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Reproduction and the family are central elements in the lives of people, and in the narratives and practices of diverse cultures and societies. In the development of ever more powerful techniques of assisted reproduction a number of questions have emerged. They lie at the heart of what it means to reproduce, to be a parent, to be a human being. Reproductive technologies and their consideration influence perceptions and practices in regard to reproduction and beyond, thus embodying anthropological implications for the understanding of family, motherhood, health, offspring, responsibility and others. Technological capabilities and socio-cultural perceptions are strongly intertwined. The role of bioethics in this context is to explore human nascency as a process. To better understand this process and its implications for human life both medical and social, we suggest considering different perspectives on reproductive technologies to widen our understanding. These perspectives range from the potential child and its parents to health care professionals and the state. In expanding our perception of reproduction, social scientific methods can help to situate philosophical and ethical issues, thus rendering bioethical examination of reproductive technologies more socially robust. In this paper, we provide an overview of several bioethical key themes in assisted reproduction: methodological questions in regard to providing better understanding of this field, selective and inclusive social aspects of assisted reproduction, financial and governance considerations, and an applied consideration of the IVF research interface.

As the possibility of genetic intervention becomes more concrete, defining and regulating ethically permissible interventions must include a consideration of the implicit as well as explicit consequences. These include the moral implications of defining "enhancement" by reference to a standard of normality. Some authors have called into question the standard ethical concerns about genetic enhancement, but the distinction between enhancing and therapeutic interventions is still structured as relatively unproblematic. However, determining the boundary between therapy and enhancement will have feedback effects on the socially implemented definitions of what counts as normal in human embodiment. Positioning the interface between permissible and nonpermissible interventions at the same place as the boundaries between therapy and enhancement, and between normal and abnormal embodiment, (1) uses biology to justify a moral evaluation, (2) privileges the single standpoint of the genetically canonical person, and (3) enhances the dichotomy between "normal" and "not normal". Assuming that the limit of permissibility along the interventional continuum is coterminous with the definitions of enhancement and of normality, distracts from the work of uncovering the real grounds to setting limits to genetic manipulation.

Gene therapy represents a new strategy to treat human disorders. It was originally conceived as a cure for severe monogenetic disorders. Since its conception, the spectrum of possible application for gene therapy has been to include the treatment of acquired diseases, such as various forms of cancer and some viral infections, most notably human immune deficiency virus (HIV) and hepatitis B virus. Since somatic gene therapy does not cause substantially new ethical problems, it has gained broad approval. This is by no means the case with germ-line gene therapy. Practically all bodies who were evaluating the related ethical aspects wanted to ban its medical application on grounds of fundamental and pragmatic considerations. In this review, practical and ethical views concerning gene therapy are summarized which were presented at the "Junitagung 1994" of the Swiss Society for Biomedical Ethics in Basle.