1. FORMAL HOME HEALTH CARE, INFORMAL CARE, AND FAMILY DECISION MAKING
- Author
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Byrne, David, Goeree, Michelle S., Hiedemann, Bridget, and Stern, Steven
- Subjects
Decision-making ,Game theory ,Home care ,Home care services ,Home care services industry ,Business ,Business, international ,Economics - Abstract
To authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00566.x Byline: David Byrne ([dagger]), Michelle S. Goeree ([dagger]), Bridget Hiedemann ([dagger]), Steven Stern (1) Abstract: We use the 1993 wave of the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data set to estimate a game-theoretic model of families' decisions concerning the provision of informal and formal care for elderly individuals. The outcome is the Nash equilibrium where each family member jointly determines her consumption, transfers for formal care, and allocation of time to informal care, market work, and leisure. We use the estimates to decompose the effects of adult children's opportunity costs, quality of care, and caregiving burden on their propensities to provide informal care. We also simulate the effects of a broad range of policies of current interest. Author Affiliation: ([dagger])Federal Reserve Board, U.S.A.; University of Zurich, Switzerland, University of Southern California, U.S.A.; University of Seattle, U.S.A.; University of Virginia, U.S.A.
- Published
- 2009