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We study inequality in mortality in Finland using registry data that covers the whole population for years 1990-2018. We create municipality-level indexes of regional deprivation (poverty rate), and show how age-specifc mortality rates have evolved across regions and over time. The inequality in mortality has been remarkably low over the time period for most age groups. However, among young and prime-age males the mortality rates have been persistently higher in the poorer areas. For these age groups the leading causes of death are deaths of despair (alcohol and suicides) and accidents. For the cohorts that were young during the deep early-1990's recession, we also document higher inequality in middle-age mortality than for cohorts entering the labor market in recovery periods.

Funding Information: We thank seminar and session participants at UCL, SOFI, SOLE 2017, EALE 2018, ESPE 2019, Barcelona Summer Forum, 2020. Fredriksson gratefully acknowledges the financial support from Marcus and Amalia Wallenberg Foundation and Handelsbanken. Huttunen gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Finnish Academy. Publisher Copyright: © 2022 This paper analyses the effects of maternal age at birth on children's short and long-term outcomes using Finnish register data. We exploit a school starting age rule for identification. Mothers who are born after the school entry cut-off give birth at higher age, but total fertility and earnings are unaffected. Being born after the cut-off reduces gestation and, hence, child birth weight. The effects on birth weight and gestation are rather small, however, suggesting that the long-run impacts may be limited. Accordingly, we find no impacts on longer-term child outcomes, such as educational attainment and adolescent crime rates. Thus, using this source of variation, we find no favorable average effects of maternal age at birth on child outcomes.

We analyze short and long-term effects of worker displacement. Our sample consists of male workers displaced from Norwegian manufacturing plants. We find that displacement increases the probability of leaving the labor force by 31%. The drop-out rate from the labor force is particularly high in the first years following displacement. The average earnings effects for those who remain in the labor force are moderate, a 3% loss relative to non-displaced workers after seven years. Splitting displaced workers on within- and between-firm movers, we find that the estimated earnings loss is entirely driven by between-firm movers who experience a 3.6% loss. Transfers to other plants within multi-plant firms upon displacement are quite common. Our results support the view that human capital is partly firm specific and partly industry specific. We find no evidence suggesting that human capital is plant specific.

It is well documented that displaced workers suffer severe earnings losses, but not why this is so. One reason may be that workers are unable or unwilling to move to regions with better employment opportunities. We study this and find that job displacement increases regional mobility but, surprisingly, we also find that displaced workers who move suffer larger income losses than displaced workers who stay in the same region. This is not a selection effect, but reflects the fact that non-economic factors such as family ties are very important for the decision to migrate. Workers are less likely to move if they have family in the region where they already live, and job loss stimulates workers to relocate with parents and siblings when they live in different regions. Looking at earnings we find that the entire post displacement income difference between displaced movers and stayers is driven by workers moving to regions where their parents live or to rural areas. Furthermore, when looking at long-run family income, we find that the difference between displaced movers and stayers is very modest. With respect to selection, we find that migrants are positively selected on average, but very heterogeneous. They seem to be drawn disproportionately both from the high and the low end of the skill distribution in the region they leave.

It is well documented that displaced workers suffer severe earnings losses, but not why this is so. One reason may be that workers are unable or unwilling to move to regions with better employment opportunities. We study this and find that job displacement increases regional mobility but, surprisingly, we also find that displaced workers who move suffer larger income losses than displaced workers who stay in the same region. This is not a selection effect, but reflects the fact that non-economic factors such as family ties are very important for the decision to migrate. Workers are less likely to move if they have family in the region where they already live, and job loss stimulates workers to relocate with parents and siblings when they live in different regions.Looking at earnings we find that the entire post displacement income difference between displaced movers and stayers is driven by workers moving to regions where their parents live or to rural areas. Furthermore, when looking at long-run family income, we find that the difference between displaced movers and stayers is very modest. With respect to selection, we find that migrants are positively selected on average, but very heterogeneous. They seem to be drawn disproportionately both from the high and the low end of the skill distribution in the region they leave.

This paper analyzes the effects of job displacement on fertility using Finnish longitudinal employer-employee data (FLEED) matched to birth records. We distinguish between male and female job losses. We focus on couples where one spouse has lost his/her job due to a plant closure or mass layoff and follow them for several years both before and following the job loss. As a comparison group we use similar couples that were not affected by job displacement. In order to examine the possible channels through which job loss affects fertility we examine also the effect on earnings, employment and divorce. The results show that a woman?s own job loss decreases fertility mainly for highly educated women. For every 100 displaced females there are approximately 4 less children born. A man?s job loss has no significant impact on completed fertility.

Low-wage subsidies are often proposed as a solution to the unemployment problem among the low skilled. Yet the empirical evidence on the effects of low-wage subsidies is surprisingly scarce. This paper examines the employment effects of a Finnish payroll tax subsidy scheme, which is targeted at the employers of older, full-time, low-wage workers. The system’s clear eligibility criteria open up an opportunity for a reliable estimation of the causal impacts of the subsidy, using a difference-in-difference-in-differences approach. Our results indicate that the subsidy system had no effects on the employment rate. However, it appears to have increased the probability of part-time workers obtaining full-time employment.