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How do people choose how to regulate others' emotional responses? We extended previous work on how the intensity of an emotional situation influences which strategies people choose to regulate their emotions (i.e., intrapersonal emotion regulation choice) to also consider the effect of intensity on which strategies people choose to regulate other people's emotions (i.e., interpersonal emotion regulation choice). Studies 1a and 1b found that the intensity of the emotional situation influenced whether participants chose distraction or reappraisal in both intrapersonal and interpersonal regulation contexts, but also that the effect of intensity differed between the contexts (participants choose reappraisal more frequently for others in intense situations than for themselves). However, this difference was stronger (or only found) when participants helped the other person to control their emotions first. Two further studies examined whether differences in perceived intensity (Study 2) and/or the anticipated effort or effectiveness of the strategies (Study 3) could explain the difference between intrapersonal and interpersonal contexts. Together, the findings suggest that the regulation strategies that people choose depend on the intensity of the emotional situation, the target of regulation, and whether people choose how to regulate their own emotions before choosing how to regulate another person's emotions, with preliminary evidence that differences between intrapersonal and interpersonal emotion regulation choice may be associated with differences in the anticipated effort and effectiveness of regulation between these contexts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

When confronted with unwanted negative emotions, individuals use a variety of cognitive strategies for regulating these emotions. The brain mechanisms underlying these emotion regulation strategies have not been fully characterized, and it is not yet clear whether these mechanisms vary as a function of emotion intensity. To address these issues, 30 community participants (17 females, 13 males, M age = 24.3 years) completed a picture-viewing emotion regulation task with neutral viewing, reacting to negative stimuli, cognitive reappraisal, attentional deployment, and self-distancing conditions. Brain and behavioral data were simultaneously collected in a 3T GE MRI scanner. Findings indicated that prefrontal regions were engaged by all three regulation strategies, but reappraisal showed the least amount of increase in activity as a function of intensity. Overall, these results suggest that there are both brain and behavioral effects of intensity and that intensity is useful for probing strategy-specific effects and the relationships between the strategies. Furthermore, while these three strategies showed significant overlap, there also were specific strategy-intensity interactions, such as frontoparietal control regions being preferentially activated by reappraisal and self-distancing. Conversely, self-referential and attentional regions were preferentially recruited by self-distancing and distraction as intensity increased. Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion that there is a continuum of cognitive emotion regulation along which all three of these strategies lie.

Individuals often receive preceding information concerning future unpleasant events that will require regulating emotions. However, conceptual accounts explaining how the presence of anticipatory information, as well as biases in the content of anticipatory information, influence subsequent emotion regulation are lacking. We propose a novel account that explains how the cognitive processing of anticipatory information influences subsequent cognitive regulatory strategies. Specifically, the presence (vs. absence) of anticipatory information, which primarily influences attention toward upcoming unpleasant events, largely impacts subsequent attention-modulation regulatory strategies. By contrast, biased (vs. unbiased) contents of anticipatory information, that primarily influence the meaning of upcoming unpleasant events, largely impact meaning-modulation regulatory strategies. Our account further argues that the fit between the direction of influence of anticipatory information on cognition and the underlying mechanisms of cognitive down-regulation strategies determines regulatory challenge (i.e., effort and effectiveness of regulation). When anticipatory information decreases attention to, or negative meaning of, upcoming unpleasant stimuli, it fits a subsequent down-regulation goal to decrease attention or negative meaning, resulting in low regulatory challenge. However, when anticipatory information enhances attention to, or negative meaning of, upcoming unpleasant stimuli, it conflicts with a counter down-regulation goal to decrease attention or negative meaning (i.e., no fit), resulting in high regulatory challenge. Broad implications and future directions are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Although selecting emotion regulation strategies constitutes means to achieve emotion goals (i.e., desired emotional states), strategy selection and goals have been studied independently. We propose that the strategies people select are often dictated by what they want to feel. We tested the possibility that emotion regulation involves choosing strategies that match emotion goals. We expected people who are motivated to decrease emotional intensity to select strategies that are tailored for decreasing emotions (e.g., distraction), whereas those who are motivated to increase emotional intensity to select strategies that are tailored for increasing emotions (e.g., rumination). We expected this pattern to be evident both in the lab and in everyday life. We first verified that some strategies (i.e., distraction) are more effective in decreasing, and other strategies (i.e., rumination) more effective in increasing emotions (Study 1). Next, we tested whether emotion goals (decrease vs. increase emotion) direct the selection of strategies inside (Studies 2-3) and outside (Study 4) the laboratory. As predicted, participants were more likely to select strategies that decrease emotions (e.g., distraction, suppression) when motivated to decrease, and strategies that increase emotions (e.g., rumination) when motivated to increase negative (Studies 2-4) and positive (Study 3) emotions. Finally, in Study 5, we demonstrated that emotional dysfunction is linked to less flexibility in matching strategies to goals. Compared to healthy participants, depressed participants selected rumination less for increasing emotions and selected distraction less for decreasing emotions. Our findings show that what people want to feel can determine how they regulate emotions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Empathy represents a fundamental ability that allows for the creation and cultivation of social bonds. As part of the empathic process, individuals use their own emotional state to interpret the content and intensity of other people's emotions. Therefore, the current study was designed to test two hypotheses: (1) empathy for the pain of another will result in biased emotional intensity judgment; and (2) changing one's emotion via emotion regulation will modulate these biased judgments. To test these hypotheses, in experiment one we used a modified version of a well-known task that triggers an empathic reaction We found that empathy resulted in biased emotional intensity judgment. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of a bias in the recognition of emotional facial expressions as a function of empathy for pain. In experiment two, we replicated these findings in an independent sample, and further found that this biased emotional intensity judgment can be moderated via reappraisal. Taken together, our findings suggest that the novel task used here can be employed to further explore the relation between emotion regulation and empathy.

Common wisdom suggests that knowledge is power. The present investigation tested the boundary conditions of this quote by asking how knowledge, in the form of anticipatory information regarding future emotional events, can be maladaptive for certain forms of subsequent coping. Therefore, Study 1 tested our hypothesis that anticipatory information selectively conflicts with and impairs subsequent emotion regulation that involves disengagement from processing emotional information (distraction). Importantly, utilizing event-related potentials enabled tracking the temporal neural processing stages underlying this selective regulatory impairment. Study 2 provided an important behavioral extension by exploring individuals' knowledge regarding the influence of anticipatory information on subsequent regulation and the experiential consequences of this knowledge. Results of Study 1 confirmed that anticipatory information amplified initial attention toward emotional stimuli, selectively conflicting with continuous efforts to disengage attention via distraction (enhanced sustained late positive potentials amplitudes). Converging evidence demonstrated that even prior to regulation, receiving anticipatory information when expecting to distract produced a strong conflict (enhanced stimulus preceding negativity amplitudes). Moreover, results of Study 2 showed that individuals adequately chose to refrain from anticipatory information when expecting to distract, with suggestive evidence for resultant decreased negative experience. Counter to our prediction, anticipatory information did not facilitate subsequent regulation that involves engaging with emotional information processing (reappraisal). Nonetheless, individuals strongly preferred to receive anticipatory information when about to reappraise. Taken together, these findings suggest that knowledge is not power when it comes to disengagement coping, but individuals seem to recognize this maladaptive link and adjust their information-seeking behavior accordingly. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).)

Which emotion regulation strategy one uses in a given context can have profound affective, cognitive, and social consequences. It is therefore important to understand the determinants of emotion regulation choice. Many prior studies have examined person-specific, internal determinants of emotion regulation choice. Recently, it has become clear that external variables that are properties of the stimulus can also influence emotion regulation choice. In the present research, we consider whether reappraisal affordances, defined as the opportunities for re-interpretation of a stimulus that are inherent in that stimulus, can shape individuals' emotion regulation choices. We show that reappraisal affordances have stability across people and across time (Study 1), and are confounded with emotional intensity for a standardised set of picture stimuli (Study 2). Since emotional intensity has been shown to drive emotion regulation choice, we construct a context in which emotional intensity is separable from reappraisal affordances (Study 3) and use this context to show that reappraisal affordances powerfully influence emotion regulation choice even when emotional intensity and discrete emotions are taken into account (Study 4).

Objectives: Previous research demonstrates that younger and older adults prefer distraction over engagement (reappraisal) when regulating high-intensity negative emotion. Older adults also demonstrate a greater bias for positive over negative information in attention and memory compared with younger adults. In this study, we investigated whether emotion regulation choice preferences may differ as a function of stimulus valence with age., Method: The effect of stimulus intensity on negative and positive emotion regulation strategy preferences was investigated in younger and older men. Participants indicated whether they favored distraction or reappraisal to attenuate emotional reactions to negative and positive images that varied in intensity., Results: Men in both age-groups preferred distraction over reappraisal when regulating high-intensity emotion. As no age-related strategic differences were found in negative emotion regulation preferences, older men chose to distract less from high-intensity positive images than did younger men., Discussion: Older men demonstrated greater engagement with highly positive emotional contexts than did younger men. Thus, age differences in emotion regulation goals when faced with intense emotional stimuli depend on the valence of the emotional stimuli.

Do rightists and leftists experience information about suffering and harm with differing emotional intensities, depending on the identity of target depicted? Do they consequently choose differently how to regulate or cope with these emotions? Research has identified ideological differences in emotional processes, but it has yet to identify what types of content lead to ideological differences in emotional intensity or whether these content-dependent differences relate to differing preferences for engaging versus disengaging emotion-regulation strategies. We posited that right-left differences in experienced emotional intensity would be context-dependent, emerging mostly in response to depictions of harm to the outgroup, in accordance with the centrality of intergroup attitudes to ideological self-placement in conflict. Study 1 (N = 83) supported this hypothesis, with leftists (vs. rightists) experiencing outgroup harm (but not ingroup harm or conflict-irrelevant harm) with greater emotional intensity. Study 2 (N = 101), which replicated this finding, additionally examined whether behavioral differences in regulatory choice consequently emerge mostly regarding outgroup harm. We tested 2 competing hypotheses as to the nature of these differences: (a) the intensity hypothesis, positing that leftists (more than rightists) would regulate their intensified reactions to outgroup harm through disengagement-distraction (vs. engagement-reappraisal) due to a documented greater preference for disengaging coping strategies as intensity increases, and (b) the motivation hypothesis, positing that leftists (more than rightists) would prefer engagement-reappraisal (vs. disengagement-distraction), consistent with leftists' documented greater preference for intergroup empathy. Results exclusively supported the intensity hypothesis, and the significance of both studies is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).)

Feeling, or the subjective emotional experience, is a fundamental element of the emotional reaction, yet past attempts to understand the mechanisms of feeling generation remain limited. The current study presents a signal detection theory (SDT) conceptualization of feeling generation. Accordingly, feeling, like other sensations, reflects an outcome of an inner decision regarding the emotional evidence, and, therefore, can be evaluated via 2 processes: e vidence differentiation ( d' )-the ability to emotionally differentiate between external stimuli, given the essentially noisy evidence-and criterion (c)-the report threshold , or amount of evidence needed to have an intense reportable feeling. According to the model, feelings can be disproportionally intense (false alarms; e.g., emotional overreaction) or disproportionally weak (misses; e.g., failing to detect danger), with the criterion controlling the relative proportion of these "errors." Results from a novel task indicate that our conceptualization provides a suitable model for valence (pleasant-unpleasant) feeling generation, as reflected in superior model fit relative to plausible alternative models, nonsignificant lack of fit, and by successful experimental tests of a novel prediction regarding contextual influences and related uncertainty. Additional evidence for the external validity of the model shows that SDT parameters, especially the criterion, were meaningfully correlated with relevant emotion regulation and affective style constructs. Implications for the understanding of feeling generation, in general, and in psychopathology, in particular, are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).)

Evaluative contexts can be stressful, but relatively little is known about how different individuals who vary in responses to self-evaluation make emotion regulatory choices to cope in these situations. To address this gap, participants who vary in self-esteem gave an impromptu speech, rated how they perceived they had performed on multiple evaluative dimensions, and subsequently chose between disengaging attention from emotional processing (distraction) and engaging with emotional processing via changing its meaning (reappraisal), while waiting to receive feedback regarding these evaluative dimensions. According to our framework, distraction can offer stronger short-term relief than reappraisal, but, distraction is costly in the long run relative to reappraisal because it does not allow learning from evaluative feedback. We predicted and found that participants with lower (but not higher) self-esteem react defensively to threat of failure by seeking short-term relief via distraction over the long-term benefit of reappraisal, as perceived failure increases. Implications for the understanding of emotion regulation and self-esteem are discussed.

Research in several domains suggests that having strategic options is not always beneficial. In this paper, we tested whether having strategic options (vs. not) is helpful or harmful for regulating negative emotions. In 5 studies (N = 151) participants were presented with 1 or more strategic options prior to watching aversive images and using the selected strategic option. Across studies, we found that people reported less intense negative emotions when the strategy they used to regulate their emotions was presented as a single option, rather than as 1 of several options. This was regardless of whether people could choose between the options (Studies 3-5) or not (Studies 1, 2, and 4), and specific to negative (but not neutral) images (Study 5). A sixth study addressed an explanation based on demand characteristics, showing that participants expected to feel more positive when having more than 1 option. The findings indicate that having strategic options for regulating negative emotions can sometimes be costly. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).)

Emotional-intensity is a core characteristic of affective events that strongly determines how individuals choose to regulate their emotions. Our conceptual framework suggests that in high emotional-intensity situations, individuals prefer to disengage attention using distraction, which can more effectively block highly potent emotional information, as compared with engagement reappraisal, which is preferred in low emotional-intensity. However, existing supporting evidence remains indirect because prior intensity categorization of emotional stimuli was based on subjective measures that are potentially biased and only represent the endpoint of emotional-intensity processing. Accordingly, this study provides the first direct evidence for the role of online emotional-intensity processing in predicting behavioral regulatory-choices. Utilizing the high temporal resolution of event-related potentials, we evaluated online neural processing of stimuli's emotional-intensity (late positive potential, LPP) prior to regulatory-choices between distraction and reappraisal. Results showed that enhanced neural processing of intensity (enhanced LPP amplitudes) uniquely predicted (above subjective measures of intensity) increased tendency to subsequently choose distraction over reappraisal. Additionally, regulatory-choices led to adaptive consequences, demonstrated in finding that actual implementation of distraction relative to reappraisal-choice resulted in stronger attenuation of LPPs and self-reported arousal., (© The Author (2016). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Emotion dysregulation is a core feature of borderline personality disorder (BPD). So far, many studies have tested the consequences of the implementation of certain emotion regulation (ER) strategies, but there have been no investigations about ER choices in BPD. Thus, the aim of this study was to investigate habitual ER choices by self-report questionnaires and experimentally by testing the preference to select between distraction and reappraisal when facing different emotional intensities (high vs. low) and contents (borderline-specific vs. unspecific negative) in patients with BPD (n=24) compared with clinical controls (patients with major depression, n=19) and a healthy control group (n=32). Additionally, heart rate (HR) responses were continuously assessed. Main results revealed that both patient groups showed maladaptive self-reported ER choice profiles compared with HC. We found, however, no differences between the groups in the choice of distraction and reappraisal on the behavioral level and in HR responses. In BPD, within-group analyses revealed a positive correlation between symptom severity and the preference for distraction under high-intensity borderline-specific stimuli. Our findings provide preliminary evidence of ER choices in BPD and show the robustness of the choice effect in patients with affective disorders., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Does aging impact strategy choice with regard to regulating negative emotions? Based on the assumption that older adults are highly motivated to quickly defuse negative states, we predicted that older adults, relative to young adults, would show an increased preference for distraction (a cognitive disengagement strategy) over reappraisal (a cognitive engagement strategy) in the face of negative material. A stronger preference for distraction, in turn, should be associated with higher affective well-being at older ages, as it helps to avoid high physiological arousal. Young (19-28 years, n = 38) and older (65-75 years, n = 39) adults completed a laboratory task of emotion-regulation choice in which they viewed negative pictures of high and low intensity and chose between distraction and reappraisal to regulate their emotional response. Confirming predictions, age was associated with an increased preference to choose distraction over reappraisal. Among older but not young adults, the relative preference for distraction to reappraisal predicted higher state-affective well-being. In addition, across age groups, the preference for distraction over reappraisal was positively predicted by stimulus intensity and negatively by cognitive resources. Findings support the notion of an age-related shift toward disengagement strategies to regulate negative emotions, which maps onto older adults' prohedonic orientation and holds affective benefits., ((c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).)

Although emotional intensity powerfully challenges regulatory strategies, its influence remains largely unexplored in affective-neuroscience. Accordingly, the present study addressed the moderating role of emotional intensity in two regulatory stages--implementation (during regulation) and pre-implementation (prior to regulation), of two major cognitive regulatory strategies--distraction and reappraisal. According to our framework, because distraction implementation involves early attentional disengagement from emotional information before it gathers force, in high-intensity it should be more effective in the short-term, relative to reappraisal, which modulates emotional processing only at a late semantic meaning phase. Supporting findings showed that in high (but not low) intensity, distraction implementation resulted in stronger modulation of negative experience, reduced neural emotional processing (centro-parietal late positive potential, LPP), with suggestive evidence for less cognitive effort (frontal-LPP), relative to reappraisal. Related pre-implementation findings confirmed that anticipating regulation of high-intensity stimuli resulted in distraction (over reappraisal) preference. In contrast, anticipating regulation of low-intensity stimuli resulted in reappraisal (over distraction) preference, which is most beneficial for long-term adaptation. Furthermore, anticipating cognitively demanding regulation, either in cases of regulating counter to these preferences or via the more effortful strategy of reappraisal, enhanced neural attentional resource allocation (Stimulus Preceding Negativity). Broad implications are discussed., (© The Author (2015). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Individuals with bipolar disorder experience emotion regulation difficulties, even during remission, but are able to effectively employ emotion regulation strategies when instructed. We hypothesized that this puzzling discrepancy might be due to their maladaptive emotion regulation choices. To test this hypothesis, we used a previously validated paradigm (Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri, & Gross, 2011; Sheppes et al., 2014), and asked remitted individuals with bipolar I disorder (n = 25) and healthy individuals (n = 26) to view standardized positive and negative images of high and low intensity, and choose reappraisal or distraction to decrease their emotion intensity. Replicating and extending prior results, participants across both groups showed a pattern of choosing distraction more for high versus low intensity positive and negative images, but no between-groups differences were evident. These results suggest that emotion regulation choice patterns may be robust across samples, and add to growing evidence that several basic emotion regulation elements may remain intact in bipolar disorder., ((c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).)

Emotional problems figure prominently in many clinical conditions. Recent efforts to explain and treat these conditions have emphasized the role of emotion dysregulation. However, emotional problems are not always the result of emotion dysregulation, and even when emotional problems do arise from emotion dysregulation, it is necessary to specify precisely what type of emotion dysregulation might be operative. In this review, we present an extended process model of emotion regulation, and we use this model to describe key points at which emotion-regulation difficulties can lead to various forms of psychopathology. These difficulties are associated with (a) identification of the need to regulate emotions, (b) selection among available regulatory options, (c) implementation of a selected regulatory tactic, and (d) monitoring of implemented emotion regulation across time. Implications and future directions for basic research, assessment, and intervention are discussed.

Although emotions and ideology are important factors guiding policy support in conflict, their interactive influence remains unclear. Based on prior findings that ideological leftists' beliefs are more susceptible to change than rightists' beliefs, we tested a somewhat counterintuitive extension that leftists would be more susceptible to influence by their emotional reactions than rightists. In three laboratory studies, inducing positive and negative emotions affected Jewish-Israeli leftists', but not rightists', support for conciliatory policies toward an adversarial (Studies 1 and 3) and a non-adversarial (Study 2) outgroup. Three additional field studies showed that positive and negative emotions were related to leftists', but not rightists', policy support in positive as well as highly negative conflict-related contexts, among both Jewish (Studies 4 and 5) and Palestinian (Study 6) citizens of Israel. Across different conflicts, emotions, conflict-related contexts, and even populations, leftists' policy support changed in accordance with emotional reactions more than rightists' policy support., (© 2014 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.)

Choice behavior is considered the fundamental means by which individuals exert control over their environments. One important choice domain that remains virtually unexplored is that of emotion regulation. This is surprising given that healthy adaptation requires flexibly choosing between regulation strategies in a manner that is responsive to differing situational demands. In the present article, we provide a broad conceptual framework that systematically evaluates the rules that govern the ways individuals choose between different emotion regulation strategies. This conceptual account is buttressed by empirical findings from 6 studies that show the effects of hypothesized emotional, cognitive, and motivational determinants of regulation choice (Studies 1-3) and illuminate the mechanisms that underlie choices between different emotion regulation strategies (Studies 4-6). Broad implications and future directions are discussed.

A growing body of literature suggests that sleep and emotions are closely linked, and that the relationship between these two domains is complex and bidirectional. This review synthesizes some of the most current empirical findings with regard to the effects of sleep (with an emphasis on sleep deprivation) on subsequent emotional state, and the effects of emotions on subsequent sleep. Furthermore, we review a selection of possible mechanisms underlying some of these associations. Finally, suggestions are made for future research as part of the effort to develop a more comprehensive theory for this emerging field., (Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

The social environment requires people to quickly form contextually appropriate social evaluations. Models of social cognition suggest that this ability depends on the interaction of automatic and controlled evaluative systems. However, controlled processes, such as reappraisal of an initial response, have rarely been studied in the context of social evaluation. In the two studies reported here, participants reappraised or simply observed angry or neutral faces. In Study 1, reappraisal modulated evaluations of angry faces on explicit as well as implicit behavioral levels. In Study 2, reappraisal altered both early and late phases of evaluative electrocortical processing. These studies suggest that controlled processes, such as reappraisal, can quickly and substantially modulate early evaluative processes in the context of biologically significant social stimuli.

Despite centuries of speculation about how to manage negative emotions, little is actually known about which emotion-regulation strategies people choose to use when confronted with negative situations of varying intensity. On the basis of a new process conception of emotion regulation, we hypothesized that in low-intensity negative situations, people would show a relative preference to choose to regulate emotions by engagement reappraisal, which allows emotional processing. However, we expected people in high-intensity negative situations to show a relative preference to choose to regulate emotions by disengagement distraction, which blocks emotional processing at an early stage before it gathers force. In three experiments, we created emotional contexts that varied in intensity, using either emotional pictures (Experiments 1 and 2) or unpredictable electric stimulation (Experiment 3). In response to these emotional contexts, participants chose between using either reappraisal or distraction as an emotion-regulation strategy. Results in all experiments supported our hypothesis. This pattern in the choice of emotion-regulation strategies has important implications for the understanding of healthy adaptation.

Distraction and reappraisal are two widely used forms of emotion regulation. The process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998) holds that they differ (1) in when they act on the emotion-generative process, and (2) in their impact on subsequent responses to regulated stimuli. We tested these two predictions by measuring electrocortical responses to neutral and emotional images during two phases. In the regulation phase, images were watched or regulated using distraction or reappraisal. During the re-exposure phase, the same images were passively watched. As predicted, during regulation, distraction reduced the late positive potential (LPP) earlier than reappraisal. Upon re-exposure, images with a distraction (but not reappraisal) history elicited a larger LPP than images with an attend history. This pattern of results suggests that distraction and reappraisal intervene at separate stages during emotion generation, a feature which may have distinct consequences that extend beyond the regulatory episode., (Copyright © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Previous studies of emotion regulation suggested that reappraisal (construing an emotional event in non-emotional terms) has no cognitive or physiological consequences, but in all these studies, reappraisal was instructed ahead of an emotional situation. The authors' recent work, using behavioral indices, showed that inhibitory self-control resources are challenged when reappraisal starts late during an emotional situation relative to late instruction of distraction (diverting attention through producing neutral thoughts). The present study provides converging physiological evidence in showing that instructing to use reappraisal but not distraction late in a sadness inducing film involved increased skin conductance and decreased finger temperature. Both of these results are indicative of increased sympathetic activation that has been previously found to accompany inhibitory self-control effort.