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We study a principal-agent relationship between a politician and a researcher that captures stylized facts regarding the involvement of politics into scientific research. The politician has some ideal policy that he would like to implement, but needs to contract with a researcher to choose a policy that is supported by scientific advice. We study the implemented contracts under symmetric and under asymmetric information about the researcher's ability and concern for reputation, and discuss with which types of researchers the politician will contract. We identify several conflicts between the interests of voters and those of the politician. (JEL D72, D82, D83), I. INTRODUCTION Reaching scientific certainty before implementing policies is typically an illusion. The ubiquitous ambiguity leaves room for speculations that political interests may determine in which form scientific insights are [...]

A study was conducted to determine why people initially give to charities, why they remain committed to the cause, and what factors attenuate these effects. An experimental design that links donations across distinct treatments separated in time was used. Findings indicate that previous donors are more likely to give, and contribute more, than other donor types.

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.05.001 Byline: Andreas Lange (a)(b), John A. List (c)(d), Michael K. Price (e) Keywords: Tontines; Public goods; Fundraising; Lotteries; Experiments Abstract: The tontine, which is an interesting mixture of group annuity, group life insurance, and lottery, has a peculiar place in economic history. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it played a major role in raising funds to finance public goods in Europe, but today it is rarely encountered outside of a dusty footnote in actuarial course notes or as a means to thicken the plot of a murder mystery. This study provides a formal model of individual contribution decisions under a modern variant of the historical tontine mechanism that is easily implemented by private charities. Our model incorporates desirable properties of the historical tontine to develop a mechanism to fund the private provision of a public good. The tontine-like mechanism we derive is predicted to outperform not only the voluntary contribution mechanism but also another widely used mechanism: charitable lotteries. Our experimental test of the instrument provides some evidence of the beneficial effects associated with implementing tontine-like schemes. We find that the mechanism has particular power in cases where agents are risk-averse or in situations where substantial asymmetries characterize individual preferences for the public good. Author Affiliation: (a) AREC, The University of Maryland, 2200 Symons Hall, College Park, MD 20742-5535, United States (b) ZEW, Germany (c) Department of Economics, University of Chicago, United States (d) NBER, United States (e) ARE, University of Nevada Reno, United States Article History: Received 17 August 2006; Revised 23 February 2007; Accepted 21 May 2007 Article Note: (footnote) [star] Seminar participants at the BBV celebration, the Guest Editors, and an anonymous reviewer provided particularly acute comments that shaped the manuscript. Shannon Price provided excellent research assistance. Andreas Lange gratefully acknowledges funding by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) under grant LA 1333/2-1. Michael Price gratefully acknowledges funding by the Russell Sage foundation.

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00449.x Byline: Andreas Lange ([dagger]), John A. List ([dagger]), Michael K. Price (1) Abstract: This study explores the economics of charitable fund-raising. We begin by developing theory that examines the optimal lottery design while explicitly relaxing both risk-neutrality and preference homogeneity assumptions. We test our theory using a battery of experimental treatments and find that our theoretical predictions are largely confirmed. Specifically, we find that single- and multiple-prize lotteries dominate the voluntary contribution mechanism both in total dollars raised and the number of contributors attracted. Moreover, we find that the optimal fund-raising mechanism depends critically on the risk postures of potential contributors and preference heterogeneity. Author Affiliation: ([dagger])University of Maryland and ZEW; University of Chicago and NBER; and University of Nevada, Reno

The economic impact of American philanthropic organizations's fund raising activities is examined.

This paper derives optimal schemes for the free allocation of emission allowances in a dynamic context. We consider emissions- and output-based allocation rules which allow for updating of the basis of allocation over time and thereby do not rely on historical data only. We show that such dynamic schemes do not necessarily induce inefficient outcomes. In closed trading systems with an absolute cap on emissions, grandfathering schemes which allocate allowances proportionally to past emissions are first-best. However, in open trading systems where allowances can be traded with outsiders, first-best allocation schemes must not depend on firm-specific decisions while second-best schemes correspond to a Ramsey rule of optimal tax differentiation and are generally based on both past emission and output levels. JEL classification: H21; H23; Q28 Keywords: Emissions trading; Emission allowances; Grandfathering; Free allocation; Optimal taxation; Efficiency

Reimplementation of an EU-wide emissions trading system by means of National Allocation Plans is at the core of the European environmental policy agenda. EU Member States must allocate their national [...]

The development of international environmental regulation is discussed.