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This study examines how various aspects of institutional context, including the regulatory environment, government affiliation, and government work experience, shape environmental nongovernmental organizations’ (eNGOs) managerial networking in China. Data from a nationwide survey of 267 eNGOs and in-depth interviews in 2014-2015 are analyzed. The findings show that China’s restrictive political environment suppresses eNGOs’ peer and business networking but is not associated with government networking. Compared with government-organized NGOs (GONGOs), civic eNGOs network more with peers, businesses, and government agencies. Furthermore, eNGOs with leaders having government work experience conduct more government networking. Theoretically, these findings point to the importance of the political and institutional context of managerial networking. Empirically, this study provides the first set of quantitative data analysis demonstrating how institutional factors affect NGO managerial networking under authoritarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the increasing volume and significance of research on nonprofit advocacy, most studies have focused on the phenomenon only in Western countries. This article expands the scope of the literature by examining the advocacy activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in authoritarian China. This article focuses on three aspects of advocacy behavior: advocacy investment and use of insider and outsider tactics. Data analyses of an original nationwide survey of 267 environmental NGOs and semistructured interviews with 30 highlight how resource and institutional factors-government funding, government affiliation, foundation funding, and peer collaborations-shape NGO advocacy in China. The findings also suggest ways in which institutional actors may enhance NGOs' capacity for policy advocacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research explores the implications of nonprofit leaders' government ties for nonprofit operations and functions. Based on 81 survey questionnaires completed by civic environmental NGOs ( eNGOs) in China and interviews with executives from 33 eNGOs, the authors examine the personal backgrounds of eNGO leaders and find that most Chinese civic eNGOs are connected with the government in one or more of three ways: political ties, service organization ties, or personal ties. Personal ties, or good guanxi with government officials, are positively associated with a higher level of funding stability and a more developed management system. Environmental NGOs with leaders who are current government officials or legislative body members are more likely to be engaged in policy advocacy. Service organization ties facilitate eNGOs' efforts to be engaged in legal services and to scale up to work on environmental issues at the national level. Moreover, an eNGO's policy advocacy engagement is associated with its ties with the nonprofit community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on political opportunity and resource dependency theories, this paper traces the development of 28 environmental NGOs (eNGOs) in China and examines the political and institutional factors that have constrained or facilitated these organizations' policy advocacy activities. The paper shows that political structural changes have created greater opportunities for eNGOs' policy advocacy, and eNGOs with better financial resources and connections to the party-state system are more capable of utilizing these opportunities to enhance their policy advocacy capacity. Yet party-state connections may in turn constrain the types of policy advocacy pursued by these eNGOs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines two cases of collective resistance involving partnerships between local grassroots organisations and external environmental NGOs against government-sanctioned land use policies in South Korea. In both cases, the partnerships used apparently similar strategies of resistance in response to similar institutional pressures in similar physical circumstances, but the outcomes of the two collective movements differed. In the case of Daeji, the resistance movement succeeded by transforming its local cause into a broader environmental one, appealing to stakeholders in the larger society. Reinforced by goal congruence between the partnering organisations, the movement was able to gain regulative legitimacy through co-optation and influence strategies for normative and cognitive legitimacy from the larger society. In the case of Won-Dong, plagued by a lack of goal congruence between partnering organisations, the resistance movement failed to secure the necessary regulative legitimacy in the absence of normative and cognitive legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]