Search

A “good life” refers to a life phase in which people achieve a satisfying degree of spiritual value perception and emotional experience in the environment of “current” high material living standards, social harmony, fairness, and justice, and thus exclaim “good” from the heart. This article focuses on Chinese traditional culture's understanding of the “good life,” and attempted to summarize the “good life” in Chinese traditional fundamental characterization, as well as analyze the “good life” in Chinese traditional ways of implementation, using the literary method.

Purpose. The paper is aimed to explicate a recently emerging anthropological model of homo eudaimonicus from its secular framework perspective. Theoretical basis. Secularity is considered in three aspects with reference to Taylor’s and Habermas’ ideas: as a common public sphere, as a phenomenological experience of living in a Secular Age, and as a background for happiness to become a major common value among other secular values in the Age of Authenticity. The modifications of happiness interpretation are traced from Early Modernity till nowadays. The preconditions of the contemporary appeal to Aristotle’s eudaimonic theory of happiness are elucidated. The main characteristics of homo economicus anthropological model and reasons for its collapse in the contemporary world are analyzed. Specificities of the contemporary interpretations of eudaimonia are described with reference to the works of MacIntyre, Haybron, Hamilton, Kekes, Melnick, and others. A moral foundation and a behavioral strategy of homo eudaimonicus model are expounded and the role of this model in the life of a contemporary individual person and society is revealed. Originality. For the first time in the Ukrainian philosophical discourse, it is shown how secular ethics enables the rise of a new homo eudaimonicus model within a sphere of secularity; and it is argued that homo eudaimonicus is the result of overcoming the values crisis. It is revealed how homo eudaimonicus along with being descriptive becomes also a normative model of a new effective behavior strategy of a contemporary person facing the current social, economic, political, and environmental challenges. Conclusions. According to the contemporary interpretation, happiness as eudaimonia is a combination of the good life and the meaningful life; it is a human flourishing in this world (saeculum) through the accomplishment of a person’s life plan in the sphere of secularity. Homo eudaimonicus manifests the overcoming of values crisis and the rediscovery of purpose and meaning, this time on the secular basis. Homo eudaimonicus implies the realization of a person’s project of a happy and fulfilling life through moral behavior and socially useful activities., Мета. Стаття спрямована на пояснення змісту нової антропологічної моделі homo eudaimonicus крізь призму її секулярного підґрунтя. Теоретичний базис. Секулярність розглядається у трьох аспектах із покликанням на ідеї Тейлора та Габермаса: як спільна для всіх публічна сфера, як феноменологічний досвід життя в секулярну добу і як підґрунтя, завдяки якому щастя стає найважливішою загальною цінністю серед інших секулярних цінностей в добу автентичності. Простежено модифікації інтерпретацій щастя від раннього модерну до сьогодення. Висвітлено передумови сучасного покликання на Аристотелеву евдемонічну концепцію щастя. Проаналізовано основні характеристики антропологічної моделі homo economicus та причини її занепаду. Описано особливості сучасних інтерпретацій евдемонії крізь призму праць Макінтайра, Гейброна, Гамільтона, Кікса, Мелніка та інших. Роз’яснено моральну основу та поведінкову стратегію моделі homo eudaimonicus та розкрито роль цієї моделі в житті сучасної людини і суспільства. Наукова новизна. Вперше в українському філософському дискурсі показано, як секулярна етика уможливлює появу в сфері секулярності нової моделі homo eudaimonicus та доведено, що homo eudaimonicus є результатом подолання кризи цінностей. Розкрито, як homo eudaimonicus, будучи дескриптивною, стає ще й нормативною моделлю нової ефективної поведінкової стратегії сучасної людини перед лицем актуальних соціальних, економічних, політичних та екологічних викликів. Висновки. Згідно з сучасною інтерпретацією, щастя як евдемонія є комбінацією доброго (благого) та значущого життя. Це процвітання людини у цьому світі (saeculum) шляхом реалізації життєвого плану в сфері секулярності. Homo eudaimonicus свідчить про подолання кризи цінностей та віднайдення мети і смислу на секулярному ґрунті. Homo eudaimonicus передбачає реалізацію людиною проєкту щасливого та повноцінного життя завдяки моральній поведінці та соціально корисній діяльності.

PurposeThis paper offers a conceptual discussion of repetition and joy in the context of information and their relation to the good life.Design/methodology/approachJoy is defined as an integrative element of the good life which can be achieved through repetition. This may be surprising, given that our most ready-to-hand associations with “repetition” are negative in tenor rather than positive. Building on the work of repetition theorists Søren Kierkegaard and Gertrude Stein, we can discern three different forms of repetition: that looking backwards (e.g. rereading), that looking forwards (e.g. art-making) and that looking inwards (e.g. chiasmus). Throughout this paper, information-related examples are given and discussed as vignettes that move the conversation forward.FindingsThese examples lead to a nascent theory of why the repetition of information can spark joy and not just tedium. First, its stability and predictability that instill comfort in us. Second, its unifying force that brings us to experience wholeness. Third, its invitation to keep the repetition going through creation, further helping us feel part of the world. And finally, its paradoxicality—as strict repetition is impossible—which requires change, paving the way for satisfying surprises and delights.Originality/valueRepetition is a ubiquitous and theoretically interesting phenomenon when it comes to information, and though it is implicit in some information science research, it has not yet been theorized directly. Moreover, this paper connects this issue to an emerging “positive” orientation in information studies.

At Philebus 53c4-55a12, Plato's Socrates identifies pleasure as an ontologically inferior "becoming" (γϵνϵσiσ) rather than a "being" (ouσiα) and then uses this information to infer that pleasure, somehow, lacks value. This paper argues that Plato's γϵνϵσiσ argument is not about the goodness of individual, particular episodes of pleasure but instead targets the identification of pleasure as the good around which we ought to organize our lives. It also shows that the argument is made up of two subarguments-the argument from finality and the argument from a life not worth living-both of which conclude that, as a γϵνϵσiσ, pleasure cannot be the good our life as a whole is aimed at reaching. Read in this way, the much maligned γϵνϵσiσ argument turns out to be more cogent and more interesting than is usually thought.

In her Exemplarist Moral Theory, Linda Zagzebski argues that we can empirically discover the meaning of moral terms like ‘virtue’ and ‘the good life’ by direct reference to moral exemplars – those people we admire as morally exceptional. Her proposal is promising, because (1) moral exemplars play an important motivating role in moral education, and (2) her use of direct reference means we may be able to avoid the contentious descriptivism that accompanies moral terms like ‘good’ and ‘virtue’. In this article, I argue that Zagzebski’s theory fails regarding (2), because her direct reference method must use presupposed descriptions and leads to circular identification of moral exemplars.

The new generations of bioenhancement technologies and traditional Virtue Theory both try to make a meaningful connection between the improvement of human states and characteristics on one hand, and attainment to the good life, on the other. Considering the main elements of virtuousness in Farabi’s thought—namely rational inquiry and deliberative insights, alongside volitional discipline within various social contexts, one can conclude that although the trajectories of enhancement technologies—be they in the field of genetic engineering, neurostimulation technologies, or pharmacology—do not in themselves satisfy the constitutive determinants of virtuousness, they function as having both mediative and amplificative/reductive roles in a life which is dedicated to the pursuit of happiness in the light of the cultivation of virtue.

The article explores the scope and the limits of virtue ethics from the perspective of critical theory (Habermas) and critical realism (Bhaskar). Based on new research in moral sociology and anthropology, it ponders how the self-realization of each can be combined with the self-determination of all. The article adopts an action-theoretical perspective on morality and defends the priority of the right over the good. It suggests that in plural and polarized societies, there no longer exists a consensus on any version of the good life. It therefore limits the scope of virtue ethics to personal life and pleads for a minima moralia at the social and political level.

The philosophical literature on well-being and the good life contains very little explicit discussion of what makes for a better or worse death. The purpose of this essay is to highlight some commonly held views about the good death and investigate whether these views are recognized by the leading theories of well-being. While the most widely discussed theories do have implications about what constitutes a good death, they seem unable to fully accommodate these popular good death views. I offer two partial explanations for why these views have been neglected in discussions of well-being and make two corresponding recommendations for future work in the philosophy of well-being.

The concept of ‘middle class’ in African societies has been recognized recently but at the same time it resists clear-cut definition. Rather than seeking clearer classification, I propose to embrace its contested nature as productive, seeing ‘middle class’ not as a category that we can find ‘out there’ and measure, but as a classification-in-the-making. Middle-class status, or a particular idea of the good life, is a position people strive towards, but what this entails depends on context and place. The study of the pursuit of social mobility in Ghana during colonialism, independence and the post-Cold War period – of those who have successfully improved their livelihoods – provides knowledge about the middle class in the making in different eras and under different conditions. I propose a three-pronged approach to study this processual nature: Raymond Williams’ notion of ‘structures of feeling’ helps unravel the shifting affective qualities of the changing political economy, while Sara Ahmed's focus on the ‘feelings of structure’ zooms in on agency as an important tool to analyse how middle-class trajectories unfold over time. Lastly, the availability of advantageous conditions is not enough to stimulate change; one needs the savoir faire to enact them.

The goal of this paper is to justify the view that hermeneutical practice as a philosophical proposal cannot be reduced to the extraction of hidden meanings or the explication of text structures but instead contains ethical assumptions and implications. Following Ricœur’s work, I will show that literary texts are part of ethics insofar as they create different mental experiments about ideas and values. I will show that the interpretation of literary texts, woven by the free play of imagination, constitutes a practice in which readers have the possibility of reconfiguring their way of looking at the world and acting. The reading of literature is an exercise of practical wisdom by enabling readers to rehearse and enable the implementation of the good life in just institutions. To achieve the paper’s goal, I initially discuss ethical assumptions present in literary texts. I then develop Ricœur’s notion of hermeneutics as used for the interpretation of literature. Finally, I propose several ethical implications resulting from the hermeneutical practice that is related to literary texts.

Character strengths are morally valued trait-like personality characteristics which contribute to fulfillments that comprise the good life, for oneself and for others. In two studies, we tested the...

Liberal theory and practice rests upon, and constantly re-affirms, a division between the secular/rational and the religious/faithful aspects of individual life. This paper will explore the philosophical implications of an alternative Gandhian understanding of the role of faith and reason in individual life. The paper will argue that M K Gandhi thought of moral life differently from both the religious traditionalist and the liberal. The distinctiveness of Gandhi’s vision came from the manner in which he could reconcile two very different ways of thinking about the good human life. These could be simply put as the religious insight (which is well articulated in the Aristotelian position) into the good life as an essentially integrated life and the alternative liberal insight that morality was better connected with the idea of universalizability/reciprocity. The first section of this paper entitled “An alternative Gandhian understanding of faith, reason, and the integrity of the good life” philosophically unpacks Gandhi’s arguments about the integrity between faith and reason in reading religious texts with a view to living a good life. The second section is entitled “On religious belief: Gandhi and liberalism”. It brings out the differences between Gandhi and liberals on faith, reason, and the truth of religious belief. Both Gandhi and the liberals agree that religious beliefs should be held with modesty. However, the liberal argument for modesty comes from an avowed skepticism about the truth of religious belief. It is such skepticism that philosophically grounds the liberal division between faith and reason. In this section, there will be an attempt to bring out Gandhi’s reasons for being modest about religious beliefs held with certitude. The paper ends with the thought that though one cannot say which of these positions on faith and reason—Gandhian or liberal—is more coherent, there is some reason for exploring the Gandhian position if only because religious persons can act on Gandhi’s arguments quite consistently with their faith.

Pellegrino and Thomasma have proposed a normative medical ethics founded on a conception of the end of medicine detached from any broader notion of the telos of human life. In this essay, I question whether such a narrow teleological account of medicine can be sustained, taking as a starting point Pellegrino and Thomasma's own contention that the end of medicine projects itself onto the intermediate acts that aim at that end. In order to show how the final end of human life similarly alters intermediate ends, such as the end of medicine, I describe Thomas Aquinas's concept of pain and explain how his remedies for pain derive from his account of the telos of human life. In turn, this account has implications for the way in which physicians who accept such a telos would manage their patients' pain. If a comprehensive telos for human life is necessary to make sense of even such a routine aspect of medical care, then medical ethicists may not be able to sidestep questions about the good life for human beings.

The main purpose of this paper is to examine Hartmut Rosa’s account of “resonance.” To this end, the analysis is divided into four parts. The first part focuses on the concept of resonance, including Rosa’s differentiation between horizontal, diagonal, and vertical “axes of resonance” and their role in the construction of different “world-relations.” The second part centers on the concept of alienation, notably the degree to which it constitutes an integral element of modern life forms and, in a larger sense, of the human condition. The third part grapples with the dialectic of resonance and alienation, shedding light on the assumption that they are antithetical to each other, while contending that their in-depth study provides normative parameters to distinguish between “the good life” and “the bad life.” The final part scrutinizes Rosa’s attempt to defend his outline of a sociological theory of resonance against objections raised by his critics and comprises a point-by-point assessment of his plea for a resonance-focused sociology of world-relations. The paper concludes by suggesting that, notwithstanding its limitations, Rosa’s approach represents one of the most promising developments in twenty-first-century critical theory.

Asceticism as a part of the good life is often discussed in the contemporary philosophy (Foucault, Agamben, Sloterdijk). The aim of this article is to analyze and criticize the encouragement to ascetic practices which was formulated by a German conservative sociologist and philosopher, Arnold Gehlen (1904-1976). In my text, I track the history of the philosophical concept of asceticism and describe Gehlen’s anthropological suggestion that ascetic practices should be actualized and secularized. The author of Der Mensch claimed that the return to asceticism can become an utopian answer to the imperatives of the consumer society. I analyze his distinction of three types of askesis as stimulans, disciplina and sacrificium. Subsequently, I criticize Gehlen’s belief that asceticism has not been secularized in the modern age by showing that he ignored the phenomenon of “wordly ascetiscism” described by Max Weber and his followers. In the final section, I point out some authoritarian and elitist moments in Gehlen’s image of asceticism and I suggest alternative possibilities of developing his intuitions.

O presente trabalho pretende explorar a tese estoica de que a sabedoria prática é uma técnica que se aplica à vida. Para isso falaremos, inicialmente, de como a aproximação entre as virtudes e as technai era comum no mundo antigo, mas é radicalizada pelos estoicos. Discutiremos as inovações conceituais necessárias para realizar tal projeto, e mostraremos como está estreitamente ligado à tese da suficiência da virtude para a felicidade. No final de nosso trabalho sustentaremos que a techné toû bíou remete a uma concepção da vida boa cujo componente fundamental é a liberdade.

The complex societies we now inhabit oblige us to question, reformulate or even rupture the traditional socio-political frameworks in which social pedagogy and the social professions have been developed and in which the theories that explain and justify them have been constructed. These frameworks have institutionalised concepts, practices and methodologies that often no longer fit within the complexity of today’s constantly changing realities. The aim of this article is to propose and analyse some key foundations for understanding the social professions and the actions they carry out. It concerns itself with generating questions that link social pedagogy and the social professions with the complexity of today’s social life. The questions address the current content of what we refer to as ‘the social’ and its relationship with other dimensions such as politics, culture and the environment. Among other issues, the article addresses how the social professions have developed within the political framework of the welfare state. Based on the answers to these questions, we argue in favour of updating the term ‘social’ with renewed connotations, and of defining the ‘good life’ as the reference point that must give it meaning.

In this chapter we propose to understand mindfulness as relational ethics, that is, an engaged, culturally mediated form of knowledge committed to “living well”. In so doing, we take Thich Nhat Hanh (TNH) use of “Nirvana” as a poetic inspiration. We consider our proposal relevant in the context of a rather different, currently dominant version of mindfulness that is (a) individualist (or centred in seemingly self-sufficient individuals); (b) instrumental (or techne-centred); (c) medicalized (or health-centred); and (d) disengaged and meaningless (or nihilist/deconstructivist and hyperfocussed in meditative practices aimed at “attending” rather than “understanding”). In our view, these dominant versions of mindfulness, which we call pop-mindfulness (PM), fail to deliver what they seemingly promise to deliver – an answer to the question about the good life. More assertively, we propose a particular strand of mindfulness, understood as “relational ethics” as a collective and pluralistic project towards “spirit” that may help us develop a more apt alternative to our current materialist, “secular” predicament.

This book provides a thought-provoking and carefully argued exposition and defense of Nietzsche’s philosophy of education. The authors argue that if educators followed Nietzsche’s approach to educa...

En este artículo considero varias tendencias emergentes en la antropología desde los 80, en el contexto de ascenso del neoliberalismo en tanto formación económica y gubernamental. Considero primero el giro hacia lo que llamo “antropología oscura”, es decir, la antropología que se enfoca en las dimensiones difíciles de la vida social (poder, dominación, desigualdad y opresión), como también en la experiencia subjetiva de esas dimensiones, en forma de depresión y desesperanza. Considero luego un abanico de trabajos que se presentan como una reacción explícita o implícita a este giro oscuro bajo la rúbrica de “antropologías de lo bueno”, incluyendo estudios de “la buena vida” y la “felicidad”, como también estudios de moralidad y ética. Finalmente, considero lo que podría ser pensado como un tipo diferente de antropología de lo bueno, es decir, nuevas direcciones en la antropología de la crítica, la resistencia y el activismo.

The perennial appeal of Kantian ethics surely lies in its conception of autonomy. Kantianism tells us that the good life is fundamentally about acting in accordance with an internal rather than an external authority: a good will is simply a will in agreement with its own rational, self-constituting law. In this paper, I argue against Kantian autonomy, on the grounds that it excessively narrows our concept of the good, it confuses the difference between practical and theoretical modes of knowing the good, and it cannot respect the essential efficacy of the principles of practical reason.

This article moves from the observation that one of the key characteristics of contemporary Italian fiction is a preoccupation with ethics and more specifically with the issues raised by the “ethical turn” in contemporary philosophy and theory. Current literary criticism, it is argued, has been slow to respond to the ethical dimension of these narratives whose innovative and important cultural contribution has yet to be fully appreciated. It is therefore necessary to develop a keener sensitivity to the ethical discourses developed in these literary texts, but this can only be achieved by first confronting some fundamental questions about the relationship between ethics and literature today. The answers to these questions make it possible to elaborate an initial conceptual framework that can re-orient reading and enable the critic to respond adequately to the ethical issues raised in and by the narrative. Accordingly, in this article the author proposes to explore from a theoretical perspective the relationship between ethics and literature in the context of the historical and philosophical predicaments of contemporary society. The discussion is divided into two parts: the first is devoted to an exploration of contemporary ethical thinking, and the second on the contribution that literature can make to that thinking. In the first part, the author proposes an approach to ethics based on the virtue tradition which, since Aristotle, has defined ethics as the search for "the good life." This tradition, however, is transformed through an engagement with the work of Gilles Deleuze and Immanuel Levinas. From Deleuze the author draws the idea that the good life is one devoted to pursuing human plenitude through the multiplication of connections and intensities. From Levinas, on the other hand, emerges a powerfully haunting description of an ethical life marked by absolute responsibility for and obligation to the other. These two seemingly opposed views are not construed as irreconcilable and contradictory but rather as vectors which keep opposing tensions in check and ultimately define a necessary negotiation between the desire for human plenitude and the acknowledgement of responsibility for other human and non human life. Ultimately my argument is that such tensions establish the ethical terrain in which contemporary narratives seek to intervene. In the second part of the article, the nature and possibilities of such an intervention are explored through six theses which provocatively articulate the relationship between literature and ethics. The cornerstone thesis is that literature is an encounter. Each subsequent thesis endeavours to develop this initial assertion and explore its consequences. The theses are accompanied by a gloss which unfolds its meaning and significance: the answers that the given thesis provides but also the questions that it raises. Together, the theses provide a heuristic framework for a literary criticism sensitive to ethical issues and therefore capable of grappling with the important cultural work carried out in fictions that have struggled to receive the recognition they deserve.

The prospect of human enhancement through the use of genetic engineering, artificial intelligence and nanotechnology is generating increasing interest in academic and commercial circles. Responses to human enhancement technology are derived from, and therefore may illuminate, underlying notions of what human flourishing ought to look like. Miroslav Volf’s anatomy of joy is used to compare representative understandings of the good life from transhumanist and secular humanist perspectives as they correspond to attitudes concerning human enhancement, particularly the question of radical life extension. The argument is advanced that a joyful Christian vision of the good life, which answers both the secular humanist respect for creaturely finitude and the transhumanist hope for glorious transformation, possesses strong normative potential for academic teaching and discourse as we contemplate the future of human being.

The current discussion of the moral admissibility or inadmissibility of euthanasia should, in my opinion, consider the greatest possible number of the shared premises of the two opinion camps. That is why I followed a thesis in this paper that the question of the good life is the focus of ethical interest, as this is what connects the advocates and the opponents to euthanasia. In the first part of the paper I critically discuss the two main theories of the good life widely embraced among the advocates of euthanasia: hedonism and desire-fulfilment theory. My focus is to show that both of them are descriptively inadequate, not quite in agreement with the intuitions and ideas that we have about the good life. From this critique I proceed towards the objective theory of full-fledged human development known as the natural law theory. Within this framework I discuss in depth the nature of life as the objective goodness and go over to a brief criticism of utilitarianism, the theory dominating bioethics today; I derive several normative conclusions from the nature of the fundamental goods, leading to the conclusion that an innocent human life cannot be ended under any circumstances. The second part of this paper focuses on the current critique of the medical practice which, as physicians assert, adheres to the norm forbidding to end a patients life, while the actual practice is different. I undertake a detailed analysis of the possibility of distinguishing between the behaviours and classifying them under 1 of 2 categories: causing injury (including termination of life) and allowing injury to happen (including death). I am trying to show that it is possible to make this distinction. In the final part I briefly outline the method of supplying arguments in support of a thesis that there exists a moral asymmetry between the two categories of behaviour, so the moral admissibility of one (letting die) cannot form a basis for the moral admissibility of the other.Key words: allowing harm - consequentialism - desire fulfillment theory - doing harm - euthanasia - hedonism - natural law ethics - preferentialism - utilitarianism.

We put forward Art-Dialogue-Methods (ADM) as an inquiry for practical wisdom within communities. It draws from a series of methodological traditions like artistic inquiry, participatory action research and narrative research. The practice of ADM could facilitate healing processes in fractured communities and organisations in today’s world. ADM avoids a search from grand over-arching solutions, but searches for outcomes as exemplars of the good life. We may find the relevance of this quest in the postmodern macro-context of the globalised world today with tendencies of individualization and neo-liberal markets. The authors explore the potential value of ADM for the development of practical wisdom within communities, by pointing out arguments in philosophical and sociological literature and by means of exemplary cases of ADM-programmes.

In this article, I argue that although the Aristotelian ideal of leading a virtuous life for its own sake is admirable, conventional Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian accounts of how it might be realised are empirically inadequate: Habituation is unlikely to produce ‘a love of virtue’, practical experience cannot then produce practical judgement or phronesis, and Aristotle's conception of a virtuous life excludes all but an idealised elite. Instead, I argue that two conceptually distinct aspects of moral development can be identified: the ‘Aristotelian’ and the ‘Humean’. In the former, the desire to lead a virtuous life for its own sake is produced through certain forms of challenging experience which, by disturbing and decentring the egoistic self, evoke a personal moral transformation. In the latter, the capacity to act well in specific social situations is the outcome of a process of socialisation, first in upbringing and later through initiation into the practices of adult life. Both aspects should be promoted in moral education for together they produce something akin to full virtue in the Aristotelian sense: Practical wisdom and practical judgement—or phronesis. Moreover, ‘the good life’ is best conceived as encompassing a variety of transcendent goods. To live a virtuous life for its own sake constitutes one good or form of human flourishing; but it is not the only one.

A society is modern when it operates in a mode of dynamic stabilization, i.e., when it systematically requires growth, innovation and acceleration in order to maintain its socio-economic and institutional status quo. Within this frame, this essay presents an analysis of modern society that explains the structural features which lead into this escalatory cycle. Secondly, it identifies the corresponding cultural “imperatives for growth” that translate the structural requirement of growth, acceleration and innovation into a strategic necessity in the humans’ search for a good life. Thirdly, it presents an alternative conception of the good life, based on the concept of resonance, which also proves to be an indispensable tool for a critique of social conditions.

Today, critical theory is marked by a conflict between two competing theories; these theories are recognition based theories of freedom and theories that equate justice with the notion of just distribution. The recognition paradigm argues that there are sources of oppression and exploitation that have less to do with material differences, and more to do with how people relate to each other in a social context, or even the attitudes that institutions can adopt towards certain groups of people (Cordelli, 2015, p.679; Honneth, 2012, pp.37-38; Schemmel, 2012, p.123; Young, 1999, p.417). Honneth's recognition theory, for example, advocates for the subordination of distributive justice to recognition concerns, making it a 'dependent variable in relations of recognition' and treating intersubjectivity as the primary means for promoting freedom (Honneth, 2012, p.46). That is, maldistribution ought to be considered a symptom of misrecognition or disrespect rather than being a primary cause for social injustice. This approach, however, is criticized as being an overly simplistic and one-sided account of morality that reduces justice claims to feelings of recognition and disrespect (Fraser, 2001; Lazzeri, 2009; Thompson, 2006; McNay, 2008; Zambrana, 2013, Zurn, 2005). For example, Fraser (Fraser and Honneth, 2003, pp.22-37) argues that a politics of recognition, centering on the concern of self-realization, is a reductive account of social justice that wrongfully equates morality to cultural concerns and psychological harm.Honneth (2014) attempts to shore up his theory by explicating how moral norms, and freedom itself, are embedded within and dependent upon social relations through a reconstruction of Hegel's three social spheres of action: relationships, markets, and the state. However, Honneth's theory of recognition still remains vague in terms of outlining a satisfying approach for dealing with the issue of distributive justice. Even if we accept that Honneth has successfully made the case that a theory of recognition is necessary for understanding social demands for distributive politics and their normative justification, it is still not sufficient in terms of dealing with a variety of distributive justice claims. As we will see, Zurn (2005) demonstrates that this deficiency in Honneth's theory is not easily remedied due to complications in Honneth's attempt to classify distributive justice claims as ultimately being recognition claims. However, if we are convinced of the necessity of a theory of recognition to explain and justify redistributive politics, then what is needed for a more complete theory of freedom is an account of distributive justice that at the same time embodies and addresses recognition needs. I propose, as one possible solution to this problem, supplementing Honneth's theory of recognition with an account of distributive justice that simultaneously addresses the recognition requirements for ethical life and freedom. The two supplements that I propose are drawn from Nussbaum's capability approach and Pettit's theory of non-domination. My aim in this article is to demonstrate how combining these two approaches is one example of how specific policies for distributive justice can be closely imbricated, even mutually reinforcing, with Honneth's border criteria of justification through mutually recognized social norms.1First, it will be argued that while Nussbaum's capabilities approach is decidedly a program for political action, it is not only sensitive to the diversity of conceptions of the good life held by individuals, but emphasizes the dignity and respect for individuals, and the importance of individual self-realization in underwriting free choice. It will also be shown that increasing opportunities for intersubjective recognition is necessary for the development of what Nussbaum calls her list of central capabilities, the capabilities a person needs in order to be counted free.2 The highlighting of various institutional provisions for the promotion of people's capacity to make meaningful political choices, what Nussbaum refers to as a positive conception of liberty, offers a distributive program of justice that can also address recognition needs identified by Honneth. …

Happiness lies in conquering one's enemies, in driving them in front of oneself, in taking their property, in savoring their despair, in outraging their wives and daughters. Genghis Khan (1) INTRODUCTION Conventional wisdom once held that well-being is an objective affair, something that the masses should not be expected to have a great deal of authority about. Among the more noteworthy ideas in those days was the perfectionist notion that well-being consists, at least partly, in excellence or virtue. The coming of modernity brought a more optimistic view of the individual's authority regarding matters of personal welfare, and the old objectivist orthodoxy yielded to the present age of subjectivism, where common opinion has it that what's good for people is, more or less, whatever they say it is. Crudely, nothing benefits a person, virtue included, unless it somehow answers to her wants or likes. Discontent with subjectivism has been brewing for some years now, driven by a more nuanced understanding of the considerable merits of some objectivist accounts, notably Aristotelian theories, as well as a barrage of criticism aimed at subjectivist views like the desire theory. (2) Indeed, Aristotelian views are now among the chief competitors in discussions of well-being--or, equivalently, welfare or flourishing. (3) This is a welcome development, for such work has greatly enriched contemporary reflection on well-being, helping to counter what some of us see as the trivialization of philosophical thought about the good life in the modern era. Whatever the merits of non-subjectivist accounts of well-being, however, it is less clear that the perfectionism espoused in much of this literature can be sustained. I will argue that it cannot, using the best-known example of a perfectionist theory, Aristotelianism, to show why. The discussion should concern even those with little interest in perfectionist theories, for a better understanding of the problems confronting Aristotelian perfectionism will illuminate some important points about the nature of well-being and related values. We can usefully think of Aristotelian theories as centering on three claims. Our inquiry will focus on the first, welfare perfectionism, which maintains that well-being consists, non-derivatively, at least partly in perfection: excellence or virtue--or, in the Aristotelian case, excellent or virtuous activity. The perfection in question includes, but certainly is not limited to, moral virtue. Perfection, that is, is a fundamental or ultimate constituent of well-being (non-perfectionists might grant that it can constitute well-being derivatively, say by being desired). Perfection is typically regarded as the perfection of one's nature: being a good specimen of one's kind, for instance, or fulfilling one's capacities well. (4) But I will understand perfectionism broadly enough to include any theory that takes well-being to consist at least partly in excellence or virtue (or the exercise thereof). Some contend that Aristotle counted external goods as an additional part of flourishing, distinct from perfection. I have no wish to debate the fine points of Aristotle exegesis here, as I am less interested in the historical Aristotle than in whether a perfectionist view of well-being can be defended. But it seems to me that his view is most plausibly and charitably read as counting external goods only insofar as they facilitate good functioning, and not as distinct contributors to well-being. (5) Roughly, well-being consists in a life of excellent or virtuous activity, or "well-functioning." But the difference should not seriously affect the arguments to follow, for all Aristotelians take well-being to consist at least primarily in virtuous activity. My arguments should apply as well to weaker forms of perfectionism. The second claim, externalism, is the denial of internalism about well-being. A weaker cousin of subjectivism, which grounds well-being in the person's attitudes, internalism roughly maintains that the constituents of an agent's well-being are ultimately determined wholly by the particulars of the individual's makeup qua individual (vs. …

The article proposes to view Paul Ricœur’s ethics and the demand of the Other from the perspectives that are mostly explicated in his seminal Oneself as Another, namely: the self and the suffering Other, friendship, the capable human being, and the notion of ‘the good life’ seen as the teleological horizon of a human life. My attempt is to demonstrate that for Ricœur the demand of the Other is set on the premise of understanding viewed as the fundamental mode of being‑­in‑­the world, and that his ethics of the Other comprises mainly such phenomena as mutual vulnerability, the self’s indebtedness to the Other and reliance on the Other, as well as an expression of the feelings of benevolence and solicitude. Significantly, for Ricouer the genuine response to the demand of the Other equals a worthy, fulfilled life manifested in the narrative coherence of a life. This article also touches upon the debate between Ricœur and Levinas regarding the ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ relation and the underlying difference in their approach to alterity; Ricœur’s presupposition of the response of the Other and Levinas’s model which does not entangle reciprocity.

This chapter aims to illuminate ways in which hope was significant in the philosophy of classical Greece. Although ancient Greek philosophies contain few dedicated and systematic expositions on the nature of hope, they nevertheless include important remarks relating hope to the good life, to reason and deliberation, and to psychological phenomena such as memory, imagination, fear, motivation, and pleasure. After an introductory discussion of Hesiod and Heraclitus, the chapter focuses on Plato and Aristotle. Consideration is given both to Plato’s direct comments on hope and to the narrative contexts of his dialogues, with analysis of Plato’s positive and negative representations of hope, hope’s relationship to reason, and Plato’s more psychological approach in the Philebus, where hope finds a place among memory, recollection, pleasure, and pain. The chapter then reviews Aristotle’s discussions of confidence, hope, and courage, observing that although Aristotle does not mention hope as a virtue, he does note its importance to human agency and deliberation and as a foundation for the further development of virtue. The chapter concludes that discussions surrounding hope in ancient Greek philosophy are rich and challenging and can serve as a lively stimulus to further exploration of the concept of hope.

The question of what it means to live a good life is an ancient one. During the same historical era as the ancient Greeks were working on Socrates’ question of what makes a good life, thinkers in other parts of the world were also asking the same thing; for example, Confucius in China, and the Vedic philosophers in India. The Socratic question has continued to occupy the minds of thinkers throughout the ages, and has become an increasingly important part of modern politics and policy. This chapter shows the areas of overlap among accounts of well-being across the ages. First, the parallels between ancient Greek, Confucian, and Hindu ethical frameworks of the good life are discussed. Next, a selection of modern political philosophies of the good are mined for candidate universals. The chapter shows that thinkers across time, geography, tradition and culture have found reason to value certain aspects of human life. These aspects are Social relationships, Work, Leisure, Education, Health (physical and psychological), Aesthetic experience, and Integrity (also known as “Authentic self-direction”). These more detailed accounts add content to the three basic values identified in Chapter 2: Happiness (from Hedonism); Freedom (from Liberalism); and Sociality (from Aristotelianism).

In this paper I discuss the role of non-humans in Aquinas’ account of moral learning. I intend to show that the entire created order can play an important role in demonstrating to us the life of virtue, and argue that non-human exemplars offer important advantages to the moral learner. I begin by addressing apparent problems with this approach, founded on the observation that human virtue, for Aquinas, is unique to humans. I resolve these by showing that Aquinas’ approach to exemplars is fundamentally analogical, meaning that exemplars point beyond themselves and need not necessarily live the good life to which they direct learners. I show that this means that Aquinas can use non-humans as moral exemplars and offer examples of him doing just that. Finally, I offer an assessment of the benefits of this approach. Among other things, it offers ethicists new ways to focus on particular virtues and provides a plausible way to include non-humans in the moral realm.

There is a trend in modern times towards taking the individual’s desire to be the indicator or basis of what the good life would be for the individual. Desire is believed to be an outer expression of an inner voice. The idea is that the individual’s desire shows what matters and therefore what constitutes the good life for her. An assumption is that the desire is knowable. The task for a fulfilled life is to reason out what the desire is and, as a next step, take corresponding rational actions towards its fulfilment. John Rawls is a paradigm case of this approach. What is missing, I believe, in assuming the knowability of desire, is an awareness of the key characteristic of human desire: that is, it is always in a process of formation and change. In this article, I try to explore the problems of seeing desire as capable of being made fully present, by looking at the ideas of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Jacques Derrida, and Adam Phillips.

Many people expect their work to provide meaning to their lives, yet the specific organizational factors that can promote meaning in life are not clearly delineated. Drawing on the basic science of meaning in life, in this paper we propose that work entails a host of experiences that foster meaning in life. We begin by defining meaning in life, noting its placement within the broader well-being literature and dispelling common myths about its rarity in people’s lives. After highlighting the myriad benefits of meaning for individuals and organizations, we describe several established sources of meaning in life and their relevance to work. We then examine how work orientations and social demographic factors influence the propensity to seek meaning through work. We conclude with a discussion of future research directions that can better illuminate the predictors and functions of meaningfulness at work.

Though George Eliot is often taken to be sympathetic to Spinoza's ethics, in fact between them lies a fundamental difference in moral outlook. Indeed, Eliot provides the basis for a deep criticism of Spinoza's entire approach to ethics. In Middlemarch she shows how his abstractionism (and by extension, the abstractionism of philosophy itself) undercuts the role that sympathy ought to play in the good life. This essay reveals how she does this by examining her and Spinoza's differing conceptions of intuition, individuality, and plurality, and the implications of these differences for ethics.

Krzysztof Piotr Skowronski, ed. Practicing Philosophy as Experiencing Life: Essays on American Pragmatism. Brill. 2015. 132 + xiv pp. ISBN 9789004301986 (paperback).Practicing Philosophy as Experiencing Life: Essays on American Pragmatism is a recent collection of essays edited by Krzysztof Piotr Skowronski. The essays, taken individually, are fascinating, but the pieces do not speak to each other enough to feel like a coherent volume. I say this not to criticize the volume, but rather to explain the form this review takes. Instead of discussing the volume in general terms, I have opted for a summary of each article.In John Lachs's contribution, "The Obligations of Philosophers," he asks about the obligations philosophers incur by taking material support from the public. In other words, what ought we to do to earn our checks? While many might think that philosophers' professional obligations are exhausted by mentoring students and going to faculty meetings, Lachs has a longer list. These range from the banal and too opt-repeated adage to avoid jargon to more tendentious claims to resist communism to more interesting suggestions. For instance, Lachs urges philosophers to be fallibilists, to acknowledge the freedom we exercise in conceptualizing, and acting in, the world, and to display the courage "to speak up when central values are in danger" (p. 8). No doubt, these obligations tug on one another. (If the world does not dictate how it is to be conceptualized, we cannot be wrong about our preferred conceptualizations, so why should we be fallibilists about these? If we are fallibilists about our value judgments, why should we ever act as though we are certain that a value has been wrongly threatened and requires our defense?) Though such tensions may be ineliminable, Lachs is surely right that navigating them is essential for being a good philosopher. Whether one likes his specific answers or not, Lachs poses an important question. What should philosophers do to earn their keep? In an age when philosophy is endangered within the academy, this question has perhaps never had more relevance."Prolegomena to Pragmatist Conception of the Good Life" is Emil Visňovský's contribution to the volume. Though the article gets off to a slow start, mentioning - not really probing - lots of well-known views about the good life and the good society, Visňovský ends the article on a high note, articulating a pragmatist vision of the good life, one that is "flexible, imaginative, pluralistic, anti-dogmatic and non-hedonistic" (p. 28). While I found this vision quite compelling, I also found myself wondering at the end: If this is the pragmatist vision, in what sense is Visňovský's text a prolegomenon? Prolegomena are expository preludes to a longer discussion. On Visňovský's view, however, pragmatists will not have any general, pre-packaged prescriptions on how to live, so there should be no tome or treatise for which his remarks serve as introduction. A pragmatist treatise on the good life is a contradiction in terms. This wrinkle aside, Visňovský offers an attractive vision of how to pursue the good life, a vision that is strongly rooted in both classical and more contemporary pragmatist thought.Why, in American thought, have people traditionally understood philosophy as a way of life, and not as a subject for detached, academic study? That question animates Kenneth W. Stikkers's contribution, "Practicing Philosophy in the Experience of Living: Philosophy as a Way of Life in the American Philosophical Tradition." Stikkers ventures two answers. First, he argues that, throughout American thought from Puritanism to pragmatism, one finds a different ontological framework than one finds in Europe, and he further suggests that this difference enabled American thinkers to resist Europe's epistemologycentered view of philosophy, which goes hand-in-hand with the "philosophy as subject" view. Second, Stikkers points to a long history of American philosophy being practiced beyond the academy. …

This paper examines similarities in the works of Epicurus, an ancient Greek philosopher, and B. F. Skinner, a behavioral psychologist. They both were empiricists who argued in favor of the lawfulness of behavior while maintaining that random events were included within those laws. They both devoted much effort to describing how individuals could live effective, rewarding and pleasurable lives. They both emphasized simple and natural pleasures (or reinforcers) and the importance of combining personal pleasures with actions that benefit friends and community. They both opposed punishment and all aversive measures used by governments and religions to control behaviors. And both created utopias: a real community, The Garden, where Epicurus lived with his followers, and a fictional one, Walden Two, by Skinner. We consider how a combination of the ideas of Epicurus and Skinner can contribute to their common goal of helping people to live better lives.

Beginning with a journalistic criticism, written by a humanist, of studies by behavioural scientists of fast-food cues, this essay goes on to describe the nature of fast-food environments today. It then develops a critique of the underlying assumptions and methods of behavioural science as exemplified in these studies, whose basic context is the field of ‘happiness studies’. This essay argues that happiness cannot be quantified; that attempts to quantify it, though well-meaning, and generally aimed toward a critique of neoliberal utilitarianism, actually reflect neoliberal ideology. It also suggests that social thought today is a long way off from understanding the roles of sensuality in the pursuit of the good life, or for that matter the enjoyment of food.

Nearly everyone agrees that knowledge is gained through diligent study and investigation, but there is far greater ambiguity when it comes to the meaning of wisdom and how it is acquired. What is wisdom, and how can it be attained? Is there an empirical relationship between wisdom and the cultivation of character, as Aristotle and others have argued? Are the development of virtue and the fulfillment of our innate potential prerequisites to living the good life? Steven Paulson, moderator and executive producer of To the Best of our Knowledge, led a discussion with philosopher Philip Kitcher, philosopher Valerie Tiberius, and psychologist Lisa Feldman Barrett on role of wisdom in the interplay between positive emotions, virtues, and character.

The debate about whether some attribute is ‘by nature’ or ‘by nurture’ has a long history and it covers numerous topics. For instance, Socrates proposed that our ideas of complex concepts come from memories that are innate within us. Even today thinkers believe that some of our ideas are part of our nature rather than our nurture. This theory has social and policy implications. If intellectual quotient (IQ) is a fixed part of nature, is it worthwhile to contribute tax dollars to improve one's nurturing environment? Or, more generally, some think that understanding human nature might affect how we ought to live. Influenced by Darwin and developments in genetics, the nature/nurture debate has reduced to a debate about whether our attributes are ‘genetic’ or ‘environmental’. Yet, the implications of the genetic theories of human nature are not obvious since genes alone do not produce any attributes. Key concepts: ‘Nativists’ employ ‘poverty of stimulus’ arguments to demonstrate that an idea or cognitive ability could not have been learned. ‘Empiricists’ believe that our beliefs about the world come from our perceptual connection to the world and not from our natures. IQ is likely to be influenced by nurturing environments. Likely, there is no such thing as the singular good life; rather there are numerous valid conceptions of the good life. The gene/environment dichotomy is false but that does not mean we cannot distinguish between robust and plastic developmental events. Keywords: nature; nurture; genetics; language; knowledge

In this article, I begin by examining critically the Socratic claim that the unexamined life is not worth living. I identify three clusters of problems with this claim. I then consider the consequences of these problems by contemplating a different view of the relation of self-knowledge to the good life. For purposes of illustration, I draw on the film version of the well-known novel Midnight in the Garden of Good and Evil. In particular, I consider the significance and the limits of a central idea in this film—the notion of an overpaint (literally a painting that has been painted over) and the claim that not knowing what is beneath the overpaint can be enjoyable. I develop this idea with reference to the philosophies of William James and Gilles Deleuze and conclude by describing the ways in which this view reorients the practice of philosophy from wisdom (sophia) to practical intelligence (freeness).

In this article I consider several emergent trends in anthropology since the 1980s against a backdrop of the rise of neoliberalism as both an economic and a governmental formation. I consider first the turn to what I call “dark anthropology,” that is, anthropology that focuses on the harsh dimensions of social life (power, domination, inequality, and oppression), as well as on the subjective experience of these dimensions in the form of depression and hopelessness. I then consider a range of work that is explicitly or implicitly a reaction to this dark turn, under the rubric of “anthropologies of the good,” including studies of “the good life” and “happiness,” as well as studies of morality and ethics. Finally, I consider what may be thought of as a different kind of anthropology of the good, namely new directions in the anthropology of critique, resistance, and activism.

Engaging in dialogue with African philosophy, I respond to questions raised by Thaddeus Metz on characteristics of Confucian philosophy in comparison with African philosophy. First, in both Confucian philosophy and African philosophy, harmony/harmonization and self-realization coincide in the process of person-making. Second, Confucians accept that sometimes it is inevitable to sacrifice individual components in order to achieve or maintain harmony at large scales; the point is how to minimize such costs. Third, Confucians give family love a central place in the good life before extend love to the rest of the world. Fourth, the Confucian philosophy of gender equality is based on appropriate division of labor consistent with its yin-yang philosophy, rather than equal split of power in the family. Fifth, in the Confucian view, hierarchy and harmony do not necessarily contradict each other, though hierarchy is not essential to all forms of harmony. The two can co-exist.