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From the epidemiological perspective, the COVID-19 pandemic is a public health crisis. From the economic perspective, it is an externality and a social cost. Strikingly, almost all economic policy to address the infection externality has been formulated within a Pigovian analysis of implicit taxes and subsidies directed by a social planner drawing on social cost-benefit analysis. In this paper, we draw on Coase (1960) to examine an alternative economic methodology of the externality, seeking to understand how an exchange-focused analysis might give us a better understanding of how to minimise social cost. Our Coasean framework allows us to then further develop a comparative institutional analysis as well as a public choice theory analysis of the pandemic response.

We build a political competition model to analyze the welfare effect of campaign finance policies in a context where parties spend campaign contributions on mobilizing voters—rather than on advertising, as is usually done in this literature. This modification results in key consequences for the welfare evaluation of campaign finance policies. Additionally, we measure the social cost of contributions in terms of the quality lost on public works delivered by contributors. We find that subsidizing campaigns with public funds and simultaneously banning contributions is welfare-improving for citizens only if the parties’ mobilization technology is not especially productive. Combining non-matching subsidies with limits on contributions is Pareto improving under same technological conditions. Imposing a contribution lump-sum tax, while simultaneously investing these revenues on public projects is welfare-improving for citizens, and combining this policy with a limit on contributions is Pareto improving. These tax results hold regardless of parties’ mobilization productivity level.

This paper analyzes the optimal regulation for “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) in a simple model. As the government cannot credibly commit to no bail-out during crises, banks have an incentive to become excessively large ex-ante. In this case, no single policy can fully eliminate the inefficiencies from TBTF. The optimal regulation for the first-best allocation features a capital requirement and an issuance of Contingent Convertible Bonds (CoCos) where the former addresses the moral hazard issue from government bailouts and the latter improves risk-sharing. Moreover, a combination of the capital requirement and size regulation can implement a second-best allocation where the government has to bail out the banking sector but the social cost of bail-out is internalized by the banks. In this case, the capital requirement forces banks to internalize the bailout cost while the size regulation directly discourages banks to become large.

Economists have adopted the Pigouvian approach to climate policy, which sets the carbon price to the social cost of carbon. We adjust this carbon price for macroeconomic uncertainty and disasters by deriving the risk-adjusted discount rate. We highlight ethics- versus market-based calibrations and discuss the effects of a falling term structure of the discount rate. Given the wide range of estimates used for marginal damages and the discount rate, it is unsurprising that negotiators and policy makers have rejected the Pigouvian approach and adopted a more pragmatic approach based on a temperature cap. The corresponding cap on cumulative emissions is lower if risk tolerance and temperature sensitivity are more uncertain. The carbon price then grows much faster than under the Pigouvian approach and discuss how this rate of growth is adjusted by economic and abatement cost risks. We then analyse how policy uncertainty and technological breakthrough can lead to the risk of stranded assets. Finally, we discuss various obstacles to successful carbon pricing.

In recent years, escalating cost of generating electricity, substantial investments with the purpose of building power plants, and environmental pollution related to the power generation have underlined the importance of optimal power supply and demand management. Given that, by employing Long-range Energy Alternatives Planning (LEAP) software, the present study set out to optimize the energy system of Iran through two model capabilities, namely electric sector optimization and simulation. To do so, the energy system was initially evaluated by optimizing Iran's demand for electricity by the Demand Side Management (DSM) scenario. Then, Iran's electricity sector was optimized to generate electricity at the lowest cost by setting emission roof with different scenarios, especially the Optimized scenario. The social cost and GHG emission were evaluated in both steps. The prospective social costs of the electricity generation sector based on Optimized and DSM scenarios were calculated to be 5.1 and 4.8 Billion U.S. Dollars in 2035. Regarding the environmental results of the study, the emission rates of pollutants based on Optimized and DSM scenarios were reported to be144 and 429 $${\mathrm{MtCO}}_{2}$$ for the same year.

The antitrust enforcement Agencies’ 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs) introduce a nontechnical application of bargaining theory into the competitive assessment of vertical acquisitions. This bargaining theory has much in common with the theory of unilateral effects that is applied to horizontal mergers. The VMGs focus on post-merger price increases requires consideration of a vertical merger’s role in eliminating double marginalization (EDM). The problem occurs when two bargaining firms both have market power but are unable to coordinate their output. Assessing EDM bundles two themes that Ronald Coase developed in his two most well-known articles: “The Nature of the Firm” and “The Problem of Social Cost”. The first argued that the boundaries of a firm are determined by the firm’s continuous search to minimize costs. The second argued that two traders in a well-functioning market will achieve the joint-maximizing solution. Anti-interventionists rely heavily on Coasean arguments that unless high transaction costs get in the way firms will bargain to joint maximizing results. If that is true, then double marginalization will rarely provide a defense to a vertical merger. The law of vertical mergers deals largely with firms that transact with one another routinely, in legally enforceable buy-sell relationships. In a well-functioning vertical market durable double marginalization should be rare.

Economic theory suggests that energy subsidies can lead to excessive consumption and environmental degradation. However, the precise impact of energy subsidies is not well understood. We analyze a large energy subsidy: the California Alternate Rates for Energy (CARE). CARE provides a price reduction for low-income consumers of natural gas and electricity. Using a natural field experiment, we estimate the price elasticity of demand for natural gas to be about −0.35 for CARE customers. An economic model of this subsidy yields three results. First, the natural gas subsidy appears to reduce welfare. Second, the economic impact of various policies, such as cap-and-trade, depends on whether prices for various customers move closer to the marginal social cost. Third, benefits to CARE customers need to increase by 6 percent to offset the costs of the program. (JEL C93, D61, H24, L94, L95, L98, Q48)

The year 2020 marks the centennial of the publication of Arthur Cecil Pigou’s magnum opus The Economics of Welfare. Pigou’s pricing principles have had an enduring influence on the academic debate, with a widespread consensus having emerged among economists that Pigouvian taxes or subsidies are theoretically desirable, but politically infeasible. In this article, we revisit Pigou’s contribution and argue that this consensus is somewhat spurious, particularly in two ways: (1) Economists are too quick to ignore the theoretical problems and subtleties that Pigouvian pricing still faces; (2) The wholesale skepticism concerning the political viability of Pigouvian pricing is at odds with its recent practical achievements. These two points are made by, first, outlining the theoretical and political challenges that include uncertainty about the social cost of carbon, the unclear relationship between the cost–benefit and cost-effectiveness approaches, distributional concerns, fragmented ministerial responsibilities, an unstable tax base, commitment problems, lack of acceptance and trust between government and citizens as well as incomplete international cooperation. Secondly, we discuss the recent political success of Pigouvian pricing, as evidenced by the German government’s 2019 climate policy reform and the EU’s Green Deal. We conclude by presenting a research agenda for addressing the remaining barriers that need to be overcome to make Pigouvian pricing a common political practice.

Feedbacks within the climate–economy system are complex. The research analyzing the relationship between human activities and the climate is considerable, with particular focus on intra-system feedback effects: environmental tipping points, and climate-triggered social tipping points, like migration, to a lesser extent (Kopp et al., 2016; van Ginkel et al., 2018). Due to their cross-disciplinary nature (Guerrero et al., 2018), two-way interactions between the environment and society, whereby movement in either system can trigger inter-system feedbacks (Lade et al., 2013; Yletyinen et al., 2019) as humans respond to a changing environment thereby further changing the environment, have only recently received attention by a growing inter-disciplinary research community. With the aim of improving climate policy and its tools, such as the social cost of carbon, we describe these social–ecological system (SES) feedbacks and place them in the existing taxonomy for tipping points applied by mainstream climate–economy models. Drawing lessons from SES research and related interdisciplinary literature, we discuss the value of and method by which to modify social-cost integrated assessment models (SC-IAMs), like Nordhaus' Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy. As it is critical that climate policy include these risks to the stability of the climate–economy system, we conclude with a research agenda for the identification, quantification, and integration of climate–society feedbacks into SC-IAMs.

I analyze the marginal value of reducing greenhouse gas emissions (the “social cost of carbon”) under uncertainty about warming, under uncertainty about how much warming reduces consumption...

The Coase theorem is one of the most influential and controversial ideas to emerge from post–World War II economics. This article examines the theorem’s origins, diffusion, and the wide variety of uses to which it has been put by economists and others over the sixty years since Coase published “The Problem of Social Cost.” Along the way, we explore the ambiguity and controversy surrounding the theorem, develop a Coase theorem that is valid as a proposition in economic logic, and probe the implications of all of this for the use of the Coase theorem going forward. (JEL D23)

The story of Ulysses and the sirens has been used to portray the theme of the field of constitutional political economy. Indeed, Ulysses adorns the cover of the field’s journal. I compare Ulysses and the prophet Jonah as constitutional allegories. The behavior of Ulysses does not transfigure to a constitution consistent with public-choice premises, while the behavior of Jonah does. A constitution transfigured from Ulysses provides privileged personal benefits for an autocratic ruler at the expense of social costs that historically often have entailed much more than placing wax in sailors’ ears. A constitution transfigured from Jonah requires leaders and politicians to exit government when the social cost from them staying on exceeds whatever social benefits their continuation in office may provide.

SUMMARY Kleine-Rueschkamp, and Elena Nikolova?>Using newly available data, we re-evaluate the impact of transition from plan to market in former communist countries on objective and subjective well-being. We find clear evidence of the high social cost of early transition reforms: cohorts born around the start of transition are about 1 cm shorter than their older or younger peers. We provide suggestive evidence on the importance on mechanisms that partially explain these results: the decline of GDP per capita and the deterioration of healthcare systems. On the bright side, we find that cohorts that experienced transition in their infancy are now better educated and more satisfied with their lives than their counterparts. Taken together, our results imply that the transition process has been a traumatic experience, but that its negative impact has largely been overcome.

Historically, water resource policy in the Murray–Darling Basin (Basin) has taken a pro-farmer orientation leaving the environment to become the residual claimant. Around 1990, the attention was focused on minimisingoveruse that led to on-farm productivity losses and developing a market for water to help define opportunity costs of water in irrigation. More recently, the scope has been extended to include explicit allocations for the environment. However, the failure to agree on policies for recovering water for the environment in the implementation of the Basin Plan has extended avenues for rent seeking and cost shifting, thereby raising the total costs of reform. A focus on water use per se, rather than system productivity, and sidelining of market-based approaches in preference for government investment in water recovery and water use efficiency has complicated risk assignment amongst different users. Recurring droughts and resultant scarcity of water has made negotiations further complicated and controversial, broadening the gulf between environmentalists seeking public good outcomes and irrigators seeking private profit. Despite these, the MDB system as a whole, including dryland and irrigated farming, environmental uses and other industries, has adjusted to chanding conditions, drawing on new knowledge and technology and emerging market opportunities. Irrigators have shown an ability to diversify into new commodities with better prospects for managing risks. However, declining farm numbers, a changing demography and accelerating climate change point to general failure risks if the reform process were to halt and governments disregarded the gains through a rebalancing of consumption possibilities from the full complement of Basin’s resources — not just irrigation. This paper, examines the sources of social costs in water resource allocation, including pros and cons of water trading with respect to agricultural production and externalities. The aim is to canvass possible reform alternatives which might help governments to become a catalyst in fostering collaboration for efficient adaptation.

Congestion models may be studied from either the users’ point of view or the social one. The first perspective examines the incentives of individual users, who are only interested in their own, personal payoff or cost and ignore the negative externalities that their choice of resources creates for the other users. The second perspective concerns social goals such as the minimization of the mean travel time in a transportation network. This paper studies a more general setting, in which individual users attach to the social cost some weight r that is not necessarily 0 or 1. It examines the comparative statics question of whether higher r necessarily means higher social welfare at equilibrium.

Prior research on the effect that formal and informal institutions have on high-growth entrepreneurship has tended to propose policies aimed at either lowering the social cost of failure in society, or creating business-friendly entry environments aimed at increasing the rate of entrepreneurship. These policies have triggered a debate about whether policies that focus on stimulating high-growth entrepreneurship conflict with policy goals aimed at decreasing the social cost of failure in society. Using approach/avoidance as a lens, we examine the relationship between high social costs of failure and the odds of individuals engaging in growth-based entrepreneurship. Our unique dataset captures the entry decisions of 208,089 individuals in 29 OECD countries. We find that while countries with a higher social cost of failure experience lower total entrepreneurial activity, they have higher odds of entrepreneurs having high-growth aspirations and firms with export-led orientations.

The most important issue related to the establishment of carbon emission trading in China is how to motivate the owners of public buildings to participate. However, Existing research few considered the characteristics of public building owners and the influence of various uncertain factors in carbon emission trading investments. To fill this gap, this study constructs a carbon emission trading investment decision model of public building owners to study the mechanism that encourages them to participate, incorporating these characteristics and uncertain factors. The findings are as follows. First, carbon price is important in adjusting the emission reductions of different owners to minimize the total social cost of emission-reduction measures. Second, the price of carbon-emission permits has a significant impact on the investment threshold and decision-making behavior of public building owners. Finally, reducing the cost of energy-conservation and emission-reduction technologies in public buildings and appropriately subsidizing owners for their emission-reduction investment were effective methods to motivate them to participate in carbon emission trading. The results were used to quantitatively analyze the impact of a carbon emission trading mechanism on the decision-making behavior of public building owners and to construct the carbon emission trading mechanism used in China’s public building industry.

Social discounting conventions vary widely. Some differences reflect institutional constraints, but many reflect differing assumptions about how a social discount rate should be derived and applied. The divide between advocates of social opportunity cost and social time preference (STP) frameworks seems unbridgeable. There is no consensus among STP advocates on whether the social cost of funding $1 of public spending is barely more than $1 of consumption or perhaps more than $2; or on whether the covariance of public service benefits with income merits a discount rate premium that is trivial or a few percentage points. The practicalities of government fund raising are sometimes overlooked. The issues are here reviewed in the light of the literature and of experience with developing and applying social discounting regimes and extended debates within government.

Uncertainty about future economic and climate conditions substantially affects the choice of policies for managing interactions between the climate and the economy. We develop a framework of dynami...

This article quantifies the impact on optimal climate policy, of both damage elasticity and equilibrium climate sensitivity uncertainty, under separable preferences for risk and intergenerational inequality. The primary findings are as follows. (1) Such preferences can depress the social cost of carbon (SCC) when calibration aims at matching actual economic outcomes, countering the prevailing view that the SCC is greater with separable than with conventional entangled preferences. (2) Damage elasticity uncertainty has larger effects on climate policy than equilibrium climate sensitivity uncertainty, even under high impact tail risk of the latter. (3) Risk aversion decisively strengthens optimal climate policy under joint damage and climate sensitivity uncertainty, than with a single source of uncertainty alone. Indeed, failing to account for the interaction between damage and climate sensitivity uncertainty underestimates the cost of climate change by more than US dollars 1 trillion.

We demonstrate an application evaluating carbon sequestration benefits from federal policy alternatives. Using detailed forest inventory data, we projected carbon sequestration outcomes in the coterminous 48 states for a baseline scenario and three policy scenarios through 2050. Alternatives included (1) reducing deforestation from development, (2) afforestation in the eastern United States and reforestation in the western United States, and (3) reducing stand-replacing wildfires. We used social cost of carbon estimates to evaluate the present value of carbon sequestration benefits gained with each policy. Results suggest that afforestation and reforestation would provide the greatest marginal increase in carbon benefit, far exceeding policy cost.

Rural electrification (RE) is a core component of the Sustainable Development Goals and a major focal point of the global development community. Despite this focus, more than one billion people worldwide lack access to electricity, and electrification rates need to more than quadruple to meet international goals. We believe that lack of progress is partly driven by a know-do gap, a misalignment between academic research and the information needs of policy makers. Most studies measuring the impacts of electrification focus on precise estimation of a few outcomes, specifically health, education and productivity impacts. Other important impacts, e.g. environmental, have remained largely unstudied. As a consequence, quantifying the full set of costs and benefits of expanding electricity access is difficult and rarely done. When cost benefit analyses are done, they are often incomplete, and conclusions are highly susceptible to unavailable or uncertain parameters. We illustrate these arguments in the case of Bhutan, where RE rates have expanded rapidly in the past few decades. We show that RE via grid extension had positive impacts related to fuelwood consumption, education, and employment, but we do not find an effect on health. We then use these impact estimates to conduct cost-benefit analyses. For the cost-benefit parameters not available from our impact evaluation, we transfer reasonable estimates from related contexts. To acknowledge the uncertainty induced by this process, we conduct Monte Carlo analyses and confirm that, while the private NPV calculations are robust to alternative parameter values, the social returns are sensitive to estimates of the social cost of carbon and costs of grid operation and maintenance. Based on this exercise, we highlight research gaps that persist and that preclude 1) careful cost-benefit analysis of RE more generally and 2) financial investment in the sector.

Cost-effective allocation of conditional cash transfers (CCT) requires identifying recipients with low opportunity costs who might change behavior. This paper develops a low-cost approach for improving program implementation by using a stated preference, referendum-style survey question to calculate willingness to accept (WTA) for CCT contracts. This is illustrated in the context of Mexico's Payments for Ecosystem Services Program, with the paper finding that the estimated social cost based on WTA is substantially lower than actual payments. Simulation of three geographic targeting approaches shows that joint selection using deforestation risk and WTA could increase program impact under the same budget. The paper also simulates modified payment schedules based on predicted WTA and demonstrates that these could reduce program cost.

The paper extends the tourist test proposed by Rochet and Tirole (2011) to the situation of emerging countries which are characterized by informality (tax evasion through cash payments). We introduce a government which faces a cost associated to cash (resources to fight against crime minus seigniorage) and tax evasion in the base model. The main idea is that merchants benefit from tax evasion since they do not provide a receipt in cash transactions and thus pocket a fraction of the VAT. In the presence of informality, the tax benefit of cash reduces the merchants’ net operating benefit of accepting card sales. The tourist test aims to determine a maximum interchange fee (the fee that the acquirer pays to the issuer whenever a card transaction is done) which makes the merchant indifferent between accepting cash or card. In this new environment, the tourist test threshold now internalizes this tax benefit of accepting cash. We assess the socially optimal interchange fees in this new model setup derived from three different social maximization functions.

This study proposes a biofuel model in Taiwan that considers the government subsidy policy, market demand, biofuel production cost, and social cost attributes. Biofuel is a prospective alternative and renewable solution to energy and environmental challenges in the transportation sector. However, the development of biofuels is constrained by several factors including the amount of land available (the primary constraint), marketing of residual resources, and technological improvements. Economic feasibility and competition analysis and use of residual resources limited the actual amount of residual resources utilized to produce biofuel. Prior studies have examined the potential to commercialize biofuels where resources are limited. Despite insufficient land availability, biofuel commercialization has the potential to be mutually beneficial and risk-sharing in the supply chain. The contribution of this study is to develop a dynamic system model to explore the potential for biofuel commercialization in Taiwan despite its limited Biofuel resources. Through this model, this study considered E3 vehicles that use a fuel blend of 3% ethanol and 97% gasoline. Data were collected from institutional statistical reports. The results showed there is a large commercial opportunity; however, biofuel resources are insufficient. To deal with this resource insufficient, the Taiwanese government could use this model to develop an appropriate subsidy policy that adjusts prices based on market demand and technological improvements.

Our answer is “less often than you might think.” We qualify and defend this answer in several steps. First, we offer some suggestive evidence that major scholarly contributions in law and economics have had relatively more influence with academics than with judges. For example, ranking articles on the basis of judicial citations rather than academic citations produces interesting results: Judges cite Ronald Coase’s “The Problem of Social Cost,” by far the most cited paper in the legal academy, much less frequently than doctrinal papers that have received relatively little attention from scholars. Second, we argue that some common features of law and economics scholarship are unappealing to judges. The broadest form of explanatory law and economics—like the hypothesis that the common law has tended to produce efficient rules—is often of little use to judges, who require reasons for making or justifying current decisions. Prescriptive law and economics, meanwhile—like various arguments that the legal system should produce efficient rules—often proceeds from ideological premises that judges don’t share, or fails to account for the institutional constraints under which judges operate. In short, much law and economics scholarship is insufficiently doctrinal to appeal to the average judge. These features of law and economics scholarship don’t prevent judges from using economics all the time. After all, economics is a basic social science, and judges encounter economic questions with some regularity. But, even here, we find little evidence that today’s judges are making greater use of concepts like “efficiency” and “incentives” than those of the past. Throughout this essay, we comment on Guido Calabresi’s “The Future of Law and Economics” (2016) and Richard Posner’s “Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary” (2016).

As a common policy tool for reducing the cost of achieving the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) targets, Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) trade can also exacerbate distributional inequity in provincial renewable electricity consumption. In this study, two types of corrective regulations –taxation and quotas on REC importing were proposed to pursue the equity-efficient trade-off. The energy, economic, and equity impacts of these corrective regulations were analyzed by applying a multi-region multi-market equilibrium model to China as a case study. The results verified that a free trade REC market can increase distributional inequity, while both import taxation and import quotas can reduce inequity. Compared to the electricity price premium for renewable energy and voluntary green certificate prices, the social cost of implementing these corrective regulations are within the public's willingness-to-pay. Moreover, the cost curve of increasing equity using the two corrective regulations on REC trade were obtained. Import taxation is found to be more cost-efficient, and therefore it should be the prior policy choice for China's central government comparing with import quotas in designing REC trade mechanisms.

Cost-benefit-analyses (CBA) are widely used to assess transport projects. Comparing various CBA frameworks, this paper concludes that the range of parameters considered in EU transport CBA is limit ...

This paper presents a novel way to disentangle inequality aversion over time from inequality aversion between regions in the computation of the Social Cost of Carbon. Our approach nests a standard efficiency based Social Cost of Carbon estimate and an equity weighted Social Cost of Carbon estimate as special cases. We also present a methodology to incorporate more fine grained regional resolutions of income and damage distributions than typically found in integrated assessment models. Finally, we present quantitative estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon that use our disentangling of different types of inequality aversion. We use two integrated assessment models (FUND and RICE) for our numerical exercise to get more robust findings. Our results suggest that inequality considerations lead to a higher (lower) SCC values in high (low) income regions relative to an efficiency based approach, but that the effect is less strong than found in previous studies that use equity weighting. Our central estimate is that the Social Cost of Carbon increases roughly by a factor of 2.5 from a US perspective when our disentangled equity weighting approach is used.

The main objective of this paper is to compare the cost of climate policy consistent with the 2 °C global warming target (Paris Agreement target) with the cost of climate change induced agricultural productivity shocks, using a recursive dynamic CGE model for India. The social cost of carbon, in terms of loss in agriculture sector, is estimated to be about 2 percent of GDP, at zero rate of discount, under conservative forecasts of fall in agricultural productivity. In comparison, the cost of climate policy consistent with the Paris Agreement target of 2 °C is about 1 percent of GDP. Thus, there is a strong case for the adoption of ambitious climate policy in India, provided other countries also adhere to the same. Besides, revenues generated from the carbon tax and emission allowance could be a means to support the development and adoption of new energy and agricultural technologies, to increase social sector expenditure and to reduce abatement costs.

Humanitarian assistance is meant to save lives and alleviate human suffering during and in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters. To prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations, having available relief supplies in the short-term becomes crucial. The lack of access to life-sustaining items implies a loss in people's welfare, treated as an externality called deprivation costs which must be incorporated into decision-making processes. Since typical humanitarian applications are extensions of commercial logistic models, they usually do not account for externalities, leading to high social costs and likely to unfeasible or suboptimal solutions. This paper develops a facility location model for prepositioning supplies in preparation for disasters; the key feature of this formulation being the fact that it explicitly considers deprivation costs in the objective function. The model attempts to minimize the global social costs, as the sum of both private costs (i.e. costs of transportation, inventory costs and fixed costs of facilities) and deprivation costs, determining the amount per type of product to be prepositioned for serving the areas affected by a disaster during the initial response. The model focuses on those assistance interventions that should be carried out immediately, i.e. within the first 24 h of a humanitarian crisis. We applied the model, using real information, to the Colombian Caribbean region, which was affected by floods in 2010 and 2011. Results demonstrate that deprivation costs represent more than 50% of the total social cost.

This paper is to forecast the Korean long-term social discount rate of carbon dioxide (SDRC) and the social cost of carbon dioxide (SCC). It is estimated using the Ramsey function, savings behavior...

This paper measures the effects of bankruptcy protection on industry structure and environmental outcomes in oil and gas extraction. Using administrative data from Texas, I exploit variation in an insurance requirement that reduced firms’ ability to avoid liability through bankruptcy. Among small firms, the policy substantially improved environmental outcomes and reduced production. Most production was reallocated to larger firms with better environmental records, but high-cost production where social cost may have exceeded social benefit decreased. These results suggest that incomplete internalization of environmental costs due to bankruptcy is an important determinant of industry structure and safety effort in hazardous industries. (JEL G22, G33, L25, L71, Q35, Q52)

The paper addresses the issue of the feasible level of private finance in a contracting model of infrastructure finding and financing. It characterizes the structure of financial contracts, deriving the conditions under which both public and private finance coexist. A key feature is that access to outside finance and the regulatory decision on pricing and the amount of public subsidy, hence the extent of price recovery, are jointly determined. Mobilizing private finance requires a combination of price for the service and subsidy to the service provider that is large enough, exacerbating the fundamental tensions between financial viability through cost recovery and social inclusion. The paper then shows that the feasibility trade-off responds in non-trivial ways to changes in the economic and institutional environment likely to occur along the development path. While improvements along some of these dimensions, notably in the efficiency of bankruptcy procedures, appear to ease access to private finance, others, such as the cost of public funds, actually makes public finance more efficient. Using project data from the PPI database including information on the financial structure, the authors uncover an inverse U-shaped pattern in the share of private finance, peaking for countries in the upper-middle income range, which echoes their theoretical findings.

The social cost of carbon is the expected present value of damages from emitting one ton of carbon today. We use perturbation theory to derive an approximate tractable expression for this cost adjusted for climatic and economic risk. We allow for different aversion to risk and intertemporal fluctuations, skewness and dynamics in the risk distributions of climate sensitivity and the damage ratio, and correlated shocks. We identify prudence, insurance, and exposure effects, reproduce earlier analytical results, and offer analytical insights into numerical results on the effects of economic and damage ratio uncertainty and convex damages on the optimal carbon price. (JEL E12, G22, H23, O44, Q35, Q51, Q54)

Negative infectious disease externalities are less prevalent in the absence of government intervention and less costly to society than is often supposed. That is so for three reasons. (1) Unlike externality‐creating behaviors in many classical externality contexts, such behaviors are often self‐limiting in the context of infectious disease. (2) In market economies, behaviors that may create infectious disease externalities typically occur at sites that are owned privately and visited voluntarily. Owners have powerful incentives to regulate such behaviors at their sites, and visitors face residual infection risk contractually. (3) The social cost of infectious disease externalities is limited by the cheapest method of avoiding externalized infection risk. That cost is modest compared to the one usually imagined: the value of life (or health) lost to the disease if government does not intervene. We elaborate these arguments in the context of the COVID‐19 pandemic.

International audience; Is climate change concerning because of its expected damages, or because of the risk that damages could be very high? Climate damages are uncertain, in particular they depend on whether the accumulation of greenhouse gas emissions will trigger a tipping point. In this article, we investigate how much risk contributes to the Social Cost of Carbon in the presence of a tipping point inducing a higher-damage regime. To do so, we decompose the eect of a tipping point as an increase in expected damages plus a zero-mean risk on damages. First, using a simple analytical model, we show that the SCC is primarily driven by expected damages, while the eect of pure risk is only of second order. Second, in a numerical experiment using a stochastic Integrated Assessment Model, we show that expected damages account for most of the SCC when the tipping point induces a productivity shock lower than 10%, the high end of the range commonly used in the literature. It takes both a large productivity shock and high risk aversion for pure risk to signicantly contribute to the SCC. Our analysis suggests that the risk aversion puzzle, which is the usual nding that risk aversion has a surprisingly little eect on the SCC, occurs since the SCC is well estimated using expected damages only. However, we show that the risk aversion puzzle does not hold for large productivity shocks, as pure risk greatly contributes to the SCC in these cases. Keywords Climate change • Tipping points • Expected utility • Integrated Assessment Models •

Industrial houses and governments of different countries and groups spend a sizeable amount of their earnings upon research and development activities to create new products and obtain patents for them. The short-run motive is to get patents, and the long-run motive is to influence income growth of the countries. The empirical findings so far are skeptical on the effects of research and development (R&D) spending. The present study further investigates the long-run associations and short-run dynamics among R&D spending, number of patents and per capita income growth in the panel of countries and groups for the period 1996–2017. Using VAR model for the panel data, the study observes that R&D spending, number of patents and per capita income growth have no long-run equilibrium relations but in the short-run, income growth and number of patents make a cause to R&D spending. However, there are weak causation from patents and R&D spending to income growth rates. The study thus recommends for controlling unfair competition on spending on R&D head and getting patents since it increases the magnitudes of social cost.

Randomized controlled trials, which randomly allocate benefits to a treatment group and not a control group, ascribe differences in post-treatment welfare to the benefits being allocated. However, it is possible that potential recipients' welfare is not only affected by the receipt of the program, but also by the allocation mechanism (procedural utility). In this paper, we ask whether potential recipients support or oppose random allocation of financial benefits, by allowing them to reward or punish an allocator conditional on her choice of allocation mechanism: direct allocation to one recipient vs. randomization among potential recipients. We find that when potential recipients have equal endowments, they on average reward the allocator for randomizing. When instead there is inequality in the potential recipients' endowments, the relatively poorer recipients punish allocators who randomize, while the relatively richer potential recipients neither reward nor punish the allocator for randomizing. Our results suggest that an allocator who chooses to randomize between potential recipients with unequal endowments imposes a social cost on the relatively poorer potential recipients.

Does emergency financial assistance reduce criminal behavior among those experiencing negative shocks? To address this question, we exploit quasi-random variation in the allocation of temporary financial assistance to eligible individuals and families that have experienced an economic shock. Chicago's Homelessness Prevention Call Center (HPCC) connects such families and individuals with assistance, but the availability of funding varies unpredictably. Consequently, we can determine the impact of temporary assistance on crime by comparing outcomes for those who call when funds are available to those who call when no funds are available. Linking this call center information to arrest records from the Chicago Police Department, we find some evidence that total arrests fall between 1 and 2 years after the call. For violent crime, police arrest those for whom funds were available 51% less often than those who were eligible but for whom no funds were available. Single individuals drive this decrease. The decline in crime appears to be related, in part, to greater housing stability—being referred to assistance significantly decreases arrests for homelessness-related, outdoor crimes such as trespassing. However, we also find that financial assistance leads to an increase in property crime arrests. This increase is evident for family heads, but not single individuals; the increase is mostly due to shoplifting; and the timing of this increase suggests that financial assistance enables some families to take on financial obligations that they are subsequently unable to meet. Overall, the change in the mix of crime induced by financial assistance generates considerable social benefits due to the greater social cost of violence.

The evolutionary game dynamics of social tolerance among heterogeneous economic agents have been discussed in an economic interaction model with asymmetric social cost functions, where the individual cost depends only on the share of intolerant people in the opposite group. We show that, very different from the symmetric function case studied previously , economic interactions between individuals in a society with asymmetric social cost functions can be exactly solved in phase plane, and rich behaviours can be revealed by using algebraic approach. Our contribution consists in offering the explicit formula of evolutionary trajectories in the phase plane for the first time. The property of equilibrium is shown to be closely related to the group populations. Based on the explicit formula in the phase plane, the equilibriums of the evolutionary dynamics can be easily identified, and the evolutionary trajectory can be exactly analysed. We also show that the explicit solutions obtained would be especially suited to effective control of the evolutionary dynamics of social tolerance. The necessary and sufficient conditions of the full tolerance equilibrium under asymmetric social cost function are also discussed, which provides guidance and reference to set policies and development strategy of social tolerance.

Deforestation is a matter of pressing global concern, yet surprisingly little is known about the relative efficacy of various policies designed to combat it. This article sets out a framework for measuring the cost effectiveness of alternative policies—both command-and-control and incentive-based—in the Brazilian Amazon. First, I estimate the demand for deforestation on private properties, exploiting regional variation in transportation costs as a means to recover farmers’ responses to permanent policies. Here, rescaling transportation costs using local yields allows me to express changes in farmers’ valuations in dollars per hectare. I then use the estimated demand to infer farmers’ willingness to deforest under different counterfactual policies, such as payments to avoid deforestation and taxes on land use, along with the corresponding potential farmers’ lost surpluses. The results indicate that payment programmes and land use taxes on agricultural land can be highly effective in preserving the rainforest and also be substantially less expensive than command-and-control policies (approximately 8 times less costly). A carbon tax equal to the social cost of carbon could virtually eliminate all agricultural land in the Amazon, given the low agricultural returns there.

While migration of men improves the social position of women in the left-behind family by transferring power and autonomy, it may also reinforce gender inequality. The present study aims to explore this migration–empowerment relationship by addressing the research question of whether labour migration brings about changes in gender relations and empowers women, measured in terms of intra-household decision-making and work participation. Using India Human Development Survey (2011–12) data, the paper assesses the social impact of labour migration on left-behind women in one of the highest out-migrating states in East India (Bihar). The study finds that migration of men is unlikely to improve women’s position, as family relations are governed by the institution of patriarchy, and economic vulnerability rather than emancipation is the reason for their participation in paid nondomestic work. The social cost of labour migration thus seems to outweigh its benefit in Bihar, as it does not initiate the process of empowerment and poses financial challenges.

The Greek financial crisis that erupted in 2010 was possibly cured after 8 years in 2018. It has been extraordinary in its social cost and its cost to European taxpayers. The causes of this failure are multiple. The main burden lies with consecutive Greek governments that did not carry out the necessary fiscal adjustment and reforms. In their lack of urgency they were strongly supported by American economists, especially Paul Krugman, who opposed austerity and instead called for fiscal stimulus, ignoring the need for financial stability. Much of this discussion was devoted to the benefits or harm of the Eurozone, which eventually hardly mattered. The crisis resolution was complicated by the European Union wanting to play a big role but not knowing how and weakening the traditional role of the International Monetary Fund. The key lessons are back to basics: A government needs to act hard and fast to resolve a severe financial crisis. The IMF is the best leader for financial stabilization. Early and fast fiscal adjustment brings about early financial stabilization, more structural reforms and early and higher growth.

We revisit the “Coase theorem” through the lens of a cooperative game model which takes into account the assignment of rights among agents involved in a problem of social cost. We consider the case where one polluter interacts with many potential victims. Given an assignment or a mapping of rights, we represent a social cost problem by a cooperative game. A solution consists in a payoff vector. We introduce three properties for a mapping of rights. First, core compatibility indicates that the core of the associated cooperative games is nonempty. Second, Kaldor‐Hicks core compatibility indicates that there is a payoff vector in the core where victims are fully compensated for the damage once the negotiations are completed. Third, no veto power for a victim says that no victim has the power to veto an agreement signed by the rest of the society. We then demonstrate two main results. First, core compatibility is satisfied if and only if the rights are assigned either to the polluter or to the entire set of victims. Second, there is no mapping of rights satisfying Kaldor‐Hicks core compatibility and no veto power for a victim.