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We describe a large outbreak of severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) involving an acute-care hospital emergency department during December 2020 and January 2021, in which 27 healthcare personnel worked while infectious, resulting in multiple opportunities for SARS-CoV-2 transmission to patients and other healthcare personnel. We provide recommendations for improving infection prevention and control.

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has highlighted the vulnerability of residents and staff members in long-term care facilities (LTCFs) (1). Although skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) certified by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) have federal COVID-19 reporting requirements, national surveillance data are less readily available for other types of LTCFs, such as assisted living facilities (ALFs) and those providing similar residential care. However, many state and territorial health departments publicly report COVID-19 surveillance data across various types of LTCFs. These data were systematically retrieved from health department websites to characterize COVID-19 cases and deaths in ALF residents and staff members. Limited ALF COVID-19 data were available for 39 states, although reporting varied. By October 15, 2020, among 28,623 ALFs, 6,440 (22%) had at least one COVID-19 case among residents or staff members. Among the states with available data, the proportion of COVID-19 cases that were fatal was 21.2% for ALF residents, 0.3% for ALF staff members, and 2.5% overall for the general population of these states. To prevent the introduction and spread of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, in their facilities, ALFs should 1) identify a point of contact at the local health department; 2) educate residents, families, and staff members about COVID-19; 3) have a plan for visitor and staff member restrictions; 4) encourage social (physical) distancing and the use of masks, as appropriate; 5) implement recommended infection prevention and control practices and provide access to supplies; 6) rapidly identify and properly respond to suspected or confirmed COVID-19 cases in residents and staff members; and 7) conduct surveillance of COVID-19 cases and deaths, facility staffing, and supply information (2).

Background:The US Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP) series provides a unique opportunity to describe the healthcare sector using a single, national data source.Methods:We analyzed CBP data on business establishments in the healthcare industry for 2000–2016 for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Setting and facility types were defined using the North American Industry Classification System.Results:In 2016, CBP enumerated 707,634 US healthcare establishments (a 34% increase from 2000); 86.5% were outpatient facilities and services followed by long-term care facilities (12.5%) and acute-care facilities (1.0%). Between 2000 and 2016, traditional facilities such as general medical surgical and surgical hospitals (−0.4%) and skilled nursing facilities (+0.1%) decreased or remained flat, while other long-term care and outpatient providers grew rapidly.Conclusion:This analysis highlights the steady growth and increased specialization of the US healthcare sector, particularly in long-term care and outpatient settings.

A surgical heater-cooler unit has been implicated as the source for Mycobacterium chimaera infections among cardiac surgery patients in several countries. We isolated M. chimaera from heater-cooler units and patient infections in the United States. Whole-genome sequencing corroborated a risk for these units acting as a reservoir for this pathogen.

Context The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention awarded $85 million to health care-associated infection and antibiotic resistance (HAI/AR) programs in March 2015 as part of Infection Control Assessment and Response (ICAR) activities in the Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity cooperative agreement Domestic Ebola Supplement. Program One goal of this funding was to assess and improve program capacity to respond to potential health care outbreaks (eg, HAI clusters). All 55 funded programs (in 49 state and 6 local health departments) participated. Implementation The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention developed guidance and tools for HAI/AR programs to document relevant response capacities, assess policies, and measure progress. HAI/AR programs completed an interim assessment in 2016 and a final progress report in 2017. Evaluation During the project period, 78% (n = 43) of the programs developed new investigation tools, 85% (n = 47) trained staff on outbreak response, and 96% (n = 53) of the programs reported hiring staff to assist with outbreak response activities. Staffing and expertise to support HAI outbreak response increased substantially among awardees reporting staffing limitations on the interim assessment, including in domains such as on-site infection control assessment (n = 20; 83%), laboratory capacity (n = 20; 91%), and data management/analytics (n = 14; 67%). By 2017, reporting requirements in 100% of the programs addressed possible HAI/AR outbreaks; 93% (n = 51) also addressed sentinel events such as identification of novel AR threats. More than 90% (n = 50) of programs enhanced capacities for tracking response activities; in 2016, these systems captured 6665 events (range, 3-1379; median = 46). Health departments also reported wide-ranging efforts to engage regulatory, public health, and health care partners to improve HAI/AR outbreak reporting and investigation. Discussion Broad capacity for responding to HAI/AR outbreaks was enhanced using Ebola ICAR supplemental funding. As response activities expand, health department programs will be challenged to continue building expertise, reporting infrastructure, investigation resources, and effective relations with health care partners.

Invasive nontuberculous mycobacteria (NTM) infections may result from a previously unrecognized source of transmission, heater-cooler devices (HCDs) used during cardiac surgery. In July 2015, the Pennsylvania Department of Health notified the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) about a cluster of NTM infections among cardiothoracic surgical patients at 1 hospital. We conducted a case-control study to identify exposures causing infection, examining 11 case-patients and 48 control-patients. Eight (73%) case-patients had a clinical specimen identified as Mycobacterium avium complex (MAC). HCD exposure was associated with increased odds of invasive NTM infection; laboratory testing identified patient isolates and HCD samples as closely related strains of M. chimaera, a MAC species. This investigation confirmed a large US outbreak of invasive MAC infections in a previously unaffected patient population and suggested transmission occurred by aerosolization from HCDs. Recommendations have been issued for enhanced surveillance to identify potential infections associated with HCDs and measures to mitigate transmission risk.

Background: Medications, medical devices, biological products, and other medical products can cause healthcare-associated infections related to contamination in production or transportation (intrinsic contamination) or contamination at the point of use (extrinsic contamination). Rapid identification of contaminated medical products can lead to actions to decrease further patient harm. We sought to describe events that prompted public health investigations of contaminated medical products in healthcare facilities. Methods: We reviewed records of CDC consultations with health departments and healthcare facilities from January 2015 through August 2019 to identify public health investigations in which medical products were identified as a likely source of patient infection or pathogen transmission to at least 1 patient. We collected data on products, contamination type, pathogens, route of patient exposure, healthcare setting where exposure occurred, and resulting actions. Results: There were 34 investigations involving medications (n = 15, 44%), medical devices (n = 12, 35%), biological products (n = 3, 9%), and other medical products (n = 4, 12%). Intrinsic contamination was suspected in 15 investigations (44%), with 13 (87%) based on isolation of a pathogen from unopened products and 2 (13%) based on isolation of similar pathogens from patients in contact with a medical product at multiple facilities. Extrinsic contamination was suspected in 19 investigations (56%) based on evidence of pathogen transmission at a single healthcare facility and concurrent infection control gaps at that facility supporting a mechanism of contamination. The most common pathogens prompting investigation were nontuberculous mycobacteria (n = 9, 26%), Burkholderia spp (n = 7, 21%), Klebsiella spp (n = 3, 9%), Serratia spp (n = 2, 6%), and other environmental and commensal organisms. Patients were most commonly exposed in hospitals (n = 19, 56%) and outpatient settings (n = 9, 26%). The most common patient exposures that resulted in transmission of the pathogen were infusions and injections (n = 15, 44%), diagnostic and therapeutic procedures (n = 9, 26%), and surgery (n = 5, 15%). Patient were notified and offered testing in at least 6 investigations (18%) . Interventions included product removal, healthcare provider alerts, patient notification and testing, modification of injection safety practices and other general infection control practices, correction of improper storage and handling, and changes in product design, manufacturing processes, or instructions for use. Conclusions: Public health investigations identified intrinsic and extrinsic contamination of medications, devices, and other products as a cause of healthcare-associated infections. Healthcare facilities should consider contaminated products in investigations of healthcare-associated infections, take steps to identify local infection control concerns, and alert public health authorities to events that could suggest widespread contamination.Funding: NoneDisclosures: None

Background: Outbreaks of infections in healthcare negatively impact patient outcomes and experience. Transparency is critical to engendering trust and optimizing health. Consistent guidance is not available regarding when to report a possible outbreak of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) to public health and when to notify a limited population or to publicly disclose the occurrence of HAI. Recent analyses of state public health policies revealed that most states address reporting of outbreaks using terms such as clusters, unusual occurrences, or incidences over baseline. Specific wording about healthcare outbreaks or guidance for notifying patients or public is often absent. Thus, HAI outbreak notification and disclosure guidance and practices vary significantly around the country. A best-practice guidance document will provide clarity for when such reporting should occur. Methods: The Council for Outbreak Response: HAI and Antimicrobial-Resistant Pathogens (CORHA) has undertaken the task of developing this guidance by forming a multidiscipline policy work group with representation from its partner organizations. This work group has been tasked with creating a general framework that will guide notification and disclosure in the context of a possible HAI outbreak. The draft guidance document has been developed over several months of telephone and in-person conferences among work group members. Results: The standardized actions stemming from the guiding principles and recommended practices for conducting step 1 (immediate notification, initial and critical communications that occur when an outbreak is first suspected), were arranged in a table format with rows representing stakeholders and constituents to be notified and columns demonstrating the actions to be taken (Fig. 1). As an investigation progresses, notification should be revisited, especially if an investigation’s scope expands. The principles and practices for step 2 (expanded notification) have also been drafted in a table format. Next, the draft guidance addresses step 3 (public disclosure), outlining indications, practical guidance, and considerations in an outline and/or summary format. Real-world examples demonstrating application of the framework are being developed as supplementary resources to the framework. Current work group activities include engaging bioethicists, media reporters and patient advocates to review and comment on the guidance to ensure that it is clear, consistent and practical. Discussion: The draft guidance provides a framework for standardized actions for HAI outbreak notification and disclosure in a stepwise fashion, modeling public health practices and grounded in bioethical principles. The final product will provide valuable, practical advice for effectively sharing information with affected or potentially affected individuals and their caregivers in a timely manner.Funding: NoneDisclosures: Dawn Terashita reports that her spouse has received honoraria rom the speaker’s bureaus of Novo Nordisk and Abbott.

Objective:Water exposures in healthcare settings and during healthcare delivery can place patients at risk for infection with water-related organisms and can potentially lead to outbreaks. We aimed to describe Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) consultations involving water-related organisms leading to healthcare-associated infections (HAIs).Design:Retrospective observational study.Methods:We reviewed internal CDC records from January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2017, using water-related terms and organisms, excludingLegionella, to identify consultations that involved potential or confirmed transmission of water-related organisms in healthcare. We determined plausible exposure pathways and routes of transmission when possible.Results:Of 620 consultations during the study period, we identified 134 consultations (21.6%), with 1,380 patients, that involved the investigation of potential water-related HAIs or infection control lapses with the potential for water-related HAIs. Nontuberculous mycobacteria were involved in the greatest number of investigations (n = 40, 29.9%). Most frequently, investigations involved medical products (n = 48, 35.8%), and most of these products were medical devices (n = 40, 83.3%). We identified a variety of plausible water-exposure pathways, including medication preparation near water splash zones and water contamination at the manufacturing sites of medications and medical devices.Conclusions:Water-related investigations represent a substantial proportion of CDC HAI consultations and likely represent only a fraction of all water-related HAI investigations and outbreaks occurring in US healthcare facilities. Water-related HAI investigations should consider all potential pathways of water exposure. Finally, healthcare facilities should develop and implement water management programs to limit the growth and spread of water-related organisms.

Background: Domestically, the integration of public health into healthcare-associated infection (HAI) and antibiotic resistance (AR) prevention activities represents a major development. We describe CDC Funding: of public health HAI/AR programs through the Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity (ELC) cooperative agreement to improve local capacity to prevent HAIs and detect and contain the spread of AR threats. Methods: We reviewed ELC budget reports and program documents to summarize the evolution of funded activities and programs from 2009 to 2018. Results: In 2009, 51 programs (49 states, 2 cities and territories) received US$35.8 million through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act for an initial 28-month period. These funds supported each jurisdiction to establish an HAI coordinator and a multidisciplinary HAI advisory group, coordinate and report HAI prevention efforts, conduct surveillance and report HAI data, and maintain an HAI plan; ~27 programs were also funded to coordinate multicenter HAI prevention collaboratives among acute-care hospitals. Through 2011, 188 state or local HAI/AR program positions were at least partially funded by the CDC. From 2011 to 2015, investments from the Affordable Care Act (~US$10–11 million annually) were used to maintain the HAI/AR programs, with some expansion of program goals related to non–acute-care settings and antibiotic stewardship. In 2015, following the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, supplemental ELC funds were awarded to 61 programs (50 states, 11 cities and territories) totaling US$85 million over 36 months. These awards marked an expansion of HAI/AR program activities to develop healthcare provider inventories, to conduct data-driven education and training, and to perform onsite infection control assessments in healthcare facilities. In 2016, through its AR Solutions Initiative, CDC invested US$57.3 million in Funding: to 57 programs (50 states, 7 cities and territories), expanding laboratory capacities for AR threat detection (via the AR Laboratory Network) and epidemiologic activities to rapidly contain novel and targeted multidrug-resistant organisms. As of 2018, >500 state or local HAI/AR program positions were at least partially funded by the CDC. Conclusions: State and local HAI/AR programs have grown substantially over the 10 years of their existence, as reflected in major increases in funding, staffing, scope, and partnerships. CDC investments and guidance have supported the development of HAI/AR epidemiology prevention and response capacity.Funding: NoneDisclosures: None

Background: Documented transmission of infectious agents involving dental care is uncommon. However, increasing attention to dental infection control, along with several recent outbreaks, have identified infection control gaps in dental settings. We describe CDC consultations involving outbreaks or infection control lapses occurring in dental settings to identify areas for prevention efforts. Methods: We reviewed internal CDC records from January 1, 2010, through October 1, 2019, to identify consultations involving investigations of potential or confirmed disease transmission and infection control lapses in dental settings. We determined yearly number of consultations, number of patients infected, how disease transmission or infection control breaches were identified, suspected mode of transmission, type of infection control breaches identified, and whether at-risk patients were notified. Results: We identified 41 consultations, among 27 states, involving investigation of possible disease transmission or infection control lapses in dental facilities. The number of consultations increased from 11 to 30 between the first half (2010–2014) and the second half (2015–2019) of the period and involved at least 113 infections confirmed or suspected to be associated with dental procedures. Most investigations (n = 29, 71%) began with identification of infection control breaches absent known patient infections; 8 (20%) investigations were initiated after identification of a single patient infection raised concerns for possible transmission associated with dental care (eg, single case of acute hepatitis B infection absent other risk factors). Moreover, 4 investigations involved >1 patient infection; 3 were outbreaks confirmed to be due to poor infection control practices. The most common infection control breaches were lapses in dental instrument reprocessing (n = 28, 78%), for example, failure to sterilize dental handpieces or failure to use biologic indicators. Of the 23 consultations where patient notification activities were discussed, 17 (74%) resulted in notification; >20,000 patients received information about their potential exposure, usually accompanied by advice on seeking screening tests. Conclusions: Dental-related consultations have increased in recent years, and they highlight the need for improved infection control training of dental healthcare personnel, especially related to dental instrument reprocessing. The CDC Division of Oral Health and the Organization for Safety, Asepsis, and Prevention offers tools, training, and other resources to help dental facilities improve infection control practices. Not all investigations resulted in notifying at-risk patients, but notification should be strongly considered, especially when serious breaches are identified, to promote transparency and help identify disease transmission that could otherwise go undetected.Funding: NoneDisclosures: None

Background: When healthcare providers lack infection prevention and control (IPC) knowledge and skills, patient safety and quality of care can suffer. For this reason, state laws sometimes dictate IPC training; these requirements can be expressed as applying to various categories of healthcare personnel (HCP). We performed a preliminary assessment of the laws requiring IPC training across the United States. Methods: During February–July 2018, we searched WestlawNext, a legal database, for IPC training laws in 51 jurisdictions (50 states and Washington, DC). We used standard legal epidemiology methods, including an iterative search strategy to minimize results that were outside the scope of the coding criteria by reviewing results and refining search terms. A law was defined as a regulation or statute. Laws that include IPC training for healthcare personnel were collected for coding. Laws were coded to reflect applicable HCP categories and specific IPC training content areas. Results: A total of 278 laws requiring IPC training for HCP were identified (range, 1–19 per jurisdiction); 157 (56%) did not specify IPC training content areas. Among the 121 (44%) laws that did specify IPC content, 39 (32%) included training requirements that focused solely on worker protections (eg, sharps injury prevention and bloodborne pathogen protections for the healthcare provider). Among the 51 jurisdictions, dental professionals were the predominant targets: dental hygienists (n = 22; 43%), dentists (n = 20; 39%), and dental assistants (n = 18; 35%). The number of jurisdictions with laws requiring training for other HCP categories included the following: nursing assistants (n = 25; 49%), massage therapists (n = 11; 22%), registered nurses (n = 10; 20%), licensed practical nurses (n = 10; 20%), emergency medical technicians and paramedics (n = 9; 18%), dialysis technicians (n = 8; 18%), home health aides (n = 8;16%), nurse midwives (n = 7; 14%), pharmacy technicians (n = 7; 14%), pharmacists (n = 6; 12%), physician assistants (n = 4; 8%), podiatrists (n = 3; 6%), and physicians (n = 2; 4%). Conclusions: Although all jurisdictions had at least 1 healthcare personnel IPC training requirement, many of the laws lack specificity and some focus only on worker protections, rather than patient safety or quality of care. In addition, the categories of healthcare personnel regulated among jurisdictions varied widely, with dental professionals having the most training requirements. Additional IPC training requirements exist at the facility level, but this information was not analyzed as a part of this project. Further analysis is needed to inform our assessment and identify opportunities for improving IPC training requirements, such as requiring IPC training that more fully addresses patient protections.Funding: NoneDisclosures: None

Background: Health departments have been increasingly called upon to monitor healthcare associated-infections (HAIs) at the hospital- or facility-level and provide targeted assistance when high rates are identified. Health department capacity to effectively respond to these types of signals depends not only on technical expertise but also the legal and regulatory authority to intervene. Methods: We reviewed annual reports describing HAI and antibiotic resistance (HAI/AR) activities from CDC-funded HAI/AR programs for August 2017 through July 2018. We performed a qualitative data analysis on all 50 state health department responses to a question about their regulatory and legal authority to intervene or assist facilities without invitation when outbreaks are suspected (as determined by the health department) or high HAI rates have been identified (eg, based on NHSN data). Results: When an outbreak is identified, 31 health departments (62%) indicated that they have the authority to intervene without invitation from a facility and 8 (16%) did not specify. Among the 11 health departments (22%) that indicated that they do not have this authority, 5 (45%) states noted that they operate under decentralized systems in which the local health department can intervene in outbreak situations and the state health department is available to assist. When a health department identifies high HAI rates, 14 health departments (28%) indicated that they have the authority to intervene without invitation, 22 (44%) indicated that they do not, and 14 (28%) did not specify. Among those in the latter categories, 3 stated they can work through their local health departments, which do have this authority and 8 described working through partners (eg, State Hospital Association, n = 3 or State Healthcare Licensing Agency, n = 5). Discussion: Assistance from state health departments (eg, HAI/AR programs) in the context of outbreaks and high HAI rates has value that is usually well recognized and welcomed by healthcare facilities. Nonetheless, there are occasions when a health department might need to exert its authority to intervene. The preliminary analysis described here indicated that this authority was more commonly self-reported in the context of outbreaks than when high HAI rates are identified. These 2 situations are connected, as high rates might be indicative of unrecognized or unreported outbreak activity, and these issues may benefit from further analysis.Funding: NoneDisclosures: None

Background To inform development, targeting, and penetration of materials from a national injection safety campaign, an evaluation was conducted to assess provider knowledge, attitudes, and practices related to unsafe injection practices. Methods A panel of physicians (n = 370) and nurses (n = 320) were recruited from 8 states to complete an online survey. Questions, using 5-point Likert and Spector scales, addressed acceptability and frequency of unsafe practices (eg, reuse of a syringe on >1 patient). Results were stratified to identify differences among physician specialties and nurse practice locations. Results Unsafe injection practices were reported by both physicians and nurses across all surveyed physician specialties and nurse practice locations. Twelve percent (12.4%) of physicians and 3% of nurses indicated reuse of syringes for >1 patient occurs in their workplace; nearly 5% of physicians indicated this practice usually or always occurs. A higher proportion of oncologists reported unsafe practices occurring in their workplace. Conclusions There is a dangerous minority of providers violating basic standards of care; practice patterns may vary by provider group and specialty. More research is needed to understand how best to identify providers placing patients at risk of infection and modify their behaviors.

Infections in 6 states were linked to persons traveling to undergo cosmetic surgical procedures., During 2013, the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene in Baltimore, MD, USA, received report of 2 Maryland residents whose surgical sites were infected with rapidly growing mycobacteria after cosmetic procedures at a clinic (clinic A) in the Dominican Republic. A multistate investigation was initiated; a probable case was defined as a surgical site infection unresponsive to therapy in a patient who had undergone cosmetic surgery in the Dominican Republic. We identified 21 case-patients in 6 states who had surgery in 1 of 5 Dominican Republic clinics; 13 (62%) had surgery at clinic A. Isolates from 12 (92%) of those patients were culture-positive for Mycobacterium abscessus complex. Of 9 clinic A case-patients with available data, all required therapeutic surgical intervention, 8 (92%) were hospitalized, and 7 (78%) required ≥3 months of antibacterial drug therapy. Healthcare providers should consider infection with rapidly growing mycobacteria in patients who have surgical site infections unresponsive to standard treatment.

Background Effective measures exist to prevent health care–associated hepatitis B virus (HBV) transmission, yet outbreaks continue to occur. In 2008, the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health identified an outbreak of HBV infections among psychiatric long-term care facility residents. Methods Residents underwent HBV serologic testing and were classified as acutely infected, chronically infected, susceptible, or immune. Persons residing in the facility during 2008 were enrolled in a retrospective cohort study to identify risk factors for acute HBV infection. We assessed infection control practices at the facility. Results Nine of 81 residents (11%) enrolled in the cohort study had acute HBV infection. Five of 15 residents (33%) undergoing podiatric care on a single day subsequently developed acute infection (rate ratio, 4.33; 95% confidence interval, 1.18-15.92). Infection control observations of the consulting podiatrist revealed opportunities for cross-contamination of instruments with blood. Other potential health care and behavioral modes of transmission were identified as well. Residents were offered HBV vaccination, and infection control recommendations were implemented by the podiatrist and facility. Conclusions Of the multiple potential transmission modes identified, exposure to HBV during podiatry was likely the dominant mode in this outbreak. Long-term care facilities should ensure compliance with infection control standards among staff and consulting health care providers.

Objective.To characterize practices related to measuring influenza vaccination rates among healthcare personnel in US hospitals.Design.Descriptive survey.Setting.Nonfederal, short-stay hospitals that provide general medical and surgical services, identified by use of the 2004 American Hospital Association Annual Survey Database.Participants.Healthcare personnel from 996 randomly sampled US hospitals stratified by region and bed size.Methods.A self-administered questionnaire was distributed in 2006 to infection control coordinators to gather data on policies and practices related to the provision of the influenza vaccine and on the measurement and reporting of influenza vaccination rates. Descriptive statistics and associations were calculated, and logistic regression was conducted.Results.The response rate was 56% (ie, 555 of 996 US hospitals responded to the questionnaire). Weighting accounted for sampling design and nonresponse. Most hospitals provided the influenza vaccine to employees (100%), credentialed medical staff (ie, independent practitioners; 94%), volunteers (86%), and contract staff (83%); provision for students and residents was less frequent (58%). Only 69% of hospitals measured vaccination rates (mean coverage rate, 55%). Most hospitals that measured coverage included employees (98%) in the vaccination rates, whereas contract staff (53%), credentialed medical staff (56%), volunteers (56%), and students and residents (30%) were less commonly included. Among hospitals measuring coverage, 44% included persons for which vaccine was contraindicated, and 51% included persons who refused vaccination. After adjustment for region and size, hospitals with vaccination plans written into policy (odds ratio, 2.0 [95% confidence interval, 1.22–7.67]) or that addressed internally reporting coverage (odds ratio, 4.8 [95% confidence interval, 2.97–7.66]) were more likely to measure coverage than were hospitals without such plans.Conclusions.Hospitals vary in terms of the groups of individuals included in influenza vaccination coverage measurements. Standardized measures may improve comparability of hospital-reported vaccination rates. Measuring coverage in a manner that facilitates identification of occupational groups with low vaccination rates may inform development of targeted interventions.

Our experiences with health departments and health care facilities suggest that questions surrounding instrument reprocessing errors and other infection control breaches are becoming increasingly common. We describe an approach to management of these incidents that focuses on risk of bloodborne pathogen transmission and the role of public health and other stakeholders to inform patient notification and testing decisions.

Objectives:To determine whether hepatitis B virus (HBV) transmission occurred among patients visiting a physician's office and to evaluate potential transmission mechanisms.Design:Serologic survey, retrospective cohort study, and observation of infection control practices.Setting:Private medical office.Patients:Those visiting the office between March 1 and December 26, 2001.Results:We identified 38 patients with acute HBV infection occurring between February 2000 and February 2002. The cohort study, limited to the 10 months before outbreak detection, included 91 patients with serologic test results and available charts representing 18 case-patients and 73 susceptible patients. Overall, 67 patients (74%) received at least one injection during the observation period. Case-patients received a median of 14 injections (range, 2-25) versus 2 injections (range, 0-17) for susceptible patients (P < .001). Acute infections occurred among 18 (27%) of 67 who received at least one injection versus none of 24 who received no injections (RR, 13.6; CI95, 2.4-undefined). Risk of infection increased 5.2-fold (CI95, 0.6-47.3) for those with 3 to 6 injections and 20.0-fold (CI95, 2.8-143.5) for those with more than 6 injections. Typically, injections consisted of doses of atropine, dexamethasone, vitamin B12, or a combination of these mixed in one syringe. HBV DNA genetic sequences of 24 patients with acute infection and 4 patients with chronic infection were identical in the 1,500-bp region examined. Medical staff were seronegative for HBV infection markers. The same surface was used for storing multidose vials, preparing injections, and dismantling used injection equipment.Conclusion:Administration of unnecessary injections combined with failure to separate clean from contaminated areas and follow safe injection practices likely resulted in patient-to-patient HBV transmission in a private physician's office.

Background and Objective:In August 2002, the Oklahoma State Department of Health received a report of six patients with unexplained hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection treated in the same pain remediation clinic. We investigated the outbreak's extent and etiology.Design, Setting, and Participants:We conducted a retrospective cohort study of clinic patients, including a serologic survey, interviews of infected patients, and reviews of medical records and staff infection control practices. Patients received outpatient pain remediation treatments one afternoon a week in a clinic within a hospital. Cases were defined as HCV or hepatitis B virus (HBV) infections among patients who reported no prior diagnosis or risk factors for disease or reported previous risk factors but had evidence of acute infection.Results:Of 908 patients, 795 (87.6%) were tested, and 71 HCV-infected patients (8.9%) and 31 HBV-infected patients (3.9%) met the case definition. Multiple HCV genotypes were identified. Significantly higher HCV infection rates were found among individuals treated after an HCV-infected patient during the same visit (adjusted odds ratio [AOR], 6.2; 95% confidence interval [CI95], 2.4–15.8); a similar association was observed for HBV (AOR, 2.9; CI95, 1.3–6.5). Review of staff practices revealed the nurse anesthetist had been using the same syringe–needle to sequentially administer sedation medications to every treated patient each clinic day.Conclusions:Reuse of needles–syringes was the mechanism for patient-to-patient transmission of HCV and HBV in this large nosocomial outbreak. Further education and stricter oversight of infection control practices may prevent future outbreaks.

In response to the emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the United States established national surveillance using a sensitive case definition incorporating clinical, epidemiologic, and laboratory criteria. Of 1,460 unexplained respiratory illnesses reported by state and local health departments to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention from March 17 to July 30, 2003, a total of 398 (27%) met clinical and epidemiologic SARS case criteria. Of these, 72 (18%) were probable cases with radiographic evidence of pneumonia. Eight (2%) were laboratory-confirmed SARS-coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infections, 206 (52%) were SARS-CoV negative, and 184 (46%) had undetermined SARS-CoV status because of missing convalescent-phase serum specimens. Thirty-one percent (124/398) of case-patients were hospitalized; none died. Travel was the most common epidemiologic link (329/398, 83%), and mainland China was the affected area most commonly visited. One case of possible household transmission was reported, and no laboratory-confirmed infections occurred among healthcare workers. Successes and limitations of this emergency surveillance can guide preparations for future outbreaks of SARS or respiratory diseases of unknown etiology.

On May 24, 2016, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene notified CDC of two cases of Exophiala dermatitidis bloodstream infections among patients with malignancies who had received care from a single physician at an outpatient oncology facility (clinic A). Review of January 1-May 31, 2016 microbiology records identified E. dermatitidis bloodstream infections in two additional patients who also had received care at clinic A. All four patients had implanted vascular access ports and had received intravenous (IV) medications, including a compounded IV flush solution containing saline, heparin, vancomycin, and ceftazidime, compounded and administered at clinic A.

In the spring of 2015, investigators in Switzerland reported a cluster of six patients with invasive infection with Mycobacterium chimaera, a species of nontuberculous mycobacterium ubiquitous in soil and water. The infected patients had undergone open-heart surgery that used contaminated heater-cooler devices during extracorporeal circulation (1). In July 2015, a Pennsylvania hospital also identified a cluster of invasive nontuberculous mycobacterial infections among open-heart surgery patients. Similar to the Swiss report, a field investigation by the Pennsylvania Department of Health, with assistance from CDC, used both epidemiologic and laboratory evidence to identify an association between invasive Mycobacterium avium complex, including M. chimaera, infections and exposure to contaminated Stöckert 3T heater-cooler devices, all manufactured by LivaNova PLC (formerly Sorin Group Deutschland GmbH) (2). M. chimaera was described as a distinct species of M. avium complex in 2004 (3). The results of the field investigation prompted notification of approximately 1,300 potentially exposed patients.* Although heater-cooler devices are used to regulate patients' blood temperature during cardiopulmonary bypass through water circuits that are closed, these reports suggest that aerosolized M. chimaera from the devices resulted in the invasive infections (1,2). The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and CDC have issued alerts regarding the need to follow updated manufacturer's instructions for use of the devices, evaluate the devices for contamination, remain vigilant for new infections, and continue to monitor reports from the United States and overseas (2).

On November 19, 2001, a suspected case of inhalational anthrax in a 94-year-old woman was reported to the Connecticut Department of Public Health (CTDPH) (1–3). This was the first case of Bacilus anthracis infection reported to the CTDPH since 1968 and the eleventh inhalational anthrax case in the United States since October 4, 2001 (1–6). The patient’s symptoms of fever, fatigue, malaise, dry cough, and shortness of breath began 20 days after the last confirmed inhalational anthrax patient became ill and 36 days after the last known intentionally contaminated letters, addressed to U.S. Senators Thomas Daschle and Patrick Leahy, were postmarked in Trenton, New Jersey (1–4) (Figure 1).The patient in Connecticut was not in the known categories of intentionally contaminated letter recipients and was not a postal worker or a mailhandler (1,5). This report describes the epidemiologic and environmental investigation conducted to determine whether her case was related to the other bioterrorism-related cases; whether she was the only case in Connecticut or a sentinel of a larger outbreak; and the source, place, and time of her exposure. The clinical aspects of the case have been described (2,3). Figure 1 Bioterrorism-related inhalational anthrax cases by week of symptom onset—United States, 2001.The first two cases of inhalational anthrax occurred in Florida. Though no direct exposure source was found, environmental samples of the media company ...

Public health activities to identify and monitor persons at risk for Ebola virus disease in the United States include directing persons at risk to assessment facilities that are prepared to safely evaluate for Ebola virus disease. Although it is unlikely that a person with Ebola virus disease will unexpectedly present to a nonemergency ambulatory care facility, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have provided guidance for this setting that can be summarized as identify, isolate, and inform.

On September 30, 2015, the New Jersey Department of Health (NJDOH) was notified by an out-of-state health services company that an experienced nurse had reused syringes for multiple persons earlier that day. This occurred at an employee influenza vaccination clinic on the premises of a New Jersey business that had contracted with the health services company to provide influenza vaccinations to its employees. The employees were to receive vaccine from manufacturer-prefilled, single-dose syringes. However, the nurse contracted by the health services company brought three multiple-dose vials of vaccine that were intended for another event. The nurse reported using two syringes she found among her supplies to administer vaccine to 67 employees of the New Jersey business. She reported wiping the syringes with alcohol and using a new needle for each of the 67 persons. One of the vaccine recipients witnessed and questioned the syringe reuse, and brought it to the attention of managers at the business who, in turn, reported the practice to the health services company contracted to provide the influenza vaccinations.

Three cases of genetically related hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection that were unattributable to infection control breaches were identified at a health care facility.To investigate HCV transmission from an HCV-infected health care worker to patients through drug diversion.Cluster and look-back investigations.Acute care hospital and affiliated multispecialty clinic.Inpatients and outpatients during the period of HCV transmission.Employee work and narcotic dispensing records, blood testing for HCV antibody and RNA, and sequencing of the NS5B gene and the hypervariable region 1 of the E2 gene.21 employees were recorded as being at work or as retrieving a narcotic from an automated dispensing cabinet in an area where a narcotic was administered to each of the 3 case patients; all employees provided blood samples for HCV testing. One employee was infected with HCV that had more than 95% NS5B sequence homology with the HCV strains of the 3 case patients. Quasi-species analysis showed close genetic relatedness with variants from each of the case patients and more than 97.9% nucleotide identity. The employee acknowledged parenteral opiate diversion. An investigation identified 6132 patients at risk for exposure to HCV because of the drug diversion. Of the 3929 living patients, 3444 (87.7%) were screened for infection. Two additional cases of genetically related HCV infection attributable to the employee were identified.Of the living patients at risk for HCV exposure, 12.3% were not tested.Five cases of HCV infection occurring over 3 to 4 years were attributed to drug diversion by an HCV-infected health care worker. Studies of drug diversion and assessments of strategies to prevent narcotics tampering in all health care settings are needed.None.

Ensuring the safety of personnel working in health care environments can be challenging and requires a multifaceted approach to target reductions in occupational exposures to blood-borne pathogens, such as hepatitis B or hepatitis C. This article reviews the epidemiology of occupational exposures to hepatitis B and hepatitis C in health care personnel in hospital settings. The nature and likelihood of risk to health care personnel are evaluated along with estimates of seroconversion risk. The review focuses on prevention programs and available surveillance programs to aid in monitoring and reducing occupational exposures to blood-borne pathogens.

Background. De novo hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection among transplant patients is rarely recognized but can have severe consequences.We investigated the scope, source, and mode of HCV transmission within a transplant center after incident HCV infection was identi¢ed in 2 patients who had liver transplantation in late 2006. Methods. Patients were interviewed, and transplant logs, medical records, and stai practices were reviewed to identify opportunities for HCV transmission. Infection via receipt of blood or organs was evaluated. Molecular epidemiology was used to determine the relatedness between persons with incident and chronic HCV infection. Results. HCV from infected blood or organ donors was ruled out. Among the 308 patients who underwent transplant in 2006, no additional incident HCV infections were identi¢ed. Eighty-¢ve (28%) had pre- transplant chronic HCV infection; 13 were considered possible HCV source patients based upon shared days on the inpatient unit, nursing assignment, or invasive procedures in common with incident HCV case-patients.V|ral isolates from 1 HCV source patient and 1 incident case-patient were found to be highly related by quasispecies analysis, con¢rming patient-to-patient HCV transmission. Possible modes of transmission identi¢ed were the improper use of multidose vials, sharing of blood-contaminated glucometers, and touch contamination. Conclusion. Sporadic transmission or endemic levels of HCV transmission might be overlooked in a setting with high HCV prevalence, such as liver transplant units, where multiple, repeated opportunities for patient-to-patient HCV transmission can occur. Surveillance through pre- and post-transplant screening is necessary to identify incident HCV infection in this setting. Constant, meticulous attention must be paid to maintaining aseptic technique and good infection control practices to eliminate HCV transmission opportunities.

Background.The medical needs of the approximately 1 million persons residing in assisted living facilities (ALFs) continually become more demanding. Moreover, the number of ALF residents is expected to double by 2030. ALFs are not subject to federal oversight; state regulations that govern ALF infection control are variable. In 2005, two outbreaks of acute hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection in ALFs in Virginia were associated with sharing fingerstick devices used in blood glucose monitoring.Objective.To characterize infection control practices, determine compliance with guidelines, and identify educational and policy needs in ALFs in Virginia.Methods.Following the outbreaks of HBV infection, educational packets were sent to ALFs in Virginia to inform them of infection control guidelines and recommendations regarding glucose monitoring. A follow-up survey consisting of on-site interviews was conducted in a random sample of ALFs. Differences among infection control practices, according to the size and ownership of the ALFs, were assessed.Results.Fifty of 155 ALFs in central Virginia were surveyed. Of the 45 ALFs that had used fingerstick devices, 7 (16%) had shared these devices (without cleaning) between residents. Sharing practices for glucose monitoring equipment did not differ by facility size or ownership. Of all 50 ALFs, 17 (34%) did not offer employees HBV vaccine. HBV vaccine was less frequently offered at ALFs that had fewer than 50 residents, compared with ALFs with at least 50 residents (P< .01), and HBV vaccine was less frequently offered at ALFs that were individually owned, compared with those that were not individually owned (P= .02).Conclusions.Despite outreach and long-standing recommendations, approximately 1 in 6 facilities shared fingerstick devices, and more than one-third of ALFs surveyed were considered noncompliant with federal guidelines (Occupational Safety and Health Administration Bloodborne Pathogens Standard). Public health and licensing agencies should work with ALFs to implement infection control measures and prevent disease transmission.

Laser-assisted in situ keratomileusis (LASIK) eye surgery is increasingly common, with approximately 600,000 procedures performed each year in the United States. LASIK eye surgery is typically performed in an outpatient setting and involves the use of a machine-guided laser to reshape the lens of the eye to correct vision irregularities. Clinic A is an ambulatory surgery center that performs this procedure on 1 day each month. On February 5, 2015, the Toledo-Lucas County Health Department (TLCHD) in Ohio was notified of eye infections in two of the six patients who had undergone LASIK procedures at clinic A on January 9, 2015. The two patients experienced eye pain after the procedures and received diagnoses of infection with Mycobacterium chelonae, an environmental organism found in soil and water.

After inhalational anthrax was diagnosed in a Connecticut woman on November 20, 2001, postexposure prophylaxis was recommended for postal workers at the regional mail facility serving the patient’s area. Although environmental testing at the facility yielded negative results, subsequent testing confirmed the presence of Bacillus anthracis. We distributed questionnaires to 100 randomly selected postal workers within 20 days of initial prophylaxis. Ninety-four workers obtained antibiotics, 68 of whom started postexposure prophylaxis, and of these, 21 discontinued. Postal workers who never started or stopped taking prophylaxis cited as reasons disbelief regarding anthrax exposure, problems with adverse events, and initial reports of negative cultures. Postal workers with adverse events reported predominant symptoms of gastrointestinal distress and headache. The influence of these concerns on adherence suggests that communication about risks of acquiring anthrax, education about adverse events, and careful management of adverse events are essential elements in increasing adherence.

To monitor disease incidence and antibiotic resistance, effective, practical surveillance strategies are needed at the local level for drug-resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae (DRSP). Knox County, Tennessee, participates in three forms of DRSP surveillance: an active system sponsored by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC; Atlanta, Georgia); a novel county-sponsored system; and conventional state-mandated reporting. Ascertainment of invasive S. pneumoniae infection cases by each system in 1998 was evaluated, and completeness of reporting, antibiotic resistance patterns, costs, and other attributes were compared. The county-sponsored system collects patient identifiers and drug susceptibility data directly from hospital laboratories, whereas the CDC-sponsored system performs medical chart abstractions and reference laboratory susceptibility testing. Similar numbers of invasive S. pneumoniae cases were detected by the county-sponsored (n = 127) and CDC-sponsored (n = 123) systems; these systems held >75% of all cases in common, and each system achieved >85% sensitivity. Conventional reporting contained 88% and 76% of the DRSP cases identified by the county- and CDC-sponsored systems, respectively, but did not capture infections produced by susceptible isolates. Both the county- and CDC-sponsored systems indicated that large proportions of isolates were resistant to penicillin and extended-spectrum cephalosporins. The county-sponsored DRSP surveillance system was inexpensive, simple to execute, and relevant to local needs.

Waterborne transmission of Cryptosporidium parvum is well-established as a source in outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis; however, the role of tap water in endemic disease is unclear. The authors applied a risk assessment approach incorporating uncertainty analysis to examine the potential role of tap water in the transmission of endemic C. parvum infection. The model had two components: exposure-infection, to relate low-dose exposure to infection; and infection-outcome, to include the probabilities of clinical outcomes leading to case detection and reporting. The population was divided into four subgroups: adults and children with and without acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). Because of the high degree of uncertainty associated with available measures, a plausible baseline concentration of oocysts, 1 per 1,000 liters, was assumed for input to the model. In the non-AIDS subgroups, the predicted median annual risk of infection was approximately 1 in 1,000 (non-AIDS adults: 0.0009 infection/person/year, 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.0003-0.0028), while in the AIDS subgroups the predicted risk was 2 in 1,000 (AIDS adults: 0.0019 infection/person/year, 95% CI 0.0003-0.0130). When the risks were applied to the 1995 New York City population, more than 6,000 infections were estimated, with 99% occurring in the non-AIDS categories. Estimates of the overall probabilities that an infection would result in a reported case predicted that three reported illnesses would occur out of every 10,000 infections in non-AIDS adults (95% CI 5 x 10[-5] to 2 x 10[-3]), with a 10-fold higher probability in the non-AIDS pediatric subgroup. In contrast, the majority of infections occurring in the AIDS subgroup were predicted to result in reported cases (AIDS adults: probability = 0.61, 95% CI 0.39-0.80). When the model was applied to the New York City population, the calculated number of tap-water-related cases per year in the non-AIDS subgroups was six (95% CI 1-29), and in the AIDS subgroups it was 34 (95% CI 6-240).

Approximately 2.7 million persons in the United States have chronic hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection. Health care-associated HCV transmission can occur if aseptic technique is not followed. The authors suspected a health care-associated HCV outbreak after the report of 4 HCV infections among patients at the same hematology/oncology clinic.To determine the extent and mechanism of HCV transmission among clinic patients.Epidemiologic analysis through a cohort study.Hematology/oncology clinic in eastern Nebraska.Patients who visited the clinic from March 2000 through December 2001.HCV infection status, relevant medical history, and clinic-associated exposures. Bivariate analysis and logistic regression were used to identify risk factors for HCV infection.Of 613 clinic patients contacted, 494 (81%) underwent HCV testing. The authors documented infection in 99 patients who lacked previous evidence of HCV infection; all had begun treatment at the clinic before July 2001. Hepatitis C virus genotype 3a was present in all 95 genotyped samples and presumably originated from a patient with chronic hepatitis C who began treatment in March 2000. Infection with HCV was statistically significantly associated with receipt of saline flushes (P0.001). Shared saline bags were probably contaminated when syringes used to draw blood from venous catheters were reused to withdraw saline solution. The clinic corrected this procedure in July 2001.The delay between outbreak and investigation (1 year) may have contributed to an underestimate of cases.This large health care-associated HCV outbreak was related to shared saline bags contaminated through syringe reuse. Effective infection-control programs are needed to ensure high standards of care in outpatient care facilities, such as hematology/oncology clinics.