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New representative survey data for Harare, Zimbabwe are used to analyze the conditions under which informal businesses encounter requests for bribes. A simple model develops basic expectations of bribe exposure: those with higher opportunity costs of formalizing and with a higher ability to pay (resources) are expected to face a higher bribe risk. Empirical results find that informal businesses operating out of necessity are likelier to have a bribe demanded of them. Robustness checks are performed to account for the endogeneity of the main regressors, through a bivariate probit specification, using an instrumental variable of whether an informal business owner started in the area of activity before the country's 2009 dollarization. Limited significant results are found for the effect of revenues (ability to pay).

An expanding body of literature has shown that better management practices can offer significant boosts to firms' productivity; this research illustrates that firms in South America are no exception. Using recent Enterprise Survey data from seven countries in South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay), the paper explores the various dimensions and drivers of management practices and analyzes how they are related to productivity. This is an important topic to investigate, given the lagging levels of productivity growth in the region. If management practices can boost firms’ productivity, this may be a cost-effective way to accelerate economic growth. The results show that improved management practices are associated with higher levels of productivity in all countries, and it is the impact of improved management specifically in larger firms that is driving the overall results. Indeed, in some countries, specifically Argentina, Paraguay, and Peru, it is only among larger firms that there is a positive link between management practices and productivity.

A new set of survey questions is used to map governance structures that firms employ to support the successful implementation of transactions. Responses to the questions were collected as part of the Enterprise Surveys in six South American countries. Without imposing any a priori model, latent class analysis (LCA) discovers meaningful patterns of governance structures that readily match constructs in the literature. All governance structures use bilateralism. Bilateralism and formal institutions are sometimes complements, but never substitutes. For each firm, LCA provides estimates of the posterior probability that the firm uses each of the discovered governance structures. These estimates can be used by researchers to go further, testing their own hypotheses relevant to Williamson's discriminating alignment agenda using additional data from the Enterprise Surveys or elsewhere. Variations in the effectiveness of different governance structures across countries and across different types of firms and transactions are explored. Regional variation within countries is greater than cross-country variation. Foreign-owned firms, exporters, larger firms, and better-managed ones are more likely to use governance structures that complement bilateralism with use of the legal system or with the help of paid third-parties.