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The application of pattern recognition-based approaches in damage localisation and quantification will eventually require the use of some kind of supervised learning algorithm. The use, and most importantly, the success of such algorithms will depend critically on the availability of data from all possible damage states for training. It is perhaps well known that the availability of damage data through destructive means cannot generally be afforded in the case of high value engineering structures outside laboratory conditions. This paper presents the attempt to use added masses in order to identify features suitable for training supervised learning algorithms and then to test the trained classifiers with damage data, with the ultimate purpose of damage localisation. In order to test the approach of adding masses, two separate cases of a dual-class classification problem, representing two distinct locations, and a three-class problem representing three distinct locations, are examined with the help of a full-scale aircraft wing. It was found that an excellent rate of correct classification could be achieved in both the dual-class and three-class cases. However, it was also found that the rate of correct classification was sensitive to the choices made in training the supervised learning algorithm. The results for the dual-class problem demonstrated a comparatively high level of robustness to these choices with a substantially lower robustness found in the three-class case.

The Tactical Tomahawk RGM-109E/UGM-109E Missile (TACTOM) counters threats against United States Forces by destroying fixed and mobile targets, which include command, control and logistic systems, industrial and other high value targets, and fixed and mobile defense systems. The Tomahawk Weapons System (TWS) consists of the TACTOM missile, the Tomahawk Mission Planning Center (TMPC), and the Tactical Tomahawk Weapons Control System (TTWCS). TACTOM is an ACAT IC program, TMPC is an ACAT II program, and TTWCS is an ACAT III program. TACTOM provides major modernization to the existing Tomahawk technology by increasing responsiveness and flexibility at a more affordable production unit cost. Key elements of the TACTOM design are an improved navigation and guidance computer, improved anti-jam Global Positioning System capability, improved responsiveness and flexibility through two-way satellite communications for in-flightre-targeting, a loiter capability, and the ability to send a single-frame Battle Damage Indication Image of over-flown areas prior to impact. Modern manufacturing techniques and Commercial Off-the-Shelf/Government Off-the-Shelf hardware provide this improved capability. Additionally, the life cycle costs are significantly reduced by extending the recertification interval from eight years for the currently fielded Block III Tomahawk to 15 years for TACTOM. TACTOM will maximize the use of existing TWS program and logistic support.

The Tomahawk missile is the United States Navy's premier land attack cruise missile and has enjoyed significant positive press during both Gulf Wars and in the recent strikes in Afghanistan. Considering the large and versatile weapon inventory of the U.S. military, it is no small achievement for a single weapon to be considered the "weapon of choice". In fact, the United States Air Force has its own land attack cruise missile called the Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM). Both the Tomahawk and the CALCM were conceived and initially developed under the same Department of Defense (DoD) program, the Joint Military Cruise Program Office. These two missiles with nearly identical early development and missions experienced quite different fates. The success of the Navy's Tomahawk, a program with relatively low secrecy when compared to the Air Force's CALCM, should be a lesson to military managers of future weapons procurement programs.

The U.S. Navy is currently developing its next-generation cruise missile, the Tactical Tomahawk, which improves upon current versions by its ability to be retargeted in flight against emergent time-critical targets. In this study, we developed an advanced operator interface prototype for monitoring, controlling and retargeting the Tactical Tomahawk missile and empirically tested the effect of mission complexity on the ability of shipboard operators to maintain situational awareness in various operational scenarios. The first phase of research involved a domain analysis of three primary domains: the weapon system; time-critical decisionmaking; and principles of interface design. The second phase was a concurrent Cognitive Work/Task Analysis (CW/TA) and scenario development effort. The third phase was interface component design followed by complete prototype implementation. In the final phase, we trained and tested twenty graduate students on the dynamic and interactive prototype, based on hypotheses pertaining to both monitoring and retargeting tasks. Statistical results support two primary conclusions. First, operators can maintain adequate situational awareness when monitoring eight missiles and twelve targets simultaneously. Second, results support the use of the missile timebar feature in the interface to compare events. Subjective results indicate the requirement for a robust decision support tool to facilitate rapid retargeting decisions. These and other results form the basis for recommendations to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) about how to most effectively allocate personnel resources in the design of a command and control watchstation for the Tactical Tomahawk cruise missile system.

Risk management is formally recognized by the government's acquisition system as providing value added to major defense programs. Actually implementing such a process, however, must be done within both programmatic and cultural constraints. This paper will examine the risk management process used on the ATWCS program, its evolution, and some of the practical considerations that have affected its implementation and continued functioning.

Computer technology has revolutionised weapons system and hardware during the last decade 'miracle chip' has had impact in all areas of battlefield. The recent Gulf War has amply demonstrated the important role of computer technology in warfare. The best of the high technology was used during the 45 days of air battle followed by 100 hours of ground offensive. Computer and communication formed the heart of every weapon system from Tomahawk, SLAM, Scud, Patriot missile to night vision of tanks and Stealth fighters. This paper discuss the salient features of computer technology used by the US for this truly hi-tech war. the hi-tech weapon systems using computers for achieving surgical precision have been highlighted. The Indian scenario and the important lessons learnt by the use of high technology, primarily based on computers for future wars, have been presented for their applicability in the Indian context.

How a worldwide network of satellites, spy planes, computers, and databases united in support of some revolutionary weapons in the Persian Gulf War is described. The nature of and role played by the coalition's information architecture, and its growth and operation, are examined. The system, which loosely fit under what the Pentagon calls command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C/sup 4/I), was so mobile and sprawling and complex-a sort of electronic ecosystem-that it defies succinct explanation. The use of the F-117A stealth aircraft, the Tomahawk cruise missile, and other high-tech weapons is discussed. Functional shortcomings among US forces identified during the conflict are briefly considered. >

Last year saw the test firing by a Royal Navy submarine HMS Splendid of a live Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) against a simulated target off San Diego. Previously only operational with US forces, this potent weapon system has significantly enhanced the strategic reach and power of UK maritime capabilities, a capability that was brought to bear this year in strikes against Serbia. Here the Commanding Officer of HMS Splendid gives an account of the testing and deployment of this advanced system.

The Command Support At-Sea Experiment (CS@SE) provides experimental advanced graphics display systems consisting of large screen color displays and operator console color displays in the combat information center (CIC) of an Aegis cruiser and in the tactical flag command center (TFCC) of an aircraft carrier. CS@SE systems are designed to prototype potential command support capabilities in an at-sea environment to validate and refine requirements for planned production system upgrades. These systems use sophisticated color graphics techniques to provide real-time tactical displays that improve the availability of information to an operator by reducing clutter through the use of color, area fill, transparen overlays and intensity coding of track symbols. Interfaces wen developed with the Aegis Display System (ADS), Shipboarc Gridlock System with Auto-correlation (SGS/AC), Flag Dats Display System (FDDS) and Tomahawk Engagement Planning and Exercise Evaluation System (TEPEE) that provided the data for the presentation of a tactical display. Display elements included both real-time and over-the-horizon (OTH) surface track data, velocity leaders, tags, uncertainty ellipses, and history trails. The display also included filled land masses, country boundaries, commercial airways, cities, graphics overlays (i.e., operational areas), weapon system missile performance contours, and engagement plans. This paper describes the experiment, its installation and integration into the shipboard environments of an Aegis cruiser (USS Leyte Gulf) and an aircraft carrier (USS America, its usage by the ships companies and embarked staffs, and the experiment result! and findings. Key conclusions of the experiment are: 1 Advanced graphics color displays can significantly enhance the ability of the warfighter to assimilate a complex tactical display. 2 Both ships reported a requirement for a correlated OTH and real-time track display with the ability to clearly differentiate the two types of tracks on the display. 3 On-line data bases such as detailed maps, airways, political boundaries, and cities provide important information that enhances the tactical track picture and the decision making process. 4 Classical rapid prototyping permits the validation of proposed command support concepts in an operational environment and permits some engineering evaluation of possible future capabilities.

The Tomahawk Block IV cruise missile of American can be used for striking tactical targets and moving targets, greatly enlarged its tactical striking ability. Aiming at these missiles of having similar capabilities, decision making support technology of the weapon control system is researched in this paper, the tactical mission decision support model based on Petri nets for cruise missile is founded, The decision algorithm of multi-targets attacking based on entropy modulus and fuzzy mathematic is presented, and tactical mission planning decision making prototype system is designed and realized in this thesis.

This report was prepared for and funded by Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Virginia, and the Office of Naval Research.

In the recent development of a human-in-the-loop simulation test bed designed to examine human performance issues for supervisory control of the Navy's new Tactical Tomahawk missile, measurements of operator situation awareness (SA) and workload through secondary tasking were taken through an embedded instant messaging program. Instant message interfaces (otherwise known as "chat"), already a means of communication between Navy ships, allow researchers to query users in real-time in a natural, ecologic setting, and thus provide more realistic and unobtrusive measurements. However, in the course of this testing, results revealed that some subjects fixated on the real-time instant messaging secondary task instead of the primary task of missile control, leading to the overall degradation of mission performance as well as a loss of SA. While this research effort was the first to quantify command and control performance degradation as a result of instant messaging, the military has recognized that in its network centric warfare quest, instant messaging is a critical informal communication tool, but has associated problems. Recently, a military spokesman said that managing chat in current military operations was sometimes a "nightmare," because military personnel have difficulty in handling large amounts of information through chat, and then synthesizing knowledge from this information. This research highlights the need for further investigation of the role of instant messaging interfaces both on task performance and situation awareness, and how the associated problems could be ameliorated through adaptive display design.

The purpose of this document is to outline the human performance evaluation of the FY03 Fleet Operability Test (FLOT) of the Land Attack Combat System (LACS) Human-Computer Interface (HCI) prototype, developed by the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, San Diego (SSC San Diego). The goal of this evaluation was to determine the level of performance that can be expected from the Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System (TTWCS) given the latest incorporation of human factors engineering principles and task management techniques developed under an Office of Naval Research (ONR) Future Naval Capability (FNC) research and development effort'. It should be stressed that the purposes of this evaluation were to explore the effectiveness of the current TTWCS prototype HCI in supporting performance and to identif% any weaknesses in its design that could be addressed during either the ongoing FNC effort or fleet system development. As such, this investigation was not intended to be an experimental comparison. Instead, data were collected under one condition: an operator with prior Tomahawk experience performing a scenario using the prototype llCI. For the scenario, a single operator performed tasking ordinarily executed by multiple operators over a longer time period in less time. Analysis then determined whether the individual operator successfiilly and comfortably completed tasking or was close to being unable to successfiilly accomplish tasking, in terms of workload and awareness of the tactical situation. In support of the general experimental process, control principles of experimental design were followed to minimize differences in testing conditions between operators, and standard ethical procedures to protect human participants were followed.

*To meet future missions, the U.S. Navy is developing more versatile missile systems while conforming to meet today’s fiscal constraints. The next generation Tactical Tomahawk (TT) has been designed as a flexible battlefield weapon that is half the cost of the current Tomahawk. A complete definition of the aerodynamic fin-folding moments was required to ensure the robustness of the design of the TT tail fin deployment system. An extensive aerodynamic database was needed to accomplish this task; however, program schedule and funding levels originally ruled out wind tunnel testing. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) recommended using computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis and was tasked to develop the necessary aerodynamic database. The large number of database points and short timeframe pointed toward the use of a lower order computational tool. The VSAERO analysis code was used to compute the subsonic aerodynamic characteristics of the TT tail fin-folding moments at deployment during the launch sequence. Quasi steady-state results were obtained at various fin-folding angles as a function of M, αt, and φ. This paper presents and discusses the computational results. Although not originally planned or budgeted, a wind tunnel test was ultimately performed, which provided an opportunity to compare the computational and wind tunnel data. The data comparison generally shows good agreement between the computational and experimental results. The computational results predicted the magnitude of the aerodynamic fin-folding moments to be considerably higher and more variable than initially estimated. As a result of this and other related analyses, a redesign of the TT tail fin deployment system was subsequently performed prior to the flight-testing phase.

The U.S. Navy recently developed a version of the Tomahawk Missile that can be retargeted while in flight. This new version, called the Tactical Tomahawk Missile, requires en route monitoring, control, and oversight by human operators. Previous research led to the design, implementation, and testing of a graphical multiuser interface system for human supervisory control of a missile "strike" (multiple missile fired together to various targets). The purpose of this study was to test the merits of a decision matrix as a high-level decision making aid, to validate previous findings about how missile load affects performance. Forty-two University of Virginia students participated as subjects. Missile level varied between 8, 12, and 16 missile, and interface type varied between having the decision matrix or not. The results confirmed that the decision matrix is a useful tool, but they failed to verify previous missile loading estimates

A consolidated database was developed for the Tomahawk cruise missiles project to store and automatically retrieve data from numerous production contractors, field activities, and repair facilities. A case study dealing with the design and implementation of the consolidated database is reported. Over 30 tracked components of each Tomahawk missile are followed through production, deployment, depot return, and redeployment. The number of missiles tracked continually increases as new missiles are produced. The system will continue to grow for some time, since only one quarter of the planned total procurement has been completed so far. >

Students and faculty in the Operations Research Department at the Naval Postgraduate School and researchers at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, Virginia, have been developing an automated decision support tool for the Navy to optimally allocate to firing units tasks requiring Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs). A new type of TLAM firing unit, the nuclear-powered cruise-missile submarine (SSGN), will soon be operational. An SSGN will be able to carry a maximum of 154 TLAMs. This report describes how to incorporate the SSGN into the existing TLAM allocation decision support algorithm.

In October 2000, the USS Cole, an 8600 ton Arleigh Burke class destroyer was en route to join the Fifth Fleet for a deployment in the Persian Gulf. As one of the world’s most modern warships, it was equipped with a range of land-attack systems including Tomahawk cruise missiles. In the event of a further crisis with Iraq during its period of deployment, the Cole would have been one of the warships likely to fire its weapons.

This paper discusses the data that were recorded during a three-month accelerated humidity test of two Tomahawk all-up rounds (AURs), one pressurized with dry nitrogen in accordance with the current practice, and the other left unpressurized. Temperature and humidity were recorded inside the canisters and missiles. Data analysis consisted of psychrometric calculations to determine the moisture intrusion into these missiles during the test. The work was carried out in support of a technical effort directed at changing the storage and stowage environmental protection of the Tomahawk missile.

Since the success of Tomahawk cruise missiles the Navy continues to pursue advanced weapons systems to project force ashore from the maritime environment. In what may be referred to as the Land Attack era for the Surface Navy, increasing emphasis is placed on the tactical responsiveness of future Land Attack weapons systems. While from a systems standpoint this may be acceptable, doctrine must be prepared that also compliments the inevitable operational use of these tactically responsive weapons. Without proper consideration of details that connect both levels of maritime power projection, tactical exploitation of future Land Attack weapons stands to undermine operational flexibility. There is a command and control architecture in place that has due regard for today's emphasis on innovative changes which, through years of evolution, also has an appreciation for relationships between operational and tactical command and control. The Navy has the opportunity now to reap the benefits of that evolution without stalling innovation. The command and control doctrine inherent to Tomahawk strike coordination is a firm basis on which to build doctrine for future Land Attack operational success as well as tactical responsiveness.

The modern term, creeping into the American lexicon, "Tomahawk Diplomacy" has come to represent a form of limited military response where the National Command Authority (NCA) employs cruise missiles and other high technology weapons as a means of enforcing American foreign policy and protecting U.S. security. Although this form of response normally includes an array of precision weapons and delivery systems, cruise missiles have become a most visible and highly publicized form of limited military response. The NCA relies heavily on cruise missiles as a strategic asset. So predominant are these weapons that cruise missiles are specifically mentioned in both the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy as an integral part of nearly every military response contingency. The U.S. is employing these weapons with increasing regularity and is expected to continue to rely on this form of response in the future. This monograph explores the implications of employing cruise missiles as a means of limited military response in the pursuit of U.S. national security objectives or imposition of U.S. foreign policy. This monograph uses the three most recent U.S. use of cruise missiles as case studies and analyzes them against a defined set of criteria in order to identify the strategic implications of their use. This research uses the instruments of national power as criteria to develop a framework for analysis. Publications from various academic and media sources form the body of knowledge necessary to develop a coherent balance of arguments for and against the use of cruise missile diplomacy. The intent of this monograph is to determine if the use of cruise missiles is restricting limited military response options to operational planners, and provides a framework for identifying and understanding strategic implications.

Battlespace meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) conditions can be defined and displayed using the Navy's C4ISR architecture for use in strike planning, optimizing weapons performance, and postoperation assessment. Using the Tactical Environmental Support System (TESS), METOC satellite imagery has been exploited to derive estimates of temperature and cloud conditions along Tomahawk flight paths, and integrated with operational geometry to support missile launches conducted during Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (JWID-95). The integrated and fused displays were sent from the Battle Management Interoperability Center (BMIC) at the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Point Mugu, and transmitted to fleet units where they were inserted as strike warfare support products on a home page for transmission to other JWID participants. Other support techniques are also being implemented using home page/internet technology. The EMIEO propagation environment is being characterized remotely by application of the "satellite-JR duct technique" which allows duct heights to be displayed over low-cloud regions over subtropical ocean areas. To provide duct height estimates in regions without clouds or in-situ measurements, or predictions of ducting conditions, the "equivalent altitude" and "experduct" techniques are employed to demonstrate additional automated capabilities using synoptic weather considerations.

In times of war, precision targeting of enemy forces requires timely updates of their movements. Overhead assets may be impaired by natural and human origin interference. Internened Unattended Ground Sensors will augmentthe overhead assets and ensure constant, accurate surveillance updates to allied commanders. The emplacement of Internetted Unattended Ground Sensors (TUGS) sensors by Tomahawk deep into enemy territory will allow the destniction of threat forces early in conflict reducing friendly casualties and reducing the enemy's offensive capabilities. Deep delivery of JUGS by the Tomahawk platform will reduce risk to military personneL lower cost, and ensure accuzate delivery to watchdog locations

The purpose of this paper is to examine the value of long-range precision weaponry systems, specifically Tomahawk cruise missiles, across the spectrum of warfare. Included in this examination will be application of Tomahawk in support of some of the Principles of War, its potential contribution to escalation control/avoidance, and the value of Tomahawk when considered in relation to the social dimensions of strategy. A discussion of the inherent deterrent value of the system will lead into a look at the applicability of Tomahawk as a flexible deterrent option and in Peace Enforcement operations. Finally, consideration will be given to the utility of Tomahawk in support of Strategic Interdiction operations. While Tomahawk, just as every other weapon system, does have some limitations, it has application in wide variety of situations. Ultimately the purpose of this paper is to provide a mental review of some potential strategic and operational applications and implications of Tomahawk for those who monitor, evaluate and make decisions at the strategic and operational levels of warfare.

Tomahawk engine/air-frame compatibility tests at the Naval Air Propulsion Center (NAPC), Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC), and in captive carry flight tests are discussed. A chronological history of these tests examines the test objectives, test configurations, and results. An emphasis on the two most recent ground tests at NAPC and AEDC is given with the tests compared in terms of repeatability of results. In the process, the major parameters effecting engine surge in the Tomahawk Cruise Missile are identified and quantified.Copyright © 1992 by ASME

The Naval Surface Warfare Center (NAVSWC) Cruise Missile Weapon Systems Division (N40), Product Support Branch (N44) performs software configuration and release management for the TOMAHAWK Weapons Control System (TWCS). The Cruise Missile Project (CMP) tasked N44 to identify areas where efficiency could be improved in its release management function. This report documents N44's findings and describes resultant actions. Keywords: Networking, Standardization of delivery requirements, Configurations.

McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC) is a producer of aerospace and high-technology products, for national defense, space exploration, and information management. The corporation’s most visible current products are the F-15, F-18, and Harrier fighters; Harpoon and Tomahawk tactical missiles; MD-80 and new MD-11 commercial aircraft; Delta rocket; and the newly-won space station. Former well-known products include Mercury and Gemini spacecraft; Phantom fighter; and DC-8, DC-9, and DC-10 commercial aircraft.

The article examines militarization in contemporary Japan, as most saliently mamfest in increases in military spending and the buildup of military might, by focusing on the erosion of anti-militaristic principles. This includes the broader interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, which now permits certain 'offensive weaponry' and 'collective defense' type arrangements; the weakening of the 'three non-nuclear principles', which are not effective against port calls by US vessels laden with Tomahawk missiles and other nuclear-capable weapons; the relaxation of the ban on the export of defense-related technology, which from 1983 onwards makes an exception of exports to the United States; and the scrapping of the '1% ceiling' on military expenditures in the 1987 budget, which put an end to an important barrier to increases in military spending. The erosion of these principles has been facilitated by external factors — American pressure, the Soviet military buildup in the region, and the decline in Asian criticism of Japan's military presence — as well as by internal factors — a greater acceptance of the Self Defense Forces and the US-Japan Security Treaty on the part of the opposition parties as well as the public.

The enormity of the task of reactivating a forty year old battleship, the USS New Jersey, for the fourth time, outfitting her with new technology surface warfare and strike capabilities, improved self defense weapons and modernized communications installations at minimal cost during a fifteen month industrial period is described in this paper. Challenges involved included the Tomahawk weapons system design modifications necessary to enhance the capabilities of the not yet operational eight missile Spruance class destroyer baseline configuration to a thirty-two missile battleship suite. Incorporation of the Tomahawk system brings to this venerable dreadnought the capability of operating offensively with battle forces in the highest threat areas and conducting offensive operations against surface ships and targets ashore, using Tomahawk land attack and antiship missiles (ASM). The revitalized New Jersey also provides self-defense against ASM and attacking aircraft at short range. The design of her combat system remains in consonance with the original attributes of the ship's design—sur-vivable, dependable, and redundant. This paper examines the adaptation of the Tomahawk weapons system for installation in New Jersey. The design modifications have been particularly critical, since the baseline system is currently under development in USS Merrill. Urgent Navy requirements dictated that the battleship-Tomahawk effort overtake and lead the baseline development in Merrill. Emphasis in this paper is placed upon the discussion of planning, implementation, problems encountered, and the advanced capabilities surrounding New Jersey as a result of installing the Tomahawk Weapons System. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of the potential operational utilization of New Jersey in the strike warfare role that was lost to the surface Navy in World War II, when aircraft carriers supplanted battleships as the Navy's main striking arm.

Time and space will not permit a detailed history of the development of Industrial Arts in the high schools, therefore I will limit my discussion to a brief history of its development and of its merits as a subject worthy of its place in our American High Schools. There have been changes in the name and purposes of Industrial Arts. It probably owes its beginning to the desire and need of the early man to fashion a weapon or weapons for gathering food and for his personal protection. Hence the cave man made his crude wooden club. Then a lighter club with a sharp rock in the end, similar to the tomahawk used by the American Indian. Woodwork, or manual training comes from a desire on the part of the young boy to whittle with a knife or fashion play things by the use of hammer and saw. Manual training or woodwork simply aided in directing the natural desire of most boys through the use of woodworking tools. Closely correlated with the development of woodworking was the development of tools, machines, and implements to facilitate and extend its possibilities. Axes to fell the trees; adzes to hew and shape great timbers for roofs and frames for ships; saws to cut more evenly and expeditiously; knives, gauges, and carving tools to decorate; planes and files to smooth; bits to bore holes for wooden pegs or screws and bolts. Next came the development of the various labor saving machines to do most of the work that was done by hand. As an educational term, manual training includes all hand work used as a means in general education. It differs from trade education through the apprenticeship systems in that it emphasizes the educational element rather than the commercial or industrial element. This "hand training" or manual training emphasizes manual skill. This training developed habits of accuracy, judgment and observation formed through manual activities. There are differences in opinion as to when and what country in

This paper discusses Soviet political responses to Trident and the Tomahawk nuclear land-attack missile. Soviet strategy in arms control is reviewed and attention placed on linkage of U.S. strategic offensive forces to the Strategic Defense Initiative. Possible Soviet responses to U.S. proposals are explored.

Conflict environment in which a conventionally armed cruise missile could be used are outlined; options for deployment of a sea-going cruise missile force on submarines and surface/airborne platforms are discussed; and selected launcher levels are projected to the year 2000. A description of the Tomahawk system together with system/subsystem growth options is provided. Recommendations are made concerning program plains for conventionally armed cruise missile systems. (Author)

Twenty-two sounding rocket systems were prepared and delivered by Thiokol Chemical Corporation consisting of fourteen Ute-Tomahawk vehicles and eight Paiute-Tomahawk vehicles. In addition to fabrication, assembly and adjustment of vehicle components, Thiokol provided additional related support to Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories in the form of static tests and computational, analytical, and field engineering services. Rocket motors and igniters; the TE-416 Tomahawk, the TU-715 Ute, and the TU-716 Paiute were major components of the twenty-two sounding rocket systems. Other system components included the Ute/Paiute tail assembly, launch lugs, Ute/Paiute-Tomahawk interstage adapter, Tomahawk tail assembly, and Tomahawk despin modules. Four Paiute booster motors were statically fired to verify the propellant batch. Computations and analyses were completed for Ute/Paiute-Tomahawk vehicles to allow theoretical prediction of trajectories, roll rate and pitch natural frequency histories, static stabilities, wind weighting data, and heating analyses.

The purpose of RAVE II was to bring together for a limited evaluation, vehicles of commercial and military design responsive to logistical support of small fighting units in remote areas. Assembling the equipment into one area and operating over identical terrain provided the Department of Defense technical personnel an opportunity to see the equipment operating over natural obstacles. To add realism, no rehearsals or dry runs of RAVE II were conducted. Much of the terrain over which the vehicles operated had not been disturbed by man for considerable periods of time. Many of the vehicles were at Tomahawk Hills for the first time and many of the drivers had never driven vehicles in this particular area before. The beach at Galloway Lake was also in its natural condition. All vehicles were on their own as no ramps were provided for water entry or exit.