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In this essay, we address an important problem in the ethics of cultural engagement: the problem of giving a systematic account of when and why outsider use of insider cultural material is permissible or impermissible. We argue that many scholars rely on a problematic notion of collective ownership even when they claim to be disavowing it. After making this case, we motivate an alternative framework for thinking about cultural exchange, which we call the core interests framework. We conclude with some reflections on how this framework helps to raise interesting questions about the most promising accounts of wrongful cultural appropriation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers believe that the relationship between a parent and a child is valuable, but few believe that this has anything to do with procreation. However, if it is indeed true that procreation adds no value to the activity of parenting, then it is hard to see how procreative-parenting can overcome two particularly pressing philosophical challenges. The first challenge is to show that it is morally permissible for prospective parents to procreate given that adoption takes us much closer to both environmental and social justice. The second challenge is to show that it is morally permissible for biological parents to parent their biological child when other prospective parents are willing and able to do a much better job at furthering the child's interests. In this essay, I provide an account of the value of procreative-parenting that can resist these two challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Denationalisation – withdrawing citizenship from a person – is a practice with a long historic pedigree that continues to affect the lives of many people today. Are there conditions under which denationalisation is morally justified? If so, what are they? And can legal and political norms that authorise states to engage in citizenship withdrawal be justified? This article provides answers to these questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, I argue that the privileging of romantic and familial ties by those who believe in the liberal state's right to exclude prospective immigrants cannot be justified. The reasons that count in favour of these relationships count equally in favour of a great array of relationships, from friends to creative collaborators, and whatever else falls in between. The liberal partialist now faces a dilemma, either the scope of the right to exclude is much more limited or much broader than she previously assumed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on two questions regarding the movement of persons across international borders: (1) do states have a right to unilaterally control their borders; and (2) if they do, are migration arrangements simply immune to moral considerations? Unlike open borders theorists, I answer the first question in the affirmative. However, I answer the second question in the negative. More specifically, I argue that states have a negative duty to exclude prospective immigrants whose departure could be expected to contribute to severe deprivation in their countries of origin. Countries have a right to unilaterally control their borders, but their exercise of this right is constrained by the demands of morality. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]