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To ensure sufficient investment in electricity generation capacity, mechanisms such as strategic reserves are being considered or already implemented. We analyze the effectiveness of a strategic reserve in the presence of a growing portfolio share of renewable energy sources (RES) with EMLab-Generation, an agent-based electricity market model. A strategic reserve can stabilize investment, but within limits. Uncertainty regarding future demand may cause the market to become instable, potentially leading to periods with very high electricity prices. In the presence of a large share of variable renewable energy sources, the reserve design should be adjusted or replaced by an alternative capacity mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU parliament has accepted a proposal of the EU commission on the backloading of EU emission allowances (EUA), where the auctioning of EUAs is postponed to future time periods. The EU commission has also proposed a market stability reserve (MSR), which is a quantity-based stabilisation policy that is aimed at controlling the volume of EUAs in circulation. Using an agent-based electricity market simulation with endogenous investment and a CO 2 market (including banking), we analyse the backloading reform and the proposed MSR. We find backloading to only have a short-term impact of CO 2 prices; regardless, there is a significant risk of high CO 2 prices and volatility in the EU ETS. Our simulations indicate that the triggers of the proposed MSR appear to be set too low for the hedging need of power producers, effectively leading to a stricter cap in its initial 10–15 years of operation. While the current proposal may be improved by choosing different triggers, a reserve that is based on volume triggers is likely to increase price volatility, contrary to its purpose. Additional problems are the two-year delay in the response time and the abruptness of the response function, combined with the difficulty of estimating future hedging behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Carbon reduction and renewable energy policies are implemented in Europe to improve the sustainability of the electricity sector while achieving security of supply. We investigate the interactions between these policies using a dynamic investment model. Our analysis indicates that both policies are necessary to achieve a sustainable power sector. However, renewable energy generation significantly affects carbon markets and could lead to very low prices. These would attract investments in carbon intensive technologies, locking the sector into future higher emissions. To contrast this effect, policy makers may introduce a floor price in the carbon market or adjust the emissions quota periodically. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

• Demand response of chlor-alkali process is modelled in operation and investment. • Fixed peak-demand network tariffs can hamper demand response. • Marketing flexibility on day-ahead market and in reserves are mostly substitutes. • However, the combination of selling in several markets can increase investments. • Interruptible load reserves can be detrimental to process flexibility. Incentives for industrial loads to provide demand response on day-ahead and reserve markets are affected both by network tariffs, as well as regulations on the provision of flexibility in different markets. This paper uses a numerical model of the chlor-alkali process with a storable intermediate good to investigate how these factors affect the provision of demand response in these markets. We also model the effect of network tariffs and regulation on endogenous investment into process excess capacities, which are needed to provide load shifting. We find that fixed network tariffs based on peak-demand (demand charges) can be detrimental for the provision of demand response, especially on new investments in process capacity. For existing excess capacities, only high network tariffs inhibit demand response by limiting the optimal peak load below its physical limit. Marketing flexibility on the day-ahead market and in the reserves are substitutes for each other. The choice where to market flexibility is affected both by fixed peak-demand network tariffs and existing excess capacities. For endogenous investments, there are synergies between primary reserve participation and day-ahead flexibility provision, with the combination leading to increased capacity investments. In contrast, so-called interruptible load reserves, regular payments to industrial loads to be able to reduce electricity consumption at any point in time, incentivize a flat demand level. Consequently, such reserve markets reduce investments into additional flexibility capacities and often crowd out active participation in other markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]