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The article discusses the objectives and principles of the use of settlements in public antitrust enforcement. Two questions, that is, conditions under which the use of settlements gives optimum antitrust enforcement and the conditions under which self-incrimination and waivers of the procedural rights by candidates opting for settlement are agreeable with the fundamental rights of defense are examined.

The purposes and methods behind the European Commission's 2006 guidelines for antitrust fines are investigated.

The theory and practice of leniency in antitrust enforcement, or granting of immunity from penalties or reduction of penalties for antitrust violations in exchange for cooperation with the antitrust enforcement authorities, is described. The positive effects and the negative effects of leniency on optimal antitrust enforcement and the degree to which the effects can be measured are discussed.

Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 provides for formal settlements of investigations by the European Commission into suspected infringements of Articles 81 or 82 EC. The origin and optimal use of this provision, the procedure for the adoption of commitment decisions, the content and effect of such decisions and the scope for judicial review is analyzed and the possibilities of informal settlement, and of settlements that include payment of a fine are explored.