgust elicitors, which include spiritual defilement, violations of the “natural order,” and, apparently, McGinn’s latest publication. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]