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This paper experimentally investigated luck framing. Specifically, we analyzed the difference between being assigned an advantageous role in a distribution game and being assigned the same role while being explicitly told that you were lucky to be in that favorable position. We tested this difference by implementing a dictator game and a no-veto-cost ultimatum game. We observed that: a) dictators transferred larger amounts in the game when they were explicitly told they were lucky to be the dictator compared to dictators who did not receive this message, and b) responders in the no-veto-cost ultimatum game who were explicitly told they were lucky to be in that role were significantly less likely to reject a particular offer compared to responders in the game who did not receive this message. The combination of these results is consistent with the hypothesis that people are more likely to behave in a more prosocial and egalitarian manner when they are reminded that they are lucky to be in a particular position.

The ultimatum and dictator games were developed to help identify the fundamental motivators of human behavior, typically by asking participants to share windfall endowments with other persons. In the ultimatum game, a common observation is that proposers offer, and responders refuse to accept, a much larger share of the endowment than is predicted by rational choice theory. However, in the real world, windfalls are rare: money is usually earned. I report here a small study aimed at testing how participants react to an ultimatum game after they have earned their endowments by either building a Lego model or spending some time sorting out screws by their length. I find that the shares that proposers offer and responders accept are significantly lower than that typically observed with windfall money, an observation that is intensified when the task undertaken to earn the endowment is generally less enjoyable and thus perhaps more effortful (i.e., screw sorting compared to Lego building). I suggest, therefore, that considerations of effort-based desert are often important drivers behind individual decision-making, and that laboratory experiments, if intended to inform public policy design and implementation, ought to mirror the broad characteristics of the realities that people face.

People are often generous even when it is not in their apparent self-interest to do so as demonstrated by numerous experiments using the dictator game (DG). More recent research using DGs has varied the number of dictators and recipients and used these games to investigate the bystander effect and congestible altruism. These studies have found that people are less generous when there are others who could be generous (the bystander effect) and also less generous when there are multiple recipients (congestible altruism) though the sum of their generosity to all recipients increases. A working hypothesis is proposed that the context-sensitive generosity observed in n-person DGs can be explained as equitable behavior. From an evolutionary perspective, explaining the evolution of equitable behavior is challenging at best. To provide an evolutionary explanation, a second working hypothesis is proposed: equitable offers evolve because they reduce resource deficits produced by variability in the accumulation of resources and thereby minimize the length of interbirth intervals (IBIs) and increase fitness. Based on this working hypothesis, an evolutionary model was developed for n-person DGs to investigate the evolution of equitable offers as a resource allocation problem when reproduction is constrained by IBIs. Simulations demonstrated that equitable offers could evolve in group-structured populations when there is a cost (i.e., longer IBIs) to running resource deficits. Mean evolved offers also varied as a function of the number of dictators and recipients in patterns consistent with the bystander effect and congestible altruism. Equitable offers evolved because they reduced resource variability among group members and thereby reduced resource deficits, which insured higher average rates of reproduction for more equitable groups of agents. Implications of these results are discussed.

In this article I develop a new theory of how globalization in the form of increasing potential foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows affects democratization. As the level of potential FDI inflows increases, workers become more willing to support democratization because of the large wage benefits from liberalizing FDI under democracy, while capitalists become less willing to support democratization because of their increasing need for protection from the dictator in the form of FDI restrictions. Increased demand for protection allows dictators to extract larger share of rents from capitalists. The effect of increasing potential FDI on democratization is ambiguous because it increases both workers’ incentive to revolt and dictators’ resistance to democratization.

The role of political parties in facilitating authoritarian rule has been the subject of extensive research, but parties vary widely in their institutional strength to perform regime-bolstering functions. This article synthesizes existing literature to develop a general theory that explains the sources of ruling party strength in autocracies. We argue that party strength stems from a strategic calculation by political actors who weigh the benefits of building a strong party against its costs. The relative benefits of strong parties depend on the stage of the authoritarian life cycle and factors specific to the strategic environment. The observable implications of the theory are tested using a dataset that includes all autocratic ruling parties that were in power between 1940 and 2015. Consistent with our argument, parties that originated from revolutions tend to be the strongest, whereas those created to support an incumbent dictator tend to be the weakest. A country's resource endowments and external environment also shape the dynamics for party building.

In a laboratory experiment we investigate whether bad behavior in anonymous environments results from more lenient social norms or a reduction in the size of the role played by social norms in decision‐making. We elicit social norms in two dictator games with different levels of anonymity, estimate subjects' willingness‐to‐pay to adhere to norms, and test for treatment differences in each factor. Overall, it is a large reduction in the role played by social norms, which results in more unfair dictator choices when anonymous. Interestingly, however, females find making an unfair decision less acceptable when the dictator is unidentified. (JEL A13, C91, Z10)

When decision makers are informed about the decisions of their peers, does this make them more selfish or more generous? We study the effect of social information on selfishness (as measured by dictator game giving) in a twice-repeated setting. We vary whether or not dictators receive information about the allocation decisions of other dictators. Independently we vary whether being the dictator is determined randomly or earned. We find that dictators act more generously in the first round with than without social information in case dictator positions are randomly assigned; no such effect is found in case dictators’ positions are earned. Allocations in the second round are generally more selfish than those in the first round. This effect is significantly stronger with than without social information, indicating that being informed about the decisions of their peers makes dictators more selfish. These results indicate that transparency about allocation decisions is unlikely to make such decisions more generous.

This paper investigates behaviour across strategic and non-strategic dictator games with a preceding production phase. In both treatments subjects remain paired and play a trust game immediately fo...

Framing influences choice. However, little is known about the underlying mechanisms behind framing effects. We study gain-loss framing in binary modified dictator games. Subjects choose the selfish option more often in the loss frame compared to the gain frame. Recording visual fixations with eye-tracking, we find that dictators focus more on their own outcomes when facing losses. This suggests that losses to the own outcome are weighted more than losses to another player.

In this study, we implemented a dictator game experiment to examine how the increase of the public characteristic in an impure public good affects individuals’ prosocial behaviour. A within‐subject design was used in the experiment. The dictator game was repeated six times with an impure public good introduced in four of them. We observe that the increase of the public characteristic in an impure public good partly crowds out individuals’ subsequent donations, which could be explained by a seemingly ‘mental accounting’ mental process. In addition, we also find that the selfish behaviour of individuals in dictator games with impure public goods, to some extent, has an inertia influence on their subsequent donations when the impure public good is removed.

While numerous studies have explored the foundations of autocratic stability by focusing on macroeconomic variables, the micro-foundations of autocratic support have largely been overlooked. Using Afrobarometer survey data from 22 African autocracies, I examine how dictators stabilize their rule even during economic recessions. I find that the provision of welfare benefits alleviates the adverse impact of negative economic perceptions on support for the dictator. Citizens are likely to continue supporting the dictator as long as the government keeps providing universal welfare benefits. The results remain robust to different model specifications that account for alternative explanations and validity concerns associated with autocratic survey data.

Experimental implementations of dictator games are found to differ in terms of their underlying strategic incentives. We explore this discovery in two separate directions. Theoretically, assuming identical other-regarding preferences, we show that the two most widely used protocols can generate strongly contrasting rational-choice predictions, from which different interpretations of dictator giving arise. Experimentally, a tailor-made experiment reveals significant differences between the two protocols but rejects full rationality as a satisfactory explanatory theory. Our findings indicate that several previously drawn conclusions regarding other-regarding preferences among humans distinguished by social class, gender, generation, nationality, etc. may be more ambiguous than hitherto believed. ISSN:0899-8256

Altruistic punishment is often thought to be a major enforcement mechanism of social norms. I present experimental results from a modified version of the dictator game with third-party punishment, in which third parties can remain ignorant about the choice of the dictator. I find that a substantial fraction of subjects choose not to reveal the dictator’s choice and not to punish the dictator. I show that this behavior is in line with the social norms that prevail in a situation of initial ignorance. Remaining ignorant and choosing not to punish is not inappropriate. As a result, altruistic punishment is significantly lower when the dictator’s choice is initially hidden. The decrease in altruistic punishment leads to more selfish dictator behavior only if dictators are explicitly informed about the effect of willful ignorance on punishment rates. Hence, in scenarios in which third parties can ignore information and dictators know what this implies, third-party punishment may only ineffectively enforce social norms.

We conduct and compare two binary dictator experiments in which the available payoff profiles are identical. In one of the games, selfish payoffs can be probabilistically implemented either via a delegate or directly; in the other game, the same payoffs can only be implemented by direct choice. We find that (1) the delegation option is almost entirely chosen by those who would otherwise be generous dictators, (2) the delegation option thereby leads to a greater overall propensity for selfish payoffs, and (3) in the delegation game, selfish dictators exhibit a net preference for direct vs. delegated decisions, consistent with recent research on decision rights.

Is more money better than less? Not always. It depends on the situation. If more money for oneself means less money for a stranger, the majority of participants in dictator games choose less money for themselves. But if they really are alone - and thus, do not have to share with a stranger - will they always choose to receive more money instead of less? Here, I report results from seven experiments where on average, one-third of a total of 3,503 participants chose to receive less money instead of more. In one experiment, the majority chose to receive less money. If participants in experiments prefer getting less money for more money, interpretation of economic experiments becomes potentially compromised. As I used a randomized payment scheme in all experiments, this may raise a reasonable concern about whether the result generalizes to a scheme in which all subjects are paid. publishedVersion

Background A country’s health expenditure significantly improves its population health status. This study aims to examine the determinants of health expenditure in dictatorships. Methods We designed a mixed methods research approach. First, we used panel data from 1995 to 2014 covering 99 countries (n = 1488). Fixed effects regression models were fitted to determine how different types of authoritarianism relate to health expenditure. Second, we chose Ivory Coast to apply the synthetic control methods for a case study. We constructed a synthetic Ivory Coast, combining other dominant party regimes to resemble the values of health expenditure predictors for Ivory Coast prior to a regime change from a dominant party system to personalist dictatorships in 2000. Results We found that dominant party autocracies, compared with non-dominant party regimes, increased health expenditure (% of GDP) (1.36 percentage point increase, CI = 0.59–2.12). The marginal effect, however, decreased when an autocrat in this type of regime held elections (0.86 percentage point decrease, CI = 0.20–1.52). Furthermore, we found the difference in health expenditure between the actual Ivory Coast and its synthetic version starts to grow following the regime change in 2000 (in 2000, actual: 6.00%, synthetic: 6.04%; in 2001, actual: 4.85%, synthetic: 5.99%), suggesting a pronounced negative effect of the government transition on Ivory Coast health expenditure. Conclusion The findings suggest that different forms of dictatorship are associated with varying levels of health expenditure. Where dictatorships rely on popular support, as is the case with dominant party dictatorships, health expenditure is generally greater.

Do donations respond to price and income in the same way as other goods and services? Andreoni and Miller design an experiment to test whether transfers to other individuals in dictator games conform to the General Axiom of Revealed Preferences. This review summarizes the contribution of the article and tracks its influence on subsequent research. Their work established that subjects’ transfers to others respond to the price of giving and endowment in much the same way that consumers respond when purchasing goods. In addition, they found substantial heterogeneity across subjects, and established, for the first time, that people differ markedly in their preferences for giving. The methodology developed in the paper has been used many times, and has been extended to the study of different research questions including gender differences, charitable donations, and variability in distributional preferences in political contexts.

Economic policy decisions often involve a tradeoff between equality and efficiency implemented through income redistribution. We test whether people are more likely to purchase equality with their own money versus transferring someone else’s money to a low-income group member which reduces inequality at the cost of group efficiency. We synthesize (Andreoni & Miller 2002) and (Engellman & Strobel 2004) by using an experiment that allows us to measure willingness-to-pay for equality both with own income and other people’s money. Subjects are more likely to purchase equality with others' money at the cost of group efficiency. The average individual prefers an outcome with more own income and more inequality relative to our experimental status quo. The average willingness-to-pay for equality is positive when using others' money. However, our subjects are sensitive to prices even when making purchases with others' money. When the cost in terms of group efficiency is very high, subjects usually do not choose to reduce inequality. We find the same outcome when subjects decide as a dictator or with majority-rule decisions.

International audience; We perform meta-regressions on a single database containing 96 observations of simple ultimatum games and 144 observations of simple dictator games to disentangle the fairness hypothesis based on the degree of economic development of a country. According to the fairness hypothesis, o ers in the two games should not di er if they were motivated by a subject's fairness concerns. Using the di erence across countries between o ers in ultimatum and dictator games, we address the e ect of being exposed to the market mechanism on pure fairness concerns and other-regarding, expectations-driven fairness. Our results show in particular that the lower the level of economic development in a country, the less likely the rejection of the fairness hypothesis.

We propose a five-player common-pool resource (CPR) game with endogenous coalition formation. We show that the level of extraction from the CPR depends on the size of each coalition that is formed and on the final coalition structure. These predictions are tested in a laboratory experiment. We consider two treatments: dictator vs. veto. In the dictator treatment, at each stage of the coalition formation game, a randomly chosen player imposes the coalition size and selected members cannot refuse to become a member. In the veto treatment, players have the right to refuse joining the current coalition if they want to and make counter-proposals. We observe that the formation of the grand coalition is more frequent in the dictator treatment. However, with the repetition of the coalition formation game, the grand coalition becomes more frequent under both treatment, and past experience of a grand coalition increases the likelihood that the current coalition structure is the grand coalition. Finally, the possibility to form coalitions is beneficial at reducing CPR extractions, compared to the singleton structure, in both treatments.

We conduct an experiment using sequential dictator games where two dictators give serially to a common recipient. In the treatment conditions, the second dictator knows the outcome in the first game and thus the endowment of the recipient. Across treatment conditions, we alter the mechanism that determines the recipient’s endowment by replacing the first game dictator by a disinterested third party or a computer. We find that a negative relationship exists between the endowment of the recipient and giving of the second dictator only when a human with self-interest performs the allocation in the first game. Additionally, we find some evidence that dictators in the second game give less than first game dictators and no significant difference in average second game dictator giving across conditions.

This article provides experimental support for the hypothesis that insurance can be a motive for religious donations. We randomize enrollment of members of a Pentecostal church in Ghana into a commercial funeral insurance policy. Then church members allocate money between themselves and a set of religious goods in a series of dictator games with significant stakes. Members enrolled in insurance give significantly less money to their own church compared with members who only receive information about the insurance. Enrollment also reduces giving toward other spiritual goods. We set up a model exploring different channels of religiously based insurance. The implications of the model and the results from the dictator games suggest that adherents perceive the church as a source of insurance and that this insurance is derived from beliefs in an interventionist God. Survey results suggest that material insurance from the church community is also important and we hypothesize that these two insurance channels exist in parallel.

We report on an experiment designed to explore whether the effects of expressing one’s emotions spill over into future interactions, thereby curtailing subsequent selfish decisions. In between two identical public goods games, participants play a binary-choice dictator game which, depending on the treatment, either gives or does not give the recipient the opportunity to text the dictator. The recipients of an unfair offer—in contrast to the recipients of a fair offer—contribute significantly less in the second public goods game. Yet, their contribution reductions are significantly smaller in the treatment allowing for recipient communication. To control for a belief-based explanation of these findings, we run treatments where we elicit beliefs about the other’s contribution. We find that belief elicitation affects the efficacy of communication.

Donors may often not be sure whether a recipient really needs their help. Does this uncertainty deter generosity? We experimentally investigate a situation in which donors do not know the financial endowment of the recipient for certain, but still have some information on the distribution the endowments are drawn from. In the experiment, we find that uncertainty does not deter generosity. In fact, if we filter out selfish dictators, under most specifications of uncertainty dictators give more, compared with the donation dictators make to a recipient they know to have the expected value of the endowment with certainty. They are particularly concerned about the possibility of a recipient leaving the lab with no payoff from the game.

In this paper, I argue that religion matters for the provision of public goods. I identify three normative foundations of Eastern Orthodox monasticism with strong economic implications: 1. solidarity, 2. obedience, and 3. universal discipline. I propose a public goods game with a three-tier hierarchy, where these norms are modeled as treatments. Obedience and universal discipline facilitate the provision of threshold public goods in equilibrium, whereas solidarity does not. Empirical evidence is drawn from public goods experiments run with regional bureaucrats in Tomsk and Novosibirsk, Russia. The introduction of the same three norms as experimental treatments produces different results. I find that only universal discipline leads to the provision of threshold public goods, whereas solidarity and obedience do not. Unlike in Protestant societies, in Eastern Orthodox societies free-riding occurs at lower than at higher hierarchical levels. Successful economic reforms in Eastern Orthodox countries start with the restructuring of the middle- and lower-ranked public sector. Authoritarian persistence is defined by the commitment of the dictator to overprovide public goods.

We examine the impact of agency and luck on bonuses in a two player, two stage controlled laboratory experiment. In the first stage, Player A makes an investment decision on behalf of Player B. In the second stage, Player B makes a dictator allocation for each possible outcome from the investment. We compare dictator giving (bonuses) across outcomes and with a control treatment in which the stage 1 outcomes are determined randomly. We do not find that luck is rewarded with higher bonuses. However, we do find a general tendency to respond to agency with reduced bonuses and, in particular, a significant tendency to reduce bonuses to agents who are unlucky. Additionally, we find that those who are more risk tolerant are less likely to give no bonus under agency but not in the control.

Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that if an aggregation rule satisfies unrestricted domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and collective rationality, then there exists a dictator. Among others, Arrow’s postulate of collective rationality is controversial. We propose a new axiom for an aggregation rule, decisiveness coherence, which is weaker than collective rationality. It is shown that given the Arrovian axioms other than collective rationality, a dictatorship arises if and only if decisiveness coherence is satisfied. Moreover, we introduce weak versions of decisive coherence and examine these implications.

•We compare Dictator Earns-Give to Recipient Earns-Take games.•Dictators’ generosity decreases when they earn the endowment and give.•Feelings of ownership mediate the effect.•Earning the endowment and the giving frame strengthen feelings of ownership.•Stronger feelings of ownership reduce dictators’ generosity.

Are decentralization reforms in dictatorial regimes mere window dressing or can they deliver longevity for dictators? Many scholars in political science have argued that seemingly democratic institutions established in dictatorships play a crucial role in increasing the survival potential of the authoritarian regime by providing a channel to the dictator to co-opt members of the opposition, identify their bases of support and recruit effective coalition members. While most of the existing analysis has focused on national elections and political parties, we use primary data and social network methodology to analyze the 2001 decentralization reforms established during General Musharraf’s military regime in Pakistan. We show that seemingly democratically empowering decentralized governance structures can also be used to distribute rents to political supporters through ostensibly legitimate channels. Therefore, this paper adds to the literature on institutions in dictatorships on two fronts in addition to providing crucial information about the political landscape in a strategically important country.

The paperreports the results of a laboratory experiment assessing the impact of social position (endowment) and power (structurally advantaged or disadvantaged network positions) on redistributive decisions, which involve a classical efficiency-equality trade-off. The experiment involves three decision conditions: veil of ignorance, informed dictator, and majority vote. We use a three-person social-preference model in order to derive hypotheses on the effect of knowledge and power on tax choices. Our results confirm that disclosing the social position raises the measured self-interest (Knowledge Effect) and that mandating a majority vote results in concessions, the size of which depends on the player's structural position in the network (Power Effect).

This paper introduces the Pay-What-You-Want game which represents the interaction between a buyer and a seller in a Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) situation. The PWYW game embeds the dictator game and the trust game as subgames. This allows us to use previous experimental studies with the dictator and the trust game to identify three factors that can influence the success of PWYW pricing in business practice: (i) social context, (ii) social information, and (iii) deservingness. Only few cases of PWYW pricing for a longer period of time have been documented. By addressing repeated games, we isolate two additional factors which are likely to contribute to successful implementations of PWYW as a long term pricing strategy. These are (iv) communication and (v) the reduction of goal conflicts. The central contribution of this study is an attempt to bridge the gap between laboratory experiments and the research on PWYW pricing, which relies largely on evidence from the field. By reviewing the relevant experiments, this study identifies factors crucial for the success of PWYW pricing and provides guidance to developing long-term applications of PWYW pricing.

To investigate how neediness and identifiability of a recipient influence the willingness of a donor to invest resources in charity-like lotteries we propose a new game, called ‘need game’. Similar to the dictator game, the need game includes two players, one active player (the donor or dictator) and one passive player (the recipient). Both players require a minimum need (ND and NR), expressed in terms of points. The donor is endowed with KD points and must retain at least ND points, i.e., the need, with ND < KD, at the end of the game with n rounds. The recipient starts with KR points and must end the game with at least NR points, i.e., the need, with KR < NR < KD. The donor is asked to choose one of three different amounts from KD to place a bet on a lottery. If won, the gain is added to the endowment. If lost, the recipient receives the points. The recipient is paid only when his/her need threshold is obtained; likewise the donor gets paid only when his/her need threshold is maintained. The main focus here is on need of both players (ND = NR = 2, 200, and ND = NR = 0 serving as baseline control) and the identifiability of the recipient (no information, described by text and picture, and physical presence). We probe whether the amount invested by the donor depends on need and identifiability of the recipient. In addition, we include the framing of the game as gain or loss, different probabilities to win/lose, and different time limits as covariates. We found that each of these factors can play a role when investing in charity-like lotteries.

We use a ‘multi-player dictator game’ (MDG), with ‘social information’ about the monetary transfer made by a previous dictator to a recipient, to examine whether average contributions as well as the behavioural strategy adopted are affected by the first amount presented (the ‘anchor’) using a sequential strategy elicitation method. We find that average contributions are positively affected by the anchor. The anchor is also found to influence the behavioural strategy that individuals adopt, such that low anchors significantly increase the likelihood that players will adopt unconditional self-interested strategies, whereas high anchors increase the likelihood of adopting giving strategies. The distribution of strategies – and hence, the distribution of behavioural ‘types’ - is therefore affected by the initial conditions of play, lending support to the notion that behavioural strategies are context dependent.

This paper examines the behavior of dictators when faced by an imminent threat of being overthrown in oil abundant countries. In the short run, the dictator’s survival strategies is argued to be confined to public spending and repression, whereas the choice of their levels is conditional upon the intensity of the mass threat (i.e. civil protest vs. mass violence) and the size of oil wealth. The empirical results indicate a possibility of mixing between spending and repression, and that oil wealth allows for differences in their employed levels in face of the same threat. Using a dataset of authoritarian regimes in 88 countries from 1981 to 2006, I found that mass violence is handled through increasing both spending and repression, whereas civil protest is only met by repression. Furthermore, greater oil wealth is found to provide a wider fiscal space to relatively increase spending, but only at low and intermediate levels of mass threats. As the threats intensify, the effect of oil wealth dissipates and oil wealth dictatorships behave the same as their non-oil wealth counterparts.

We examine the value of a statistical life of a citizen in the interwar Soviet Union based on the preferences of its dictator. We model and specify Stalin’s preferences for a policy of statistical repression, an integral feature of the Great Terror (1937–1938). We use regional variation in the victims generated by this policy to structurally estimate the value that Stalin would have been willing to accept for a reduction in citizens’ fatality risk. Our estimate of this value, roughly $85,000 (in 2019 U.S. dollars), is substantially smaller than estimates based on citizens’ willingness to pay in modern India and in the United States in 1940.

We examine how group decision-making affects other-regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision-making and whether the difference in decision-making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity. We make two findings on group decision-making. First, group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision-making.

We experimentally investigate preference for randomization in social settings, in which the dictator chooses probabilistically between two allocations for herself and an anonymous recipient. We observe substantial proportions of subjects choosing to randomize under various circumstances. The observed patterns have rich implications for various assumptions in social preference models and shed light on recent studies on ex-ante and ex-post social preferences.

Giving in dictator games has been shown to vary with the nature of the endowment (earned vs. house money) and the action space (give only vs. the option to give or take). This article is the first to test if these factors similarly affect warm-glow giving alone. There is no reason that one would expect the same outcomes given that the motivations for warm-glow giving are different from the motivations for total (warm-glow plus purely altruistic) giving. We find that warm-glow giving to charity or philanthropic institutions in a real-donation experiment increases when the endowment is earned. The option to take does reduce warm-glow giving to charity, but significant giving remains. Our results suggest that donating earned income creates greater utility than donating an equal amount from a windfall gain, and that warm glow comes not merely from the act of giving, but also from the characteristics of the recipient. (JEL C90, D64, H41)

I study a multilateral bargaining game in which committee members invest in a common project prior to redistributing the total value of production. The game corresponds to a Baron and Ferejohn (1989) legislative bargaining model preceded by a production stage that is similar to a voluntary contribution mechanism. In this game, contributions reach almost full efficiency in a random rematching experimental design. Bargaining outcomes tend to follow an equity standard of proportionality: higher contributors obtain higher shares. Unlike other bargaining experiments with an exogenous fund, allocations involving payments to all members are modal instead of minimum winning coalitions, and proposer power is quite low. (JEL C78, D63, D71, D72, H41)

A common assumption of money is that it is fungible. An implication of this assumption is that the source of money does not affect economic decision making. We find evidence contradicting this fungibility assumption. Specifically, we explore how the perception of an endowment source influences amounts sent in a dictator game. We find perceived similarity to the endowment provider to be negatively correlated with dictator offers. Dictators who consider themselves relatively more similar to their endowment provider send significantly smaller amounts to their partners. Our results demonstrate that economic decision making can be influenced by the provider of income shocks. (JEL C78, C91, C99, D31, D64, D74)

Influential recent scholarship assumes that authoritarian rulers act as perfect agents of economic elites, foreclosing the possibility that economic elites may at times prefer democracy absent a popular threat from below. Motivated by a puzzling set of democratic transitions, we relax this assumption and examine how elite uncertainty about dictatorship -- a novel and generalizable causal mechanism impacting democratization -- can induce elite support for democracy. We construct a noisy signaling model in which a potential autocrat attempts to convince economic elites that he will be a faithful partner should elites install him in power. The model generates clear predictions about how two major types of elite uncertainty -- uncertainty in a potential autocratic successor's policies produced by variance in the pool of would-be dictator types, and uncertainty in the truthfulness of policy promises made by potential autocratic successors -- impact the likelihood of elite-driven democratization. We demonstrate the model's plausibility in a series of cases of democratic transition.

Our paper models the interaction between authorities in a country with poor rule of law and a potentially acquisitive agent (e.g., an investor interested in illegitimate land acquisition), whose actions are possibly licensed by the corrupt authorities. We explore this relationship in a two-stage experiment where the authorities have the right to expropriate the investor’s earnings, if they are not content with the share of the profit they receive as a bribe. Realizing this condition, potential investors’ initial decision is whether to become a land grabber in such an authoritarian state or not. Although the risks are obvious, we find that many agents do not act according to the Nash equilibrium of the game. Many subjects in the first stage of the game, who face a potential total loss when choosing to enter into the second stage of the game, accept the risk and try to bribe the second stage dictator. Also deviating from the Nash equilibrium, the second-stage dictators often appear to be appeasable by bribery.

We report the experimental results on a game with an outside option where forward induction contradicts with backward induction based on a focal, risk dominant equilibrium. The latter procedure yields the equilibrium selected by Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) theory, which is hence here in contradiction with strategic stability (Kohlberg-Mertens (1985)). We …nd the Harsanyi-Selten solution to be in much better agreement with our data. Since fairness and bounded rationality seem to matter we discuss whether recent behavioral theories, in particular fairness theories and learning, might explain our …ndings. The fairness theories by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) or Charness and Rabin (2002), when calibrated using experimental data on dictator- and ultimatum games, indeed predict that forward induction should play no role for our experiment and that the outside option should be chosen by all su¢ ciently sel…sh players. However, there is a multiplicity of “fairness equilibria”, some of which seem to be rejected because they require too many levels of reasoning. � We thank Prof. Reinhard Selten for his support in the design of the experiment and for many helpful discussions. The design of the basic game is due to him. We are grateful for the help received by those working at the Bonn Laboratory for Experimental Economics when preparing and conducting the experiment. We had several opportunities to present this work in seminars which resulted in many helpful comments and suggestions by the participants.

This article considers how international criminal justice administered by the International Criminal Court (ICC) affects the possibility of negotiated, peaceful transitions of power in autocracies. We argue that a strong international criminal tribunal can deter dictators’ decisions to peacefully relinquish their power. It does so when the dictator in question has faced a relatively violent opposition, one that was ready to strike a deal with the dictator promising him amnesty in exchange for stepping down. Facing an opposition that “has skeletons in its closet,” the dictator will peacefully exit his office only under a weak ICC regime. We use a cross-national time-series data set spanning 1998 to 2007 to test our theory and find that under a weak ICC regime, the more skeletons the opposition has in its own closet, the more likely is the dictator to peacefully step down from office. Interestingly, this relationship holds, to a large extent, across various levels of dictator’s culpability. If the ICC is strong, the number of skeletons the opposition has in its closet has, for the most part, no effect on the dictator’s likelihood of stepping down.

The literature on dictator (D) and joy-of-destruction (JoD) games demonstrates that some people can be nice and some people can be nasty. We study, by way of an experiment with between-subjects and within-subjects features, to what extent social preferences are consistent or context dependent. We find that participants’ giving amount in D games, and the amount they destroy in JoD games, depends on the choice set. While the choice set strongly affects participants’ giving decisions, its effect on participants’ destruction decisions is much weaker. We observe inconsistent choices (giving in D games and destroying in JoD games) for about one in five subjects but also find this mixed-motive preference dramatically reduces when the choice sets of standard D and JoD games are enlarged. Most of our participants are selfish although they also tend to make choices that increase social welfare when given the opportunity. The Machiavellian attitudes we elicited predict the giving amount in D games but not the destruction amount in JoD games.