Search

We revisit the discussion about the relationship between price’s cyclical features, implicit collusion and the demand level in an oligopoly supergame where a positive shock may hit demand and disrupt collusion. The novel feature of our model consists in characterising the post-shock noncooperative price and comparing it against the cartel price played in the last period of the collusive path, to single out the conditions for procyclicality to arise both in the short and in the long-run. This poses an issue in terms of an antitrust agency’s ability to draw well defined conclusions on the firms’ behaviour after the occurrence of the shock, with particular reference for the litigation phase after a cartel breakdown.

This paper studies whether civic capital (those persistent shared beliefs and values that help a group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities) acts an effective restraint against opportunistic behavior in transactions by looking at the firm-level degree of service outsourcing in Italy. Our results show that firms tend to outsource more services in areas where civic capital is higher. We claim that the rise in the propensity to engage in transactions with outside service suppliers stems from the decrease in opportunism between the parties involved. We consider a dynamic specification which allows to disentangle state dependence of service out- sourcing from firm-level heterogeneity, and we use historical instruments to address the potential endogeneity of civic capital.

Economic inequality may fuel frustration, possibly leading to anger and antisocial behavior. We experimentally study a situation where only the rich can reduce inequality while the poor can express their discontent by destroying the wealth of a rich counterpart with whom they had no previous interaction. We test whether the emergence of such forms of antisocial behavior depends only on the level of inequality, or also on the conditions under which inequality occurs. We compare an environment in which the rich can unilaterally reduce inequality with one where generosity makes them vulnerable to exploitation by the poor. We find that the rich are expected to be more generous in the former scenario than in the latter, but in fact this hope is systematically violated. We also observe that the poor engage in forms of antisocial behavior more often when reducing inequality would be safe for the rich. These results cannot be rationalized by inequality aversion alone, while they are in line with recent models that focus on anger as the result of the frustration of expectations.

This article deals with the role of time in causal models in the social sciences. The aim is to underline the importance of time-sensitive causal models, in contrast to time-free models. The relation between time and causality is important, though a complex one, as the debates in the philosophy of science show. In particular, an outstanding issue is whether one can derive causal ordering from time ordering. The article examines how time is taken into account in demography and in economics as examples of social sciences in which considerations about time may diverge. We then present structural causal modeling as a modeling strategy that, while not essentially based on temporal information, can incorporate it in a more or less explicit way. In particular, we argue that temporal information is useful to the extent that it is placed in a correct causal structure, thus further corroborating the causal mechanism or generative process explaining the phenomenon under consideration. Despite the fact that the causal ordering of variables is more relevant than the temporal order for explanatory purposes, in establishing causal ordering the researcher should nevertheless take into account the time-patterns of causes and effects, as these are often episodes rather than single events. For this reason in particular, it is time to put time at the core of our causal models.

We consider a broad class of intertemporal economic problems and characterize the short-run and long-run responses of the demand for a good to a permanent increase in its market price. Depending on the interplay between self-productivity and time discounting, we show that dynamic substitution effects can generate price elasticities of opposite signs in the short run and in the long run. (JEL D11, D15, H20, J22, J24)

This paper develops a theoretical framework for four sustainability paradigms (weak sustainability, a-growth, de-growth, strong sustainability) within cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios, and includes changes in four values (a sense of responsibility to nature and future generations; aversion to inequality for current and future generations). The model assesses the feasibility of sustainability solutions for a shared environment as a function of specific value changes in each country by interpreting these value changes as support for environmental policies. The solutions are defined in terms of consumption, use of the environment, and welfare of representative individuals in each country; they are characterised by efficiency and equality at both intra- and inter-generational levels; and they are checked for internal consistency and consistency with alternative approaches such as utilitarianism, egalitarianism (i.e., Arneson, Dworkin, Sen), and contractarianism. Theoretical insights are obtained by comparing contextual stability and relative effectiveness of the environment's use among countries in alternative scenarios. A case study of the Baltic Sea operationally suggests that the currently adopted strong sustainability (i.e., an ecosystem approach) in a non-cooperative scenario (i.e., countries attempt to maximize their own rather than overall welfare) is internally consistent, relatively efficient, and consistent with Dworkin egalitarianism. A-growth was never feasible, but de-growth in which Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Sweden increase environmental protection would increase intra-generational equality; de-growth or weak sustainability in which Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Russia increase environmental R&D would increase intra- and inter-generational equality; weak sustainability and de-growth consistent with Arneson and Dworkin egalitarianism would improve the environmental status.

We study the problem facing the operator of a lottery who is charged with raising revenue for the public finances. Demand for the lottery is a function of both disposable income and the pricing of the game. Departing from the current literature, we show that optimal lottery pricing includes corrections for the degree of inequality and skewness in the income distribution and features of the function relating lottery spend to disposable income. When gross lottery expenditure is regressive, it is optimal for the operator to improve the terms of the game by being more generous with the proportion of spend that is returned to players. The opposite result holds when gross lottery expenditure is progressive. Using results from analysis of the U.K. National Lottery’s Saturday game between 1997 and 2013, we show that the effective price was about ten percentage points too low to be efficient, so that the operator was not fully exploiting its lottery power. However, we also show that, were it to have raised its price to improve efficiency, it would have increased inequality.

This paper proposes to measure and to evaluate gender gaps and gender inequalities by means of the decomposition of an inequality measure. A three-terms decomposition of the Gini index is applied, thus allowing to take into account also the role of overlapping between female and male subpopulations. We develop an unified framework for the evaluation of gender gap, linking traditional measures, based on subgroups income means, to the approach related to inequality decomposition, and showing how overlapping component represents a key issue in gender gap analysis. An analysis of the income distribution of the Italian households shows how gender gaps represent a major source of inequality, without particular improvements during the last 20 years.

This paper illustrates the building procedure of a firm-level panel dataset that merges several sources of information concerning the various activities of business firms. The aim of this work is to achieve a detailed dataset able to shed light on firm demographics, in terms of survival, entry and exit processes, distinguishing between “voluntary" and “involuntary" exits. Moreover, the derived dataset allows to monitor the innovation activities of the firms and also to capture complementarities between two instruments of intellectual property rights (IPRs), namely granted patents and registered trademarks. We assess the validity of the proposed procedures resorting to the virtual universe of Italian limited liability companies as provided by Bureau van Dijk (BvD). The dataset covers more than 1 million companies operating in both manufacturing and service sectors and contain financial and economic information, as well as, among the others, the ownership structure and administrative procedures undergone by the firms, which may lead to firm exit. The main purpose of the paper is to provide a unified set of procedures to help the researcher dealing with the vast amount of information available on corporate firms and of ever increasing size. This will also facilitate the replication of empirical analyses, across researchers working on dataset with similar characteristics, although from different countries or data providers.

This study investigates the optimal nature of law making under uncertainty. I focus on a case in which a harmful activity will be subjected to some regulatory measures (a standard, exposure to liability, or a corrective tax). The benefits and costs of precaution are ex-ante uncertain, and this places a risk burden on both injurers and victims. The optimal policy should, at the same time, strike a balance between benefits and costs of the measures, and attenuate the ex-ante risk. Whether measures should be made stronger or softer depends on the size and the sign of the shocks affecting the parties (positive or negative) and their disposition towards risk. With corrective taxes, it also depends on the elasticity of precautions with respect to the tax rate.

The key role played by public information in market economies is paramount. Yet, investigation on how prices are affected is hindered by intricate endogeneity and parametrization issues. This paper contributes to the literature by identifying and studying a case where public information is related to weather forecasts, in a sector (tourism) where meteorological conditions exogenously impact on both suppliers' and consumers' decisions, especially in leisure destinations. We first develop a theoretical model where forecasts affect demand and hence equilibrium prices in accommodation: an improvement in the weather forecast has a positive impact on the price, the effect being stronger the higher the level of accuracy of the forecast and the level of ex ante uncertainty in weather conditions. We then estimate an augmented hedonic price model where dynamic characteristics (typical of advanced booking strategies) are included together with information about weather forecasts. Consistent with the theory, we find that, ceteris paribus, good weather forecasts are associated to higher prices, the impact being larger the higher their level of accuracy and the higher the ex ante level of uncertainty in weather conditions.

The aim of this article is to model the decisions of tourists and a monopolist firm when weather forecasts are available. Before deciding whether to go on holiday or not, but after the firm has decided and posted its price, tourists can look at weather forecasts. Our results show that the price chosen by the firm and the corresponding equilibrium profit are decreasing as a function of the accuracy of weather forecasts. Consumers, instead, are better off, the more accurate weather forecasts become. Managerial and policy implications are also derived.

In this paper we investigate the process of creation and destruction of industries as it stems from productivity increasing innovations and from the induced changes of consumption patterns. In our model industries whose demand increases experience an expansion of the number of intermediate goods and hence of their research effort, while those whose demand declines undergo a cost-cutting restructuring with a corresponding reduction of the number of intermediates. We show that if aggregate consumption is concentrated on high (low) priority goods in the early (later) stages of the economy’s development and spread out more evenly in an intermediate stage, then the diversification of the economy over the development path is inversely U-shaped: a result that is consistent with the empirical evidence in Imbs and Wacziarg 2003 “Stages of Diversification.” American Economic Review 93: 63–86.

Nonlinear estimation of the gravity model with Poisson-type regression methods has become popular for modelling international trade flows, because it permits a better accounting for zero flows and extreme values in the distribution tail. Nevertheless, as trade flows are not independent from each other due to spatial and network autocorrelation, these methods may lead to biased parameter estimates. To overcome this problem, eigenvector spatial filtering (ESF) variants of the Poisson/negative binomial specifications have been proposed in the literature on gravity modelling of trade. However, no specific treatment has been developed for cases in which many zero flows are present. This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, by employing a stepwise selection criterion for spatial filters that is based on robust (sandwich) p-values and does not require likelihood-based indicators. In this respect, we develop an ad hoc backward stepwise function in R. Second, using this function, we select a reduced set of spatial filters that properly accounts for importer-side and exporter-side specific spatial effects, as well as network effects, both at the count and the logit processes of zero-inflated methods. Applying this estimation strategy to a cross-section of bilateral trade flows between a set of 64 countries for the year 2000, we find that our specification outperforms the benchmark models in terms of model fitting, both considering the AIC and in predicting zero (and small) flows.

Our model explains the observed gender-specific patterns of career and child-care choices through endogenous social norms. We study how these norms contribute to the emergence of a gender wage gap. We show that via the social norm a couple’s child-care and career choices impose an externality on other couples, so that the laissez-faire is inefficient. We use our model to study the design and effectiveness of three commonly used policies.We find that child-care subsidies and women quotas can be effective tools to mitigate or eliminate the externality. Parental leave, however, may even intensify the externality and decrease welfare.

This paper develops a theoretical model as a foundation of empirical analysis of the transmission channel of non-performing loans (NPLs) on bank cost of capital, credit and liquidity creation in the Eurozone. Empirical results confirm the model’s predictions and suggest that holding non-performing loans increases the cost of capital for banks in the short-term and the long-term. Moreover, the increased cost of capital reduces credit and liquidity creation, and the more so the less capitalized is the bank. This phenomenon is found to be economically more significant for European periphery country banks than for core country banks. The identification of the transmission channel is robust to the Granger predictability test.

We study subgame-perfect equilibria of the classical quality-price, multistage game of vertical product differentiation. Each of two firms can choose the levels of an arbitrary number of qualities. Consumers’ valuations are drawn from independent and general distributions. The unit cost of production is increasing and convex in qualities. We characterize equilibrium prices, and the effects of qualities on the rival’s equilibrium price in the general model. Equilibrium qualities depend on what we call the Spence and price-reaction effects. For any equilibrium, we characterize conditions for quality differentiation.

We revisit the adoption of voluntary export restraints (VERS) in the differential Cournot game with sticky price and intraindustry trade by Dockner and Haug (Can J Econ 3:679–685, 1991). The analysis relies on linear and nonlinear feedback strategies, to encompass the special cases considered in Fujiwara (Aust Econ Pap 49:101–110, 2010). We show that a VER may arise in correspondence of any free trade equilibrium generated by feedback information, when the intensity of competition is at least as strong as under open-loop information. The adoption of a VER by a foreign firm also benefits the domestic firm, yielding an outcome which has a definite collusive flavour. The foreign firm’s incentive to adopt the VER can be interpreted in the light of the dynamic formulation of conjectural variations due to Dockner (J Ind Econ 40:377–395, 2010).

This paper is about technology choices in a differentiated oligopoly. The main questions are: whether the position in the product space affects the choice of technology, how changes in fixed costs affect price outcomes, the strategic responses to policy interventions. The industry is an oligopoly where a central firm is competing with two peripheral (or marginal) ones. The former is shown to be more ready than the latter to adopt a technology with low marginal costs and high fixed costs (Increasing Returns to Scale) rather than one with the opposite pattern (Constant Returns to Scale). The fixed cost in the IRS affects the technology configuration and hence output prices. For instance, a lower fixed cost may trigger lower prices and it is neutral only for given technologies. A price-cap may forestall a change in technologies; nondiscriminatory ad-valorem tax and taxes on variable input, or discriminatory unit taxes can also affect the technology pattern and deliver important effects on prices.

Even though informal employment is widespread in transition economies, the literature on this phenomenon in the region is rather scarce. For policy makers it is important to know the incidence and the determinants of informal employment. In the first part of the paper we demonstrate that its incidence and to a lesser degree its determinants depend on the definition used. We then discuss studies that attempt to test for labor market segmentation in transition economies along the formal–informal divide. The presented results are inconclusive, and we come to the conclusion that more work needs to be done before we can make definitive statements about whether labor markets are integrated or segmented in transition economies. Last but not least we introduce a new research area that links risk preferences and selection into labor market states. We show that if individuals have a choice, relatively risk-loving workers have an increased likelihood to choose informal employment and self-employment.

State building and state competition during the 16th century triggered a creative moment in the history of public finance. Recent scholarship has clearly identified the Papal States and their communities as active participants both in the state building process and the reorganization of public finance. Banking on a wealth of fiscal records, it is argued that Papal authority succeeded in forging a new fiscal pact – which lasted over two centuries - between central and local authorities. Blending conservatism and innovation the papacy promoted a contractual approach: local powers were granted a large degree of autonomy in selecting fiscal instruments, the types of wealth to be taxed and the means of collecting resources, while the Apostolic Chamber secured both the control of a growing portion of the provinces’ fiscal income as well as access to a pool of financial resources at a rapidly declining cost.

We reformulate the Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model of natural resource extraction under the alternative assumptions of Cournot behaviour and perfect competition, to revisit the tragedy of commons vs the possibility of sustainable harvesting. We stress the different impact of demand elasticity on the regulator’s possibility of driving industry harvest to the maximum sustainable yield in the two settings. The presence of a flat demand function offers the authority a fully effective regulatory tool in the form of the exogeneous price faced by perfectly competitive firms, to drive their collective harvest rate at the maximum sustainable yield. The same cannot happen under Cournot competition, as in this case the price is endogenous and the regulator’s policy is confined to limiting access to the common pool.

This paper proposes a new Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with credit frictions and a banking sector, which endogenizes loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of households and banks by expressing them as a function of systemic and idiosyncratic proxies for risk. Moreover, the model features endogenous balance sheet choices and a novel formulation of the targeted leverage ratio, in which assets are risk-weighted by risk-sensitivity measures. The results highlighted in this paper are important along two dimensions. First of all, the presence of endogenous LTV ratios exacerbates the procyclicality of lending conditions. Second, the model contributes to deeper understand the role of prudential regulatory frameworks in affecting business cycle fluctuations and in restoring macroeconomic and financial stability. The results suggest that when the economy is severely stressed by shocks originating in the financial sector, prudential regimes such as Basel II and Basel III are capable of downsizing substantially aggregate volatility, with Basel III found to be significantly more effective than Basel II.

We study how envy affects screening contracts offered to employees who care about the mission of the organisation and differ in ability, which is their private information. We show that organisation's mission plays a critical role. In sectors where mission is important, despite receiving higher wages than their less talented colleagues, high-ability workers perceive their contract as unfair because they are required to perform much more demanding tasks. In contrast, in sectors where mission is not particularly relevant, the less talented employees are envious towards their high-ability colleagues. Our model provides novel implications for organisations' compensation schemes and new insights on the possible effects of minimum wage policies. We test our theoretical predictions by using the German Socio-Economic Panel data and a novel survey addressed to academics in Spain.

We investigate the relationship between market concentration and industry innovative effort within a familiar two-stage model of R&D race in which firms compete à la Cournot in the product market. With the help of numerical simulations, we show that such a setting is rich enough to generate Arrovian, Schumpeterian, and inverted U curves. We interpret these different patterns on the basis of the relative strength of the technological incentive and the strategic incentive. We then bridge our theoretical results and some recent empirical research.

We revisit the well known differential Cournot game with polluting emissions dating back to Benchekroun and Long (1998), proposing a version of the model in which environmental taxation is levied on emissions rather than the environmental damage. This allows to attain strong time consistency under open-loop information, and yields two main results which can be summarized as follows: (i) to attain a fully green technology in steady state, the regulator may equivalently adopt an appropriate tax rate (for any given number of firms) or regulate market access (for any given tax rate); (ii) if the environmental damage depends on emissions only (i.e., not on industry output) then the aggregate green R&D effort takes an inverted-U shape, in accordance with Aghion et al. (2005), and the industry structure maximising aggregate green innovation also minimises individual and aggregate emissions.

Building on the literature on regularization and dimension reduction methods, we have developed a quarterly forecasting model for euro area GDP. This method consists in bridging quarterly national accounts data using factors extracted from a large panel of monthly and quarterly series including business surveys and financial indicators. The pseudo real-time nature of the information set is accounted for as the pattern of publication lags is considered. Forecast evaluation exercises show that predictions obtained through various dimension reduction methods outperform both the benchmark AR and the diffusion index model without pre-selected indicators. Moreover, forecast combination significantly reduces forecast error.

A well established dynamic model describing the impact of oligopolistic interaction on a renewable resource is revisited here to illustrate its dual interpretation as a waste removal differential game. The regulatory implications are illustrated by assuming that the public agency may control market price and possibly also access to the commons. Two different formulations of the managerial or CSR objective are envisaged, based on a combination of profits and either output or the individual share of the waste stock. It is shown that if the representative firm’s objective includes the residual waste stock, there exists a unique regulated price driving to zero the steady state stock itself. Hence, the present analysis delivers some useful indications concerning an appropriate definition of the CSR objective firms should adopt.

Although death occurs with certainty, the time of death is uncertain. In this paper we build on this conceptualization and show that, although life ends at some point in time, human life can be meaningfully conceptualized as a strive for immortality that is never reached. We consider an intertemporal problem where health investments and consumption choices are made, taking into account that mortality depends on environmental factors, which are not controlled by the agent, and the agent's health condition, which is endogenous to lifestyle and health behavior. Formally, the infinite horizon approach has the advantage that adjustment dynamics to the steady state (i.e. human aging) can be discussed analytically. We explore the determinants of health deficits in this framework and show how individuals choose consumption and health expenditure over their lifetime in order to slow down (biological) aging. We compute analytically the impulse response functions for unexpected parameter changes. Specifically, we investigate how higher prices for medical goods and advancing medical technology affect individual behavior and health deficit accumulation.

We experimentally test for spillover effects of gender quotas on subsequent unrelated, unethical behavior. We find that introducing quotas has no systematic effect on unethical behavior for both genders. High performing, competitive females are more likely to display unethical behavior than their male counterparts.

Among the various statistical studies on migration before the Great War, Italy has received little attention, with a few notable exceptions. The standard economic approach explains emigration to any given country as driven by relative wages, relative employment rates, and the stock of previous emigrants to that country, the "network". This paper improves on earlier contributions by covering all Italian migration outflows between 1876 and 1915 to the most significant destination countries, taking all countries separately and simultaneously and adopting the most consistent and up-to-date econometric approaches. As it turns out, the standard model is only partially confirmed when accounting for heterogeneity of destinations, whereas other relevant hypotheses are not accepted.

A new behavioral foundation is uncovered for why money promotes impersonal exchange. In an experiment, subjects could cooperate by intertemporally exchanging goods with anonymous opponents met at random. Indefinite repetition supported multiple equilibria, from full defection to the efficient outcome. Introducing the possibility to hold and exchange intrinsically worthless tickets affected outcomes and cooperation patterns. Tickets resembled fiat money, which emerged as a tool for equilibrium selection in the economy. Monetary exchange facilitated coordination on cooperation and redistributed surplus from defectors to cooperators. Treatments where subjects could develop a reputation revealed a limited record-keeping role for monetary exchange.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between government spending and private consumption in the UK, for which there is scarce previous empirical evidence. We disaggregate public expenditure into three categories and search for the corresponding private consumption multipliers. Our analysis is based on the estimation of a structural vector error correction model with quarterly non-interpolated data for the period 1981:1 – 2007:4. Initially, we estimate negative but barely significant effects on consumption of shocks to total public spending. Then, using the public spending breaking down, we find that while shocks to public wages crowd-out private consumption as predicted by neoclassical models, shocks to the non-systematic component of social spending and government purchases of goods and services generate a positive reaction, so to crowd-in private consumption. Thus, the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of fiscal multipliers on private consumption change across different public spending categories. Our findings suggest that any empirical support of competing theoretical models on the issue would benefit from a disaggregation of government expenditure, rather than focusing on the aggregate measure.

New entrepreneurial ventures may represent a viable and effective mechanism to transform academic knowledge into regional economic growth. We test this notion for the Italian provinces between 2001 and 2006. We evaluate three outputs of academic activities: teaching, research and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) activities management. New ventures may be able to transform the mentioned outputs into improved economic performance. The findings show that the effects of academic outputs on provincial economic growth (all sectors) are appreciable when they are associated with sustained entrepreneurial activities in the province. It suggests that academic inquiry may provide new ventures with valuable commercial opportunities overseen by established companies.

This paper develops an original mean-variance model able to capture the disposition of the parties towards both standard risk and ambiguity. Ambiguity arises when the causal link between conduct and harm is not univocal, as is frequently the case with toxic torts. Risk aversion and ambiguity aversion tend to have a similar impact on optimal liability rules if greater care reduces the ambiguity perceived by the parties, i.e. if safety and predictability go hand in hand. Strict liability dominates negligence when the injurer has lower degrees of risk and ambiguity aversion than the victim and can formulate less ambiguous estimates of the probability of harm. The reverse result only holds under stronger conditions.

We revisit Fujiwara’s (2008) linear–quadratic differential duopoly game to show that the degenerate nonlinear feedback identified by the tangency point with the stationary state line is indeed unstable, given the dynamics of the natural resource exploited by firms. To do so, we fully characterise the continuum of nonlinear feedback solution via Rowat’s (2007) method, thereby identifying the infinitely many stable nonlinear feedback equilibria. This entails that Rowat’s method can be used in games where each player’s instantaneous payoff depends quadratically on all players’ controls.

Studies about innovation find evidence of a positive relationship between technological advancement and firm performance, in particular when the innovative effort is continuous. This paper aims to further the analysis on the duration of R&D investment at the firm level. The contribution of this study is threefold: first, we extend M'a~nez et al. [2014], Triguero et al. [2014] analysis for Spain to the Italian case: we use a panel of manufacturing and service companies, thus enlarging the view of R&D duration within the European countries. Secondly, from a methodological point of view, we employ both discrete- and continuous-time duration models, in order to test the Proportional Hazards (PH) assumption, i.e. the assumption that the hazard rate is equivalent over time across groups. Last, but not least, we assess whether a firm?s likelihood of continuing investment in R&D depends on the market power of companies. We test alternative measures for market power: the classical price-cost margin and a new proxy for the firm demand elasticity, obtained from a specific survey question. Results are in line with the hypothesis that R&D presents considerable temporal spill overs and strong persistence, even once unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for. Also, we argue that the appropriate proxy for market power is the firm demand elasticity, and we find support for the Schumpeterian hypothesis.

The paper investigates the optimal scope of trade secrets law. In the model, one innovative firm invests resources first to produce knowledge, and then to protect it from unwanted disclosure. A rival firm invests to ferret out this knowledge. Trade secrets law affects this “secrecy contest” by reducing the probability of unwanted disclosure given the efforts of the parties. We show how optimal trade secrets policy depends on structural market features and cost parameters. In the final section, we consider the limit case in which the innovation lies on the face of the product, and derive the optimal scope of legal provisions preventing copycat imitation of products (unfair competition, passing off).

This paper identifies the globally stable conditions under which an individual facing the same choice in many subsequent times learns to behave as prescribed by the expected-utility model. To do so, the analysis moves from the relevant behavioural models suggested by psychology (i.e., weighted probabilities applied to regret and rejoice theory), and by updating probability estimations and outcome preferences according to the learning models suggested by neuroscience (i.e., adaptive learning aimed at reducing surprises), and analogous to Bayesian updating. The search context is derived from experimental economics, whereas the learning framework is borrowed from theoretical economics. Analytical results show that obstinate and lucky individuals are better off in the short-run (i.e., a low density of events in the reference period), but they do not learn, and this is true to a greater extent in a simple context; in contrast, reactive and unlucky individuals are worse off in the short-run, but they learn and are better off in the long-run (i.e., all individuals are equally lucky or unlucky), and this is true to a greater extent in a complex context. The expected-utility model explains real behaviours in the long-run whenever unlucky events are more likely than lucky events.

The paper presents a new framework to assess firm level heterogeneity and to study the rate and direction of technical change. Building on the analysis of revealed short-run production functions by Hildenbrand (1981), we propose the (normalized) volume of the zonotope composed by vectors-firms in a narrowly defined industry as an indicator of inter-firm heterogeneity. Moreover, the angles that the main diagonal of the zonotope form with the axes provide a measure of the rates and directions of technical change over time. The proposed framework can easily account for n-inputs and m-outputs and, crucially, the measures of heterogeneity and technical change do not require many of the standard assumptions from production theory.

This paper analyzes a two-sided market for news where two rival advertisers may pay a media outlet to conceal negative information about the quality of their own product (paying positive to avoid negative) and/or to disclose negative information about the quality of their competitor׳s product (paying positive to go negative). We show that competition in the product market does not necessarily prevent the emergence of commercial media bias. Whether or not competing advertisers end up having negative consequences on news accuracy ultimately depends on the extent of correlation in the quality of their products; the lower the correlation, the higher the expected accuracy of the media outlet׳s reports. These findings provide a rationale to explain the observed differences in the extent of commercial media bias across seemingly similar industries or products, within the same media market. The results are robust to the presence of multiple media outlets and to asymmetries between the advertisers. Overall, the paper provides theoretical insights for media regulators and for the empirical literature examining the link between advertising and news contents.

Greenhouse gases generate impacts that can last longer than human civilization itself. Such persistence may affect the behavioral ability to cooperate. Here we study mitigation efforts within a framework that reflects key features of climate change and then contrasts a dynamic versus a static setting. In a treatment with persistence, the pollution cumulates and generates damages over time while in another treatment it has only immediate effects and then disappears. We find that cooperation is not hampered, on average, by pollution persistence. Mitigation efforts, though, should not be delayed, because cooperation levels appear to deteriorate for high stocks of pollution.

none 2 no Pubblicato come working paper: Delbono, Flavio ; Lambertini, Luca (2016) Choosing Roles under Supply Function Competition. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 19. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5173 . In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1069). ISSN 2282-6483. Multiplicity of equilibria under supply function competition is a two-layer problem. To prove it, we investigate an extended game with observable delay under duopolistic competition in affine supply functions. Firms use the intercepts of supply functions as their strategic variables. Best replies are downward (upward) sloping if the common slope of supply functions is sufficiently low (high). Accordingly, simultaneous (sequential) play is selected at the subgame perfect equilibrium when best replies are negatively (positively) sloped. When best replies are increasing, the mixed strategy solution cannot be circumvented. This makes the design of procurement more challenging than we were used to think. open Delbono, Flavio; Lambertini, Luca* Delbono, Flavio; Lambertini, Luca*

We challenge the global optimality of one-shot punishments in infinitely repeated games with discounting. Specifically, we show that the stick-and-carrot punishment à la Abreu (1986) may not be globally optimal. We prove our result by investigating tacit collusion in the infinite repetition of a linear Cournot game. We illustrate the existence of the stick-and-carrot globally optimal punishment for large cartels, and fully characterise it. Then, we show that for mall cartels, global optimality may be reached only with two-period punishments.

As observed in many advanced economies experiencing an increase of self-employment rates since the late 1970s, a flourishing small- and medium-size enterprise sector is traditionally associated with positive economic development and growth. In the regional context, areas benefiting from an established entrepreneurial culture are in general more successful and innovative, as well as better equipped to sustain structural changes and to lessen unemployment. It is therefore important to investigate the reasons why individuals choose self-employment, and why they do it despite lower protection, higher risks, and possibly more effort than what is required in a comparable wage employment position. Existing research identifies better prospects of entrepreneurial earnings as compared to wages as a major stimulus towards self-employment. However, besides pecuniary motivations, other factors may be considered when it comes to the occupational choice. These include displacement, uncertainty, (the threat of) unemployment, and (dis)-satisfaction. Building on a job quits model, we propose a representation of transition behaviour from wage to self-employment which includes subjective evaluations of pecuniary and nonpecuniary satisfaction on the previous job. Individual microdata are drawn from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), and cover the time period 1999–2008. Additionally, we focus on the dynamics of job satisfaction in order to highlight the role played by shocks in subjective evaluations, and introduce their interaction with levels to control for threshold effects.

This paper analyzes a model of electoral competition with uncertainty on the policy implemented by candidates. I show that this uncertainty can induce risk-averse voters to elect politicians whose policies are biased. I apply these results to a lobbying game, where candidates hold private information about their willingness to pander to lobbies once elected. I show that voters elect politicians who implement policies biased in favor of the lobby. Increasing the probability of non-pandering candidates can increase the effect of lobbying. The model thus demonstrates that uncertainty on the influence of special interests can lead to large effects of lobbying on policy.

In a field experiment, we studied the performance of an incentive scheme that combines a lottery-based reward for compliance with probabilistic sanctions for noncompliance. For one month, bus passengers who purchased a ticket on board a subset of buses operating in a medium-sized Italian city participated in a lottery awarding a €500 prize. The remaining buses—otherwise identical—were used as controls. We observed the amount of tickets sold on treated and control buses over three months, before, during, and after the introduction of the lottery. Results show that treated buses sold significantly more on-board tickets than control buses during the lottery period. In our setup, the estimated extra revenues from the ticket sales caused by the introduction of the lottery fell short of the amount of the total prizes raffled off. However, the incentive scheme proved cost-effective because not all the lottery prizes were claimed by winners. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.

This study examines how the quality of political institutions affects the distribution of the government budget in Iran. We first introduce a mechanism through which democracy can shift government expenditure from national defense (military) to productivity-enhancing public spending (e.g., education). Using impulse response functions (IRF) and a variance decomposition analysis (VDC) on the basis of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model, our results imply that the response of military spending to an improvement (a deterioration) of democratic institutions is negative (positive) and statistically significant, whereas that of education spending is positive (negative) and significant. Our results are robust to other indicators of political institutions, different orderings of variables in the VAR and alternative specifications of government spending categories.

We study unique data from a dynamic natural experiment involving more than 7,000 American women to understand how a woman’s propensity to perform an annual mammography changes over time after a co-worker is diagnosed with breast cancer. We find that in the year this event occurs the probability that a woman performs a mammography drops by about 8 percentage points, off a base level of about 70%. This impact effect is persistent during at least the following 2 years, is driven by cases of breast cancer diagnosed at non-early stages, and by the behavior of individuals who are less knowledgeable about health issues. This negative effect is confirm ed when we allow for serial correlation in screening behavior and when we estimate the effect of the treatment on the hazard of not screening, at the daily frequency. However, the effect vanishes in placebo experiments.

Random utility models are widely used to estimate preference parameters. In the case of intertemporal choice, the two most common models are the discounted logit and one we call the discounted Luce. Due to their apparent similarity, the choice to use one model or the other seems irrelevant. In this paper, we argue that the discounted Luce is superior to the discounted logit in two significant aspects. First, in relevant applications, the discounted Luce is monotone in the sense of Apesteguia and Ballester (2018), while the discounted logit is not. Second, we show that the discounted logit is incompatible with a property of choice probabilities we call “weak stationarity”. The latter is compatible with common assumptions on the random nature of choices and is often not falsifiable with commonly available data. Fitting a logit model to weakly stationary choice probabilities biases the time-preference estimates. On the contrary, the discounted Luce can be safely used when choice probabilities are weakly stationary. An application to an existing dataset supports the theoretical results.