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This paper discusses the revision process of the EU emissions trading system (ETS). The ETS has so far operated on the basis of a main directive adopted in 2003 and a 'linking directive' adopted in 2004. In January 2008 the European Commission put forward a formal proposal for a revision of the system and hence new rules for trading in the 2013-20 period. The proposal was debated in the EU decision-making bodies in the course of 2008 and the final revised directive was adopted in December 2008. With the outcome of the process and the significant changes adopted as the dependent variable, the paper discusses three main explanations. First, applying 'intergovernmentalist' lenses, the key determinants for EU policy are found at the level of member states. The member states are the ultimate and main decision-makers, through decisions in the Council. Second, applying the lenses of multi-level governance theory, key determinants for EU policy are (increasingly) found in the positions and actions of the European Commission and the European Parliament. The Commission is the formal agenda-setter in the EU, but has also formal and informal influence in the decision-making phase. The Parliament has become a formal co-decider in the EU. Third, looking through global lenses, key determinants for EU policy may be found in global factors and institutions. Not least, EU policy-making is often embedded in global regimes/institutions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper addresses the rapid initiation, decision-making and implementation of the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) in light of EU resistance to emissions trading during the Kyoto negotiations. It discusses the explanatory power of three explanatory perspectives, all rooted in established theory traditions. First, we discuss the relevance of ‘Liberal Intergovernmentalism’, indicating that the EU ETS was requested by central Member States and the rapid decision-making process was possible because a majority of Member States quickly came to favour such a system. Second, we assess ‘Multi-Level Governance’ and institutional approaches to EU policy making, indicating that the EU ETS was initiated by the enrepreneurship of European Commission in alliance with non-state actors, and the rapid decision-making process was possible due to the leadership of the Commission and the European Parliament. The third perspective is inspired by literature on international regimes, indicating that the EU ETS was a result of external institutional factors, such as the Kyoto Protocol and developments within the climate regime. The paper concludes by using the relative explanatory power of these perspectives to shed light on the functioning of the EU ETS so far and discuss the prospects for an environmentally effective system in light of the recent proposal for a revised EU ETS for the period after 2012. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role and influence of non-state actors in global environmental politics. It draws on the theoretical framework of multilevel governance, emphasising the influence of non-state actors at various policy-making levels. Empirically, we assess and compare the following cases: multilateral environmental negotiations (the climate change negotiations and the International Whaling Commission - IWC), the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), and social and environmental certification programs The comparison across cases reveals that there is significant variation in both the role and influence of non-state actors in multilateral, EU-level and private governance programs. Careful attention to this variation is crucial for advancing our understanding of how and under what conditions nonstate actors influence policy outcomes. We argue that the influence of non-state actors is closely related to the authority and competence of nation states. Moving from multinational to supranational and transnational rulemaking, the cases show a declining role of nation states and increasing role of non-state actors. Moreover, in all three cases, we see that because rulemaking is an ongoing and iterative process, the goal attainment and influence of various actor groups change over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]