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Over the last four decades, banking crises around the globe have become longer. This, along with the unprecedented government responses to the Great Recession of 2007/08, has led to a critical question of whether political decisions were somehow to blame for these more prolonged crises. Despite growing concerns, little attention has been given to the political and institutional determinants of financial crisis duration. Using an extensive database with 125 countries observed over the period 1976-2017 and employing a discrete-time duration model, we find that the electoral cycle, political ideology, majority governments, and institutional quality matter for the understanding of the length of financial crises. This study also shows that, to better understand the dynamics of the duration of financial crises, it is essential to look at the duration dynamics in each type of financial crisis. Finally, allowing for more flexible duration dependence patterns, we observe that the duration of banking and twin/triple crises presents a non-monotonic cubic behavior, while the probability of debt crisis ending decreases monotonically over time.

A choice experiment (CE) with approximately 1000 respondents was designed and conducted to estimate economic benefits associated with air quality improvements in Hanoi City, the capital of Vietnam. In this CE application, different scenarios of air quality improvements were described based on reduction in morbidity and mortality risk, and increase in urban tree cover to elicit respondents’ willingness-to-pay (WTP). To gain better understanding of the WTP estimates, the econometric analysis applied several models, including conditional logit models, a mixed logit model, a generalized multinomial logit model and a latent class model. The WTP for maximal improvements is about 0.16–1.88% of household income. Results of marginal WTP for reduction in morbidity and mortality risk suggest that the values of statistical illness relating to air pollution range from USD1,120 to USD8,280, and the values of statistical life fall between USD7,100 and 64,700. Based on marginal WTP for boosting urban tree cover, aggregate WTP estimated for Hanoi population is about USD18.6–124 million per year to achieve the tree cover level of 18m2 per capita. Given the budget limitation, the information on residents’ WTP for improving air quality would be useful for policy makers to invest efficiently in controlling air pollution.

This study explores ordering effects in close association with strategic behaviour in a discrete choice experiment surveying preference for improvements in cyclone warning services. To examine strategic behaviour, we assign respondents to assumed non-strategic and strategic groups using their answers to two questions on their beliefs about the consequentiality of the survey and the payment obligation. The data from each group are analysed non-parametrically and parametrically to investigate ordering effects in their preferences. Comparison of results between the two groups suggests that preferences of possibly strategic respondents are relatively unstable over a sequence of six choice tasks. It appears that these respondents could have behaved strategically from the fourth task onwards, diverting their responses from the choices of the non-strategic respondents. This finding may indicate that strategic behaviour is a possible cause of position-dependent ordering effects in the repeated question format.

This paper assesses the role of the political environment in the timing of financial crises over a sample of 85 countries during the period 1975-2017. We consider systemic banking, currency, and sovereign debt crises in addition to twin and triple crises. Using a fixed effects logit model, this study shows that banking and currency crises are more likely to occur within one year after elections. There is also evidence that the probability of currency crises increases when right-wing parties are in office. Moreover, time in office of incumbent chief executives reduces the likelihood of any type of financial crises. The incidence of twin and triple crises is lower when majority governments are in office. This study contributes to the literature by calling attention to the importance of some political factors for different types of financial crises.

Motivated by the unprecedented high levels of recent economic policy uncertainty in Europe and the globe, this paper examines the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and bank stability, as well as the conditioning effects of bank regulation and supervision on this relationship. Using a sample of more than 950 commercial banks in eight major European countries over the period 2005–2020, economic policy uncertainty has been consistently linked to a sharp decrease in bank stability, once other traditional drivers are controlled for. More importantly, this paper offers important insights into how strengthening bank regulation and supervision, particularly regulations on activity restrictions, capital stringency, official supervisory power, and private monitoring, cushions the adverse effects of policy uncertainty on bank stability.

This article analyses the effects of involuntary excess reserves (IER) on bankers' remuneration and the penalty associated with bank risk-taking if discovered. The study finds that IER help conceal tail risks, improves bankers' performance and remuneration. However, the risks once discovered result in heavy penalties on bankers' remuneration. The study extends the agency theory to the context where banks hold large IER.

This study analyzes the impacts of excess liquidity in association with monetary policy rates on commercial banks’ performance – as indicated by their net interest margins (NIMs) – in Vietnam. The study finds that excess liquidity compresses NIMs and attenuates the positive impacts of policy interest rates on NIMs. The study argues that excess liquidity induces banks to reduce lending interest rates so as to facilitate credit expansion, making tightening monetary policy less effective. The study extends the monetary policy transmission literature to the context of an emerging economy with excess liquidity.

The order of a series of choice tasks presented to respondents in a discrete choice experiment (DCE) could affect the choice outcomes. This study explores the ordering effects in a DCE surveying preferences for improvements in cyclone warning services in Vietnam. Respondents’ choices are analysed non-parametrically and parametrically to investigate the ordering effects in their preferences. Across the sequence of six choice questions, the stated demand of respondents is statistically significantly different at the first position from all other positions. Based on a parametric analysis using mixed logit models, we also find that the willingness-to-pay for a number of improvement programs estimated at the first position is relatively larger when compared with the other positions. The findings indicate that although DCEs can provide additional information on respondents’ preferences when compared with survey methods using a single valuation question, the trade-off for more information is the ordering effects over a sequence of repeated questions.

In a discrete choice experiment (DCE), some respondents might not attend to all presented attributes when evaluating and choosing their preferred options. Utilizing data from a DCE survey in Vietnam, this paper contributes to the literature on attribute non-attendance (ANA) with an investigation of the ANA in a developing country context. Based on a review of relevant published ANA studies, we find that the extent of ANA reported by respondents in our Vietnam case study could be potentially more serious than in developed country studies. Our econometric analysis, based on a mixed logit model, shows that respondents who ignored the attributes have different preferences from respondents who attended to the attributes. An examination of ANA determinants using a multivariate probit model was undertaken to gain a better understanding of reasons for the differences in the preferences of two groups of respondents. Our results confirm that the stated ANA could be an example of a simplifying strategy of respondents, and that respondents ignored attributes which were not relevant to their situation.