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Chayanov, outside of his theoretical analysis of how peasant households are distinctive for being at once a production and a consumption unit and the multiple implications of that fact, has made two other major theoretical contributions, one making clear that peasant economies observe the logic of "differential optimums" rather than the simple logic of economies of scale and the other having to do with the need for co-operatives for "vertical integration" of small peasant economies in order to preserve for the peasants more of the value of their products in the BIG MARKET. The former can be readily observed in the "new agriculture revolution" of the Chinese economy in the past few decades; the latter can be readily seen in the striking modernization of the "East Asian" (i.e., Japan, South Korea, and the Taiwan area) economies since 1945. China's annual "Number One Documents" about agriculture of the past two decades have shown how the country first mistakenly tried to imitate the simple scale-economy logic of the United States and then shifted since 2018 toward a new emphasis on the peasants as the principal agents of agricultural development and peasant villages as the basic unit for agricultural co-ops. Those have been the basis for new advances as well as for reinterpretations and modifications of Chayanov's two major theoretical visions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The "third sphere" born of the interacting of a market economy with a centralized state, and of a system of market contracting 合同 with administrative "assigning responsibility" 发包/承包, has become a key characteristic of the new political-economic system of Reform China. It has imported the private enterprise market economy of the modern West, but has also retained the (revolutionary) tradition of a socialist party-state and its ownership of the principal means of production. Its administrative system resembles more and more the modern West's (Weberian) bureaucratic system, but it has also retained the traditional imperial Chinese "centralized minimalism" and "parcelized despotism" characteristics. It cannot be grasped by the either/or dualistic opposites mode of thinking, but can only be understood in terms of the combining and interacting of dualistic opposites. The combination may be understood as one concrete and substantive meaning of the officialized term of a "socialist market economy." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China’s economic reform has been understood mainly in terms of the "new institutional economics," emphasizing the role of marketized private firms and related laws. Andrew Walder and Yingyi Qian, however, have pointed out instead the crucial role played by Chinese local governments, especially their township and village enterprises. Neither interpretation, however, can account for what has happened in China since the mid-1990s, when the main engine for development shifted to local governments’ competition for and active support of outside investment. Typically, local governments have provided land and related infrastructural support below cost, plus special subsidies and tax privileges, and also circumvented formal rules and regulations on labor use and environmental protection. Those informal practices and the huge accompanying informal economy, not just the new enterprises drawn in, have been the main dynamic both for China’s striking GDP growth and its mounting social and environmental crises. The analysis presented here is historical-cum-theoretical and calls for a new understanding of China’s development experience and of its practical implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]