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We address an open problem in the philosophy of artificial intelligence (AI): how to justify the epistemic attitudes we have towards the trustworthiness of AI systems. The problem is important, as providing reasons to believe that AI systems are worthy of trust is key to appropriately rely on these systems in human-AI interactions. In our approach, we consider the trustworthiness of an AI as a time-relative, composite property of the system with two distinct facets. One is the actual trustworthiness of the AI and the other is the perceived trustworthiness of the system as assessed by its users while interacting with it. We show that credences, namely, beliefs we hold with a degree of confidence, are the appropriate attitude for capturing the facets of the trustworthiness of an AI over time. Then, we introduce a reliabilistic account providing justification to the credences in the trustworthiness of AI, which we derive from Tang’s probabilistic theory of justified credence. Our account stipulates that a credence in the trustworthiness of an AI system is justified if and only if it is caused by an assessment process that tends to result in a high proportion of credences for which the actual and perceived trustworthiness of the AI are calibrated. This approach informs research on the ethics of AI and human-AI interactions by providing actionable recommendations on how to measure the reliability of the process through which users perceive the trustworthiness of the system, investigating its calibration to the actual levels of trustworthiness of the AI as well as users’ appropriate reliance on the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: An extensive literature examines the prevalence of conspiracy theories and the factors that determine why some people believe them. Conspiracy theories are only one example of baseless beliefs, which we define as beliefs that are not epistemically warranted by the available evidence. The goals of this research were to determine if there are discrete domains of baseless beliefs and to identify the psychological and cognitive factors most closely associated with each type. Methods: We surveyed 435 U.S. adults about their baseless beliefs and measured an extensive set of cognitive, epistemological, and personal characteristics. Results: Four distinct domains of baseless belief were discovered, which we label conservative controversies, classic coverups, magical thoughts, and pseudoscience. The data suggest the confidence people have in these beliefs differs across domains and reveal clear differences in the cognitive, epistemological, and personality factors predicting belief in each domain. Conclusion: Baseless beliefs encompass a number of distinct domains, and the psychological dynamics underlying belief acquisition vary across these domains. This finding suggests caution in generalizing from studies examining only one domain. The prominent role of conservatism documented in the literature on conspiracy theories, for example, is weaker or not present at all in other domains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper replies to “Can AI Believe?”—an insightful commentary on “Can AI Know?” Addressing the substantive concern, this paper argues that AI systems can possess knowledge-conducive dispositional beliefs, rather than mere dispositions to believe, akin to certain human perceptual and manipulated beliefs. In response to the dialectical concern, it defends the appropriateness of the original dilemmatic reasoning. The commentators’ claim that proponents of innate knowledge deny knowledge’s need for experience is critically examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is argued that in order to properly engage with the debate regarding the ethics of belief one first needs to determine the nature of the propositional attitude in question. This point is illustrated by discussing a related topic from social philosophy, broadly conceived, concerning the nature of, and inter-relationship between, delusions and the Wittgensteinian notion of a hinge commitment. Are we to understand either or both of these notions as beliefs? Are delusions a kind of hinge commitment? In answering these questions we will appeal to a distinction between folk belief and knowledge-apt belief. It is argued that while both delusions and hinge commitments count as beliefs in the former sense, neither is a belief in the latter sense. Moreover, once we understand what is involved in the notion of a hinge commitment, it will also become clear why delusions are not hinge commitments. It is claimed that by gaining an understanding of delusions and hinge commitments, and thereby of two fundamental ways of thinking about belief, we will be in a better position to determine what is at issue in the ethics of belief debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Kalemname is the property of Kalemname and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Adam Carter has recently presented a novel puzzle about extended knowledge–i.e. knowledge that results from extended cognitive processes. He argues that allowing for this kind of knowledge on the face of it entails that there could be instances of knowledge that are simply ‘engineered’ into the subject. The problem is that such engineered knowledge does not look genuine given that it results from processes that bypass the cognitive agency of the subject. Carter’s solution is to argue that we need to impose an additional autonomy condition on knowledge that excludes such cases of non-autonomous knowledge. In response, two points of criticism are offered. First, that when extended knowledge is properly understood, virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge can already exclude non-autonomous knowledge without the need of an additional epistemic condition. Second, that the cases that Carter offers of putatively non-autonomous knowledge involve the inclusive folk notion of belief rather than the more restrictive notion of belief that is relevant to epistemology (K-apt belief). Once it is recognized that the belief condition on knowledge concerns this more restrictive notion, then we already have the means to exclude cases of non-autonomous knowledge (regardless of which theory of knowledge one favors).

In Thinking with Assent: Renewing a Traditional Account of Knowledge and Belief, Maria Rosa Antognazza offers a historical narrative of pre-modern epistemology. She argues that until very recently, philosophers generally held that "knowing and believing are distinct in kind in the strong sense that they are mutually exclusive mental states". This paper tests, and ultimately confirms, that account by applying it two thinkers of the Islamic world, al-Fārābī (d.950 CE) and Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, d.1037 CE). It is shown that both of them used the term 'assent (taṣdīq)' as an umbrella term covering two very different states, knowledge and belief. In the case of Ibn Sīnā, this contrast is ultimately tied to his sharp distinction between immaterial intellective thinking and embodied thinking that uses a physical organ. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The label of delusion can be so powerful that people so labelled are no longer believed or supported in preferred ways by those around them. This leads to a lack of meaningful and non-pathologising support for their significant, and at times unusual, beliefs. This phenomenon constitutes a form of epistemic injustice. To address this issue, this paper outlines specific approaches practitioners can adopt to better respond to such beliefs, illustrating these strategies with real-world examples from practice. By doing so, it aims to foster a form of epistemic justice that respects the knowledge and experience of people labelled as delusional and supports them to understand and lessen the impact of these often-distressing experiences. This paper is informed by research undertaken with people who had been labelled by psychiatry as "delusional". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is written in the continental tradition - facing the analytic one - and advocates the knowledge first thesis, reviewing the entailment thesis (where believing is knowing, because to know entails to believe). It starts from the ancient distinction between knowledge and opinion and develops criteria for distinguishing knowledge, opinion and belief. The demonstration necessarily arrives to the kinds of beliefs and thus, to the relationships between knowledge and these kinds. While the distinction of kinds of beliefs leads to the understanding of why the knowledge belief problem did appear in epistemology, the analysis with this distinction is not rigid and can be approached dialectically. This standpoint is aiming at contributing to the debate of knowledge belief problem and to warmer relations between the continental and the analytic philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a need in teacher education to explore experienced physics teachers' domain-general epistemological beliefs and classroom practices. The study reports 30 experienced physics teachers' epistemological beliefs and classroom practices in Turkish public high school context. The data was collected through interviews and classroom observations. During the analysis, qualitative data was analyzed through constant comparative method. Level and frequency of participants' epistemological beliefs and classroom practices were quantified for descriptive statistics. The results indicated that most teachers held transitional epistemological beliefs, but they taught in traditional ways. Their epistemological beliefs and classroompractices were not in alignment. These results showed that experienced teachers might have sophisticated epistemological beliefs, but they were not able to reflect their beliefs into practice according to their perception of students' expectations. The study provides implications for research for teacher learning and development through large-scale longitudinal studies and to understand the factors of misalignment between their beliefs and practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It might initially appear impossible to inquire into whether p while trusting someone that p. At the very least, it might appear that doing so would be irrational. In this paper, I shall argue that things are not as they appear. Not only is it possible for a person to inquire into whether p while trusting someone that p, it is very often rational. Indeed, combining inquiry and trust in this way is an epistemic balancing act central to a well-lived epistemic life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a need in teacher education to explore experienced physics teachers' domain-general epistemological beliefs and classroom practices. The study reports 30 experienced physics teachers' epistemological beliefs and classroom practices in Turkish public high school context. The data was collected through interviews and classroom observations. During the analysis, qualitative data was analyzed through constant comparative method. Level and frequency of participants' epistemological beliefs and classroom practices were quantified for descriptive statistics. The results indicated that most teachers held transitional epistemological beliefs, but they taught in traditional ways. Their epistemological beliefs and classroom practices were not in alignment. These results showed that experienced teachers might have sophisticated epistemological beliefs, but they were not able to reflect their beliefs into practice according to their perception of students' expectations. The study provides implications for research for teacher learning and development through large-scale longitudinal studies and to understand the factors of misalignment between their beliefs and practices.

The popularization and normalization of conspiracy theories over the last decade are accompanied by concerns over conspiracy theories as irrational beliefs, on the one hand; and their advocates as radical and extremist believers on the other hand. Building on studies emphasizing that such accounts are one-sided at best, and pars pro toto stigmatizations at worst; we propose to study what we call " participatory conspiracy culture" —the everyday, mundane online debates about conspiracy theories. Based on a 6-month ethnography on Reddit 's r/conspiracy subreddit, an analysis of 242 selected discussions, and supported by digital methods tool 4CAT, this article addresses the question of how people participate in online conspiracy culture. It shows that among the plethora of conspiracy theories discussed online, discussions are heterogeneous, and their participants relate to each other primarily through conflict. Three epistemological positions occur: belief (particularly leading to constant discreditation of others' beliefs), doubt (particularly as opposed to belief), and play (particularly with the fun of entertaining conspiracy theories without taking them too seriously). We conclude that the participatory conspiracy culture of r/conspiracy is not a homogenous echo chamber of radical belief, but a heterogeneous participatory culture in which belief is fundamentally contested, rather than embraced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the conversation between Jesus and Nicodemus in John 3:1–21, highlighting the ways omissions, multivalency, and intratextual and intertextual links invite audience participation and encourage listeners to see themselves as re-generated children of God. In this way, persuaded audiences assent not just to the content of the Gospel, but to its epistemology—how it instructs them to receive and seek truth. As classical and contemporary rhetorical theories indicate, when audiences participate to create the world of the Gospel, they are more likely to be persuaded by it and to use it to craft the reality in which they live. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are a variety of reasons for which one might claim an exemption from a public health mandate such as a required COVID-19 vaccine. Good-faith exemption requests—for medical, religious, or other reasons—are generally recognized as legitimate and granted to individuals when the imposition of the mandate on the requestor is perceived to outweigh the corresponding risk their lack of vaccination poses to the health and rights of others. This paper develops a method of analysis rooted in Western analytic philosophy designed to examine these issues and arrive at a framework for assessing the scientific, moral, and religious claims for exemptions from COVID-19 vaccinations. I argue that some empirical and moral beliefs are epistemically superior to others when they have a correspondence with agreed-upon facts about the world, are grounded in shared human experience, employ strong and substantive reasons for their claims, and embrace common convictions evidenced in the character of moral agents. Such facts must be demonstrable in the form of observably verifiable evidence and reliable testimony. Only then should a request for an exemption to an otherwise-required public health mandate (including a vaccine) be recognized. The alternative creates various difficulties, including the problem of moral arbitrariness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction. The article analyzes the structure of the epistemology of knowledge of weak artificial intelligence in comparison with the structure of human knowledge. The article was written within the framework of one of the most demanded branch sections of philosophy – the philosophy of artificial intelligence. The novelty of the research is based on the idea of applying the analysis of knowledge developed within the framework of analytical epistemology to the field of artificial intelligence.Methodology and sources. The article is written in the framework of analytical tradition in philosophy. We use conceptual analysis to analyze the most crucial aspects of knowledge. This method assumes that in order to explain a complex phenomenon, it is necessary to analyze its components. This method formed the basis of an analytical discussion about knowledge in the second half of the 20th century. The article also uses comparative analysis.Results and discussion. People's knowledge is characterized by three essential characteristics – the presence of information-bearing mental states, their reliability, and factuality. We analyzed to what extent the information-carrying internal states of a weak AI correspond to these qualities. The authors concluded that internal states can be considered beliefs if they are weakly interpreted, they can have a high degree of reliability under certain conditions, and they can have factuality if we accept that a weak AI has beliefs.Conclusion. A weak interpretation of the concept of belief allows us to argue that neural networks are capable of having beliefs. A more rigorous interpretation of the concept of belief also includes the requirement to understand the meaning. However, we do not have at our disposal a satisfactory theory of understanding meaning. In this case, the condition of reliability is the only criterion of knowledge to which the functional states of machines can correspond in the case of certain tasks, in connection with which the problem of generality arises especially acutely.

The notion of belief appears frequently in cognitive science. Yet it has resisted definition of the sort that could clarify inquiry. How then might a cognitive science of belief proceed? Here we propose a form of pluralism about believing. According to this view, there are importantly different ways to "believe" an idea. These distinct psychological kinds occur within a multi‐dimensional property space, with different property clusters within that space constituting distinct varieties of believing. We propose that discovering such property clusters is empirically tractable, and that this approach can help sidestep merely verbal disputes about what constitutes "belief." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Gorgias's Encomium of Helen and Defense of Palamedes, the orator draws attention to two important limitations of speech's power that concern its different relationships to belief vs. knowledge. First, logos has the capacity to affect and change a person's beliefs, but it is powerless to change or undermine a person's knowledge. Second, speech has the power to produce a new belief, but it is powerless to produce knowledge itself where knowledge is lacking. My primary aim in this essay is to examine Gorgias's epistemology of persuasive logos with a view to illuminating these two limitations. I suggest that Gorgias's claims in the Helen and Palamedes make the most sense when considered in the forensic and deliberative contexts in which the art of rhetoric thrived in ancient Greece. In such contexts the prevailing epistemology that contemporary orators take for granted is a kind of folk empiricism that privileges sense-perception as a source of knowledge, and I argue that Gorgias's ideas about logos and its limitations are best understood in terms of that epistemological framework. Speech cannot make people "unknow" what they have seen with their own eyes, nor can it act as a surrogate or replacement for sense-perception itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the U.S. Navy's report that an unidentified aerial phenomenon was observed by pilots dispatched from the Nimitz aircraft carrier in 2004, a report published by the New York Times in 2017. I argue that an unidentified phenomenon is an unexplainable phenomenon, meaning one with unknown causality. In this case, unknown causality involves the apparent negation of gravity. Exploring how a phenomenon might appear within spacetime yet simultaneously appear independent of the causality of spacetime, I review the concept of causation as it is developed by Descartes and Kant, highlighting their contemplation of beings that might exist outside spatiotemporal causation. Using concepts from quantum mechanics and information theory, I explore various ways such a being might be compatible with mathematics and logic. Finally, I consider what conclusions might be drawn if one embraces the phenomenon simply as an appearance of the unexplainable. I observe that any understanding of the phenomenon is possible only on the condition one elects to entertain a report of it. This opens avenues for analysis of reportative speech and belief. Finally, I consider the implications of a determinate experience of a being with no apparent causality for historiography and theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to show the historical-theological conception about the nature and fundamentals of magic in the context of the Relectio de arte magica (1540) by Francisco de Vitoria (1486-1546). The devoted interest in the occult sciences on the part of Renaissance men and women is an unquestionablehistorical fact. Hence the interest and, at times, the fight by theologians against such knowledge, considered to be heterodox, fanciful, immoral and without foundation. This paper seeks to show Vitoria's view; how his opinion may present a certain concession to such occult knowledge, starting from the investigation of its historical and philosophical foundations that determine the nature of magic. If this optimistic, i.e., moderate and non-combative concession is to be made, the question arises: why should a theologian operating within theological orthodoxy make concessions and consider the knowledge of magic, i.e., the set of beliefs as subject to rational foundation and speculation? One solution would be to claim that the general background idea in such an intellectual stance consists in its universalistic view of theological ideas as applied to the great human questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Instability occurs when the very fact of choosing one particular possible option rather than another affects the expected values of those possible options. In decision theory: An act is stable iff given that it is actually performed, its expected utility is maximal. When there is no stable choice available, the resulting instability can seem to pose a dilemma of practical rationality. A structurally very similar kind of instability, which occurs in cases of anti-expertise, can likewise seem to create dilemmas of epistemic rationality. One possible line of response to such cases of instability, suggested by both Jeffrey (The logic of decision, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983) and Sorensen (Aust J Philos 65(3):301–315, 1987), is to insist that a rational agent can simply refuse to accept that such instability applies to herself in the first place. According to this line of thought it can be rational for a subject to discount even very strong empirical evidence that the anti-expertise condition obtains. I present a new variety of anti-expertise condition where no particular empirical stage-setting is required, since the subject can deduce a priori that an anti-expertise condition obtains. This kind of anti-expertise case is therefore not amenable to the line of response that Jeffrey and Sorensen recommend. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I consider how the embodied approach can be applied to religious faith, and possibly other kinds of faith. I start with the reformed epistemologists' idea that religious faith is similar to sense perception, and I argue that we can elaborate this idea by taking into account our capability perceptually to grasp what is not accessible by senses—the 'presence in absence' (Noë 2012) or, as I call it, perceptual faith. As perception necessarily involves not only a mental but also an embodied relation to its object; an embodied relation can be seen as a constitutive component of faith as well. According to phenomenological accounts of perception (Merleau-Ponty, Noë, Siewert), embodiment and enactment allow humans to transcend perspectival limitations and to perceive an object as it is beyond its appearances: constant despite changes of angle, light, and other conditions and whole even when only parts of it are visible. I argue that, in the same vein, embodied relations and particular normativity involved in perception-based faith allow humans to transcend the precariousness of our experience and to sustain a perception-like relation to religious objects, achieved in a 'better look' moments of religious experience. I conclude that an embodied account can provide new insights into the nature of religious faith and resolve some puzzles, such as how faith can be a virtue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Susanna Rinard has recently offered a new argument for pragmatism and against evidentialism. According to Rinard, evidentialists must hold that the rationality of belief is determined in a way that is different from how the rationality of other states is determined. She argues that we should instead endorse a view she calls Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of all states is determined in the same way. In this paper, I show that Rinard's claims are mistaken, and that evidentialism is more theoretically virtuous than its opponents sometimes give it credit for. Not only does evidentialism not make an exception for belief, but it fits naturally into a unified, explanatorily powerful account of the rationality of intentional mental states. According to such an account, the rationality of all intentional mental states, including belief, is determined by the right kind of reasons for those states. Since the right kind of reasons for belief just are evidential considerations, this unified account entails evidentialism. I conclude, contra Rinard, that evidentialism can be (and often is) situated within a general account of rationality that is at least as theoretically virtuous as pragmatism, if not more so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Quelle est la logique de l'assentiment donné à une théorie complotiste ? L'ère de la post-vérité est-elle à entendre comme une quête de certitude, ou au contraire comme le déchaînement d'un doute ? De telles interrogations méritent d'être appréhendées par un abord psychologique du complotisme, afin d'expliciter le sens et l'équivocité que prennent aujourd'hui les termes de croyance, de vérité, de logique assertive ou encore de doute. Cette clarification conceptuelle ne peut s'opérer sans examiner l'usage de ces notions par le biais de l'épistémologie de la connaissance et de la philosophie des sciences. Cet entretien a été mené par Sarah Troubé et Olivier Douville avec le philosophe des sciences Philippe Huneman, autour de ses travaux récents portant sur les théories du complot et sur les conditions de la production et de la diffusion de la connaissance scientifique. L'entretien invite à questionner l'analogie de surface entre les modes rapides de construction des théories du complot et la démarche de constitution de la connaissance scientifique. Il convient de prendre en compte que ce déferlement de post-vérités nous offre l'occasion d'interroger les critères d'un doute rationnel et d'une croyance justifiée. La difficulté de poser des critères a priori qui permettraient de départager, à partir du seul examen de la croyance individuelle, les usages rationnels du doute et de la croyance, de leurs usages irrationnels, conduit à examiner les conditions de la production sociale de la connaissance. Réduire l'adhésion aux théories du complot à une croyance individuelle dans la vérité de ces théories mène à une mécompréhension du phénomène considéré. Prendre acte de l'équivocité épistémique de la croyance permet de la resituer dans sa dimension sociale et interlocutoire d'adresse à l'autre. La question de la production sociale de la connaissance, et plus particulièrement de la connaissance scientifique, invite à interroger les processus qui légitiment l'assentiment du public et des chercheurs dans la fiabilité des connaissances scientifiques. Mais elle permet aussi d'identifier, dans les conditions sociales et économiques actuelles de la recherche, les éléments susceptibles d'engendrer une forme de défiance envers certaines productions scientifiques. L'impossibilité de s'en tenir à un examen de la croyance comme phénomène individuel, et de départager a priori l'irrationnel du rationnel dans le phénomène du complotisme, débouche sur une réflexion épistémologique et politique. En diffusant dans le débat public une indifférence à tout partage entre le vrai et le faux, la prolifération de fake news attaque non seulement les conditions même de la constitution d'un savoir partagé, mais met en péril les ressorts de la délibération démocratique. À l'encontre de toute filiation entre l'ère de la post-vérité et les philosophies post-modernistes, la compréhension de cette indifférence au vrai et au faux est à replacer dans le contexte d'un marché de l'information qui crée les conditions de cette indifférenciation entre faits avérés et faits alternatifs. What is the logic of assent given to a conspiracy theory? Is the post-truth era to be understood as a quest for certainty, or on the contrary as the unleashing of doubt? Such questions deserve to be apprehended through a psychological approach to conspiracy, in order to clarify the meaning and equivocity of the terms belief, truth, assertive logic, and doubt. This conceptual clarification cannot take place without examining the use of these notions in the epistemology of knowledge and in the philosophy of science. Sarah Troubé and Olivier Douville interviewed the philosopher of science Philippe Huneman about his recent work on conspiracy theories and the conditions of the production and the diffusion of scientific knowledge. The interview invites us to question the surface analogy between the rapid modes of construction of conspiracy theories and the process of the constitution of scientific knowledge. It should be taken into account that this outpouring of post-truths offers us the opportunity to question the criteria of rational doubt and justified belief. The difficulty of establishing a priori criteria that would make it possible to separate – from the sole examination of individual belief – the rational and irrational uses of doubt and belief leads us to examine the conditions of the social production of knowledge. Reducing adherence to conspiracy theories to an individual belief in the truth of these theories leads to a misunderstanding of the phenomenon under consideration. Acknowledging the epistemic equivocity of belief allows us to re-situate it in its social and interlocutory dimension of address to the other. The question of the social production of knowledge, and more particularly of scientific knowledge, invites us to question the processes that legitimize the assent of the public and researchers in the reliability of scientific knowledge. But it also allows us to identify, in the current social and economic conditions of research, the elements likely to engender a form of mistrust towards certain scientific productions. The impossibility of confining oneself to an examination of belief as an individual phenomenon, and of separating a priori the irrational from the rational in the conspiratorial phenomenon, leads to epistemological and political reflection. By introducing, in public debate, an indifference to any division between true and false, the proliferation of fake news not only attacks the very conditions of the constitution of shared knowledge, but also jeopardizes the springs of democratic deliberation. Contrary to any filiation between the post-truth era and post-modernist philosophies, the understanding of this indifference to true and false is to be placed in the context of an information market that creates the conditions for this lack of differentiation between true and false facts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I develop a challenge for a widely suggested knowledge-first account of belief that turns, primarily, on unknowable propositions. I consider and reject several responses to my challenge and sketch a new knowledge-first account of belief that avoids it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A good account of the agnostic attitude of Suspending Judgement should explain how it can be rendered more or less rational/justified according to the state of one's evidence—and one's relation to that evidence. I argue that the attitude of suspending judgement whether p constitutively involves having a belief; roughly, a belief that one cannot yet tell whether or not p. I show that a theory of suspending that treats it as a sui generis attitude, wholly distinct from belief, struggles to account for how suspension of judgement can be rendered more or less rational (or irrational) by one's evidence. I also criticise the related idea that suspension essentially requires an 'Inquiring Attitude'. I show how a belief-based theory, in contrast, neatly accounts for the rational and epistemic features of suspending and so neatly accounts for why an agnostic has a genuine neutral opinion concerning the question whether p, as opposed to simply having no opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Questions of belief and ways of knowing are what the characters in F. D. Shands's Frame 39 set out to explore in spiritual and epistemological journeys across time and space. In this architectural pilgrimage narrative, certain numbers appear to have a particular significance. Twos appear in the form of doubles, dichotomies, and ambiguities. Fours stand out, too, and could be related to the classical elements of earth, water, fire, and air. Used to create mood and atmosphere throughout the story, the four elements, as this essay will argue, constitute a hidden matrix in this novel. A symbolism related to the number four could be seen as particularly significant in a narrative focused on spiritual and epistemological matters. Predominant as explanatory principles of fundamental energy forces in many different thought systems throughout history including ancient Greek thought, Eastern spirituality, and medieval philosophy, the four elements have been a way of understanding the origins and workings of the physical universe and to get a grasp of the most elusive and ungraspable building stones of existence itself. It is precisely such a pursuit of deeper knowledge and fundamental material and spiritual truths that informs the pilgrimage in Frame 39. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We seem to be responsible for our beliefs in a distinctively epistemic way. We often hold each other to account for the beliefs that we hold. We do this by criticising other believers as 'gullible' or 'biased', and by trying to persuade others to revise their beliefs. But responsibility for belief looks hard to understand because we seem to lack control over our beliefs. In this paper, I argue that we can make progress in our understanding of responsibility for belief by thinking about it in parallel with another kind of responsibility: legal responsibility for criminal negligence. Specifically, I argue that that a popular account of responsibility for belief, which grounds it in belief's reasons-responsiveness, faces a problem analogous to one faced by H.L.A. Hart's influential capacity-based account of culpability. This points towards a more promising account of responsibility of belief, though, if we draw on accounts of negligence that improve on Hart's. Broadly speaking, the account of negligence that improves on Hart's account grounds culpability in a (lack of) concern for others' interests, whereas my account of epistemic responsibility grounds responsibility for belief in a (lack of) concern for the truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of REICE. Ibero-American Journal on Quality, Effectiveness & Change in Education / REICE. Revista Iberoamericana Sobre Calidad, Eficacia y Cambio en Educación is the property of Red Iberoamericana de Investigacion sobre Cambio y Eficacia en Educacion and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The prologue of the Gospel of John famously depicts Jesus as the divine λόγος made flesh. Ancient evidence and insights from sensory analysis support that John also presents Jesus as materializing Israel's God through the λόγοι he speaks. Because the physical act of speaking creates sound, and sound becomes perceptible to persons through the auditory sense, Jesus' words render the God of Israel accessible in the somatic realm. John presents the Father as remote and inaccessible, yet suggests that Jesus uniquely shares in his divinity, so Jesus' speech functions to make the ineffable thoughts of the Father God both heard and thus corporeally known. The materiality of Jesus' speech underscores an important distinction between the divinity of Jesus and that of his transcendent Father; its corporeal connection to audition also reveals how John presents persons coming to believe in and know God tangibly, and, ultimately, to acquire eternal life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Epistemology of Testimony is one of the new branches of epistemology which seeks to cope with issues like the nature of testimony, its acceptability, and its relation to other sources of knowledge. This debate was also important for some Muslim theologians especially Qadi Abd al-Jabbar, who was one of the most important Mu’tazilite theologians. He believes that testimony is a way of reaching knowledge and responds to the doubts raised by some Islamic sects that reject testimony as a source of knowledge. He also believes -like Plantinga and some new philosophers in epistemology- that in transmission of knowledge, the main thing that transfers is the belief of the speaker and its properties. He also asserts that testimony is as reliable as other sources of knowledge and is not reducible to them. He has used his epistemic concepts about testimony as a foundation for proving some other religious beliefs such as occurrence of miracles.