We thank the editor in chief, Alan Hastings, for giving us the opportunity to publish this response to the critical paper in this issue (Barraquand 2013). Since we were asked to write a short response, we will focus only on the author’s main point. The critique addresses many details of our book (Arditi and Ginzburg 2012), but responding to all of it would require repeating much of the book because it already contains most answers. The controversy about ratio dependence was substantially settled with the joint paper of Abrams and Ginzburg (2000). So, focusing only on the author’s main point will lead us to an explanation of how this critique originates and will allow us to address a more general issue that may be of interest to the readers of Theoretical Ecology. The main argument constructed by Frederic Barraquand (FB) is that the prey-dependent model is a “straw man” artificially erected by us in order to cut it down in favor of the opposing “limit myth” of ratio dependence. FB’s position is that there are many other models besides these two classes, and all have their places under the sun; different models are needed for different purposes. The latter statement is so general that it is bound to be correct. We never said that the ratio-dependent model would give an exact description of every existing trophic community. What we say is that it is a good “null model,” i.e., a good starting point. All ecologists, even the most empirical, have some theory in their minds, and what ecologists view as the “default theory” can serve as another definition of the null model. Our meaning in this regard was clear, as shown by the various reviewers who understood fully our book’s purpose (DeAngelis 2013; Fryxell 2013; Krebs 2013; Peterson 2013). (We note in passing that, while FB uses some of Krebs’s work on cycles in support of his critique, Charles Krebs actually wrote a very favorable review of our book.) As we explained in our book, our theory can be traced back to a number of precursors; we mentioned Kolmogorov, Leslie (in part only), and Contois, and we recently found out that Ivlev too had been led to the same idea in his work with fish (Ivlev 1961). Both Contois and Ivlev were experimentalists and developed ratio-dependent models on empirical grounds. Although FB calls for pragmatism, he hardly mentions the many direct tests of functional responses against data that we present in our book, chapter 2. There, we show that most experimental estimates of interference fall on a spectrum of intermediate values, but closer to the ratio-dependent end than to the prey-dependent. If we simplify by choosing the ratiodependent end, not only do we gain in parsimony (admittedly, a little), but we obtain a very satisfactory model on theoretical grounds because of its symmetry (see below). FB’s proposition to use various models to explain a variety of trophic relations is unsatisfactory. Given that our theory, which he criticizes, unifies the explanation of all of these phenomena, we see no compelling reason for preferring a multiplicity of approaches. Moreover, beyond criticism of our theory, FB targets the whole theoretical school that uses deterministic models. He suggests instead stochastic population models and time series analysis. We have nothing against log-linear Gompertz-like predator–prey stochastic R. Arditi Ecologie et Evolution, Universite Pierre et Marie Curie, Sorbonne Universites, Case 237, 75231 Paris Cedex 05, France