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A dynamic model for multiple auctions, wherein sellers, each with a single good to sell, competes for buyers, was constructed. Based on the model, an equilibrium distribution for buyer types was determined and conditions for altering the equilibrium distribution were identified. The analyses showed that although sellers have the ability to alter the distribution of buyer types, equilibrium conditions are the optimum conditions for both buyer and seller.

A private-values model is used to describe the selling techniques of auctions and posted-price selling. Comparisons of the prices of the social optimum and the monopoly seller are provided. The global steepness of the marginal-revenue curve related to the buyer valuation distribution affects the type of sales technique that is used. A uniformly steeper marginal-revenue curve makes auctions more preferable to sellers, even if auctioning is expensive.

The nonlinear pricing problem faced by a multiproduct monopolist operating in a market in the presence of agents with budget constraints was investigated. The existence of an optimal, individually rational and incentive compatible selling mechanism for multiproduct monopolists was also examined. Empirical evidence indicates that an optimal, individually rational and incentive compatible selling mechanism arises if other goods are available and if the multiproduct monopolist's goods are not essential relative to other goods.

We study a repeated game where a seller, who has a short-term incentive to supply low quality, is periodically matched with a randomly selected buyer. Buyers observe only the outcomes of their neighbors' games and may receive signals from them. When the buyer population is large, the seller may sell high quality even when each buyer observes her action in any given period with an arbitrarily small probability. When networking among buyers is costly, low quality is always supplied with a positive probability. For this case, we characterize an equilibrium where the seller randomizes between high and low quality.