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'Creole', or domestically birthed, anticommunisms came in many different flavours and are in need of deeper investigation to understand how they responded to local conditions. This study examines one case from Ecuador where political leaders eagerly manipulated an anticommunist agenda to advance their own partisan prospects in ways that were distinct from the United States government's global geopolitical concerns. Conservatives had their own motivations, which sometimes paralleled with and at other times came into conflict with those of larger political powers. These 'creole anticommunisms' could be more aggressive than those of United States officials, even as they served other purposes. [q]TQ3[/q] [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A mythology has grown among scholars that during the early years of the Cold War the CIA was so preoccupied with a perceived Soviet threat that except for highly exceptional events such as the 1954 coup in Guatemala the agency largely ignored Latin America. In this narrative, it took the 1959 Cuban revolution to bring the region front and center in its imagination (but even then, still only as a pawn of the Soviet Union). A review of CIA documentation, however, indicates that from its beginnings the agency dedicated a significant amount of attention to the region. Not only does the material that the CIA's case officers and their agents generated challenge our assumptions about the agency's presumed priorities, it also highlights the value of a largely unexploited source to understand domestic developments in Latin America in the early post-World War Two period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A tradition in Latin America of reliance on strong leaders becomes problematic when political parties look outside their ranks for candidates who have popular appeal but do not embody their ideologies. This contradiction emerged in Ecuador in the mid-twentieth century when the Left looked to General Alberto Enríquez Gallo as its champion. His early trajectory in the military made him a most unlikely hero for the Left, but when he promulgated progressive labour legislation he gained its strong support. It was, however, a marriage of convenience, as leftists and populists inherently follow different political logics. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

On September 30, 2010, discontented police officers and military troops plunged Ecuador into a political crisis as they took President Rafael Correa hostage, seized airports, and stormed the National Assembly building. In response, Correa declared a state of emergency and denounced what he termed a coup attempt. To outside observers, what appeared to be in process was yet another potentially extraconstitutional transfer of power in Ecuador’s tumultuous political history, with some pointing to the presence of the heavy imperial hand of the United States. Some grassroots activists, however, cast the political disruptions as little more than a labor dispute that Correa manipulated to entrench his increasingly authoritarian control over the country. At play in these competing narratives were debates over what political and economic direction Ecuador should take and whose interests those developments would benefit. Furthermore, the September 30 protests raise questions of how various domestic and international actors opportunistically exploit political developments to advance their own competing interests. Analyzing these events leads to a deeper understanding and appreciation for the compromises local social movements make, as well as the difficulties inherent in building transnational solidarity networks.El 30 de septiembre de 2010, tropas militares y oficiales de la policía descontentos sumieron al Ecuador en una crisis política al tomar como rehén al Presidente Rafael Correa, ocupar aereopuertos y asaltar el edificio de la Asamblea Nacional. En respuesta, Correa declaró un estado de emergencia y denunció lo que él consideró un intento de golpe de estado. Para los observadores externos, lo que parecía que estaba ocurriendo era un nuevo intento de cambio de poder potencialmente extra constitucional en la tumultuosa historia política del Ecuador, y algunos llegaron a señalar la presencia de la pesada mano imperial de los Estados Unidos. Algunos activistas populares, sin embargo, vieron las perturbaciones políticas como poco más que una disputa laboral que Correa manipuló para afianzar su control cada vez más autoritario sobre el país. En juego en estas narrativas antagónicas estaba el debate sobre qué dirección política y económica el Ecuador debería tomar y a quiénes beneficiarán esos desarrollos. Además, las protestas del 30 de septiembre suscitan interrogantes sobre cómo varios actores domésticos e internacionales explotaron de manera oportunista estos desarrollos políticos para adelantar sus propios intereses antagónicos. El análisis de estos acontecimientos nos lleva a un mejor entendimiento y apreciación sobre las conceciones que los movimientos sociales locales tienen que hacer, y también sobre las dificultades inherentes en la creación de redes de solidaridad transnacionales. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Procesos: Revista Ecuatoriana de Historia is the property of Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar, Sede Ecuador and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Although Ecuador is home to a large number of indigenous peoples, the country failed to produce the number of internationally recognized indigenista intellectuals or governmental policies that emerged in Mexico or Peru, countries with similar demographic profiles. Despite being one of the first countries to endorse proposals that emerged out of the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano (Inter-American Indian Institute) formed at Pátzcuaro, Mexico, in 1940, indigenista institutions were unable to gain traction in Ecuador. The shortcomings of a national indigenista institute in Ecuador were due to the failure of its liberal leaders to present a sufficiently radical critique of indigenous realities. Their failure opened spaces that allowed a grassroots movement to grow, leading to the organization of militant indigenous federations that pressed for economic and social justice.No obstante que Ecuador sea el hogar de un gran número de indígenas, el país no llegó a producir el número de intelectuales indigenistas con reconocimiento internacional o políticas gubernamentales que se vieron a dar en México o Perú, países con perfiles demográficos similares. Pese ser uno de los primeros entre países apoyando las propuestas que emergieron del Instituto Indigenista Interamericano formado en Pátzcuaro, México, en 1940, las instituciones indigenistas no lograron ganar cancha en Ecuador. La deficiencias de un instituto nacional indigenista en Ecuador se debían a la falla de sus lideres liberales en presentar una critica suficientemente radical de la realidades indígenas. Su fracaso abrió espacios que permitieron el crecimiento de movimientos de base, dirigiendo la organización de federaciones militantes indígenas que presionaron para la justicia económica y social. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Gonzalo Oleas Zambrano was a socialist lawyer from Quito who, from the 1930s to the 1970s, became deeply involved in assisting rural communities in Ecuador with their legal petitions. Intermediaries have a long and varied history in negotiating relationships between the city and the countryside, and one that is often not well understood. At various points in his career Oleas acted like a tinterillo, a socialist and an indigenista. An examination of Oleas’ petitions quickly breaks down a simplistic characterisation of his actions and interpretation of his motivation. Rather, his ability to transcend existing categories helps explain why rural litigants so often turned to Oleas for assistance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In 2008, voters in Ecuador approved a new and progressive constitution. Indigenous leaders questioned whether the new document would benefit social movements or strengthen the hand of President Rafael Correa, who appeared to be occupying political spaces that they had previously held. Correa’s relations with indigenous movements point to the complications, limitations, and deep tensions inherent in pursuing revolutionary changes within a constitutional framework. Although the indigenous movements, as well as most social movements, shared Correa’s stated desire to curtail neoliberal policies and implement social and economic strategies that would benefit the majority of the country’s people, they increasingly clashed over how to realize those objectives. The political outcome of the new constitution depended not on the actions of the constituent assembly but on whether organized civil society could force the government to implement the ideals that the assembly had drafted. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In June 1990, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) led a massive uprising against their social, economic, and political marginalization. The protest altered the political landscape of Ecuador and gave that country a reputation as home to some of the strongest and best-organized social movements in South America. Two decades later—this year, 2010—the children of the leaders of that historic uprising continued to lead mobilizations against the government. This time, however, Rafael Correa, whom many saw as emblematic of Latin America's shift to the left, was in power. What explains indigenous protest against a leftist government? Was Correa not a true leftist, as some militants alleged? Or was this yet another example of a white urban left failing to take the concerns of rural indigenous communities into account? Recent developments point to an alternative explanation: Indigenous movements have become more conservative and have discarded a strategy of building coalitions that had brought them so much success in the twentieth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]