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The aim of this paper is to bridge macro agent-based models with mainstream macroeconomic models by agentifying the baseline New Keynesian DSGE model. The model features multiple, boundedly rational, optimizing agents and is analyzed through numerical simulations. We exploit the flexibility of agent-based modeling to explore the effect of dispersed information on the learning process and on macroeconomic outcomes. We find that with dispersed information monetary and fiscal policy acquire the role of public signals.

We study the effects on economic activity of a pure temporary change in government debt and the relationship between the debt multiplier and the level of debt in an overlapping generations framework. The debt multiplier is positive but quite small during normal times while it is much larger during crises. Moreover, it increases with the steady state level of debt. Hence, the call for fiscal consolidation during recessions seems ill-advised. Finally, a rise in the steady state debt-to-GDP level increases the steady state real interest rate providing more room for manoeuvre to monetary policy to fight deflationary shocks.

The adoption of a "makeup'' strategy is one of the proposals adopted in the ongoing review of the Fed's monetary policy framework. Another suggestion, to avoid the zero lower bound, is a more active role for fiscal policy. We put together these ideas to study monetary-fiscal interactions under price level targeting. Under price level targeting and a fiscally-led regime, we find that following a deflationary demand shock: (i) the central bank increases (rather than decreases) the policy rate; (ii) the central bank, thus, avoids the zero lower bound; (iii) price level targeting is generally welfare improving if compared to inflation targeting.

According to the long-run Taylor principle (Davig and Leeper, 2007), a central bank can deviate to a passive monetary policy and still obtain equilibrium uniqueness if a sufficiently aggressive monetary policy is expected for the future. Does this principle hold true when both monetary and fiscal policies can switch between active and passive and there is positive trend inflation? We find that passive monetary detours are no longer possible when trend inflation is high, whatever fiscal policy is in place. This has important policy implications in terms of flexibility and monetary-fiscal authorities coordination.

This paper studies the debt multiplier, that is the effects of a temporary and pure change in government debt on economic activity. Contrary to an infinitely-lived representative agent model, in an overlapping generations (OLG) framework output increases even after a temporary increase in debt due to a lump-sum tax reduction that is totally reversed in the future. When nominal interest rates are positive, the debt multiplier is generally quite small. However, the debt multiplier is much larger when the nominal interest rate is at the zero lower bound. Hence, the call for fiscal consolidation in recession times seems ill-advised. Moreover, the steady state level of debt matters in an OLG framework. Multipliers tend to increase with the level of debt in steady state. A rise in the steady state debt-to-GDP level increases the steady state real interest rate and thus it provides an alternative route to increase the room for manoeuvre for monetary policy facing deflationary shocks.

In various speeches, former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke contrasted the proposal of setting a higher inflation target by claiming that it could unanchor inflation expectations. A standard New Keynesian framework with learning supports this claim both asymptotically, because a higher inflation target shrinks the E-stability region when a central bank follows a Taylor rule, and in the transition phase, because a higher inflation target slows down the speed of convergence of expectations. Transparency helps anchoring expectations. However, the importance of being transparent diminishes with the level of the inflation target. Finally, the higher the inflation target, the more policy should respond to inflation and the less to output to guarantee E-stability. Hence, a policy that increases both the inflation target and the monetary policy response to output would be “reckless”.

How does a higher inflation target affect determinacy and learnability of rational expectations equilibria under alternative monetary/fiscal policy mixes in new Keynesian models? What is the role of central bank transparency? This article proves that in a non-Ricardian regime, determinacy and learnability conditions are insensitive to changes in trend inflation and to transparency issues: expectations stabilization requires taxes to react weakly to government debt. Conversely, a higher inflation target always destabilizes expectations under active monetary regimes. In a Ricardian regime, raising the inflation target requires a more hawkish central bank to attain determinacy. However, determinacy implies learnability only when agents are aware of both the inflation target and the central bank reaction function. If agents need to learn a positive inflation target, active monetary regimes are unstable. Therefore, fully disclosing the reaction function, including the target inflation rate, greatly increases the central bank’s effectiveness in stabilizing expectations.

Since dollarized countries import US monetary policy, identifying US monetary shocks through sign restrictions on US variables only, does not use all available information. In this paper we therefore include dollarized countries, which enable us to restrict more variables and leave the responses of US output and prices unrestricted (to allow for the working capital view of monetary shocks). We find only little evidence for the latter in the US, as prices fall immediately after most contractionary shocks that we identify. Furthermore, monetary shocks do not seem to have a clear effect on real GDP.

Inflation depends on both monetary and fiscal policies and on how agents believe that these policies will evolve in the future. Can monetary policy control inflation, when both monetary and fiscal policies are allowed to change over time? To analyse this problem, we study a model in which both monetary and fiscal policies may switch according to a Markov process. Controlling inflation entails a unique and Ricardian solution. We propose a natural generalisation of the original Leeper (1991) taxonomy, introducing the concepts of globally active (or passive) and globally switching policies to define the conditions that allow monetary policy to control inflation under Markov switching. First, monetary and fiscal policies need to be globally balanced to guarantee a unique equilibrium: globally active monetary policies need to be coupled with globally passive fiscal policies, and switching monetary policies with switching fiscal policies. Second, this distinction characterises the nature of the solutions: a globally AM/PF regime is Ricardian, while a globally switching regime features expectation and wealth effects. Third, the strength of policy deviations across regimes is key, insofar a globally active (or passive) policy allows only timid deviations. Finally, our framework can rationalise the impulse responses from a Bayesian VAR on U.S. data for the recent zero lower bound period as being due to "timidity" in fiscal actions that have been unable to spur inflation.