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Research in emotion regulation has largely focused on how people manage their own emotions, but there is a growing recognition that the ways in which we regulate the emotions of others also are important. Drawing on work from diverse disciplines, we propose an integrative model of the psychological and neural processes supporting the social regulation of emotion. This organizing framework, the 'social regulatory cycle', specifies at multiple levels of description the act of regulating another person's emotions as well as the experience of being a target of regulation. The cycle describes the processing stages that lead regulators to attempt to change the emotions of a target person, the impact of regulation on the processes that generate emotions in the target, and the underlying neural systems., (Copyright © 2015. Published by Elsevier Ltd.)

In this paper, we examine the relationship between people's actual interpersonal sensitivity (such as their ability to identify deception and to infer intentions and emotions) and their perceptions of their own sensitivity. Like prior scholars, we find the connection is weak or non-existent and that most people overestimate their social judgment and mind-reading skills. Unlike previous work, however, we show new evidence about who misunderstands their sensitivity and why. We find that those who perform the worst in social judgment and mind-reading radically overestimate their relative competence. We also find origins of these self-estimates in general narcissistic tendencies toward self-aggrandizement. We discuss evidence from two studies, one involving the Interpersonal Perception Task (the IPT-15) and another focusing on inferences about partners after a face-to-face negotiation exercise. In both cases, actual performance did not predict self-estimated performance but narcissism did. KEY WORDS: empathic accuracy; interpersonal sensitivity; metacognition; mind-reading; narcissism.

Two studies investigated the roles of entitativity and essentiality in judgments of collective responsibility. Analyses focused on four group types (i.e. intimacy groups, task groups, social categories, and loose associations). Repeated measures analyses revealed that intimacy groups and task groups were rated highest in entitativity while intimacy groups and social categories were rated highest in essentiality. Correlational analyses revealed that entitativity played a more central role in judgments of collective responsibility for all four group types. However, tests of interaction effects revealed that essentiality moderated the effect of entitativity on blame judgments. Implications of the role of collective responsibility in intergroup relations are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Participants recalled instances when they felt vicariously ashamed or guilty for another's wrongdoing and rated their appraisals of the event and resulting motivations. The study tested aspects of social association that uniquely predict vicarious shame and guilt. Results suggest that the experience of vicarious shame and vicarious guilt are distinguishable. Vicarious guilt was predicted by one's perceived interdependence with the wrongdoer (e.g. high interpersonal interaction), an appraisal of control over the event, and a motivation to repair the other person's wrongdoing. Vicarious shame was predicted by the relevance of the event to a shared social identity with the wrongdoer, an appraisal of self-image threat, and a motivation to distance from the event, implications for intergroup behavior and emotion are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]