Search

Hugh Epstein, Hardy, Conrad and the Senses, Edinburgh University Press, 2019. 312 p. ISBN: 9781474449878The present review refers to the paperback edition (2021).

Based on a reconstruction of the development of Rudolf Carnap’s views from the Aufbau until the 1960s, this paper provides an account of the philosopher’s understanding of non-cognitivism, which is here seen as in line with the so-called scientific world-conception of left-wing logical empiricism. The starting point of Carnap’s conception is the claim that every human decision depends on certain attitudes that cannot be justified at a cognitive level, that are neither based on empirical facts nor logical reasoning. The key features of Carnap’s non-cognitivism, however, go beyond this general basis and involve several fundamentally moral commitments, such as a commitment toward science, and the embracing of moral attitudes as the result of a long-term process of rational discourse. I argue that these commitments contained in Carnap’s non-cognitivism/scientific world-conception establish a genuinely political worldview that is characteristic of left-wing logical empiricism and converges with socialism and democracy.

The main focus of this paper is to demonstrate that René Descartes and John Locke were two opposing thinkers notably in their theories of knowledge. But despite their opposing views, our major preoccupation in this work is to show their point of unity. This could be seen at the level where they were preoccupied in restoring the autonomy of man which has been high jacked by the slavery of the medieval period. Their thoughts paved the way from theocentrism to anthropocentrism. They were also united in the fact that they have been considered as the pillars of modern epistemology. Our inspiration is being drawn notably from two principal works which areMeditations on First Philosophy(Descartes) andAn Essay Concerning Human Understanding(John Locke).

A scientific understanding of the biological world arises when ideas about how nature works are formalized, tested, refined, and then tested again. Although the benefits of feedback between theoretical and empirical research are widely acknowledged by ecologists, this link is still not as strong as it could be in ecological research. This is in part because theory, particularly when expressed mathematically, can feel inaccessible to empiricists who may have little formal training in advanced math. To address this persistent barrier, we provide a general and accessible guide that covers the basic, step-by-step process of how to approach, understand, and use ecological theory in empirical work. We first give an overview of how and why mathematical theory is created, then outline four specific ways to use both mathematical and verbal theory to motivate empirical work, and finally present a practical tool kit for reading and understanding the mathematical aspects of ecological theory. We hope that empowering empiricists to embrace theory in their work will help move the field closer to a full integration of theoretical and empirical research.

This is a discussion note on Michael Ayers’ Knowing and Seeing. Groundwork for a New Empiricism.

The attempt of empiricist psychology to achieve scientific respectability through reliance on quantification is deeply flawed. Not only does it come at the expense of the phenomena, which, in the study of the mind, must reference subjectivity, but it is incommensurate with the basic scientific principles on which it claims to operate. Specifically, psychological theory typically cannot support prognostication beyond the binary opposition of "effect present/effect absent." Accordingly, the "numbers" assigned to experimental results often amount to affixing names (e.g., more than, less than) to the members of an ordered sequence of outcomes. This, I contend, is one reason why psychologists find it difficult to discriminate between competing theories: without a well-specified theory capable of enabling precise and detailed quantitative prediction, inferring underlying mental mechanisms from experimental outcomes becomes a difficult, if not impossible, task.

In conversation with Didier Debaise, this piece thinks transversally across Nature as Event (2017a) and Speculative Empiricism (2017b) to explore some of the key stakes in his philosophy, namely: the relationship between the task of thinking a speculative empiricism and the problem of the bifurcation of nature. Engaging with the themes of nature, abstraction, dualism, pragmatism, and the role of stories in dramatizing our sensitivity to the world, the conversation develops Debaise’s contribution to theorising alternative modes of knowledge and experience capable of admitting those infra-sensible, inaudible, or imperceptible qualities of events. Distinctly, Debaise introduces here the problem of ‘predatory abstractions’ as one way to understand the problem of bifurcation. Ethically, the question of predatory abstractions makes new demands on the social sciences: to story new abstractions capable of deepening our experience of nature. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).

Epistemology is one of three philosophical dichotomies that rises to two main isms to obtain knowledge: rationalism initiated by Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and empiricism initiated by John Lock (1632-1704). As an empiricist, Locke offers the tabula rasa theory to support his argument. Thus, this study aims to describe radically and comprehensively the concept of John Locke's thought from the perspective of epistemological philosophy. This aim is achieved by describing the background and principal works of John Lock on the philosophy of epistemology, including the main ideas, views, and reasoning of his empiricism through tabula rasa theory. The method used in this research is descriptive qualitative in the field of philosophy. Data were collected through a literature study, then analyzed hermeneutically with two methodical elements: verstehen and interpret. First, this research shows that knowledge is principally obtained from sensory experience in which the mind is only passive. Second, the sensory experience is obtained objectively (primary quality) and subjectively (secondary quality). Third, external sensation and internal sensation obtained from sensory experience are built into simple ideas to complex ideas.

In this paper I draw a connection between Kuhn and the empiricist legacy, specifically between his thesis of incommensurability, in particular in its later taxonomic form, and van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. I show that if it is the case the empirically equivalent but genuinely distinct theories do exist, then we can expect such theories to be taxonomically incommensurable. I link this to Hacking's claim that Kuhn was a nominalist. I also argue that Kuhn and van Fraassen do not differ as much as might be thought as regards the claim that observation is theory laden.

The development of the science of development is slowly growing rapidly, more so in the western world based on the main base, namely rationalism, and empiricism. However, it is in contrast to the treasures of Islamic scholarship which stagnated due to differences in perceptions of accepting or rejecting science which only stems from rationalism and empiricism. Based on this anxiety, there was an effort made by one of the leading Muslim figures named M. Abid Al Jabiri who tried to construct ideas about the importance of the development of science in Islamic treasures with an Islamic epistemological approach. Therefore, this paper was appointed to reveal more deeply how the views of M. Abid Al Jabiri in the development of Islamic scientific treasures with an Islamic Epistemology approach so that with his view it provides a solution to confusion and adversity in the development of Islamic scholarship. This study method uses a qualitative approach with the type of library research. Through this type of research, the author collects various references regarding the views of M. Abid Al Jabiri on Islamic epistemology which the authors then analyze and can finally produce a conclusion. The results of this study conclude that in M. Abid Al Jabiri's view, Islamic epistemology through Bayani, Irfan, and Burhani epistemologies is an answer to how important it is to use Islamic epistemology for the development of Islamic scholarship so that it does not lag behind the dominance of Western scientific development.

This paper warns against misunderstanding the logical empiricists’ take on the concepts of experience and empiricism. Far from expressing traditionalist way-of-ideas conceptions, these concepts were themselves rethought and refashioned to accord with their overall aim of making contemporary philosophy of science fit for purpose. To this end, this paper disarms the supposed counter-examples of Schlick’s foundationalism and Carnap’s Aufbau and exemplifies the aimed for understanding by examples of the physialist theorising of Carnap and Neurath.

Author(s): Blankholm, Joseph | Abstract: This essay reassembles many of the key points in the thematic issue ‘Anthropology Within and Without the Secular Condition’ nto create a coherent picture of the fragments that comprise secularity and secularism. Understanding what secularism often affirms, such as a materialist ontology and an empiricist epistemology, makes it easier to recognize the vast diversity within the secular discursive tradition. Exploring this internal diversity is important for giving a better account of the secular condition and for finding alternatives to the most common ways of being secular, which have become worthy objects of critique. This essay then looks more closely at two aspects of the secular that are usually overlooked: a poetic language ideology and the locus of explanatory satisfaction. A better understanding of what it means to be secular, in all its variety, will help scholars better control for the ways in which secular discourse shapes their feelings and the knowledge they desire to produce.

The relationship established in the field consumption is complex and increasingly challenging. As theories show (Sociology and Antropology), consumption involves in a ritualistic, market, conjunctive and relational logic, a symbolic dimension (of meanings), a material dimension (of products) and a human dimension (of consumers). This article derives from an investigative effort that embraces theory and empiricism, trying to understand the dilemmas and the challenges of the consumption of jewels in the present days. From the study carried out with a qualitative approach and interpretative theoretical paradigm, we propose here discussions and reflections about the development on the Brazilian jeweler market, the symbolic consumption in contemporaneity and the effective role of advertising communication in the dynamics of consumption.

Hermann Cohen, as it is well known, criticised the Kantian notion of the thing-in-itself. And before him the Kantian thing-in-itself was criticised by Fichte and other German idealists. Probably for this reason, Hermann Cohen is sometimes regarded as a person who said things similar to Fichte. This gives a completely wrong perspective, making it impossible to understand the philosopher's ideas. The basis for his critique of the Kantian thing-in-itself is quite different from the motives, determining the criticism of Kant in the classical German Idealism. Such interpretation does not allow to see close connection of Cohen's theoretical philosophy with revolution in physics which took place at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The article explains how Cohen's demand that pure thinking must form its own content is connected with transformations taking place in physics and mathematics, and the peculiarity of Cohen's understanding of idealism is demonstrated: for him, correct idealism must realize that autonomous, free thinking should work seriously with sense data. The closeness of Cohen's ideas to the postpositivist thesis of the theory-ladenness of observation is explained. For Cohen, serious work with sense data is opposite to uncritical acceptance of them as given. The origin of scientific thinking is thinking itself. It responds to the challenge of sensory material by creating its own constructs. Mathematized natural science becomes for Cohen both an example and a confirmation of this thesis. For him, what is real is what is described in the language of mathematical analysis, i.e. continuous processes, in spite of the fact that any data are discrete. It is shown that the source of Cohen's assertions on this issue is in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, namely in the doctrine of the Principles of pure natural science and, more specifically, in the Anticipations of Perception. Cohen's conviction of the constructive character of the theories of mathematized natural science is confirmed in the article by references to the authority of A. Einstein.

In this paper, we investigate how the life and work of Louis Rougier relate to the broader political dimension of logical empiricist philosophy. We focus on three practical projects of Rougier in the 1930s and 1940s. First, his attempts to integrate French-speaking philosophers into an international network of scientific philosophers by organizing two Unity of Science conferences in Paris. Second, his role in the renewal of liberalism through the organization of the Walter Lippmann Colloquium. Third, Rougier’s attempts at political negotiations between Great Britain and the Vichy regime during the Second World War. These activities of Rougier in the 1930s and 1940s have so far never been discussed as part of a unified project on Rougier’s part. Based on our investigations of these practical projects of Rougier, we argue that Rougier’s relation to logical empiricist philosophers should primarily be understood on the level of action. Rougier’s projects aimed to proliferate the concrete improvement of society and the lives of its citizens by expunging all metaphysical questions and speculations from the sphere of social discourse. Rougier conceived logical empiricist philosophers as allies to achieve such practical effects in society. ispartof: HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science vol:11 issue:2 pages:461-487 status: published

Radical empiricists at the turn of the twentieth century described organisms as experiencing the relations they maintain with their surroundings prior to any analytic separation from their environment. They notably avoided separating perception of the material environment from social life. This perspective on perceptual experience was to prove the inspiration for Gibson’s ecological approach to perceptual psychology. Gibson provided a theory of how the direct perception of the organism-environment relation is possible. Central to his account was the notion of a medium for direct perception. However Gibson provided two mutually inconsistent accounts of the medium leading to problems for his radical empiricism. We develop an account of the medium that does justice to ecological psychology’s radical empiricist roots. To complement this account of the medium we detail a usage-based account of information. Together they allow us to propose a novel radical empiricist view of direct perception. We then return to the notion of medium and expand it to include sociomaterial practices. We show how direct perception happens in the midst of social life, and is made possible by an active achieving and maintaining of a pragmatic relation with the environment.

The problem of scholarly knowledge strata is one of the key subjects in modern philosophy of science and epistemology (theory of knowledge). The threelevel model is the most popular in the document sphere as a sociocultural domain; it comprises empirical, theoretical and philosophical scientific knowledge. The author describes collision and contradictions between theoretical documentology and the empirical disciplines of document studies and book studies. He appraises achievements of empirical knowledge in the documentosphere and compares theoretical and methodological ways of three types: informational, conventional and medialogical ones. The author is skeptical about the following statement: the concept of document is relative, conventional and conditional in its essence. The author examines “The Strategy for Librarianship in the Russian Federation for the Period up to the Year 2030”. He insists that the Strategy has to be supported by the scientific strategy aimed to promote each level of empirical, theoretical and philosophical knowledge. He is also concerned about lacking philosophical level in document studies. The wisdom of philosophy lies in its comprising both rational and irrational sides of objects being studied. With document rational and irrational attributes in view, he offers the philosophical definition of document: document is the statement of humanness within social environment and historical time. This definition comprises anthropological and national variations of homo sapiens and philosophical concept of humanness as the unity of the opposite universal principles – the material and ideal.

This paper contributes to a debate that has arisen in the recent self-knowledge literature between agentialists and empiricists. According to agentialists, in order for one to know what one believes, desires, and intends, rational agency needs to be exercised in centrally significant cases. Empiricists disagree: while they acknowledge the importance of rationality in general, they maintain that when it comes to self-knowledge, empirical justification, or warrant, is always sufficient. In what follows, I defend agentialism. I argue that if we could only come to know our judgement-sensitive attitudes in the way described by empiricism, then we would be self-estranged from them when we acquire knowledge of them. We would relate to our own attitudes as if we were watching the movies of our inner lives unfold. Given that this is not the position we typically inhabit, with respect to our judgement-sensitive attitudes, I conclude that empiricism fails. This is the self-estrangement argument against empiricism. I then consider a response that Brie Gertler, an empiricist, offers to the objection that empiricism fatally portrays us ‘mere observers of a passing cognitive show’ (2016, p. 1). I argue that her response is unsuccessful. Hence, we should endorse agentialism.

El presente artículo propone un recorrido teórico de la discusión sobre la identidad personal, que se inicia considerando el punto de vista empirista, expresado en los planteamientos de Locke s. XVII y Hume s. XVIII, en esta línea argumentativa, también se recogen las tres tesis de Parfitt (1986) sobre la identidad personal, que intentan reducir la identidad a la experiencia almacenada en un cerebro y, por tanto, destaca el predominio absoluto de la posición epistemológica de la identidad. Luego, se contrapone esta posición con la Teoría Narrativa de Ricoeur, (1996) quien refuta las tesis de Parfitt, señalando aporías en el interior mismo del armazón intelectual de las tesis referidas. Luego, de haber neutralizado el proyecto de Parfitt, Ricoeur plantea la dualidad “carácter y promesa” como modelos opuestos de Identidad, para ello, el citado autor recupera las nociones de “ídem e ipse” como constituyentes del primer modelo de identidad personal, el mismo que considera como invariante relacional, y lo opone a la “promesa”, siendo éstos, dos modelos, con los cuáles propone una Teoría de Identidad Narrativa. La metodología empleada considera un patrón inductivo y cronológico. Como fuente principal para el recojo de datos se tomó en cuenta el análisis documental, asimismo la experiencia recogida a lo largo del doctorado en Pensamiento Complejo de Multiversidad Mundo Real y la experiencia laboral y profesional. Se encontró que Ricoeur logra establecer la reconciliación entre la ontología y la epistemología del ser en la discusión sobre la identidad personal, con lo cual ubica la discusión de la identidad en el campo de la complejidad. Se concluye que, a partir de esta reconciliación, pueden considerarse puntos de contacto o puentes de abordaje de dicha teoría a partir de los Principios del Pensamiento Complejo de Morín (1994).

This review seeks to understand the implications of empiricism, interpretivism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, pluralism, and solipsism in social science inquiry within social reality, using scoping review method. An in-depth review of the literature was conducted to understand the various philosophical alignments or paradigms applied in social sciences research. The study is aimed at understanding and applying these paradigms with the view of having a deep comprehension of the turbulences plaguing society and proffering solutions to them. From the review, it was discovered that the various philosophical alignments in social science inquiry provide the scientist or researcher with a worldview of the different perspectives and multiple levels of analysis of the social world. Thus, creating a systematic lens from which individuals (at several levels), groups, and organizations are examined to know the; “when”, “how”, and “why” they behave the way and manner that they do. It was concluded that an adequate understanding of these paradigms would better shape the methodology to be adopted in conducting research studies within the social and/or behavioural sciences. This will help determine its objectivity, rigor, or the extent to which scientific methodology is applied within social science researches. Lastly, a combination of these paradigms creates a mixed-method, which demonstrates knowledge validity and objectivity in investigator triangulation (which involves; observation, questionnaire administration, and interview), data triangulation (which encompasses collecting data at different times from different people in different places as a cross-check for validity and to check the interpretation and conclusion arrived at), methodological triangulation (which includes within-method triangulation and between method triangulation: the former entails the application of various techniques within the same method, while the latter applies a combination of research methods), generalization, verification, explanation, and deductions. This will allow for data gathering and/or fact-finding, in search of new knowledge, and subsuming new valid knowledge, enhance research results and findings efficacy.

Theory has become critical in information systems (IS) research. Generally, empirical papers cannot be accepted for publication in IS journals unless the hypotheses or findings are grounded in theory. In this paper, I argue that IS has taken the role of theory too far, up to a point in which insisting on theory to explain observation may be costly to the advancement of IS research. It is suggested that the logic of discovery in scientific inquiry has been completely abandoned in favor of a logic of justification; that important accidental discoveries demonstrate the merit of discovery-oriented research; that the recent emergence of data science amplifies the value of discovery to theory development; and that the increasing length of empirical articles, partially as a consequence of the increasing importance of theory, may shift the limited attention of the community away from the phenomena of interest. Finally, a possible remedy for the overreliance on theory is offered to allow the IS community to open a door to discovery-oriented research that may yield long-term benefits and even strengthen its theoretical foundations.

This essay looks at some of the key aspects of Hans Reichenbach’s career as a radio engineer, broadcaster, and producer. It argues that some of the themes of Reichenbach’s logical empiricism can be illuminated by looking at them in relation to his work as a radio engineer during and after World War One. It also argues that attention to the educational activities he undertook in the new broadcast radio medium can help us understand that affinities he saw between logical empiricism and other modernizing projects of Weimar Germany.

Resumen El empirismo de conceptos propuesto por Jesse Prinz pretende ser una teoría de conceptos que cumpla con todos los desiderata que, según el mismo autor, una teoría de conceptos debe cumplir y, a la vez, lo haga de la manera más económica posible. Con respecto al contenido intencional, propone una semántica informacional no atomista. Los conceptos, para Prinz, son meros detectores de rasgos perceptibles, es decir, entidades estructuradas, cuyas partes significativas obtienen su contenido de manera informacional. Es el objetivo de este trabajo mostrar que el empirismo de conceptos es incapaz de satisfacer el desideratum que se refiere a la explicación del contenido intencional. Argumentamos que los conceptos entendidos como meros detectores no logran dar cuenta satisfactoriamente del contenido de los conceptos sin caer en el problema de la disyunción y que son incompatibles con el externalismo propio de las teorías informacionales Abstract Concept empiricism, introduced by Jesse Prinz, intends to be a theory about concepts which satisfies the desiderata that, according to that author, every theory of concepts must fulfill, and which does it as economically as possible. Regarding intentional content, it puts forward a non atomistic informational semantic theory. According to Prinz, concepts are merely detectors for perceptible features, that is, they are structured entities. The meaningful parts of these detectors obtain their content in an informational way. The aim of this paper is to show that concept empiricism is unable to fulfill the desideratum about intentional content. We argue that concepts as mere detectors are unable to properly account for the content of concepts without facing the disjunction problem, and that they are incompatible with the externalism that characterise informational theories of content.

The Empirical school of medicine, which arose in the third century BCE, defined itself in opposition to rationalist tendencies in medical thought. Causal explanation, which typically appeals to hidden, theoretical entities, is most at home in rationalist physiology and pathology, and much of what the Empiricists had to say about causes belongs to their anti-rationalist polemics. Over the course of the school’s history, however, some members appropriated the language and idea of cause, though always in ways that was consistent with its defining commitment to Empiricism.

Resumo: Examinamos aspectos da falência do ideal positivista na Ciência e de sua associação com o empirismo, particularmente no contexto do ensino de ciências. Argumentamos, contra uma pressuposição comum neste contexto, que o empirismo não é necessariamente associado ao positivismo. Para isso, apresentamos como contraexemplo a concepção epistemológica antirrealista do filósofo holandês Bas C. van Fraassen: o empirismo construtivo. Destacamos, na obra do autor, sua concepção pragmática da explicação e apontamos possíveis contribuições de suas ideias ao ensino. A partir desse referencial, mostramos que a desmistificação da ciência como verdade é um ideal compatível com o empirismo e que a atribuição de sentido ao conhecimento científico não requer aceitá-lo como verdadeiro. Abstract: We examine aspects of the failure of the positivist ideal in Science and its association with empiricism, particularly in the context of science teaching. We argue, against a common assumption in this context, that empiricism is not necessarily positivist. For this, we present as a counterexample the anti-realist epistemological conception of the Dutch philosopher Bas C. van Fraassen: constructive empiricism. We highlight, in the author's work, his pragmatic conception of explanation and we point out possible contributions of his ideas to teaching. From this framework, we show that the demystification of science as truth is an ideal compatible with empiricism and that the attribution of meaning to scientific knowledge does not require accepting it as true.

There is, of course, The Given: what is given in experience. The ‘Myth Of The Given’ (‘the Myth’) is just a wrong answer to the question ‘What is given?’ This paper offers a brief sketch of three possible right answers. (1) It examines an early account by Charles Augustus Strong of why The Myth is a myth. (2) It maintains that a natural and naturalistic version of empiricism is compatible with the fact that the Myth is a myth. (3) It gives proper place to enactivist (physiological, motor) considerations. (4) It is (in spite of (3)) broadly in line with the Sellarsian view as refined by John McDowell. (5) It meets an important constraint: acknowledging the reality of something that seems at first to lend support to The Myth—i.e. the fact that we can engage in ‘non-inferential self-attribution of … sensations’ (McDowell in ‘Having the World in View’, In Having the World in View Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1998/2009: p. 20)—without in any way succumbing to the Myth.

This article considers how postmodernist thought can illuminate the doctrine of judicial notice. Specifically, it considers how postmodernist critiques of empiricism have challenged the idea of ‘indisputable’ facts which inform judicial decision-making. It argues that, while the practical realities of judicial administration must be borne in mind, increased sensitivity to the arbitrary nature of notorious facts will lead to more accountable decision-making.

It is the task of this article to explore the status of experience within Jean-Luc Nancy’s exposition of freedom in order to discover his positioning of “the empirical” within philosophical discour...

It is an old and venerable idea in philosophy that morality is built into us, and this nativist view has seen a resurgence of late. Indeed, the prevailing systematic account of how we acquire complex moral representations is a nativist view inspired by arguments in Chomskyan linguistics. In this article, I review the leading argument for moral nativism – the poverty of the moral stimulus. I defend a systematic empiricist alternative that draws on the resources of statistical learning. Such an empiricist account, I argue, promises to explain much of the complexity of people’s moral and other normative attitudes.

The system of knowledge acquisition is one of the most important topics in philosophical debates since ancient Greek. According to the Western philosophical worldview, as the universally accepted method, there are two schools of thought to acquire proper knowledge; rationalism and empiricism. Rationalism assumes that sound reason is the main human potential to acquire knowledge that constitutes a priori knowledge, while empiricism relies on sensory abilities constituting a posteriori or empirical knowledge. In addition, Islam offers intuition or instinct as another source of knowledge that creates intuitive knowledge, be it empirical or spiritual. The knowledge gained is then developed through language symbols, from being personal to finally public knowledge. Through language, knowledge is inherited from one generation to the next. However, due to its limitations, language is not able to symbolize all types of knowledge. Consequently, there are two kinds of knowledge; articulated (explicit) knowledge and unarticulated (tacit) knowledge. Nevertheless, despite their sharp differences, both the Western and Islamic worldviews assume that knowledge acquisition is the field of a speculative philosophical endeavor which is hard to get a satisfying answer, though it is not impossible.

The aim of this article is to analyze a feminist Arabic literary criticism research from a philosophical perspective, which includes the ontology, epistemology, and axiology of the research. The research subject analyzed was the poem "Sihru Sītā" which was translated by Usman Arrumi from Indonesian poet; Sapardi Djoko Damono. It can be seen that the diction used in poetry seems to corner the image of women in the form of women's oppression over men. As for the philosophical framework in completing the scientific research process, at least it needs to go through various stages, which include identifying problems, formulating problems, compiling a conceptual framework, formulating hypotheses, research methods that include data collection and analysis methods, and finally in the form of conclusions from research. Scientific knowledge, including Arabic literary research, can be said to be correct when a combination of rationalism and empiricism appears. Rationalism provides a coherent and logical framework of thought, whereas empiricism provides a testing framework to ascertain the correctness of that knowledge.

Philosophy of Science, understood as a special philosophical discipline, was born only at the beginning of the twentieth century as part of the effort for overcoming the “foundational crisis” that had affected especially mathematics and physics. Therefore, it was conceived as an investigation about the features and reliability of scientific knowledge and for a few decades was deeply marked by the philosophical approach of logical empiricism. This cognitive point of view persisted also when, after Kuhn’s work, the attention focused on the scientific activity in order to understand scientific change and a sociological model replaced the view that empirical adequacy and logical consistency are the factors that determine the change of scientific theories. Ethical, social and political considerations regarding science ware considered inappropriate and potentially dangerous since they violate the alleged “neutrality of science” with respect to values. Nevertheless, the strict intertwining of science and technology in contemporary “technoscience” has produced a wide debate regarding the practical aspect of technoscientific activity that has the intrinsic features of a philosophical debate. Therefore, it is natural and advisable that the entire wealth of the philosophical disciplines (and not just logic, ontology, epistemology and philosophy of language) be called to contribute to the specific complex discourse of the Philosophy of Science.

According to language, science consists of two syllables, namely science and science. Science derives from the word 'allama in Arabic is interpreted to taste or signal. While 'Science in Arabic means knowledge. The characteristics of science are, systematically, generality, rationality, objectivity, verifiability and community. Systematic of science is structured like a system that has important facts that are interrelated.The quality of science in general can summarize various phenomena that are ever wider by determining concepts that are increasingly common in the target of discussion. Rationality, based on rational thinking that adheres to the rules of logic. Verifiability, can be checked for correctness, reinvestigated or retested by any other member of the scientific community. Community, generally acceptable, after being tested for truth by scientists. While the object of science can be divided into two parts, namely material objects and formal objects. The source of knowledge consists of empirism (senses), rationalism (reason), intuition (intuition), nationalism (heart) and revelation. How to Acquire Science begins with reason in order to acquire or gain knowledge. Empirical uses reason to form ideas or concepts of objects. Especially in the school of rationalism that emphasizes the ability of reason. Intuition, illumination and revelation are obtained from the power of reason to think. However, the knowledge generated from these sources is different.

In this paper, we take a closer look at Danish psychology students’ Master’s thesis projects. We do this by analysing 4,100 descriptions of all Master’s theses in Danish psychology study programs between 2014 and 2019. Via a sentiment analysis of the data material, we identify and categorize the different theses and attempt to identify their methodological focus. Initially, we describe the characteristics of the Danish Master’s thesis and discuss why an analysis of different theoretical and methodological orientations within the theses is relevant. The results we draw out in this article point to what we term a methodological discrepancy between psychological research published in journals and Danish psychology students’ Master’s thesis projects. The sentiment analysis also shows that Danish Master’s theses in many cases refer to one or more specific (meta)theoretical orientations in their problem statements. The paper discusses whether students’ (meta)theoretical orientation(s) can be interpreted as a sign of sound theoretical literacy among students or, conversely, if theory rather is applied in a routine-like manner in Master’s thesis projects. It is further discussed whether the methodological discrepancy is seen because of the more intuitive nature of qualitative methods, or if it caused by what could be termed a dustbowl (qualitative) empiricism. The article is concluded with a discussion on the social normativity of psychological research.

C. Wright Mills’ The Sociological Imagination (1959) represents one of the most influential texts of postwar American sociology. The title has become a catchphrase that stands for a style of thought that transcends both theoretical dogma and the constraints of mere methodological rule following. This article sets out to show that Mills’ vision of the sociological imagination had more in common with the then dominant lines of scholarship than his broadside against Parsonian grand theory and Lazarsfeldian abstracted empiricism in the main part of the book would suggest. Among the tools that Mills introduced as fostering the sociological imagination were 2 × 2 tables. The article traces the use of such tables over time and across scholarly communities and shows that, contrary to Mills’ own estimate, these tables describe a common nexus between his own work and that of Parsons and Lazarsfeld. All three scholars made ample use of this formal tool to construct sociological arguments at central places of their oeuvre. Given its shared use across otherwise divergent schools, the 2 × 2 table is a prime example for what historians of science have called paper tools, i.e. statistical formulas, algorithms, tables, diagrams, graphs, etc., that structure scientific research across different schools of thought and theoretical approaches. Drawing on the notion of paper tools, the article advances a post-Kuhnian perspective on the history of sociology that shifts the research focus from substantive ideas to formal tools and demonstrates elements of commensurability among presumably incommensurable schools of thought.

Powszechny stał się pogląd, że nie tylko fakty, ale i osobiste oraz wspólne przekonania stanowią element wiedzy naukowej. Rodzi to dwa ważne pytania. Jak ludzie mający bardzo odmienne systemy przekonań mogą wspólnie uprawiać naukę? Czy wiedzy naukowej można ufać, skoro jest kształtowana i niekiedy zniekształcana przez przekonania funkcjonujące na zapleczu nauki? Zacznę od wskazania, że uczeni, którzy wierzą w istnienie rzeczywistości niezależnej od umysłu, mają moralny obowiązek przeciwstawiania się zniekształcaniu ich wiedzy o zjawiskach przyrodniczych. Następnie wyjaśniam, dlaczego przekonania towarzyszące są konieczne do formułowania teorii w nauce. Argumentuję, że przekonania towarzyszące niekoniecznie zniekształcają wiedzę naukową, ponieważ Bóg stworzył obiektywnie istniejącą rzeczywistość, która opiera się zniekształceniu. Gdy dochodzi do zniekształceń, nauka dysponuje standardowymi sposobami ich wykrywania. Sposoby te to między innymi zbieżność wzajemnie niezależnych linii danych empirycznych prowadzących do tego samego wyjaśnienia, możliwość odłączenia przekonań towarzyszących od wyjaśnień naukowych oraz autodestrukcyjność przekonań towarzyszących prowadzących do dogmatyzmu. Później pokazuję, że w swojej pracy naukowcy w istocie przeciwstawiają się własnym przekonaniom towarzyszącym. Zgodnie z moim wnioskiem przekonania towarzyszące naukowców nie dyktują treści wiedzy naukowej, zaś ludzie mający odmienne systemy przekonań, w tym chrześcijanie, mogą wspólnie prowadzić badania naukowe. Nie opowiadam się jednak za powrotem do chrześcijańskiej formy neopozytywizmu, ponieważ w pełni biorę pod uwagę to, czego dowiedzieliśmy się przez ostatnie kilkadziesiąt lat o tym, w jakim stopniu nauka osadzona jest w kontekście społeczno-kulturowym.

This paper considers how to best relate the competing accounts of scientific knowledge that Russell and Reichenbach proposed in the 1930s and 1940s. At the heart of their disagreements are two different accounts of how to best combine a theory of knowledge with scientific realism. Reichenbach argued that a broadly empiricist epistemology should be based on decisions. These decisions or “posits” informed Reichenbach’s defense of induction and a corresponding conception of what knowledge required. Russell maintained that a scientific realist must abandon empiricism in favor of knowledge of some non-demonstrative principles with a non-empirical basis. After identifying the best versions of realism offered by Reichenbach and Russell, the paper concludes with a brief discussion of the limitations of these two approaches.

Hans Reichenbach’s position in the debate over scientific realism is remarkable. On the one hand, he endorsed the programmatic premises of logical empiricism; on the other, he explicitly employed a realist approach to conceptions such as reference, causality, and inference to the best explanation. How could that work out? It will be shown in the present paper that in Reichenbach’s view scientific realism is not, as frequently assumed, opposed to logical empiricism but rather to logical positivism. A distinction without a difference? Not at all, at least for Reichenbach. As is well known, his particular—probabilistic—variant of logical empiricism was intended to circumvent what he considered the shortcomings of the Vienna Circle’s verificationist (reductionist) approach to the language of science. In Experience and Prediction (1938), Reichenbach became most explicit in this regard. However, I shall argue that his position remained notoriously unstable in the end. It oscillated between a full-fledged scientific realist reading and an eminently pragmatist reading. Nevertheless, Reichenbach’s contribution proved instrumental in preparing subsequent efforts at reconciling logical empiricism and scientific realism.

This study aims to discuss the flow of rationalism and empiricism within the framework of science. The research method used is a qualitative type through literature study. The result and discussion of this research is that there are fundamental differences between science and knowledge at the level of philosophy of science. Science and knowledge are produced by human absorption of everything that is guided by curiosity (curiosity) which is human nature. The knowledge that is owned is then tested for accuracy by fulfilling three basic aspects of science, namely ontology (the object of knowledge), epistemology (how to obtain knowledge), and axiology (the use value of science). This study concludes that epistemologically, there are two understandings about the source of knowledge, namely, rationalism and empiricism. Rationalism believes that reason is the main source of knowledge and emepiriism believes that only sensory experience brings true knowledge. Both of them have a big role in the development of science to reach a critical human civilization and are able to survive as a superior identity in this universe.

The article attempts to find individualistic ideas in German classical philosophy, which can be considered a result of philosophy and law studies of the modern times that became the leading and most influential Western European philosophical trend. The most famous representatives of this philosophy trend are as follows: I. Kant, G. Hegel, I. Fichte, L. Feuerbach, F. Schelling. These philosophers approached in a new way many world problems, philosophical and law issues, including individualistic issues, since they changed the emphasis from the analysis of nature to the study of a man. Until now, neither empiricism, nor rationalism, nor the Enlightenment enabled resolving individualistic problems. Thus, study of a man started together with the history of German classical philosophy, when the representatives of this philosophic trend first realized that a person lives not in nature but in the world of culture. It was established that the German classical philosophy approached the analysis of relationship between a man and the world in a radically new way, viewing a person, first of all, as an internally active being that influences and constructs the world. A man is capable of rational cognition, and, therefore, is higher than the world of nature and all other beings. Such an attitude determined the spiritual mentality of German classical philosophy. The features that were inherent to German classical philosophy and that influenced the formation of individualism were identified, in particular the key ones, such as shifting the emphasis from the analysisof nature to the study of a man, which is characterized by such qualities as freethinking, knowledge and ability to act with competence; the assertion that a man does not live in the world of nature, but in the world of culture; study of the human essence, spiritual life of a man, not just human history; humanity, humanism are considered as a natural goal of society development; a man is capable of rational cognition, and therefore is above the world of nature and all beings; an individual is viewed as a goal, not as a means; the emphasis was put on the importance of man’s desire for own spiritual essence and study of the issue of individual morality; emphasis on self-esteem; discovering anthropological, ontological and social components of freedom; an individual is viewed as internally active being who influences and constructs the world; introduction in philosophy the notions of object and subject of cognition, highlighting the intention of the cognizing subject.

In this article, I put forward a basic philosophical claim: empirical scientific knowledge, that is, knowledge generated in experimental and observational practices, presupposes real causation. My discussion exploits two core notions from the philosophical analysis of scientific experimentation and observation: the aim of realizing object-apparatus correlations and the required control of the relevant interactions between environment and experimental or observational system. The conclusion is that, without the notion of real causation, acquiring epistemically sound empirical knowledge is impossible. Several empiricist objections to this conclusion are discussed and refuted. As a consequence, empiricism faces an unsolvable dilemma: either it cannot account for empirical knowledge or it should accept the existence of unobservable but real causal interactions.

The topical task of the national legal science at the present stage of its development is the need to rethink the works of the classic of iusnaturalism and contractarism – Thomas Hobbes, who made a great contribution to the development of the ideological and theoretical foundations of the state and law of the Euro-Atlantic civilization. Purpose: to give a comprehensive analysis of the etatgenetic concept of Thomas Hobbes. Methods: the author uses the methods of dialectical and formal logic, interpretation, as well as historical, logical, problem-theoretical, comparative, textual methods. Results: The historical context in which this concept was formed is studied. The fundamental principles that permeate the entire content of this concept are revealed: individualism and voluntarism. Its essential characteristics are given, which reflect a complex, bizarre combination of very different principles: idealism and realism, outright fiction and empiricism. The natural law and contractual principles are particularly prominent among them. Their combination with the leading role of the social contract determined the essence of the concept under consideration. It is reported that despite the broadest application of a purely discursive approach, Thomas Hobbes deservedly gained worldwide fame as a result of the masterly implementation of his artificial constructs in the process of scientific solution of the most complex problem of the origin of the state.

In this paper we attempt to find an answer to the question – how can we revisit political theory? This question may seem apparently simple, but the moment one start exploring, the incongruities and complexities of politics make the undertaking question highly toilsome. It is impossible to completely reject the normative framework in political analyses as far as it deals with the human society. On the other side, the age of post-truth politics also creates a difficulty to find out the objective facts and truth. So rather than arguing which method of politics is more efficient to deal with the uncertainties of human political life today, we attempt to visualize politics from a new understanding i.e., politics as absence of general agreement beyond excessive empiricism and extreme normativism. It is the antagonistic nature of human beings what keep ‘the political’ alive, and constitute the factual practices known as ‘politics’.

Most accounts of “logical empiricism in America” take logical empiricism to be a monolithic, or at least a one-dimensional, philosophical group. This picture of logical empiricism has come under we...

Sociology is an unusual science. Many authors call its current state “paradoxical”, other authors speak about the crisis of this science. The article presents sociology as a project of the modern era. This interpretation can explain many of the contradictions and eclectic results of its development.Sociology as a project initiated by O. Comte was to combine social philosophy and empiricism. The latter was represented by socio-economic statistics and surveys, which were carried out in accordance with common sense by representatives of the state and other people. The project was aimed to create from these elements, different in nature, an integral science, built on the principles of natural sciences,i.e. representing a single hierarchy — from the most general ideas to concrete calculations.This project failed. The article discusses the reasons for this situation and different results of the project.The results of the sociological project can be conditionally divided into five groups: 1) “small” particular laws that say little about society as a whole; 2) specific methods of empirical research that yield accurate results in the fields of politics, marketing, human resource management, etc.; 3) the results achieved by deterministic theories; 4) sociological antinomies; 5)“negative results, which are also results” and lead to the comprehension of the fact, that there are some areas of social reality, to which scientific methods are radically inapplicable. Despite the fact that the goal of the project turned out to be unattainable, these results must be treated with reverence, because they are the work of outstanding scientists who called themselves sociologists, and some of them are really able to improve people’s lives. Today sociology is losing its monopoly on the production of useful knowledge about society, and its structure is beginning to be something like an exhibition of ideas in social philosophy and achievements in empirical studies of society.