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Copyright of Aufklärung: Revista de Filosofia is the property of Aufklarung: Revista de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this article, we offer some reflections on the concept of surprise by questioning its place and role in the practice of analytic processes. After discussing some elements related to the preconditions for surprise to occur in the analytic framework, in particular the dialectic between predictability and unpredictability, we examine the particularities of the mental state that favors states of surprise by drawing on the notions of »negative capability« and »selected fact«. We would like to propose a typology of moments of surprise that may be encountered in the analytical framework and that reveals their heterogeneous and polymorphic dimensions. Surprise can indeed vary in its temporality and intensity and can be experienced by both the analyst and the analysand separately or together. Surprise thus appears as an expression of unconscious meaning according to a reorganization of its relation to defense mechanisms such as splitting or repression. It could also maintain variable relationships with other sensory impressions such as astonishment, horror, and disconcerting strangeness. We further propose to consider surprise as an essential feature of the symbolization process to which the analyst pays particular attention. From this perspective, it appears as an expression of an encounter with the unexpected at the interface between the inside and the outside, between pleasure and displeasure, which is why it is so central to the work of psychic integration. It therefore occupies an essential place in analytic work and is catalyzed by the occurrence of transference and free association. Finally, the article concludes with some thoughts on surprise at the intersection of psychoanalysis, neuroscience, and epistemology, drawing in particular on Karl Friston’s work on the Bayesian brain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Nouvelles Perspectives en Sciences Sociales is the property of Editions Prise de parole and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Académica Internacional de Educación Física is the property of Asociacion Cientifica Internacional de Educacion Fisica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper is written in the continental tradition - facing the analytic one - and advocates the knowledge first thesis, reviewing the entailment thesis (where believing is knowing, because to know entails to believe). It starts from the ancient distinction between knowledge and opinion and develops criteria for distinguishing knowledge, opinion and belief. The demonstration necessarily arrives to the kinds of beliefs and thus, to the relationships between knowledge and these kinds. While the distinction of kinds of beliefs leads to the understanding of why the knowledge belief problem did appear in epistemology, the analysis with this distinction is not rigid and can be approached dialectically. This standpoint is aiming at contributing to the debate of knowledge belief problem and to warmer relations between the continental and the analytic philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates surrounding Jung's archetype theory could be characterized as tacit attempts to contend with the concept's dual function as referring to something known to psychologists (sign) and standing for something that is fundamentally unknowable (symbol). This essay considers implications of the term "archetype," outlines and critiques some of the conundrums of categorization and scientific credibility posed by Jung's formulation of the theory, and prompts locating the archetypal "human quality" of being human in imaginaries of typical patterning of the experiential realm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current paper contains a comparative reading of the Phaedrus and the Cratylus. Some of their central topics are here contrasted in order to highlight the characteristic traits of Platonic thought present in both dialogues. The description of dialectic in the Phaedrus fits well with a Socratic definition in the Cratylus which clearly specifies that names are tools at the service of the dialectician. This evidence leads us to the conclusion that --besides being the main mechanism to control and judge rhetoric-- dialectical technic appears in the dialogues as the only correcting procedure that makes it possible to verify any sort of proposition and bring speeches and depictions of reality closer to the truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I study Engels' ideas on dialectical materialism, from the perspective of Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science. I argue that Engels' efforts, in works such as Anti-Düring or (even more so) in his Dialectics of Nature, are best understood as an attempt to crystalize a new scientific paradigm, in the sense that Kuhn (2000) gives to this last word. In order to do this, I start by identifying Marx's previous statement regarding this topic. Then I present Kuhn's concept of a "disciplinary matrix". Thirdly, I apply the aforementioned concept to Engels' work, identifying all the elements of the disciplinary matrix. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To judge by the title, one would expect that interpretations of the Critique of Pure Reason would prioritize the division of the book most about reason and its critique: The Transcendental Dialectic. But the Dialectic is surprisingly secondary in the most established interpretive approaches. This article argues as follows: There is a problem that contributes to explaining the lack of popularity: The problem of how arguments really based in the Dialectic itself really promise to ground a broader project in theoretical philosophy, of the scope of the Critique. But the problem can be solved: One aim important in the critique is critical argument against rationalist metaphysics. The Dialectic must play a central role in such critique, given a difficulty concerning begging the question. The positive claims of the Dialectic, about reason and the unconditioned, are necessary for such an argument, and the Dialectic gives them enough defense for that purpose. Finally, there are reasons to take seriously Kant’s promises that the Antinomy of the Dialectic can support the weight in such an argument, without begging the question. The article concludes that a Dialectic-first approach to the Critique is viable and worth further development.

This paper aims at providing a summary account of the main contents of David Sedley’s book Plato’ Cratylus, through a review with a primarily descriptive purpose and some critical observations at times. The speculations on language formulated by the author are grouped into three theoretical strands – result of a personal choice – concerning (1) the etymological section; (2) the theory of flux and Forms and (3) a linguistic account of the dialectical method, in order to clarify the fundamental theses supported in Sedley’s work. The paper concludes with a more comparative part, in which – taking up the themes mentioned above – an attempt is made to place the author’s writing within a brief status quaestionis of the famous Platonic dialogue, subject of linguistic interest since ancient times until nowadays. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Quaestiones Disputatae is the property of Universidad Santo Tomas, Seccional Tunja and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

It is shown that the difficulties that appear during attempts to uncover the mechanisms of changing of scientific paradigms can be overcome by consistent application of the apparatus of dialectics and by the interpretation of science as a social institution that produces intangible assets. This interpretation demonstrates analogy between T. Kuhn‟s theory of changing scientific paradigms and the theory of innovation cycles, which goes back to the works of J. Schumpeter. The fact allows one to consider the production of intangible assets by the methods of institutional economics. The basic dialectical contradiction in this interpretation is the contradiction between the innovativeness of a set of ideas that form a new paradigm and ensure the systematic generation of intangible assets, and its liquidity. The liquidity of intangible assets is primarily determined by the extent to which society is ready to accept new ideas and views. The resolution of the identified contradiction is carried out through a cyclical change in resistance to innovation. The period of dominance of a certain paradigm ends when it exhausts the potential of its development, which determines the finiteness of the life cycle of any scientific paradigm, just as the life cycle of any innovation is finite. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Filozofija i Drustvo is the property of University of Belgrade, Institute for Philosophy & Social Theory and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A theory of reasoned knowledge is presented by developing and demonstrating the methodology of a novel skeptical critique designed to extend the epistemological practice of belief justification to an epistemological practice of reason justification. Analyses of the reasoning found in the theorizations of certain seminal philosophers and leading scientists will reveal how the absence of the epistemic justification of reason defaults to the use of an unjustified form of reason that runs the play of an unrecognized and unchecked dialectic between epistemology and science. An alternative form of reason will be logically outlined and tested against the formalized skeptical critique in order for the newly recognized dialectic to be checked over reason with provisional epistemic justification. Zeno's paradox and Green's and Sellars' critique of givenness are employed as argument functionaries of the reasoned knowledge theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In echo of the research that has been developed in the context of the cultural turning point concerning the place of representations in the territoriality, this article engages an indepth discussion of epistemological distinctions and seeks to demonstrate that the promotion of the study of creative and meaningful relationships which are established between individuals and places is possible. These relations which evoke an existential quest are the basis of bonds that are created with places. In this context, the aim is to promote a poetic, sensual and reincarnating geography where the incorporation of the subject by the researcher takes a prominent place so that intuition and tacit knowledge can be reinvested into the methodology of the process. Enactive ethnography can be considered to be fruitful methodological approaches because it can allow the researcher to understand the nature of the intimate, sensitive, poetical and carnal relationship that is maintained, and more generally, that maintained by individuals with place. This sensitive socio-anthropological interpretation of "inhabiting" explores the dialectic which is orchestrated between the individual and place. The purpose is then to hypothesize that according to sensual, emotional and affective resonance related to place individuals experiment the intensity of their presence in the world where the ontological dimension is closely linked to the depth of attention which is formed through the eidetic character of place, the body, oneself, space and time" Finally, this sensitive geography is presented as a valuable paradigmatic framework for a reenchantment of participatory democracy built on the acknowledgement of the existentialist character of dwelling as being on earth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Estudios Demográficos y Urbanos is the property of El Colegio de Mexico AC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Artefactos: Revista de Estudios Sobre La Ciencia Y La Tecnologia is the property of Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Trans/Form/Ação is the property of Trans/Form/Acao and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Engels once remarked to Marx that the "materialist dialectic, which for years has been our best working tool and our sharpest weapon, was, remarkably enough, discovered not only by us but also, independently of us and even of Hegel, by a German worker, Joseph Dietzgen." The status of the dialectic, however, within what ought to instead be described as Dietzgen's inductive empiricism, is problematic. Dietzgen's work stands as a hitherto unacknowledged precursor to the Marxist ideology of Diamat. The first question is whether or not Marx's materialism ought to be conflated with Dietzgen's empiricism. Second, Dietzgen's efforts to establish a theory of human thought structured through the methods of the natural sciences requires critical evaluation. Although Dietzgen's works may anticipate some of the theoretical contours of Diamat, equating materialism with empiricism and rendering the dialectical method into a universal methodology on a par with the methods of the natural sciences, as pursued by Dietzgen, is a project that is perhaps not worthy of Marx's and Engels' nominal veneration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this article is to find an epistemology that allows the foundation of scientific knowledge, to answer the questions that appear in its construction and to allow its further development. As a methodology, the following methods of philosophy are used: hermeneutics for the interpretation of texts, analysis and synthesis to decompose the ideas of the texts read and recompose them in a new vision within the analyzed problematic; and deduction to obtain valid inferences from those obtained ideas. Epistemology is conceived neither as a particular scientific discipline nor as a prescriptive discipline, but as a branch of philosophy that studies science. Dialectical-hermeneutic realism is proposed as the philosophical framework that supports and orients the sought epistemology, so realism, dialectics and hermeneutics are analyzed. Results: both a realism far from the static dogmatism that requires a passive knowing subject, and a constructivism away from subjectivism and relativism are justified. Conclusions: a dialectical-hermeneutic realist epistemology is useful for the analysis of science in general and information science in particular, since it allows to explain the evolution of both and the problem of the relationship between new and old theories; the inter and transdiscipline; as well as the role of the subject and society in the construction of science without denying objectivity [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Filozofija i Drustvo is the property of University of Belgrade, Institute for Philosophy & Social Theory and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Filozofija i Drustvo is the property of University of Belgrade, Institute for Philosophy & Social Theory and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Rónai - Revista de Estudos Classicos e Tradutorios is the property of Ronai - Revista de Estudos Classicos e Tradutorios and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Filozofija i Drustvo is the property of University of Belgrade, Institute for Philosophy & Social Theory and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The present paper highlights some gnosiological issues widespread in Plato's dialogues. The ontology in Parmenides, sophists discourses, and Socratic dialectic are widely amalgamated into platonic philosophy and can be considered as the main influences in his innovative way of seeking knowledge, based on dialectic and on the love of the truth. Epistemology, as discernible in platonic's writings, is about the following conceptions: a) the Eleatic tradition of thinking on the being; b) the sophists' speeches (logos) as an exercise of democracy; c) the Socrates dialectic method, based on collective and dialogical investigation. Based on these references, I emphasize that the path to knowledge drawn by Plato is filled with appreciations of wisdom s ultimate goal, that is, the ethics as a necessary attitude towards life and transforming, for the better, the world and the human beings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The investigation on how we think and build knowledge has always been central to philosophy. Several theories have already suggested the influence of dominant class and language power on how societies reproduce unjust, inefficient, and even unsustainable ideas and concepts from the environmental and future generations' point of view. In an unprecedented way and seeking to update the debate, this article focuses on two reflections from different contexts on this theme. It aims to verify the pertinence in assigning to a same type of epistemology the dialectic of knowledge and the cognitive history, proposed, respectively, by Caio Prado Júnior and Jeremy Lent. The choice to compare the ideas of the two authors - the first with a work published in 1963 in Brazil and the second in 2017 in the United States - is due to the similarity of some of its background formulations while starting from very different perspectives. In order to reach the announced goal, this work presents a comparative study between both propositions. At the end, it is emphasized that, despite the differences, both authors denounce bias of gnosiology and indicate that the most appropriate approach for the knowledge construction must contemplate the interaction between subject and object of thought as a complex, systemic and relational process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Saint Augustine's De quantitate animae is a dialogue often neglected by scholars who have studied the question of Augustinian dialogue. This study aims to remedy this lack of interest and to show the strategic place of this dialogue in the Augustinian production of the years 386–390. Firstly, after stating the question, the article questions the genre of dialogue and shows that the De quantitate animae of Augustine perfectly meets the criteria defining the genre of the philosophical dialogue. Secondly, this study examines the stakes and the place of the dialectic in this work. In fact, our paper emphasizes, following the analyzes proposed by Giovanni Catapano, the importance of considering the kind of dialogue in Augustine by the yardstick of his epistemological presuppositions. In this perspective, the De quantitate animae appears as a work of transition, which is based on the epistemology of Contra Academicos and the notions of doubt and inconcussum, while announcing the epistemology of the inner Master developed in the De magistro. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Enthymema is the property of Enthymema, International Journal of Literary Criticism, Literary Theory & Philosophy of Literature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper aims to shed light on the dialectic of scientific reason in the philosophy of contemporary science through Gaston Bachelard’s model. This model shows the impact of scientific knowledge in the structure of thought which reveals the new epistemological values that make the reason, putting its philosophical position into question whenever the scientific thought results new theories and attitudes that oblige it to reconsider its structure and content in order to be kept up to scientific revolutions. All this require from the reason to be revolutionary, renewed and developed. This means that reason and reality are no longer the same as they were in the classical philosophy and science.

This essay intends to address perspectives and reflections on nature and culture in the contemporary anthropological literature. Dialogically engaging with Ingold, Wagner, Viveiros de Castro, Descola and Strathern, I aim to demonstrate the implications of understanding culture as an axiomatic point of differentiation of human nature, or as re-elaboration of materiality through human action. This reflection calls us to rethink the Western scientific epistemology, along with its presupposed ontological order. Such questioning unfolds in the elaboration of the ethnographic text, which in turn is the result of a dialectical process that speaks not only of one culture, but of two, and especially of our gaze on the Other. In the ethnographic text, an anthropologist and a native are the potential locus of reproduction of their culture. Through this approach we extend the implications of epistemological concerns to fieldwork practices and to the art of understanding other knowledge systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I want to propose a theoretical comparison between Kant's transcendental philosophy and Hegel's speculative one, and I argue that both - according to their peculiar method - determine an epistemological grounding of metaphysics. The foundations converge for what concerns the need of a scientific self-founded knowledge, which is universally valid and actually necessary, without occurring to arbitrary and extrinsic assumptions. Nevertheless, they differ as of the foundational technique, the overall epistemology and its metaphysical outcome. Indeed, while Kant's foundational criteria is given by the transcendental deduction, Hegel's is made up of the dialectic. Furthermore, while Kant's transcendental philosophy determines a metaphysica generalis, by means of a linear, vertical epistemology which has a twofold ontological foundation, conversely Hegel's speculative philosophy, by virtue of an epistemology which consists of a single circle of scientific knowledge, and which foundation is "broken at the bottom" (abgründiger Grund), also determines a metaphysica specialis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Plato's Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger leads Socrates the Younger and their audience through an analysis of the statesman in the service of the interlocutors' becoming "more capable in dialectic regarding all things" (285d7). In this way, the dialectical exercise in the text is both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable, as it yields a philosophically rigorous account of statesmanship and exhibits a method of dialectical inquiry. After the series of bifurcatory divisions in the Sophist and early Statesman, the Stranger changes to a non-bifurcatory method of dividing to account for the statesman, but does not explain the reason for this change. I argue that the change is prepared by the elements discussed in the digression from 277a2 to 287b2. Here the Stranger makes use of four concepts that are crucial for understanding this change: the notion of paradigm, the paradigms of care and the weaver, and the notion of due measure. I claim that the notion of paradigm clarifies the nature of dialectical inquiry, care and weaving act as paradigms appropriate to dialectical practice, and an account of due measure offers insight into the constitutive ratios that govern the structuring of kinds pursued through dialectical inquiry. I suggest that the non-bifurcatory method is intended to articulate knowledge in the strictest sense, or knowledge of the forms, presenting a method of inquiry into being and its structure that will foster the turning of the soul from things to forms that Socrates describes in the Republic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]