Search

The transactive energy market (TEM) is a recent development in energy management that enables prosumers to trade directly, promising many environmental and economic benefits. Prosumer trading necessitates sharing information to facilitate transactions. Additionally, many TEMs propose using blockchains to manage auctions and store transactions. These facts introduce privacy concerns: consumption data, trading history, and other identifying information pose risks to users if leaked. Anonymity by trading under a pseudonym is commonly presented as a solution; however, this creates risks for market participants: scammed users will not have recourse, and users with innocent malfunctions may be banned from trading. We propose the Individually Linkable Pseudonymous Trading Scheme (ILPTS), which enables users to trade under a pseudonym, protecting their identity, while a smart contract monitors reputations and can temporarily deanonymize a user, ensuring market integrity. ILPTS was developed in stages. Examination of existing TEM literature was performed to identify desirable features. Analysis of cryptography literature was performed to identify techniques that may confer certain features. It was found through formal analysis that ILPTS adheres to identified design goals, improves upon existing solutions, and resists common attacks against TEMs. Future work includes software simulation and on-device implementation to further verify security and feasibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The transactive energy market is an emerging development in energy economics built on advanced metering infrastructure. Data generated in this context is often required for market operations, while also being privacy sensitive. This dual concern has necessitated the development of various methods of obfuscation in order to maintain privacy while still facilitating operations. While data aggregation is a common approach in this context, many of the existing aggregation methods rely on additional network components or lack flexibility. In this paper, we introduce Cyclic Homomorphic Encryption Aggregation (CHEA), a secure aggregation protocol that eliminates the need for additional network components or complicated key distribution schemes, while providing additional capabilities compared to similar protocols. We validate our scheme with formal security analysis as well as a software simulation of a transactive energy network running the scheme. Results indicate that CHEA performs well in comparison to similar works, with minimal communication overheads. Additionally, CHEA retains all standard security properties held by other aggregation schemes, while improving flexibility and reducing infrastructural requirements. Our scheme operates on similar assumptions as other works, but current smart metering hardware lags in terms of processing power, making the scheme infeasible on the current generation of hardware. However, these capabilities should quickly advance to an accommodating state. With this in mind, and given the results, we believe CHEA is a strong candidate for aggregating transactive energy data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advances in energy generation and distribution technology have created the need for new power management paradigms. Transactive energy markets are integrated software and hardware systems that enable optimized energy management and direct trading between prosumers. This literature review covers unresolved security and privacy vulnerabilities in the proposed implementations of such markets. We first performed a coarse search for such implementations. We then combed the resulting literature for references to privacy concerns, security vulnerabilities, and attacks that their system was either vulnerable to or sought to address. We did so with a particular focus on threats that were not mitigated by the use of blockchain technology, a commonly employed solution. Based on evidence from 28 peer-reviewed papers, we synthesized 14 categories of concerns and their proposed solutions. We found that there are some concerns that have been widely addressed, such as protecting trading history when using a public blockchain. Conversely, there were serious threats that are not sufficiently being considered. While a lack of real-world deployment has limited information about which attacks are most likely or feasible, there are clear areas of priority that we recommend to address going forward, including market attacks, false data injection attacks, single points of failure, energy usage data leakage, and privacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this paper, an agent-based system for bilateral contracts of energy is proposed. The generating companies submit their offers to the demand companies. The demand companies also submit their bids to the generators. Each load or generator’s agent wants to match with an opponent, which offers the most valuable proposal. However, the problem of simultaneous decision-making causes decision conflicts among the agents. To overcome this conflict, we assume loads as the leaders and generators as the followers. We use Stackelberg game to match the seller and buyer agents. The negotiation process between a buyer and its potential seller will determine the power price between them. This process is carried out through a proposed combined time-behavioral protocol (TBP). With negligible changes in around the agreed price, this protocol can reduce the negotiation time considerably. After successful negotiation, the seller and buyer agents could sign a bilateral contract of energy if the market conditions allow it. The applicability of the proposed method is illustrated through a case study. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]