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The ne bis in idem principle (procedural defence) proscribes multiple criminal proceedings and punishments for the same criminal offence/conduct, which is predicated on a final verdict of acquittal or conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction. Incorporated as a fundamental human right through Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 annexed to the ECHR and fundamental right safeguarded through Article 50 CFR, the principle is conjoined with the right to free movement of persons through Article 54 CISA. An evaluation of the characteristics, substance, rationale, scope, and limitations associated with the autonomous procedural defence reveals corresponding purposes. CJEU and ECtHR jurisprudence have delineated the scope and limitations of the procedural defence and the two European courts have reciprocally influenced their respective case law. Definitive and practical judicial guidelines on the application of the principle facilitate consistency of approach by diverse national legal systems consistent with the principle of legality. The article provides an interpretative analysis of the procedural defence and associated jurisprudence of the two European courts that aim to ensure consistency of approach by national legal systems notwithstanding the applicability of the margin of appreciation and the principle of subsidiarity. The article concludeswith an evaluation of the narrow same criminal offence criterion (idem crimen) commensurate with broader proscribed conduct (idem factum) criterion that is pivotal to the application of the procedural defence and evidently the most litigated aspect of the ne bis in idem principle. The main issue causing tensions between the different streams of case law seems to be the question of the combination of distinct types of proceedings (administrative and criminal), and there is a reciprocal influence of the ECHR and CJEU on this issue.

Under the dual sovereignty doctrine the Supreme Court has accepted that different sovereigns may prosecute an individual for the same facts without violating the double jeopardy clause if the act of the individual infringed the laws of each sovereignty. This article aims to analyze the evolution of the dual sovereignty doctrine in the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States. Although the doctrine has been highly criticized by scholars, the Supreme Court has persistently upheld it. . Besides, the article addresses the safeguards that currently exist against eventual abuses of the dual sovereignty doctrine, such as the “sham exception” and the “Petite Policy”. Finally, since the previous safeguards have been considered insufficient, the contribution briefly explores the possibility of applying the Eighth Amendment as an additional protection against eventual abuses committed under the dual sovereignty doctrine., Bajo la doctrina de la soberanía dual, la Corte Suprema ha aceptado que diferentes soberanos persigan penalmente a la misma persona sin violar la cláusula double jeopardy por los mismos hechos si es que la conducta de tal individuo infringió las leyes de cada soberano. El presente artículo tiene por objeto estudiar la evolución de la doctrina de la soberanía dual en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Suprema. Además, el artículo aborda las protecciones actualmente existentes en contra de eventuales abusos que puedan ser cometidos bajo la doctrina de la soberanía dual, tales como la “sham exception” y la “Petite Policy”. Finalmente, y dado que las anteriores protecciones han sido consideradas insuficientes, el artículo explora brevemente la posibilidad de aplicar la Octava Enmienda como una protección adicional en contra de eventuales abusos que la aplicación de la doctrina de la soberanía dual pueda generar.

In the Unites States the existence of statutes that allow to declare forfeiture of the property used in certain prohibited ways in civil proceedings without the general safeguards of criminal law is an extended legal practice. This parallel law enforcement system, however, has raised several constitutional discussions. One of these debates concerns the compatibility of the parallel system with the double jeopardy clause: does the double jeopardy clause bar the government from bringing a civil forfeiture proceeding against a defendant that has previously been convicted in a criminal court for the same offence? The aim of the present article is studying the evolution of the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States on the constitutionality of parallel civil forfeiture proceedings and criminal prosecutions under the double jeopardy clause, analysing the current state of the jurisprudence and its possible further developments.Â

Aimed at establishing an effective and consistent enforcement of market abuse regulation, the regime introduced by Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 (‘MAR’) and Directive 2014/57/EU (‘MAD II’) relies on a mix of criminal penalties and administrative sanctions, both of which are subject to the principles of double jeopardy and due process. In the light of a few cases decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’), the features of this regime are, however, unclear, and it is doubtful whether the current framework is adequate to achieve its goals. This article criticizes the decision to criminalize market abuse at the EU level and argues that a credible EU supervisory system is better served by an enforcement system based on administrative sanctions. Moreover, the article discusses the solution offered by the ECtHR to the trade-off between efficiency and fairness in administrative proceedings and proposes an allocation of prosecution and decision-making to independent bodies within the same supervisory authority as a means to better balance efficiency and fairness.

This case note examines the Court of Justice of the European Union’s decision in WS (C-505/19) concerning the application of the ne bis in idem principle enshrined in Article 54 CISA and Article 50 Charter in the context of an Interpol red notice. It examines whether a person may be provisionally detained on the basis of a red notice in cases where investigation proceedings have previously been closed by a judicial decision. The case note closes with a commentary on the decision as well as an outlook for legal practitioners in the field., New Journal of European Criminal Law, vol. 13, no. 1, p. 91

In Gamble v. United States, the defendant questioned the constitutionality of the dual sovereignty doctrine under the double jeopardy clause. In its judgment, delivered on 17 June 2019, the United States Supreme Court upheld the application of the dual sovereignty doctrine, according to which different sovereigns may prosecute an individual without violating the double jeopardy clause if the individual's act infringed the laws of each sovereignty. This comment aims to address the reasoning of the Supreme Court and the rationale of the dual sovereignty doctrine, suggesting the convenience and necessity of a further study on its limits and possible safeguards against potential abuses. Resumen: En Gamble v. United States, el imputado cuestionó la constitucionalidad de la doctrina de la soberanía dual, en el contexto de la garantía non bis in ídem. En su sentencia, de 17 de junio de 2019, la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos confirmó la aplicación de la doctrina de la soberanía dual, conforme a la cual distintas soberanías pueden enjuiciar a una persona, sin violar el ne bis in idem, si la conducta del imputado infringió las leyes de cada una de ellas. El presente comentario tiene por objeto abordar el razonamiento de la Corte Suprema y el fundamento de la doctrina de la soberanía dual, abogando por la conveniencia y necesidad de un estudio profundizado sobre sus límites y posibles salvaguardias en contra de posibles abusos.

O presente estudo foi inspirado pela (atual) constata??o de que o Estado sanciona, o mesmo fato, m?ltiplas vezes: atrav?s do direito administrativo, cada vez mais sancionador, e atrav?s do direito penal, cada vez mais administrativizado. A doutrina e a jurisprud?ncia brasileiras, em raz?o de apego ao (contest?vel) mantra da independ?ncia entre as inst?ncias, n?o enfrentam o tema com a profundidade devida. Esta pesquisa busca, por isso e inicialmente, compreender o fen?meno da multiplicidade sancionat?ria estatal, bem como tra?ar a (dif?cil, mas necess?ria) distin??o entre o il?cito penal e o il?cito administrativo. Busca, na sequ?ncia e considerando o cen?rio jur?dico brasileiro, assentar pressupostos relacionados aos princ?pios do ne bis in idem e da proporcionalidade. Pretende, por fim (e como fim), responder a dois questionamentos. O primeiro: toda vez que o Estado sanciona, em raz?o do mesmo fato, m?ltiplas vezes, restar? violado o princ?pio do ne bis in idem? Antecipa-se, j? nestas breves linhas, a resposta: nem sempre. H? cumula??es sancionat?rias ileg?timas, mas h? cumula??es sancionat?rias leg?timas, elencando, o presente estudo, com base em decis?es de tribunais e cortes internacionais, crit?rios aptos a constatar dita (i)legitimidade. Adv?m, da primeira resposta, o segundo questionamento: toda vez que o Estado legitimamente sanciona, em raz?o do mesmo fato, m?ltiplas vezes, restar? violado o princ?pio da proporcionalidade? Mais uma vez estas breves linhas antecipam a resposta: o autom?tico e impensado c?mulo sancionat?rio - advindo de inst?ncias diversas ? viola, sim, a proporcionalidade, raz?o pela qual ? urgente n?o apenas atentar para o conjunto sancionat?rio estatal aplic?vel ao mesmo fato, bem como indicar (concretos) caminhos para a que a aplica??o de san??es m?ltiplas alcance a irrenunci?vel proporcionalidade. ? o que o presente estudo busca realizar. This study has been inspired by the (current) ascertainment that the State sanctions the same fact multiple times: through both administrative law, which has become more sanctioning in recent years, and criminal law itself, which in turn has acquired more and more characteristics of administrative law. Due to their attachment to the (debatable) mantra of independence between the different instances, both Brazilian doctrine and jurisprudence do not tackle the topic with due diligence. Therefore, the aim of this research is to understand the phenomenon of the State?s sanctioning multiplicity ? known in the United States as the ?piling on? of fines and penalties ? as well as draw the (difficult, but necessary) distinction between a criminal offense and an administrative offense. Afterwards, not without taking into consideration the Brazilian legal scenario, the focus will be shifted to settling presuppositions related to the principles of ne bis in idem (double jeopardy) and proportionality. Finally, and as a means to an end, the answers to two questions will be provided, the first one being: whenever the State sanctions, due to the same fact, multiple times, will the principle of ne bis in idem be violated? The answer to this inquiry can be provided, briefly, in this very abstract: not always. There are illegitimate sanctioning cumulations, but there are also legitimate ones. This research lists, based on decisions of international tribunals and courts, criteria apt to verify said (il)legitimacy. From the answer to the first question comes the second one: whenever the State rightfully sanctions, due to the same fact, multiple times, will the principle of proportionality be violated? Once again, the question can be briefly answered in this summary: the automatic and unadvised overlaid sanctioning ? coming from all instances ? does violate the principle of proportionality, thus making it urgent not only to focus on the applicable state sanctioning set to the same fact, but also to indicate (concrete) ways for the application of multiple sanctions to achieve unavoidable proportionality. These are the aims and objectives of this research. Este an?lisis ha sido inspirado por la actual constataci?n de que el Estado sanciona el mismo facto m?ltiples veces: a trav?s del derecho administrativo, cada vez m?s sancionador y tambi?n a trav?s del derecho penal, que se encuentra m?s y m?s lleno de elementos del derecho administrativo. La doctrina y la jurisprudencia brasile?as, por apego al (discutible) mantra de la independencia entre las instancias, no lo enfrentan al tema con la hondura que se hace necesaria. Esa b?squeda ambiciona, por eso e inicialmente, comprender el fen?meno de la multiplicidad sancionatoria estatal, bien como trazar la (dif?cil, pero necesaria) diferencia entre el delito penal y la infracci?n administrativa. En seguida se busca tambi?n, llevando en cuenta el escenario jur?dico brasile?o, asentar suposiciones relacionadas a los principios del ne bis in idem y de la proporcionalidad. Pretende, por fin (y como fin), contestar a dos cuestionamientos. El primer: todas las veces que el Estado sanciona, por el mismo fato, m?ltiples veces, ?quedar? violado el principio del ne bis in idem? Se anticipa, ya en estas breves l?neas, la respuesta: ni siempre. Hay acumulaciones sancionatorias ileg?timas, pero hay asimismo acumulaciones sancionatorias leg?timas, listando este estudio, al mismo rato que se basa en decisiones de cortes y tribunales internacionales, criterios capaces de constatar supuesta (i)legitimidad. De la respuesta de la primera pregunta surge la segunda: todas las veces que el Estado sanciona, por el mismo fato, m?ltiples veces, ?quedar? violado el principio de la proporcionalidad? Una vez m?s, en estas breves l?neas, se anticipa la respuesta a la pregunta: el maquinal e impensado c?mulo sancionatorio ? viniendo de instancias diversas ? quebranta, s?, la proporcionalidad, raz?n por la cual es urgente no solo prestar atenci?n en el conjunto sancionatorio estatal aplicable al mismo fato, como tambi?n indicar caminos (concretos) para que la aplicaci?n de sanciones m?ltiples alcance la irrenunciable proporcionalidad. Eso es lo que este estudio ambiciona alcanzar. Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior - CAPES

It is sure that the ne bis in idem constitutes a fundamental right, protected by a plurality of national (article 649 of the Italian Criminal Procedure Code) and European rules (article 50 CDFUE and article 4 protocol n. 7 ECHR). However, precisely the “multilevel protection” of fundamental rights that characterizes the Italian system risks - paradoxically - to become an obstacle to the wider operation of the guarantee. The provisions that identify the content of the double jeopardy both at national and European level are based upon different concept (identity of the fact; identity of the offence), with a negative effect about the identification of the objective limits of the ne bis in idem. At the same time, the interpretation of the same provisions by the national judges, ordinary and constitutional, and by the Supranational Courts makes the boundaries of the ne bis in idem generated by a final decision even more uncertain. We refer to the hypotheses in which the ne bis in idem is linked with “parallel proceedings”, where the same fact is sanctioned both by penal and administrative dispositions. The reconstruction of the guarantee provided for by the art. 649 of the Italian Criminal Procedure Code shall strengthen the legality principle and the implies, therefore, on one hand, to reconsider the sameness of the object of the different proceedings; on the other hand, to avoid casuistic solutions, in contrast with to the legality principle, about the duplication of the different proceedings having the same object., È assunto consolidato che il ne bis in idem costituisca un diritto fondamentale, protetto da una pluralità di fonti nazionali (art. 649 c.p.p.) e sovranazionali europee (art. 50 CDFUE e 4 prot. n. 7 CEDU). Sennonché, proprio la “tutela multilivello” dei diritti fondamentali che connota l’ordinamento italiano rischia – paradossalmente – di trasformarsi in un ostacolo alla più ampia operatività della garanzia. Le previsioni che individuano i presupposti della garanzia sul piano nazionale e su quello europeo si caratterizzano per un contenuto eterogeneo (identità del fatto; identità dell’infrazione), destinato ad incidere negativamente sull’individuazione della portata oggettiva del divieto di secondo giudizio. D’altra parte, l’interpretazione delle medesime previsioni da parte della giurisprudenza nazionale, ordinaria e costituzionale, e delle Corti sovranazionali rende ancor più incerti i confini dell’effetto preclusivo generato da una decisione irrevocabile. Si allude, in modo particolare, alle ipotesi in cui il ne bis in idem venga in gioco in relazione al “doppio binario sanzionatorio”, in forza del quale un medesimo fatto viene sanzionato, al contempo, sul terreno penale e su quello amministrativo. La ricostruzione della portata di garanzia assegnata all’art. 649 c.p.p. deve muovere dalla valorizzazione del principio di legalità processuale e implica, dunque, da un lato, di ricondurre a unità il presupposto rappresentato dalla medesimezza dell’oggetto dei diversi procedimenti; dall’altro, di scongiurare soluzioni casistiche, contrarie al principio di legalità, in rapporto al presupposto della duplicazione dei diversi procedimenti aventi il medesimo oggetto., É premissa consolidada que o ne bis in idem constitua um direito fundamental, protegido por uma pluralidade de fontes nacionais (art. 649 do c.p.p. italiano) e supranacionais (art. 50 CDFUE e 4° protocolo CEDH). Entretanto, exatamente a “tutela multinível” dos direitos fundamentais que caracteriza o ordenamento italiano – paradoxalmente – corre o risco de se transformar em um obstáculo à mais ampla operabilidade dessa garantia. Ademais, nos panoramas italiano e europeu, as previsões que especificam os pressupostos para a aplicabilidade dessa garantia se caracterizam por um conteúdo heterogêneo (identidade do fato; identidade da infração), destinado a incidir negativamente sobre a definição da perspectiva objetiva da proibição de dupla persecução. Por outro lado, a interpretação das mesmas previsões por parte da jurisprudência italiana, ordinária e constitucional, e pelas Cortes supranacionais torna ainda mais incertos os confins do efeito preclusivo gerado por uma decisão irrevogável. Em particular, alude-se as hipóteses em que o ne bis in idem entre em jogo em relação ao “duplo binário sancionatório”, por força do qual o mesmo fato é sancionado, contemporaneamente, em campo penal e em campo administrativo. A reconstrução da perspectiva da garantia atribuída ao art. 649 do c.p.p. italiano deve partir da valorização do princípio de legalidade processual e implica, portanto, por um lado, a recondução da unidade do pressuposto representado pelo mesmo objeto dos diferentes procedimentos; por outro lado, evitar soluções casuísticas, contrárias ao princípio de legalidade, em relação ao pressuposto da duplicação dos diferentes procedimentos que se refiram ao mesmo fato.

Článek se zabývá trestněprávním pojmem skutku, zásadou zachování totožnosti skutku v trestním řízení a otázkami pokračování v trestném činu. Podává analýzu odborných názorů, jež se uplatňovaly v československé právní nauce od konce 50. let 20. století. Zejména se zabývá diskusí mezi Antonínem Růžkem, Vladimírem Solnařem, Vojtěchem Přichystalem a Aloisem Burdou. Pojem skutku je zásadní i pro otázku pokračujících deliktů, jejichž dílčí útoky prohlašuje § 12 odst. 12 trestního řádu, zákon č. 141/1961 Sb., za samostatné skutky. Z hledisek hmotněprávních jde o trestný čin jediný. Autoři poukazují na proměny názorů teorie a rozhodovací praxe v sousedním Německu a Rakousku, kde byla koncepce pokračujícího trestného činu v nedávné době opuštěna. The article deals with the criminal-law concept of an act, the principle of preserving the identity of an act in criminal proceedings, and the issue of continued criminal offence. It provides an analysis of the expert opinions applied in the Czechoslovak legal doctrine from the late 1950s. The article namely focuses on the discussion among Antonín Růžek, Vladimír Solnař, Vojtěch Přichystal, and Alois Burda. The concept of an act is essential also with respect to continuing torts, the partial attacks of which are deemed individual acts according to Section 12(12) of Act No. 141/1961 Coll., the Code of Criminal Procedure. From the perspective of substantive law, the same constitutes a single criminal offence. The authors point to the changing views in theoretical and decision-making practice in neighbouring Germany and Austria where the concept of a continuing criminal offence was recently abandoned.

This paper demonstrates the interest which a victim of a transnational crime may have in moving proceedings across the border. It also considers the means with which this can be done. By virtue of the passive personality principle, a Swiss victim can move proceedings back to Switzerland for a civil claim which would not otherwise have a forum in Switzerland. Further, it is suggested that there is a conflict between the passive personality principle and the prohibition of double jeopardy. This paper argues for a restrictive interpretation of the passive personality principle and a broadening of the principle of ne bis in idem .

The paper portrays the new European Union extradition system, established by the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States of 2002. In the introductory remarks, the author explains the formation and development of the traditional extradition procedure, depicts relevant legal sources, and points to its flaws, which boil down to tardiness and inefficiency. The main author's standpoint is that the European arrest warrant is based on mutual trust in the member-states' legal systems, and that it depoliticizes the extradition procedure by transforming interstate cooperation into cooperation between member - states' law enforcement authorities. On these grounds, the author determines the nature of this new legal institute, that introduces radical changes into the paradigm of the classical extradition, and explains its main features as well as the scope of application. Further on, the paper explores the conditions for issuance of the European arrest warrant, which are proscribed by negative formulations - as absolute and relative obstacles for extradition. Finally, the author explains the standardized formal elements of the European arrest warrant content, which should make its application easier and more expeditious.

Because of its mandate and its enforcement powers, the ICC has been hailed as a major advance on the road towards individual accountability for the perpetration of the most heinous violations of human rights (international crimes) and thus as a major contribution to the prevention of such horrible crimes. However, with its limited resources in terms of human and financial means, the ICC will not be able to deal with all perpetrators of the crimes that come under its jurisdiction wherever such crimes are committed throughout the world. For this reason, in order to end impunity in the commission of international crimes, there will always be a need for combined efforts by the ICC and national courts. This reality is recognised by the Rome Statute which, in the preamble and article 1 of the Statute, provides that the jurisdiction of the ICC is “complementary” to national courts and that, therefore, States Parties retain the primary responsibility for the repression of international crimes. In legal literature, this is generally referred to as the “principle of complementarity” or the “complementarity regime of the Rome Statute”. In order to give effect to the complementarity principle of the Rome Statute, South Africa passed the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 (hereafter the Implementation Act); which determines the modalities of prosecuting perpetrators of the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in South African courts. The Implementation Act also provides that South African courts will have jurisdiction over these crimes not only when they are committed on South African territory but also when they are committed outside the Republic, thus empowering South African courts to exercise “universal jurisdiction” over these three international crimes. This thesis examines the extent to which South African courts, acting under the complementarity regime of the Rome Statute are, or are not, allowed to exercise universal jurisdiction over international crimes committed in foreign States. The study is based on two assumptions. First, it is assumed that since under the principle of complementarity South African courts are required to do the same job as the ICC, they should have the same powers as those States Parties gave to the ICC when they adopted the Rome Statute. Secondly, it is assumed that, although having the same mandate as the ICC in terms of the complementarity principle, South African courts are nonetheless domestic courts as opposed to the ICC which is an international court and that, accordingly, the international law principle of State sovereignty may impose limitations on their ability to exercise universal jurisdiction over international crimes committed in foreign States. In the light of the above assumptions, this study investigates three issues. Firstly, do South African courts have the same powers as the ICC has to disregard immunities of foreign States’ officials which, under international customary law, attach to their functions or status? Secondly, are South African courts entitled, as the ICC is, to disregard amnesties granted by foreign States, either in the process of national reconciliation or as means to shield the criminals from prosecution by the ICC? Finally, are South African courts entitled, as the ICC is, to retry a case which has already been tried in a foreign country but with the aim of shielding the accused from criminal responsibility or where, for example, the sentence imposed was too lenient in comparison with the gravity of the crime? PhD (Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

The primary aim of the article is to examine the sum of the three Swedish judgments of 2013 that was handed down after the ECJ's judgment in the Åkerberg Fransson-case. The examination is done against the backdrop of the legal developments preceding these judgments, with a particular attention to how different layers of law are perceived and given effect in the national legal order.

Citizens and companies globalize: they are increasingly making use of their rights to free movement, to free settlement, to offer services and goods, to realize financial transactions, etc. Enforcement systems, including the criminal justice system, have to follow suit. They are obliged to go abroad to gather evidence, for the detention and extradition or surrender of suspects, to confiscate assets, to deal with conflicts of jurisdiction and the choice of allocating a criminal investigation and adjudication. Globalizing criminal justice systems increases the risk of double prosecution and/or double punishment. Do (legal) persons have the (fundamental) right not to be prosecuted or punished twice for the same facts in a globalizing and integrating world. Are they protected against these forms of double jeopardy in settings of transnational criminal justice, such as for instance in the EU area of freedom, security and justice? Does the ne bis in idem principle have a transnational reach? If so, what does this mean and what are the obstacles and exceptions thereto? In posing these questions, this article asks whether a (legal) person can derive a right to transnational protection in the area of freedom, security and justice from the different sources of ne bis in idem obligations in domestic law, in public international law (human rights law and mutual legal assistance) and in EU law. By analysing these sources and the case law thereon, I come to the conclusion that (legal) persons are unprotected against transnational double jeopardy, with the exception of the transnational ne bis in idem in the EU area of freedom, security and justice. However, even in the case of the latter exceptions, derogations, reservations and draw back interpretations based on national sovereignty undermine the rationale and scope of a real transnational ne bis in idem principle in a common space of transnational criminal justice.

Krajem prošloga i početkom ovoga stoljeća u Engleskoj je provedena velika reforma prava obnove kaznenoga postupka. Napuštena je višestoljetna tradicija zabrane obnove kaznenoga postupka na štetu oslobođene osobe i uspostavljena vrlo značajna iznimka od u common law sustavima tradicionalne zaštite protiv double jeopardy. Novo se rješenje sastoji u dopuštanju obnove kaznenoga postupka samo za tzv. kataloška kaznena djela i to pod strogo propisanim uvjetima, a što predstavlja svojevrsno srednje rješenje u odnosu na uobičajene stavove zakonodavstava u pogledu dopuštanja primjene ovoga instituta na štetu oslobođene osobe. U radu se prvo iznose argumentirani prigovori koji se tradicionalno upućuju dopuštanju obnove na štetu oslobođene osobe te razlozi koji snažno idu u prilog dopuštanju takve obnove, nakon čega slijedi detaljan prikaz razloga i sadržaja reforme., A great reform of right to renewal of criminal procedure was carried out in England by the end of the last and the beginning of this century. A centuries-old tradition of injunction to renewal of criminal procedure to the detriment of the acquitted person was abandoned and a significant exception to the common law systems of traditional protection against double jeopardy was established. The new solution comprises permission to a renewal of criminal procedure only for the so called registered criminal offences and this according to strictly regulated terms and thus representing a specific solution in relation to common legislative standpoints regarding permission to implement this institute to the detriment of the acquitted. The paper conveys complaints that are traditionally lodged against the renewal permission to the detriment of the acquitted and reasons strongly supporting renewal alowance followed by a detailed reform reasons and content survey., Ende des vorigen und anfang dieses Jahrhunderts wurde in England eine umfangreiche Reform des Wiederaufnahmerechts durchgeführt. Die mehrhundertjärige Tradition des Verbots der Wierderaufnahme des Strafverfahrens zu Ungunsten des Freigesprochenen wurde verlassen und eine wichtige Ausnahme von dem innerhalb von Common law-Systemen verankerten Schutz gegen double jeopardy hergestellt. Die neue Lösung besteht in der Zulassung des Wiederaufnahmeverfahrens nur für die sog. katalogiesierten Straftaten, und zwar unter streng vorgeschriebenen Voraussetzungen, was eigentlich eine eigentümliche mittlere Lösung in Bezug auf die üblichen Auffassungen der Gesetzgebung hinsichtlich der Zulassung der Anwendung dieses Instituts zu Ungunsten des Freigesprochenen darstellt. In der Arbeit werden zunächst die argumentierten Einwände vorgetragen, die traditionell gegen die Zulassung der Wiederaufnahme zu Ungunsten des Freigelassenen gerichtet werden, sowie die Gründe, die die Zulassung solcher Wiederaufnahme befürworten, wonach eine detailreiche Darstellung der Gründe und des Inhalts der Reform folgt.