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This article makes a contribution to the critique of market-based mechanisms for climate and energy policy. It explores the environmental effectiveness of market instruments by engaging a broadly conceived 'fossil fuel landscape', or the material, social, and political inertia of fossil energy dependence, as a factor delimiting policy outcomes. The argument is developed through a focus on the idea of economic efficiency as a key ideological construct underlying market-based policy, and draws on examples from two different market instruments, namely the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, and the Flemish tradable green certificate scheme. I argue that an understanding of the shortcomings of these, and similar, policies requires acknowledgment of the political and socio-economic power that emanates from the temporal dynamics of fossil fuel capitalism, which are reproduced when economic efficiency becomes the key focus of climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is so far the largest emissions trading system in the world. A rigorousex postempirical analysis of the scheme is presented. The effect of the scheme on firms' investment decisions in carbon-reducing technologies is analysed by using detailed firm-level data from Swedish industry. Based on difference-in-difference estimation as well as a before–after difference estimation, the results reveal that the EU ETS has not had a significant effect on firms’ decisions to invest in carbon-mitigating technologies. However, although the EU ETS appears to have no direct effect on investments, it is too early to dismiss the system. Consideration is given to how the EU ETS can realize its potential to become an effective tool in the EU climate and energy policy portfolio. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the outlook related to lignite industry in Germany for 2014. Topics discussed include the impact of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan in 2011 to the country to decide to stop using nuclear power by the end of 2022, the proposed 40% reduction on greenhouse gas (GHG) emission of the European Commission (EC), and the European emissions trading scheme (EU-ETS), which plays significant role in the environmental policy of the European Union (EU).

Is rescuing the EU's emissions trading system impossible? Despite the substantial reform in 2008, subsequent problems of allowance surplus and a low carbon price have spurred new efforts to reform the system for the 2013-2020 phase. But these efforts have met resistance both among member states and in the European parliament, and the EU is struggling in its efforts to improve the ETS. This article draws on four central EU and political science theory approaches to more systematically explore why. The financial crisis and slow international policy progress have narrowed the window of opportunity that was open in 2008. Factors that could open that window again include an economic upswing, a new European commission and parliament, and new global negotiations in 2015. But even without short-term reform, the linear reduction factor will gradually tighten the system and lead to a higher carbon price. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Powerful political actors in the international system quite frequently adopt unilateral policies whose implications extend beyond their respective borders. Examples include financial market regulation as well as taxation, trade and environmental policies. They do so to avoid lowest common-denominator outcomes in areas where they desire more ambitious international policies, and to motivate or coerce other countries to shoulder a part of the burden associated with problem solving. This article explores whether and how such unilateralism affects public opinion in other countries, arguing that such analysis can point to external constraints on unilateralism and is worthwhile also for normative reasons. Empirically, we examine the effect of a major unilateral European Union (EU) climate policy initiative, which regulates emissions from aircraft, on public opinion in India and the United States, the two largest democracies outside the EU. Based on survey experiments, we study the effects of cost and sovereignty considerations on people’s evaluation of the EU’s new policy. The results show that both types of concern play a significant role and may act as a constraint on unilateral European climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Research has shown that industrial firms and organisations engaged in lobbying during the making and revision of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). However, little is known on how they went about lobbying. This article provides insight into industrial lobbying during the revision of the EU ETS by focusing on six industrial firms from Sweden and Norway, examining how and where they lobbied, and whether their lobbying was shaped by originating from an EU member state or not. The article finds that EU membership did influence how and where firms lobbied. Compared to Swedish firms, Norwegian firms lobbied less alone, via national associations and national institutions, and this limited Norwegian firms’ ability to lobby at the European level. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article seeks to refine the joint decision trap model by introducing additional time-based exit mechanisms. The procrastination of decisions, temporary derogation, and transitory compensation enable European Union (EU) member states to escape gridlock by distributing the costs and benefits of a decision over the time axis. In addition, time-based mechanisms not only help to overcome stalemate in policy-making, they also lock member states into a policy regime that may gradually be strengthened once delayed measures take effect. We demonstrate the workings of time-based strategies for the case of the EU's Emission Trading System (EU ETS). Given the diversity of EU member states' interests, the evolution of a mandatory and increasingly ambitious EU ETS presents a puzzle for EU scholars. While established exit mechanisms do not provide conclusive explanations for the case of the EU ETS, we argue that time-based strategies were key to move the EU's policy on emission trading forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Resource management and environmental policies form the basis for establishing relevant legislation and regulations; they ensure that government policies relating to gas flaring are being achieved efficiently and most effectively. It is the responsibility of government to set out a country's resource management and environmental policy. As part of developing a relevant policy, it is recommended that the government specify the strategy and the role flare reductions can and should play to achieve overall environmental and resource management objectives. This paper is in tune with the effectiveness of the emissions trading scheme which has considerable impact on flaring of gas on the (United Kingdom Continental Shelf) UKCS,1 the essay starts with a brief introduction, overview of onshore and offshore gas flaring in the United Kingdom, The effectiveness and impact of the emission trading scheme on the UKCS and finally the conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aviation industry has been included in the EU’s emissions trading scheme (ETS) since 1 January 2012. Airlines now have to acquire and ‘surrender’ allowances for the carbon emissions produced by their flights. The scheme is comprehensive: it applies to EU and non-EU airlines (subject to a potential exemption), to passenger and cargo flights, and to flights between EU airports and between EU and non-EU airports. An airline that fails to surrender allowances is fined €100 per allowance and must make up the shortfall the following year. The EU’s scheme has already given rise to legal action in connection with the EU’s international civil aviation obligations. But, due to its impacts on trade in goods and services, the scheme also has implications for the EU’s obligations under WTO law: specifically, under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Some of these issues are specific to this scheme, but in other respects they are connected with the current debate on the WTO legality of border carbon adjustments (BCAs). As this article shows, it is challenging to design a carbon scheme that is both administratively feasible and justifiable under WTO law. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper examines the multi-level governance of climate change with a particular focus on the European Union (EU). It examines the relationship between the EU and its Member States (the federalism dimension), particularly in relation to emissions trading, and the relationship between the EU and the rest of the world (the global dimension). The paper argues that we are witnessing a shift in the EU's climate leadership style; a shift that is characterized by an increasing willingness of the EU to use its economic power in a bid to promote effective climate governance elsewhere. We see this in relation to different sectors including aviation, biofuels, energy-intensive products and as a result of increasing EU regulation of carbon offsets in its emissions trading scheme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political feasibility (or infeasibility) is often associated with target-group support (or opposition) of specific policy alternatives. We argue that target-groups' capacity to influence the spectrum of politically feasible policy options tends to be higher when (1) target groups control resources needed by decision-makers, that (2) are agenda-setters and/or veto players in the decision-making process. In the 2008 revision of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) exemptions from the basic principle of full auctioning of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions allowances can all be traced to target-group interest representation by single veto players or blocking minorities in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Our analysis indicates that target groups succeeded in constraining the spectrum of politically feasible policy options to the extent that their positions were unified and threats to shut down or relocate activity were perceived to be relevant, severe and credible. Our findings confirm both the significance and the limits of portfolio assignment in the Commission. Even with Directorate General (DG) Environment in an agenda-setting role, target groups acquired exemptions through their relations with veto players in the Council. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theory and analysis of regulation provides an understanding of climate change regulation and its limitations leading to the identification of political strategies to improve such regulation by orientating it more towards public interest objectives. Public interest and private interest theories of regulation are considered together with regime theory, which understands regulatory regimes as dynamic interactions of a variety of forces that can be altered by external pressure. One possible pressure is governmental action to increase regime transparency. UK and EU climate change regulation is used to consider whether increased transparency, in particular focused around a carbon price-based instrument with quantified emissions reductions, can shift the climate regime towards meeting the public interest. This runs up against difficulties of sociocultural plurality and the one-dimensional nature of the price mechanism. More successful strategy requires a price-based instrument coupled to transparent complementary policies and regulations that address sociocultural pluralities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU emissions trading system (ETS) is the first large-scale international emissions trading system and a “cornerstone” in EU climate policy. A key element in the ETS implementation process is deciding upon the ceiling (“cap”) for the emissions included in the ETS. Over time, a significant change and centralization of this model has taken place. In order to understand this development, we need to acknowledge the increasing acceptance of stronger centralized governance among the member states due to ETS pilot phase problems; take into consideration frustration in the European Commission over complex and differing National Allocation Plans; and add the fact that the Kyoto Protocol target was getting nearer and a good performance of the “flagship” ETS was becoming increasingly important. Hence, although the case supports the importance of acknowledging the multilevel character of the EU, it still emphasizes the key role of changes in member states' interests and positions for understanding outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on potential implications from the introduction of the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme in January 2005 (EUETS) for defined 'point sources', or stationary installations, in the energy and manufacturing industries. This Scheme is expected to become integrated with international emissions trading from 2008 within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol, following the implementation of that agreement in February 2005. The paper explains the background to the EUETS, focusing on its structure as a 'cap and trade' system for defined installations, and how it differs from the UK's Emissions Trading System, which preceded it and will continue to operate in parallel until 2008. The paper highlights some of the difficulties in harmonization of the Scheme across all of the member countries of the EU and then discusses the economic implications arising from increased energy prices and consequent increased operating costs for energy-intensive industries. The paper concludes that this may give rise to continued relocation of manufacturing industries from Europe to countries not subject to emission targets or caps, such as China, India and the USA. This relocation may be mitigated if European industries implement carbon saving technologies and procedures in a cost-effective manner, and such actions will become particularly important if those countries not subject to targets before 2012, such as China and the USA, do not change their position thereafter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this paper is first to provide empirical evidence of what can be seen as a rather remarkable change in EU’s position on the use of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading (ET) in climate policy, from the role of a sceptic in the run-up to Kyoto towards more of a frontrunner. The paper argues that there is a synergistic and multilevel mix of explanatory factors for this “U-turn”, including developments at the international, EU, Member State, sub-national, and even down to the personal level. Second, the paper explores and discusses the philosophy behind the Commission’s proposal for a directive on GHG ET. Third, the paper examines the prospects for ‘success’ of a scheme for EU-wide ET using a multifaceted set of metrics. In brief, we argue that output success—the chances for having a directive adopted—hinges on the resolution of two key issues. First, whether the preliminary phase is to be mandatory or voluntary, and second, incompatibilities with domestic ET schemes. Outcome success—steering and cost-effectiveness—will in turn depend on factors like the coverage of the scheme and inclusion of project-based credits, while more long-term political implications hinges on the successful adoption and operation of the scheme.“The Proposal on emissions trading represents a major innovation for environmental policy in Europe. We are de facto creating a big new market, and we are determined to use market forces to achieve our climate objectives in the most cost-conscious way […]. The emissions trading system will be an important cornerstone in our strategy to reduce emissions in the most cost-effective way”.Environment Commissioner Margot Wallstro¨m. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The European Commission (document COM (2001) 581) has recently presented a directive proposal to the European Parliament and Council in order to implement a greenhouse gas emission trading scheme. If this proposal survives the policy process, it will create the most ambitious trading system ever implemented. However, the legislative process is an opportunity for various interest groups to amend environmental policies, which as a result generally deviate further from what economic literature proposes. A close look at implemented emission trading schemes, stressing their discrepancies with economic literature requests, is thus useful to increase the chances of forthcoming emission trading schemes to go through the political process. We thus review ten emission trading systems, which are either implemented or at an advanced stage of the policy process. We draw attention to major points to be aware of when designing an emission trading system: sectoral and spatial coverage, permits allocation, temporal flexibility, trading organisation, monitoring, enforcement, compliance, and the harmonisation vs. subsidiarity issue. The aim is to evaluate how far experiences in emission trading move away from theory and why. We then provide some lessons and recommendations on how to implement a greenhouse gas emission trading program in Europe. We identify some pros of the Commission proposal (spatial and sectoral coverage, temporal flexibility, trading organisation, compliance rules), some potential drawbacks (allocation rules, monitoring and enforcement) and items on which further guidance is needed (monitoring and allocation rules). Lastly, the European Commission should devote prominent attention to the US NOX Ozone Transport Commission budget program, as the only example of integration between the federal and state levels. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper expands our earlier analysis to examine the implications of the median value for the 2010 European Union (EU) baseline emissions derived from the four economic modelling studies for both Annex 1 countries and non-Annex 1 countries as well as for the market price of permits. Our results suggest that, in terms of the reductions in the total abatement costs relative to the no trading case, the EU under the two trading scenarios examined gains as much as Japan and the US in the case of the high EU emissions baseline in contrast with our earlier examined, low official EU emissions baseline case where the US and Japan benefit much more from trading than the EU does. Moreover, the sharp increase in emissions reductions required of the EU drives up the total Annex 1 countries’ demand for permits and hence the market price of permits, thus the gains of the Former Soviet Union as exporters of permits and of developing countries as suppliers of the clean development mechanism (CDM) credits increase substantially in the case of the high EU emissions baseline in comparison with the case of the low official EU emissions baseline case. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Explains how the European emissions trading scheme will work and what it means for the climate change policy in Great Britain. Range of greenhouse-emission-reduction measures; Effort to foster growth in renewable generation; Progress made by the scheme in the legislative stages of the European Council and Parliament; Plans for a 60% reduction in carbon dioxide emission by 2050.

The article discusses developments in greenhouse gas emissions in European Union (EU) countries. Topics addressed include the report "Trends and projections in Europe 2015" about the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in the EU between 1990 and 2014, information on the aggregated exchange and use of international credits in the EU emissions trading system (ETS) released by the European Commission, and highlights of the Climate Action Progress report.

The article presents updates on the environmental policy of European Union (EU) countries as of July 2015. It notes on the two decisions to ratify the second commitment period of Kyoto Protocol, the so-called Doha amendment, adopted by the Council of the EU on July 13, 2015. A proposal called COM(2015)337 was published by the European Commission for a Directive amending the EU emissions trading system (ETS) on July 15, 2015.

The article presents a chart for the European Carbon Index for the months of December 2006 and January 2007. The recent steep fall of carbon emission allowances and the second phase of carbon trading for the period 2008 to 2012 are discussed in the article. The reasons for the downward market trend including lower gas prices, fewer restrictions on carbon emissions reduction credits and other environmental issues are presented.

Reports on the launch of the multinational emissions trading system by the European Union. Slated opening of the market in 2005; Concept of the emissions trading system.