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To reduce traffic congestion and protect the environment, license plate control (LPC) policy has been implemented in Beijing since 2011. In 2019, 100,000 vehicle license plates were distributed, including 60,000 for electric vehicles (EVs) and 40,000 for gasoline vehicle (GVs). However, whether the current license plate allocation is optimal from a social welfare maximization perspective remains unclear. This paper proposes a two-level Stackelberg game, which portrays the interaction between vehicle applicants and the government to quantify the optimal number of EV license plates under the LPC policy in Beijing. The equilibrium number of EV license plates derived from the Stackelberg model is 58,800, which could increase the social welfare by 0.38%. Sensitivity analysis is conducted to illustrate the impact of important influential factors — total license plate quota, vehicle rental fee, and energy price — on EV adoption. The LPC policy under COVID-19 is also studied through a scenario analysis. If the government additionally increases the total quota by 20,000, 24% could be allocated to GV and 76% to EV. One third reduction of the current vehicle rental fee could increase EV license plates by 10.5%. In terms of energy prices, when gasoline price is low, reducing electricity prices could contribute to EV adoption significantly, while that effect tapers off as gasoline prices increase. • The optimal license plate allocation between EVs and GVs in Beijing is analyzed. • A Stackelberg game is proposed to model stakeholders' interaction under LPC policy. • The optimal license plate allocation policy under COVID-19 is also studied. • One third reduction of vehicle rental fee could increase EV adoption by 10.5%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• The Stackelberg game theoretical models of recycling retired EV batteries are established. • The social-economic-environmental impacts of three recycling mechanism are analyzed. • The reward-penalty mechanism presents greater effects on recycling rate. • The minimum recycling rate is the key factor for social-economic-environmental impacts. With the increasing popularity of Electric Vehicles (EVs), a large number of EV batteries are intensively reaching their end-of-life, which has posed substantial challenges in ecological protection and sustainable development. However, the traditional subsidy mechanism is not effective in the current recycling market. Moreover, it is not conducive for guiding the EV industry to reduce dependence on the governmental financial support. As the reward-penalty mechanism has been successfully applied in similar fields, such as the recycling of waste portable batteries, it is expected to become a feasible alternative policy to promote the recycling of retired EV batteries. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the social-economic-environmental impacts of recycling retired EV batteries under reward-penalty mechanisms by developing a Stackelberg game theoretical model. Three scenarios are proposed and compared: S1 no policy intervention, S2 subsidy mechanism, and S3 reward-penalty mechanism. The obtained results show that:(i) Compared with the subsidy mechanism, the reward-penalty mechanism presents greater effects on recycling rate and the social welfare; (2) Under the subsidy mechanism, consumer surplus and the profit of EV manufacturer are two main driving factors of the social welfare. Under the reward-penalty mechanism, the reduced environmental burden tends to be another key contribution; (3) A relatively low minimum recycling rate favors the environmental benefit, consumer surplus and profit of EV manufacturer, while a relatively high minimum recycling rate is beneficial to reduce both the policy implementation cost and environmental burden caused by untreated EV batteries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]