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In this chapter, we argue for an essential dualism in the U.S. economy; there are simultaneously institutional sources of dynamism and institutional patterns that portend a process of decay and decline. This dualism corresponds to a growing divide between innovative small- and medium-sized enterprises and big corporations -- both financial and non-financial -- that are increasingly predatory in their business strategies. Surprisingly, firms on both sides of the divide are increasingly dependent on government. The small- and medium-sized firms rely heavily on government science and technology programs to help them innovate. The large firms need government to protect their position. Whether dynamism or decay will prove to be stronger, we think, is contingent on political choices that will be made over the next ten years. This contingency, in turn, makes it easier to understand the highly polarized nature of partisan politics in the United States today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A global financial crisis seems a propitious time to renew a dialogue between legal scholarship and the field of economic sociology. In the 1920s and 1930s, legal realist scholars developed insightful analyses of market processes. But since post-war mainstream legal scholarship has largely ignored this aspect of legal realism, economic sociology might be helpful in refocusing legal scholarship on what happens in actual market settings. One tool is Zelizer's concept of relational work; that in market transactions, actors must define the nature of their relationship, what is to be exchanged, and by what media. Relational work has an enormous impact on the outcomes of transactions, but it is largely ignored in economic accounts. An empirical study of variations in relational work across economic settings could provide a strong foundation for rethinking the relationship between law and economic activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces the special issue on “Relational Work in Market Economies” by explaining the origins of the concept and its value in illuminating a dimension of market activity that has not been systematically addressed by social scientists. It also explains why this focus on individual economic transactions could be relevant for those whose interest centers on broader questions of political economy. Finally, there are brief descriptions of the other six articles that make up this special issue. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Despite the dominant role of market fundamentalist ideas in U.S. politics over the last thirty years, the Federal government has dramatically expanded its capacity to finance and support efforts of the private sector to commercialize new technologies. But the partisan logic of U.S. politics has worked to make these efforts invisible to mainstream public debate. The consequence is that while this "hidden developmental state" has had a major impact on the structure of the U.S. national innovation system, its ability to be effective in the future is very much in doubt. The article ends by arguing that the importance of these developmental initiatives to the U.S. economy could present a significant opening for new progressive initiatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a neo-Polanyian theoretical framework for understanding the dynamics within contemporary market societies. It uses this framework to analyze the divergence between the United States and other developed societies that has become more pronounced in the first years of the twenty-first century. The argument emphasizes the shifting political alliances of the business community in the United States and suggests that from 1994 onward, business lost power in the right-wing coalition to its religious Right allies. The growing power of a religious-based social movement is a critical ingredient in the unilateralist turn in the Bush Administration's foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]