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EMOKINE is a software package and dataset creation suite for emotional full-body movement research in experimental psychology, affective neuroscience, and computer vision. A computational framework, comprehensive instructions, a pilot dataset, observer ratings, and kinematic feature extraction code are provided to facilitate future dataset creations at scale. In addition, the EMOKINE framework outlines how complex sequences of movements may advance emotion research. Traditionally, often emotional-'action'-based stimuli are used in such research, like hand-waving or walking motions. Here instead, a pilot dataset is provided with short dance choreographies, repeated several times by a dancer who expressed different emotional intentions at each repetition: anger, contentment, fear, joy, neutrality, and sadness. The dataset was simultaneously filmed professionally, and recorded using XSENS® motion capture technology (17 sensors, 240 frames/second). Thirty-two statistics from 12 kinematic features were extracted offline, for the first time in one single dataset: speed, acceleration, angular speed, angular acceleration, limb contraction, distance to center of mass, quantity of motion, dimensionless jerk (integral), head angle (with regards to vertical axis and to back), and space (convex hull 2D and 3D). Average, median absolute deviation (MAD), and maximum value were computed as applicable. The EMOKINE software is appliable to other motion-capture systems and is openly available on the Zenodo Repository. Releases on GitHub include: (i) the code to extract the 32 statistics, (ii) a rigging plugin for Python for MVNX file-conversion to Blender format (MVNX=output file XSENS® system), and (iii) a Python-script-powered custom software to assist with blurring faces; latter two under GPLv3 licenses., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

Dance has entered mainstream empirical research: dance as an experimental stimulus, and dancers as movement experts. Informed by several sources, including primary sources (original, historical documents, and oral reports, such as interviews with practitioners and academic scholars of Iranian dance genres) and secondary sources (research literature), we describe what we label "Iranian classical dance" within this paper as an important resource for empirical research, not only in humanities scholarship but also, and importantly, for empirical aesthetics, emotion psychology, cross-cultural psychology, and affective neuroscience. For this purpose, we (1) describe the aesthetics, characteristics, and history of Iranian classical dance; (2) outline issues of definition and systematization; and (3) give an overview of the cultural complexities and sociopolitical issues regarding Iranian classical dance in the past 40 years, which have shaped its current form. After the political revolution of 1979 (Iranian solar calendar year: 1358), dance in Iran-both as everyday practice and as a cultural heritage-was first forbidden, and now remains heavily restricted. International, interdisciplinary research teams can contribute to safeguarding Iranian classical dance in the future by firmly enshrining it into empirical research on human dance. We outline empirical research perspectives on Iranian classical dance, dataset resources, and expert communities., (© 2024 The Authors. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of The New York Academy of Sciences.)

We explore dance video clip stimuli as a means to test human observers' accuracy in detecting genuine emotional expressivity in full-body movements. Stimuli of every-day-type full-body expressions of emotions usually use culturally very recognizable actions (e.g. fist shaking for anger, etc). However, expressive dance movement stimuli can be created to contain fully abstract movements. The expressivity results from subtle variations in the body movements of the expressor, and emotions cannot be recognised by observers via particular actions (e.g. fist shaking, etc). Forty-one participants watched and rated 24 pairs of short dance videos -from a published normalised dance stimuli library- in randomised order (N = 48). Of each carefully matched pair, one version of the full-body movement sequence had been danced to be emotionally genuinely expressive (clip a), while the other version of the same sequence (clip b) had been danced -while technically correct- without any emotional expressivity. Participants rated (i) expressivity (to test their accuracy; block 1), and (ii) how much they liked each movement (an implicit measure to test their emotional response ("liking"); block 2). Participants rated clips that were intended to be expressive as more expressive (part 1: expressivity ratings), and liked those expressive clips more than the non-expressive clips (part 2: liking ratings). Besides, their galvanic skin response differed, depending on the category of clips they were watching (expressive vs. non-expressive), and this relationship was modulated by interceptive accuracy and arts experience. Results are discussed in relation to the Body Precision Hypothesis and the Hypothesis of Constructed Emotion., (Copyright © 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

There has been a controversy on the moral import of music and art in general. On the one hand, the moralist view contends that there is some sort of link between art and morality, even if the way to specify this link may be highly diverse. It comprises most of the classical views of art, from Schiller's view of the role of artistic education in moral development, to any view that declares a form of art as corrupt or degenerated, or enlightening. What it is assumed minimally in all of them is that the moral import of an artwork contributes to its aesthetic value. On the other hand, formalist views claim that the aesthetic value of an artwork is genuine and autonomous, and therefore it is independent of any other value. In this chapter we focus on music, as the most difficult case for the moralist standpoint, given the lack of representational content of music. We argue for a variety of the moralist's view according to which the moral import of a musical artwork is not derived from its content (obviously, as it lack any), but from its pragmatics: the context and the intentions that guide its composition and performance, by analogy with any other intentional action, and point to the emotional impact of music as the common ground that bridges moral and aesthetic values. As a provisional conclusion, we outline a research program for brain studies that follows from this proposal, as a way test its predictions, focusing both on the emotional grounds of valuation and their context-dependency., (© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

This paper provides an integrative review of neuroscientific and biobehavioral evidence about the effects of dance on the individual across cultural differences. Dance moves us, and many derive aesthetic pleasure from it. However, in addition-and beyond aesthetics-we propose that dance has noteworthy, deeper neurobiological effects. We first summarize evidence that illustrates the centrality of dance to human life indirectly from archaeology, comparative psychology, developmental psychology, and cross-cultural psychology. Second, we review empirical evidence for six neural and biobehavioral functions of dance: (1) attentional focus/flow, (2) basic emotional experiences, (3) imagery, (4) communication, (5) self-intimation, and (6) social cohesion. We discuss the reviewed evidence in relation to current debates in the field of empirical enquiry into the functions of human dance, questioning the positions that dance is (1) just for pleasure, (2) all about sex, (3) just for mood management and well-being, and (4) for experts only. Being a young field, evidence is still piecemeal and inconclusive. This review aims to take a step toward a systematization of an emerging avenue of research: a neuro- and biobehavioral science of dance., (© 2017 New York Academy of Sciences.)

We examined the influence of affective priming on the appreciation of abstract artworks using an evaluative priming task. Facial primes (showing happiness, disgust or no emotion) were presented under brief (Stimulus Onset Asynchrony, SOA = 20 ms) and extended (SOA = 300 ms) conditions. Differences in aesthetic liking for abstract paintings depending on the emotion expressed in the preceding primes provided a measure of the priming effect. The results showed that, for the extended SOA, artworks were liked more when preceded by happiness primes and less when preceded by disgust primes. Facial expressions of happiness, though not of disgust, exerted similar effects in the brief SOA condition. Subjective measures and a forced-choice task revealed no evidence of prime awareness in the suboptimal condition. Our results are congruent with findings showing that the affective transfer elicited by priming biases evaluative judgments, extending previous research to the domain of aesthetic appreciation.

The law assumes that healthy adults are generally responsible for their actions and have the ability to control their behavior based on rational and moral principles. This contrasts with some recent neuroscientific accounts of action control. Nevertheless, both law and neuroscience acknowledge that strong emotions including fear and anger may "trigger" loss of normal voluntary control over action. Thus, "Loss of Control" is a partial defense for murder under English law, paralleling similar defenses in other legal systems. Here we consider the neuroscientific evidence for such legal classifications of responsibility, particularly focussing on how emotional states modulate voluntary motor control and sense of agency. First, we investigate whether neuroscience could contribute an evidence-base for law in this area. Second, we consider the societal impact of some areas where legal thinking regarding responsibility for action diverges from neuroscientific evidence: should we be guided by normative legal traditions, or by modern understanding of brain functions? In addressing these objectives, we propose a translation exercise between neuroscientific and legal terms, which may assist future interdisciplinary research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theories of human emotion, including some emotion embodiment theories, suggest that our moods and affective states are reflected in the movements of our bodies. We used the reverse process for mood regulation; modulate body movements to regulate mood. Dancing is a type of full‐body movement characterized by affective expressivity and, hence, offers the possibility to express different affective states through the same movement sequences. We tested whether the repeated imitation of a dancer performing two simple full‐body dance movement sequences with different affective expressivity (happy or sad) could change mood states. Computer‐based systems, using avatars as dance models to imitate, offer a series of advantages such as independence from physical contact and location. Therefore, we compared mood induction effects in two conditions: participants were asked to imitate dance movements from one of the two avatars showing: (a) videos of a human dancer model or (b) videos of a robot dancer model. The mood induction was successful for both happy and sad imitations, regardless of condition (human vs. robot avatar dance model). Moreover, the magnitude of happy mood induction and how much participants liked the task predicted work‐related motivation after the mood induction. We conclude that mood regulation through dance movements is possible and beneficial in the work context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Dance" has been associated with many psychophysiological and medical health effects. However, varying definitions of what constitute "dance" have led to a rather heterogenous body of evidence about such potential effects, leaving the picture piecemeal at best. It remains unclear what exact parameters may be driving positive effects. We believe that this heterogeneity of evidence is partly due to a lack of a clear definition of dance for such empirical purposes. A differentiation is needed between (a) the effects on the individual when the activity of "dancing" is enjoyed as a dancer within different dance domains (e.g., professional/"high-art" type of dance, erotic dance, religious dance, club dancing, Dance Movement Therapy (DMT), and what is commonly known as hobby, recreational or social dance), and (b) the effects on the individual within these different domains, as a dancer of the different dance styles (solo dance, partnering dance, group dance; and all the different styles within these). Another separate category of dance engagement is, not as a dancer, but as a spectator of all of the above. " Watching dance " as part of an audience has its own set of psychophysiological and neurocognitive effects on the individual, and depends on the context where dance is witnessed. With the help of dance professionals, we first outline some different dance domains and dance styles, and outline aspects that differentiate them, and that may, therefore, cause differential empirical findings when compared regardless (e.g., amount of interpersonal contact, physical exertion, context, cognitive demand, type of movements, complexity of technique and ratio of choreography/improvisation). Then, we outline commonalities between all dance styles. We identify six basic components that are part of any dance practice, as part of a continuum, and review and discuss available research for each of them concerning the possible health and wellbeing effects of each of these components, and how they may relate to the psychophysiological and health effects that are reported for "dancing": (1) rhythm and music, (2) sociality, (3) technique and fitness, (4) connection and connectedness (self-intimation), (5) flow and mindfulness, (6) aesthetic emotions and imagination. Future research efforts might take into account the important differences between types of dance activities, as well as the six components, for a more targeted assessment of how "dancing" affects the human body. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study provides exploratory evidence about how behavioral and neural responses to standard moral dilemmas are influenced by religious belief. Eleven Catholics and 13 Atheists (all female) judged 48 moral dilemmas. Differential neural activity between the two groups was found in precuneus and in prefrontal, frontal and temporal regions. Furthermore, a double dissociation showed that Catholics recruited different areas for deontological (precuneus; temporoparietal junction) and utilitarian moral judgments [dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC); temporal poles], whereas Atheists did not (superior parietal gyrus for both types of judgment). Finally, we tested how both groups responded to personal and impersonal moral dilemmas: Catholics showed enhanced activity in DLPFC and posterior cingulate cortex during utilitarian moral judgments to impersonal moral dilemmas and enhanced responses in anterior cingulate cortex and superior temporal sulcus during deontological moral judgments to personal moral dilemmas. Our results indicate that moral judgment can be influenced by an acquired set of norms and conventions transmitted through religious indoctrination and practice. Catholic individuals may hold enhanced awareness of the incommensurability between two unequivocal doctrines of the Catholic belief set, triggered explicitly in a moral dilemma: help and care in all circumstances—but thou shalt not kill. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to highlight the possibilities that research on dance appreciation offers empirical aesthetics, as well as the challenges such research poses. Behavioral and neuroimaging approaches have, to date, mainly focused on the perception and recognition of human body movement and structure. A small number of studies, nonetheless, have explicitly taken the basic research on the perceptual, emotional, and cognitive processes engaged during movement observation, together with their neural concomitants, as a starting point to understand the aesthetic experience triggered by the observation of a dance. We provide an overview of these studies and point out avenues for future research on dance appreciation within the scope of empirical aesthetics. We also note some methodological and conceptual issues that should be taken into account in the design of empirical studies of the aesthetic appreciation of dance, including dance theory scholarship and humanistic approaches to dance practice. Finally, we describe how common movement features of dance styles around the world suggest that humans may be endowed with an evolved cognitive ability to appreciate and to be aesthetically moved by dance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]