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This work presents a binary expansion (BE) solution approach to the problem of strategic bidding under uncertainty in short-term electricity markets. The BE scheme is used to transform the products of variables in the nonlinear bidding problem into a mixed integer linear programming formulation, which can be solved by commercially available computational systems. The BE scheme is applicable to pure price, pure quantity, or joint price/quantity bidding models. It is also possible to represents transmission networks, uncertainties (scenarios for price, quantity, plant availability, and load), financial instruments, capacity reinforcement decisions, and unit commitment. The application of the methodology is illustrated in case studies, with configurations derived from the 80-GW Brazilian system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this work is threefold. We firstly present an optimization model for a price-taker hydrothermal generation company (Genco) to devise bidding strategies in multi-item iterative auctions of long-term contracts. The bidding model calculates a bidder's best-response function, which takes into account the key issues on the auctioned contracts, such as its time horizon, the risk factors that affect the future contract outcomes, interdependence between auctioned products, and the agents' risk profile. The risk profile of the Gencos are represented as piecewise linear utility functions and a practical specification approach is proposed. We finally present a simulator of a uniform-pricing and iterative multi-item contract auction, where the set of auction rules is implemented and the optimization model developed is used to determine the Gencos's best responses at each auction round. The simulator enables auctioneers and generators to estimate the auction's competitive equilibrium price and to study the auction dynamics. A real multiproduct descending clock auction is simulated for the Brazilian power system under the proposed bidding scheme. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The firm energy of generation plants is a critical component in some electricity markets. It is usually calculated by the regulator and sets a cap to the amount a plant can trade in capacity markets (or auctions), in order to avoid free-riding behaviors. Firm energy is a systemic property and, in case of hydro plants, a synergy is observed whenever a cooperative operation occurs, i.e., the firm energy of a system is greater than the sum of the individual plants. This immediately raises the question of how to divide the system's firm energy among the individual hydro plants. The objective of this work is to investigate the application of different allocation methods of firm energy rights among hydro plants using a game-theoretic framework. It is shown that there is not an optimal and unique approach to make this allocation. The paper investigates the advantages and disadvantages of different methods, such as marginal allocation, average production during the critical period, incremental allocation, finally recommending the Aumann-Shapley as the allocation method. This method is tested for the Brazilian power system, which has around 100 hydro plants. The results obtained are compared with the current allocation adopted by the electricity regulatory agency of Brazil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]