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This article considers the integrity of the emerging emissions allowance markets for greenhouse gases (GHG) under the international emissions trading system created by the Kyoto Protocol and the parallel European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. In particular, we suggest that accepted definitions of emissions baselines, initial allocation of emission credits, verification of “additionality” for GHG reduction beyond what would have occurred without trading, assuring permanence for offset-generating projects, preventing leakage of emissions-generating activities from protected project areas, monitoring, and reporting requirements are problematic. As with previous reforms that also rely on market allocation and expansion of private property rights, GHG trading deflects change in the social relations of production required for more sustainable production while commodifying access to the atmosphere and nature's ability to recycle carbon. Alternatives to this modern-day GHG indulgence system are considered, especially an upstream carbon tax, designed to force change in energy procurement and use. Although we found that most of the conditions required for the efficient operation of the international GHG markets are not being met thus far, further changes in the trading systems are being made. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States faces a potential turning point in the relationship between state and federal regulation of environmental issues. With the election of President Barack Obama, who has signaled a commitment to taking action in the area of carbon emissions regulation, the national government may step into an arena where the states are already playing, setting up a federalism debate to determine the better actor to enact meaningful and efficient environmental protection. Effectiveness in this area depends on the balance between quick enactment to prevent increased emissions (and further harm) and the comprehensiveness required to address this national and global issue. This Comment examines the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative to illustrate how the use of a seldom-examined constitutional tool-consent under the Compact Clause-could enable states to form efficient and effective regional regulatory schemes that could be meaningful units within the greater system of federalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers an appreciation of the complex detail of the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme and the complications encountered in linking such a scheme across 25 Member States before examining the scheme, with a view to ascertaining its potential business consequences and flirt her developments to the scheme which may occur in the months and years ahead. The author concludes that it is safe to assume that the scheme is here to stay and that it will make a valuable contribution to cutting CO2 emissions and meeting the EU'S Kyoto obligations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The introduction of a European emission trading scheme is a major step in handling the Kyoto Protocol's demand for a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. The EU concept is based on grandfathering. A linking directive including the use of the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol is expected to be sisued. Thereby the cap will not be tight and there will be a risk of trade in hot air. Having established the background the author looks at the concept of quotas; sets out the scope of the Emission Trading Directive; examines national quotas; considers allocation of quotas and pooling, queries the issue of allocation as state aid; ponders other treaty infringements; suggests the position in relation to tradability; describes the likely position in relation to periodical split, surrendering and monitoring; and outlines joint implementation and the clean development mechanism, before making some concluding comments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses how Europe will launch an updated emissions trading program for greenhouse gases in 2005 which is much larger and more complex than the U.S. effort. Role of market-based policies in environmental regulation and in the formation of future European and international climate change policies; Consideration of the plans for the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to address global climate change implement a more consistent trading program among nations; Innovations regarding provisions that provide flexibility in monitoring and compliance; Difficulty associated with the preparation and review of National Allocation Plans; Use of auctions in the distribution of tradable emissions allowances in the U.S. INSETS: EUROPEAN UNION TERMINOLOGY;KEY FEATURES OF EU ETS;EFFECTIVE EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAMS: A VIEW FROM THE ECONOMICS;SUMMARY OF U.S. TRADING PROGRAMS

On 9 December 2002 the (Environment) Council of the European Union unanimously agreed on a common position on a Commission's proposal for a Directive establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emissions allowance trading. This follows the idea that a common European emissions trading system should be preferred above a collection of national emissions trading systems. The European framework for emissions trading needs to he filled in by the Member States. One of their main tasks will be to allocate the greenhouse gas allowances according to a National Allocation Plan. The use of new regulatory instruments as emissions trading will raise new legal questions, which not always can be foreseen before the real application of the instrument in practice. It does not seem to he that the relevant institutions in the European Community already have a clear insight in all the necessary provisions for a well-functioning and just emissions trading, scheme. Especially the allocation of the tradable emissions rights can be questioned. With the present criteria, the allocation of the transferable rights will likely be a complicated and probably time-consuming task for the national governments. The European politicians seem to be willing, to take this risk with emissions trading, in order to build experience [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a report on the Climate Policy reports at the Aspen Institute's Climate Change Policy Dialogue which occurred during November 2003. How the report was commissioned by the Pew Center and was issued to participants in May 2003 under the title Designing a Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program; Introduction of the report by Eileen Claussen, president of the Pew Center on Global Change; Controversies surrounding the Kyoto mechanisms and emissions trading practices; Focus of the report on a U.S. unilateral mandatory scheme to be launched outside the Kyoto Protocol; Efficiency of U.S. action on climate change.

Presents observations about the international efforts to track climate change and instill laws which protect the environment. Consideration of how Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; How the goals of the convention were to set framework for intergovernmental efforts to fight the challenges of climate change; Ways in which the Kyoto Protocol would reduce developed-country greenhouse gas emissions by at least 4 percent; Details provided on the laws at the UNFCCC Web site.

This commentary discusses the European Union's Emissions Trading system. In their very instructive and useful overview of the European Union's Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), "Greenhouse Gas Trading in Europe: The New Grand Policy Experiment," Joseph A. Kruger and William A. Pizer note that implementation of the system has been an impressively rapid process. They indicate that a main factor for understanding the character and speed of this process is the constructive use of lessons from U.S. trading programs by EU decisionmakers. The EU's high-speed decision-making process in constructing the emissions trading system can basically be understood and explained by a combination and interaction of three perspectives. First, the EU system was more ripe and ready for emissions trading when the process started in 1998 than may be readily apparent. Second, the European Commission (the Commission), the formal EU agenda-setter, played an extraordinarily strong entrepreneurial role throughout the development of the system, which sped up the process. Third, there is the perspective of the lessons learned from the U.S. emissions trading experience, as emphasized by Kruger and Pizer.

The article reports that in May 2005, Washington became the ninth U.S. state to adopt vehicle tailpipe standards that are tougher than the federal government's. Washington's standards would not go into effect until Oregon approves the low-emission vehicle (LEV) rules for its automobiles, which could happen in the next few years. More controversial is California's update of its LEV-II rules in September 2004 which addresses greenhouse gases. LEV supporters are delighting in what they call the creation of clean-car corridor.