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The idea that dreaming can serve as a model for psychosis has a long and honourable tradition, however it is notoriously speculative. Here we demonstrate that recent research on the phenomenon of lucid dreaming sheds new light on the debate. Lucid dreaming is a rare state of sleep in which the dreamer gains insight into his state of mind during dreaming. Recent electroencephalogram (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data for the first time allow very specific hypotheses about the dream-psychosis relationship: if dreaming is a reasonable model for psychosis, then insight into the dreaming state and insight into the psychotic state should share similar neural correlates. This indeed seems to be the case: cortical areas activated during lucid dreaming show striking overlap with brain regions that are impaired in psychotic patients who lack insight into their pathological state. This parallel allows for new therapeutic approaches and ways to test antipsychotic medication., (Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Dreaming has fascinated and mystified humankind for ages: the bizarre and evanescent qualities of dreams have invited boundless speculation about their origin, meaning and purpose. For most of the twentieth century, scientific dream theories were mainly psychological. Since the discovery of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, the neural underpinnings of dreaming have become increasingly well understood, and it is now possible to complement the details of these brain mechanisms with a theory of consciousness that is derived from the study of dreaming. The theory advanced here emphasizes data that suggest that REM sleep may constitute a protoconscious state, providing a virtual reality model of the world that is of functional use to the development and maintenance of waking consciousness.

Study Objectives: The goal of the study was to seek physiological correlates of lucid dreaming. Lucid dreaming is a dissociated state with aspects of waking and dreaming combined in a way so as to suggest a specific alteration in brain physiology for which we now present preliminary but intriguing evidence. We show that the unusual combination of hallucinatory dream activity and wake-like reflective awareness and agentive control experienced in lucid dreams is paralleled by significant changes in electrophysiology., Design: 19-channel EEG was recorded on up to 5 nights for each participant. Lucid episodes occurred as a result of pre-sleep autosuggestion., Setting: Sleep laboratory of the Neurological Clinic, Frankfurt University., Participants: Six student volunteers who had been trained to become lucid and to signal lucidity through a pattern of horizontal eye movements., Measurements and Results: Results show lucid dreaming to have REM-like power in frequency bands delta and theta, and higher-than-REM activity in the gamma band, the between-states-difference peaking around 40 Hz. Power in the 40 Hz band is strongest in the frontal and frontolateral region. Overall coherence levels are similar in waking and lucid dreaming and significantly higher than in REM sleep, throughout the entire frequency spectrum analyzed. Regarding specific frequency bands, waking is characterized by high coherence in alpha, and lucid dreaming by increased delta and theta band coherence. In lucid dreaming, coherence is largest in frontolateral and frontal areas., Conclusions: Our data show that lucid dreaming constitutes a hybrid state of consciousness with definable and measurable differences from waking and from REM sleep, particularly in frontal areas.

Many previous observers have reported some qualitative similarities between the normal mental state of dreaming and the abnormal mental state of psychosis. Recent psychological, tomographic, electrophysiological, and neurochemical data appear to confirm the functional similarities between these 2 states. In this study, the hypothesis of the dreaming brain as a neurobiological model for psychosis was tested by focusing on cognitive bizarreness, a distinctive property of the dreaming mental state defined by discontinuities and incongruities in the dream plot, thoughts, and feelings. Cognitive bizarreness was measured in written reports of dreams and in verbal reports of waking fantasies in 30 schizophrenics and 30 normal controls. Seven pictures of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) were administered as a stimulus to elicit waking fantasies, and all participating subjects were asked to record their dreams upon awakening. A total of 420 waking fantasies plus 244 dream reports were collected to quantify the bizarreness features in the dream and waking state of both subject groups. Two-way analysis of covariance for repeated measures showed that cognitive bizarreness was significantly lower in the TAT stories of normal subjects than in those of schizophrenics and in the dream reports of both groups. The differences between the 2 groups indicated that, under experimental conditions, the waking cognition of schizophrenic subjects shares a common degree of formal cognitive bizarreness with the dream reports of both normal controls and schizophrenics. Though very preliminary, these results support the hypothesis that the dreaming brain could be a useful experimental model for psychosis.

Thinking is known to be state dependent but a systematic study of how thinking in dreams differs from thinking while awake has not been done. The study consisted of analyzing the dream reports of 26 subjects who, in addition to providing dream reports also provided answers to questions about their thinking within the dream. Our hypothesis was that thinking in dreams is not monolithic but has two distinct components, one that is similar to wake-state cognition, and another that is fundamentally different. We found that cognition within a dream scenario was similar to that of wake-state cognition, but that thinking about the scenario itself was deficient and very different than wake-state thinking.

The activity that takes place in memory systems during sleep is likely to be related to the role of sleep in memory consolidation and learning, as well as to the generation of dream hallucinations. This study addressed the often-stated hypothesis that replay of whole episodic memories contributes to the multimodal hallucinations of sleep. Over a period of 14 days, 29 subjects kept a log of daytime activities, events, and concerns, wrote down any recalled dreams, and scored the dreams for incorporation of any waking experiences. While 65% of a total of 299 sleep mentation reports were judged to reflect aspects of recent waking life experiences, the episodic replay of waking events was found in no more than 1-2% of the dream reports. This finding has implications for understanding the unique memory processing that takes place during the night and is consistent with evidence that sleep has no role in episodic memory consolidation.

This study investigated the relationship between dream emotion and dream character identification. Thirty-five subjects provided 320 dream reports and answers to questions on characters that appeared in their dreams. We found that emotions are almost always evoked by our dream characters and that they are often used as a basis for identifying them. We found that affection and joy were commonly associated with known characters and were used to identify them even when these emotional attributes were inconsistent with those of the waking state. These findings are consistent with the finding that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, associated with short-term memory, is less active in the dreaming compared to the wake brain, while the paleocortical and subcortical limbic areas are more active. The findings are also consistent with the suggestion that these limbic areas have minimal input from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the dreaming brain., (Copyright 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).)

Dreams and psychosis share several important features regarding symptoms and underlying neurobiology, which is helpful in constructing a testable model of, for example, schizophrenia and delirium. The purpose of the present communication is to discuss two major concepts in dreaming and psychosis that have received much attention in the recent literature: insight and dissociation. Both phenomena are considered functions of higher order consciousness because they involve metacognition in the form of reflective thought and attempted control of negative emotional impact. Insight in dreams is a core criterion for lucid dreams. Lucid dreams are usually accompanied by attempts to control the dream plot and dissociative elements akin to depersonalization and derealization. These concepts are also relevant in psychotic illness. Whereas insightfulness can be considered innocuous in lucid dreaming and even advantageous in psychosis, the concept of dissociation is still unresolved. The present review compares correlates and functions of insight and dissociation in lucid dreaming and psychosis. This is helpful in understanding the two concepts with regard to psychological function as well as neurophysiology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues both rapid eye movement (REM) and non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep contribute to overnight episodic memory processes but their roles differ. Episodic memory may have evolved from memory for spatial navigation in animals and humans. Equally, mnemonic navigation in world and mental space may rely on fundamentally equivalent processes. Consequently, the basic spatial network characteristics of pathways which meet at omnidirectional nodes or junctions may be conserved in episodic brain networks. A pathway is formally identified with the unidirectional, sequential phases of an episodic memory. In contrast, the function of omnidirectional junctions is not well understood. In evolutionary terms, both animals and early humans undertook tours to a series of landmark junctions, to take advantage of resources (food, water and shelter), whilst trying to avoid predators. Such tours required memory for emotionally significant landmark resource-place-danger associations and the spatial relationships amongst these landmarks. In consequence, these tours may have driven the evolution of both spatial and episodic memory. The environment is dynamic. Resource-place associations are liable to shift and new resource-rich landmarks may be discovered, these changes may require re-wiring in neural networks. To realise these changes, REM may perform an associative, emotional encoding function between memory networks, engendering an omnidirectional landmark junction which is instantiated in the cortex during NREM Stage 2. In sum, REM may preplay associated elements of past episodes (rather than replay individual episodes), to engender an unconscious representation which can be used by the animal on approach to a landmark junction in wake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the Cartesian theatre as a metaphor for the virtual reality models that the brain uses to make inferences about the world. This treatment derives from our attempts to understand dreaming and waking consciousness in terms of free energy minimization. The idea here is that the Cartesian theatre is not observed by an internal (homuncular) audience but furnishes a theatre in which fictive narratives and fantasies can be rehearsed and tested against sensory evidence. We suppose the brain is driven by the imperative to infer the causes of its sensory samples; in much the same way as scientists are compelled to test hypotheses about experimental data. This recapitulates Helmholtz's notion of unconscious inference and Gregory treatment of perception as hypothesis testing. However, we take this further and consider the active sampling of the world as the gathering of confirmatory evidence for hypotheses based on our virtual reality. The ensuing picture of consciousness (or active inference) resolves a number of seemingly hard problems in consciousness research and is internally consistent with current thinking in systems neuroscience and theoretical neurobiology. In this formalism, there is a dualism that distinguishes between the (conscious) process of inference and the (material) process that entails inference. This separation is reflected by the distinction between beliefs (probability distributions over hidden world states or res cogitans) and the physical brain states (sufficient statistics or res extensa) that encode them. This formal approach allows us to appeal to simple but fundamental theorems in information theory and statistical thermodynamics that dissolve some of the mysterious aspects of consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dream thought is both impoverished and non-logical. While some inferential reasoning is present in dreaming, many illogicalities that would demand cognitive attention during waking go unnoticed during sleep. The physiological basis of this illogicality may include frontal lobe inactivation and amionergic demodulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bill Domhoff (2005) has challenged the activation synthesis model of dreaming on the basis of a misreading of the neurobiological literature and an individualistic view of dream psychology. The author begins his reply by clarifying and emphasizing the formal approach to dream cognitions. Instead of focusing on the individual aspects of dreaming that interest Domhoff activation synthesis strives to identify and measure the generic differences that characterize all dreams and that are likely to correlate with the neurobiological findings. He then goes on to point out that such formal features as the visuomotor imagery, the emotional intensification, and the defective cognition of dreams do correlate with the cellular and molecular neurobiological data from animal studies and with the brain imaging and lesion data from human studies. individual differences may also exist but these are not relevant to the main task of sleep psychophysiology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dreaming consciousness can be quite different from waking consciousness and this difference must depend upon the underlying neurobiology. Our approach is to infer the underlying brain basis for this difference by studying dream reports and comparing them with waking. In this study we investigated mentation during dreaming by asking subjects to provide us with dream reports and by asking them to create a dream log. In the dream log, the subjects recorded all implausibility, illogicality or inappropriateness of character during the dream narrative when compared to the character's real-life waking counterpart. Thus, the dream acted as its own control in comparing waking and dreaming mentation. Our results showed that recognition of the implausibility of a character occurred far less often during the dream than outside of the dream when the subject compared the dream character to its real-life waking counterpart. Further, not all kinds of implausibility were equally likely to occur in the dream. The most common implausibility both during the dream and when compared to the character's real-life counterpart was a character's behaviour. Calling on existing imaging data of the brain in REM sleep, we speculate on the brain-basis of these results in terms of the inaccessibility of episodic memory during dreaming and the diminished role of the dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex during REM sleep. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Clinical lore and a small number of published studies report that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) intensify dreaming. This study examines the dream effects of paroxetine and fluvoxamine in order to both increase clinical knowledge of these agents and to test an important potential method for probing the relationship between REM sleep neurobiology and dreaming in humans. Fourteen normal, paid volunteers (4 males, 10 females; mean age 27.4 year, range 22–39) free of medical or neuropsychiatric symptoms as well as of psychotropic or sleep affecting drugs completed a 31-day home-based study consisting of: 7 days drug-free baseline; 19 days on either 100 mg fluvoxamine (7 Ss) or 20 mg paroxetine (7 Ss) in divided morning and evening doses; and 5 days acute discontinuation. Upon awakening, subjects wrote dream reports, self-scored specific emotions in their reports and rated seven general dream characteristics using 5-point Likert scales. Dream reports were independently scored for bizarreness, movement and number of visual nouns by three judges. REM sleep-related measures were obtained using the Nightcap ambulatory sleep monitor. Mean dream recall frequency decreased during treatment compared with baseline. Dream report length and judge-rated bizarreness were greater during acute discontinuation compared with both baseline and treatment and this effect was a result of the fluvoxamine-treated subjects. The subjective intensity of dreaming increased during both treatment and acute discontinuation compared with baseline. Propensity to enter REM sleep was decreased during treatment compared with baseline and acute discontinuation and the intensity of REM sleep increased during acute discontinuation compared with baseline and treatment. The decrease in dream frequency during SSRI treatment may reflect serotonergic REM suppression while the augmented report length and bizarreness during acute SSRI discontinuation may reflect cholinergic rebound from serotonergic suppression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assesses the state of dream sciences, such as phenomenology, psychophysiology, neurobiology, neuropsychology, models and philosophy and learning and memory as of 2000. Bizarreness of dreams; Neurobiological explanations on formal dream features; Discussion on whether dreaming is the subjective correlate of rapid eye movement sleep physiology.

Discusses whether rapid eye movement (REM) sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. Discussion on dreaming; Description of the activation-synthesis model; Early findings on the distinct difference between REM and NREM mentation.

Compares three explanations of physical motions in dreams. Measurement of physical movements in dream reports; Dream theories; Functional importance of dreamed motion; Implications to Freudian explanation of dream movement.

Comments on several studies which discussed the influence of Sigmund Freud's dream theory on the dream theory of Mark Solms. Claims of Solms that Freud was right in postulating wishes and emotions as dream instigators; Details on the brain processes associated with dreaming in rapid eye movement (REM) sleep; Flaws in the arguments that dreaming is disassociated with the REM sleep brain process.