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The value of public–private partnerships has typically been sought in financial and budgetary benefits. In both research and practice, important aspects of nonfinancial value have remained under the radar. This article discusses four “white raven” public–private partnerships that have shown rather atypical results in terms of their physical outcomes—design, contextual fit, and multifunctionality. We argue that despite the increasing role of private sector actors, public sector clients fulfill a key role in delivering value. A strong sense of ambition and vision, in combination with a solid coordination on the part of the client, helps deliver projects that go beyond mere financial perks and deliver true social value. These elements have largely been overlooked in previous research, which has often focused on financial, legal, political, and managerial capacities of government actors.

Public-private partnerships for infrastructure development are often conceived as puzzling governance tools. A peculiar case in Belgium has been the procurement of multiple similar projects to single private sector partners who design, build, finance and maintain infrastructure for a fixed period— bundled procurement. Under the umbrella of the Flemish Sports Infrastructure Program, several of these bundles were tendered, particularly in order to achieve economies of scale. However, bundled procurement came at a price. This article scrutinizes its tense relationship with local governments' interests and competitive tendering. It shows that competition was hampered to a certain extent, but an equally important role in this respect was played by high contractual demands. As for local interests, in some cases the voice of local governments was given too much weight during the procurement phase. Consequently, political interests intervened and uncertainty arose.

Although public private partnership (PPP) in infrastructure development has gained foothold in Flanders (the northern part of Belgium) over time, dissimilar results are evident and the controversy around PPP remains. This paper investigates the contradictory achievements of the Flemish Sports Infrastructure Program. It shows that the form of governance as applied by the Flemish Government was inadequate and led to interferences of political, multi-actor, and technical complexities, which in turn compromised the performance of the Program. A mismatch is revealed between the complicated governance approach and the relatively straightforward infrastructures that were developed, hence the argument that a better sense of contingency is required in future PPP programs. Moreover, governments across the globe are recommended to think twice before embarking on PPP programs which include bundled procurement and mandating agreements: severe complexities are likely to emerge and convincing evidence on the merits of bundling and mandating has not yet been delivered.(2) (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.

Publicprivate partnerships (PPPs) for the provision of public infrastructure involve costly contracting processes. Standard contracts are modularly structured documents, which provide standard terms for these processes; it is argued that they help reduce transaction costs by limiting the room for contractual negotiations. We investigate the use of standard contracts in an embedded case study of a PPP policy program in the Belgian sports sector, and apply notions of standardization theory and transaction cost economics to explain the differences in the success of using these contracts. On the basis of desk research and interviews, our study demonstrates both successful and unsuccessful usage of standard contracts across a range of subcases, which include artificial pitches, sports halls, and multifunctional sports centers. Unsuccessful cases were characterized by an interference of local governments interests that was poorly managed by the leading public actor, and a persistently rigid attitude at the negotiation table of this latter actor. We further relate the different degrees of success to inappropriate government responses to the assets at hand. Finally, we proclaim a more cautious approach toward the standardization of contracts, both in theory and practice.

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are known as challenging contractual endeavors to public sector managers, and governments are developing standard contracts in order to ease the contracting process toward PPP deals. This study examines the learning process governments go through while managing the procurement trajectories of PPPs over time and revising the model contract they use, thereby gradually moving toward the formulation of a standard contract. It presents a case study of four consecutive road infrastructure projects in Belgium that looks into the contractual changes that were made over time and explains the reasons behind those changes. The results indicate a learning process that is characterized by an open attitude to learning of public sector actors, and a leading role of private sector actors-primarily financiers-in proposing or even requiring change. Contrary to theory-based expectations, the government continuously tested whether its model contract was in line with market practice, rather than increasingly limiting the room for negotiation as it gained experience.

A call for an increased use of standard contracts in publicprivate partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure development is noticeable in practice. These contracts are expected to simplify and improve procurement by creating opportunities for learning, lower transaction costs, and better competition. This paper delineates standard contracts in PPP as a new venue for research and unfolds their potential impact. Here lies an important challenge since the benefits of standardization are not as straightforward as they look at first sight, particularly when taking into account the tension between the powerful, control-oriented role of contracting authorities and the need for contingent, informal contracting.