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This article examines how angel investors' human capital affects the valuation of their portfolio companies, based on the pre-money valuation of 123 investment rounds in 58 Belgian companies. We argue that angel investors with higher levels of human capital will perceive a higher value-creating potential in entrepreneurial opportunities through their ability to see more value-creating options, a higher value-adding potential post-investment, and an enhanced legitimacy provided to the venture. Economic theories suggest they appropriate these rents through lower valuations, whereas stewardship theory suggests they share value creation with entrepreneurs. Consistent with stewardship theory, we show angel investors negotiate higher valuations when they have higher levels of human capital, more specifically if they studied longer, have a business degree, more entrepreneurial experience, or previous professional law experience. As such, our results contrast with the behavior of venture capital investors who negotiate lower valuations when they have more experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the role of entrepreneurs in investment tie formation in science-based entrepreneurial firms. Specifically, we address why investment tie formation is path dependent for some firms but more amenable to intentional management for others. Using longitudinal case studies, our evidence suggests that early investment tie formation is path dependent because scientific entrepreneurs typically approach only one or a few prospective investors from within their institutional context. Differences in experience between early investors affect the professionalization of entrepreneurial teams (or lack thereof), which influences the extent to which subsequent investment tie formation becomes more amenable to intentional management or remains path dependent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A bibliography on the subject of venture capital and entrepreneurship is presented, which includes the articles "Is There a Puzzle in the Failure of Venture Capital Backed Portfolio Companies?," by K. Abdoua and O. Varela and "Performance Effects of Venture Capital Firm Networks," by P. Abell and T. M. Nisar.

While bootstrap finance is widely used in entrepreneurial ventures, both scholars and practitioners have presented conflicting views on the relation between financial bootstrapping and venture growth. This article empirically investigates the association between bootstrap strategies used at startup and subsequent venture growth. For this purpose, we use a longitudinal database comprising data from both questionnaires and financial accounts of 214 new ventures. Findings demonstrate that the association between financial bootstrapping and venture growth is either nonexistent or positive. More specifically, new ventures that use more owner funds, employ more interim personnel, encourage customers to pay more quickly, and apply for more subsidy programs exhibit higher growth over time. We discuss the managerial and policy implications of these results and suggest avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) is used in this paper to empirically study whether an entrepreneur transfers his/her firm, conditional on exiting the firm. TPB posits that entrepreneurial intentions drive actions, being the transfer of a business. The TPB framework is expanded by assessing whether formal and informal planning of the exit process further explains the remaining gap between intentions to transfer and the actual transfer. Based on survey responses of 198 Belgian entrepreneurs who exited their company between 2001 and 2006, the TPB explains both the intention to transfer and the actual transfer with a significant amount of variance. Formal planning of the exit has no direct impact on business transfers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses a large multi-country sample of venture capital firms to compare the approaches to investee valuation and sources of information used by venture capital investors in English, French and German legal systems as well as geographical regions. Different legal systems are significantly associated with the valuation mechanism used. In particular, compared to English-based Common Law systems, VC firms operating in a Germanic legal system are significantly more likely to use DCF based measures and significantly less likely to use PE comparators. This latter result is also the case for VC firms operating in a French legal system who are also significantly more likely to adopt historic cost valuation methods. VC firms in Europe and Asia are significantly less likely than US VC firms to make use of liquidation value methods but significantly more likely to use PE comparators. European firms are significantly less likely to adopt DCF methods compared to US VC firms. VC firms operating under a Germanic legal system are less likely to utilise information from the financial press but significantly more likely to use interviews with entrepreneurs. VC firms operating under a French legal system are more likely to utilise interviews with company personnel as well as sales and marketing information. VC firms in Europe and Asia are significantly more likely than US VC firms to use financial press. VC firms in Asia are significantly less likely to make use of interviews with entrepreneurs or business plan data. VC firms in Europe are significantly more likely to utilise sales and marketing information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyses venture capitalists' (VCs) selection process in biotechnology ventures. Biotech ventures operate in an extremely risky environment making this an interesting research setting. The majority of venture capitalists exclude certain biotech sectors ex-ante because of regulatory uncertainty, the long development process to a market-ready product and the difficulty to understand the technology. The more thorough due diligence process focuses on financial, market and technology criteria. Management team capabilities are more important for later stage investors, whereas early stage investors expect to have an impact on the future recruiting of professional managers. Despite the higher risk of biotech investments, we find no evidence that VCs require higher hurdle rates or more complete contracts for these investments, compared to investments in other technology-based companies. The most important reason for not reaching an investment agreement is disagreement over valuation, due to large differences in risk perception between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists and the lack of a standard valuation tool for biotech projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]