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Variations in economic voting are commonly linked to the ability of voters to hold politicians accountable. In contrast, we argue that they may also stem from the incentives that voters have to cast an economic vote or not. In this paper, we follow Pacek and Radcliff (1995) and argue that voters who receive welfare benefits from anti-poverty programs should be insulated from swings in the national economy and thus have fewer incentives to cast a sociotropic vote. Evidence from the Mexican public opinion surveys conducted over the 1991-2004 period offers support this proposition. The findings suggest the rewards for investing in anti-poverty welfare programs may increase with program efficiency rather than politicization and that effective social safety nets are political ones as well. It also suggests that variations in economic voting might not reflect the weakness of accountability but its strength: voters are getting what they ask for. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]