The goal of this study is to demonstrate that although the original purpose of the White House national economic adviser was to serve as an "honest broker" of economic policy advice, the political and policy roles of the position have greatly expanded. Empirical research and theory has delineated that advisory roles and role expectations are significant explanatory forces that provide scholars with a useful vantage point in discerning the relative impact of policymakers on policy decision-making (for example: Link and Glad 1994; George 1980; Mulcahy 1986). Based on primary source documentation from presidential archives, congressional testimony, speeches, and secondary accounts, this study observes that the national economic adviser has evolved into the president's primary staff member in the realm of domestic and foreign economic policy. Although the treasury secretary, US Trade Representative, OMB Director, and CEA Chair have great statutory and political authority over particular economic issues, the national economic adviser has tended to serve the president as his primary economic policy guru. Several political roles have been observed. First, the national economic adviser has become the primary administrator of the economic policy process. This formal responsibility is critical, since the size and responsibilities of the economic bureaucracy demand that an individual or group manages the process. Second, though most national economic advisers perceive themselves as neutral brokers and deny playing policy roles, they tend to play the role of influential advisor-advocates of specific courses of policy action. Third, the national economic adviser is also a gatekeeper-guardian of the president's economic policy agenda. They seek to protect the White House from criticism, perform unpopular tasks such as firing personnel, saying "no" to particular requests, and preventing individuals and groups from dominating policies. Fourth, as mediators, national economic advisers go to great lengths to quell internal bureaucratic strife and please domestic and international constituencies. The combination of these observed roles suggest that although others have traditionally been perceived as the president's most important and credible source of advice on key issues, national economic advisers, with their close proximity to the president, their strong White House perspective, and their relative freedom from bureaucratic pressures, are the president's preferred source of economic policy advice. Moreover, one could argue that the national economic adviser is the policy equivalent of the national security adviser within the White House decision-making system. This study concludes that the expanding roles of the national economic adviser challenge the original notion of the NEC serving as an honest broker of the economic policymaking process. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]