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Environmental decentralization is an institutional factor that influences the effect of ecological environment governance. Based on panel data of provinces in China from 2008 to 2015, this paper evaluates the indicators of environmental decentralization, and uses a fixed-effect model and a threshold model to test the influence of environmental decentralization and environmental regulation on environmental pollution. The results indicate that China's environmental decentralization can significantly curb environmental pollution in general. There is a U-shaped relationship between environmental decentralization and environmental pollution. Reasonable environmental decentralization can restrain environmental pollution, while excessive environmental decentralization aggravates environmental pollution. There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between environmental regulation and environmental pollution. If the intensity of environmental regulation is too low, it cannot inhibit environmental pollution, while if the intensity of environmental regulation is increased to a certain level, it can help to inhibit environmental pollution. The joint impact of environmental decentralization and environmental regulation cannot reduce environmental pollution. That is, with the enlargement of environmental decentralization, environmental regulation fails to reduce environmental pollution. The effect of environmental decentralization has significant regional heterogeneity in economic development level and emission intensity. The above conclusions have important reference value for optimizing the environmental decentralization system and formulating scientific environmental decentralization policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental stringency policy shocks and environmental tax have become fundamental policy tools for mitigating the degradation of the environment. The study explores the effects of environmental tax and environmental stringency policy shocks in the reduction of pollution emissions in China for the time 1993 to 2019. This study is a pioneer in assessing the simultaneous impact of these two policy instruments on pollution emissions in China. For empirical investigation, the study employed NARDL estimation techniques. The NARDL results show that positive shocks in environmental tax reduce N2O emissions by 0.03%, PM2.5 emissions by 0.13%, CO2 emissions by 0.18%, and GHGs emissions by 0.01%, however, negative shocks in environmental tax increase N2O emissions by 0.01%, PM2.5 emissions by 0.07%, CO2 emissions by 0.28%, GHGs emissions by 0.17% in the long run. The long-run results also show that positive shocks in environmental policy stringency reduced CO2 emissions by 0.94%, GHGs emissions by 0.77%, while negative shocks in environmental policy stringency increased N2O emissions by 0.17%, PM2.5 emissions by 0.50%, CO2 emissions by 0.63%. The findings suggest vigorous policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental regulation policy is the main means of pollution control and emission reduction and plays an irreplaceable role in environmental governance. However, due to the competitive behavior of economic development, the local government cannot effectively use the efficiency of environmental regulation to reduce the emission of environmental pollution. Taking 284 prefecture-level cities in China from 2005 to 2016 as samples, this paper studies the strategic interaction of environmental regulation enforcement by local governments under different circumstances and its impact on environmental pollution, so as to provide reference for national overall environmental governance planning. Through the research, it is found that the strategic interaction of environmental regulation enforcement among Chinese cities is characterized by the race-to-the-top. And the strategic interaction of environmental regulation enforcement among cities of the same economic level has the strongest impact. Besides, the impact of environmental regulation on environmental pollution has different intensity in different scenarios, showing a non-positive correlation. Most importantly, the Pollution Paradise exists in some cities under special circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the pressure of environmental deterioration mounted in recent years, Chinese government has formulated a series of environmental policies and regulations with the intention of improving environmental quality. However, the effectiveness of these environmental regulations have not been carefully examined yet. This study for the first time investigates the effects of environmental regulations on the environmental performance. Using the city-level panel data of 283 Chinese cities for the period 2003–2010 and four indicators for environmental quality (the industrial waste water discharged, industrial SO2 emissions and industrial Soot emissions), this study employs the first-difference GMM method that could deal with potential endogeneity and allow dynamics to conduct the empirical estimations. Overall, the estimation results indicate that current environmental control measures and regulations have not achieved the desired goal of controlling and reducing pollution. Moreover, the direct impact of FDI on China's environment is negative, suggesting that there is evidence for the “Pollution Heaven” hypothesis. The coefficients of the interactive term of environmental regulation and foreign direct investment are estimated to be negative, which indicates that the environmental regulation is effective only when FDI is controlled for. The estimation results are basically consistent for different Chinese regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]