Search

Artificially intelligent systems (AISs) are being created by software developing companies (SDCs) to influence clinical decision‐making. Historically, clinicians have led healthcare decision‐making, and the introduction of AISs makes SDCs novel actors in the clinical decision‐making space. Although these AISs are intended to influence a clinician's decision‐making, SDCs have been clear that clinicians are in fact the final decision‐makers in clinical care, and that AISs can only inform their decisions. As such, the default position is that clinicians should hold responsibility for the outcomes of the use of AISs. This is not the case when an AIS has influenced a clinician's judgement and their subsequent decision. In this paper, we argue that this is an imbalanced and unjust position, and that careful thought needs to go into how personal moral responsibility for the use of AISs in clinical decision‐making should be attributed. This paper employs and examines the difference between prospective and retrospective responsibility and considers foreseeability as key in determining how personal moral responsibility can be justly attributed. This leads us to the view that moral responsibility for the outcomes of using AISs in healthcare ought to be shared by the clinical users and SDCs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Importance: Patient-reported outcomes (PROs) can inform health care decisions, regulatory decisions, and health care policy. They also can be used for audit/benchmarking and monitoring symptoms to provide timely care tailored to individual needs. However, several ethical issues have been raised in relation to PRO use.Objective: To develop international, consensus-based, PRO-specific ethical guidelines for clinical research.Evidence Review: The PRO ethics guidelines were developed following the Enhancing the Quality and Transparency of Health Research (EQUATOR) Network's guideline development framework. This included a systematic review of the ethical implications of PROs in clinical research. The databases MEDLINE (Ovid), Embase, AMED, and CINAHL were searched from inception until March 2020. The keywords patient reported outcome* and ethic* were used to search the databases. Two reviewers independently conducted title and abstract screening before full-text screening to determine eligibility. The review was supplemented by the SPIRIT-PRO Extension recommendations for trial protocol. Subsequently, a 2-round international Delphi process (n = 96 participants; May and August 2021) and a consensus meeting (n = 25 international participants; October 2021) were held. Prior to voting, consensus meeting participants were provided with a summary of the Delphi process results and information on whether the items aligned with existing ethical guidance.Findings: Twenty-three items were considered in the first round of the Delphi process: 6 relevant candidate items from the systematic review and 17 additional items drawn from the SPIRIT-PRO Extension. Ninety-six international participants voted on the relevant importance of each item for inclusion in ethical guidelines and 12 additional items were recommended for inclusion in round 2 of the Delphi (35 items in total). Fourteen items were recommended for inclusion at the consensus meeting (n = 25 participants). The final wording of the PRO ethical guidelines was agreed on by consensus meeting participants with input from 6 additional individuals. Included items focused on PRO-specific ethical issues relating to research rationale, objectives, eligibility requirements, PRO concepts and domains, PRO assessment schedules, sample size, PRO data monitoring, barriers to PRO completion, participant acceptability and burden, administration of PRO questionnaires for participants who are unable to self-report PRO data, input on PRO strategy by patient partners or members of the public, avoiding missing data, and dissemination plans.Conclusions and Relevance: The PRO ethics guidelines provide recommendations for ethical issues that should be addressed in PRO clinical research. Addressing ethical issues of PRO clinical research has the potential to ensure high-quality PRO data while minimizing participant risk, burden, and harm and protecting participant and researcher welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aims and Objectives: To explore moral distress empirically and conceptually, to understand the factors that mitigate and exacerbate moral distress and construct a model that represents how moral distress relates to its constituent parts and related concepts. Background: There is ongoing debate about how to understand and respond to moral distress in nursing practice. Design: The overarching design was feminist empirical bioethics in which feminist interpretive phenomenology provided the tools for data collection and analysis, reported following the COREQ guidelines. Using reflexive balancing, the empirical data were combined with feminist theory to produce normative recommendations about how to respond to moral distress. The Moral Distress Model presented in this paper is a culmination of the empirical data and theory. Methods: Using feminist interpretive phenomenology, critical care nurses in the United Kingdom (n = 21) were interviewed and data analysed. Reflexive Balancing was used to integrate the data with feminist theory to provide normative recommendations about how to understand moral distress. Results: There are five compounding factors that exacerbate/ mitigate nurses' experiences of moral distress: epistemic injustice; the roster lottery; conflict between one's professional and personal responsibilities; ability to advocate and team dynamics. In addition to the causal connection and responses to moral distress, these factors make up the moral distress model which can guide approaches to mitigate moral distress. Conclusions: The Moral Distress Model is the culmination of these data and theorising formulated into a construct to explain how each element interacts. We propose that this model can be used to inform the design of interventions to address moral distress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When providing care, nephrologists are subject to various ethical duties. Beyond the Hippocratic notion of doing no harm, nephrologists also have duties to respect their patients' autonomy and dignity, to meet their patients' care goals in the least invasive way, to act impartially, and, ultimately, to do what is (clinically) beneficial for their patients. Juggling these often-conflicting duties can be challenging at the best of times, but can prove especially difficult when patients are not fully adherent to treatment. When a patient's nonadherence begins to cause harm to themselves and/or others, it may be questioned whether discontinuation of care is appropriate. We discuss how nephrologists can meet their ethical duties when faced with nonadherence in patients undergoing hemodialysis, including episodic extreme agitation, poor renal diet, missed hemodialysis sessions, and emergency presentations brought on by nonadherence. Furthermore, we consider the impact of cognitive impairment and provider-family conflict when making care decisions in a nonadherence context, as well as how the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic might affect responses to nonadherence. Suggestions are provided for ethically informed responses, prioritizing a patient-narrative approach that is attentive to patients' values and preferences, multidisciplinarity, and the use of behavioral contracts and/or technology where appropriate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been increasing debate in recent years about the conceptualization of moral distress. Broadly speaking, two groups of scholars have emerged: those who agree with Jameton's 'narrow definition' that focuses on constraint and those who argue that Jameton's definition is insufficient and needs to be broadened. Using feminist empirical bioethics, we interviewed critical care nurses in the United Kingdom about their experiences and conceptualizations of moral distress. We provide our broader definition of moral distress and examples of data that both challenge and support our conceptualization. We pre‐empt and overcome three key challenges that could be levelled at our account and argue that there are good reasons to adopt our broader definition of moral distress when exploring prevalence of, and management strategies for, moral distress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The phenomenon of 'moral distress' has continued to be a popular topic for nursing research. However, much of the scholarship has lacked conceptual clarity, and there is debate about what it means to experience moral distress. Moral distress remains an obscure concept to many clinical nurses, especially those outside of North America, and there is a lack of empirical research regarding its impact on nurses in the United Kingdom and its relevance to clinical practice. Research aim: To explore the concept of moral distress in nursing both empirically and conceptually. Methodology: Feminist interpretive phenomenology was used to explore and analyse the experiences of critical care nurses at two acute care trauma hospitals in the United Kingdom. Empirical data were analysed using Van Manen's six steps for data analysis. Ethical considerations: The study was approved locally by the university ethics review committee and nationally by the Health Research Authority in the United Kingdom. Findings: The empirical findings suggest that psychological distress can occur in response to a variety of moral events. The moral events identified as causing psychological distress in the participants' narratives were moral tension, moral uncertainty, moral constraint, moral conflict and moral dilemmas. Discussion: We suggest a new definition of moral distress which captures this broader range of moral events as legitimate causes of distress. We also suggest that moral distress can be sub-categroised according to the source of distress, for example, 'moral-uncertainty distress'. We argue that this could aid in the development of interventions which attempt to address and mitigate moral distress. Conclusion: The empirical findings support the notion that narrow conceptions of moral distress fail to capture the real-life experiences of this group of critical care nurses. If these experiences resonate with other nurses and healthcare professionals, then it is likely that the definition needs to be broadened to recognise these experiences as 'moral distress'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Austerity, by its very nature, imposes constraints by limiting the options for action available to us because certain courses of action are too costly or insufficiently cost effective. In the context of healthcare, the constraints imposed by austerity come in various forms; ranging from the availability of certain treatments being reduced or withdrawn completely, to reductions in staffing that mean healthcare professionals must ration the time they make available to each patient. As austerity has taken hold, across the United Kingdom and Europe, it is important to consider the wider effects of the constraints that it imposes in healthcare. Within this paper, we focus specifically on one theorised effect—moral distress. We differentiate between avoidable and unavoidable ethical challenges within healthcare and argue that austerity creates additional avoidable ethical problems that exacerbate clinicians' moral distress. We suggest that moral resilience is a suitable response to clinician moral distress caused by unavoidable ethical challenges but additional responses are required to address those that are created due to austerity. We encourage clinicians to engage in critical resilience and activism to address problems created by austerity and we highlight the responsibility of institutions to support healthcare professionals in such challenging times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aims: The aim of this narrative synthesis was to explore the necessary and sufficient conditions required to define moral distress. Background: Moral distress is said to occur when one has made a moral judgement but is unable to act upon it. However, problems with this narrow conception have led to multiple redefinitions in the empirical and conceptual literature. As a consequence, much of the research exploring moral distress has lacked conceptual clarity, complicating attempts to study the phenomenon. Design: Systematic literature review and narrative synthesis (November 2015–March 2016). Data sources: Ovid MEDLINE® In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations 1946–Present, PsycINFO® 1967–Present, CINAHL® Plus 1937–Present, EMBASE 1974–24 February 2016, British Nursing Index 1994–Present, Social Care Online, Social Policy and Practice Database (1890–Present), ERIC (EBSCO) 1966–Present and Education Abstracts. Review methods: Literature relating to moral distress was systematically retrieved and subjected to relevance assessment. Narrative synthesis was the overarching framework that guided quality assessment, data analysis and synthesis. Results: In all, 152 papers underwent initial data extraction and 34 were chosen for inclusion in the narrative synthesis based on both quality and relevance. Analysis revealed different proposed conditions for the occurrence of moral distress: moral judgement, psychological and physical effects, moral dilemmas, moral uncertainty, external and internal constraints and threats to moral integrity. Conclusion: We suggest the combination of (1) the experience of a moral event, (2) the experience of 'psychological distress' and (3) a direct causal relation between (1) and (2) together are necessary and sufficient conditions for moral distress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conditional and directed deceased organ donations occur when donors (or often their next of kin) attempt to influence the allocation of their donated organs. This can include asking that the organs are given to or withheld from certain types of people, or that they are given to specified individuals. Donations of these types have raised ethical concerns, and have been prohibited in many countries, including the UK. In this article we report the findings from a qualitative study involving interviews with potential donors (n = 20), potential recipients (n = 9) and transplant staff (n = 11), and use these results as a springboard for further ethical commentary. We argue that although participants favoured unconditional donation, this preference was grounded in a false distinction between 'medical' and 'non-medical' allocation criteria. Although there are good reasons to maintain organ allocation based primarily upon the existing 'medical' criteria, it may be premature to reject all other potential criteria as being unacceptable. Part of participants' justification for allocating organs using 'medical' criteria was to make the best use of available organs and avoid wasting their potential benefit, but this can also justify accepting conditional donations in some circumstances. We draw a distinction between two types of waste - absolute and relative - and argue that accepting conditional donations may offer a balance between these forms of waste. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the UK, putative fathers are encouraged to be involved in antenatal and maternal health care, in the belief that involving men as early as possible lays the foundation for better, more involved fatherhood. Integrating men into maternity care can, however, have hitherto unexplored ethical complexities. We begin by providing three ethical justifications for involving men in antenatal and maternity health care, and then discuss how each necessarily constrains the nature of this involvement. The medical setting itself creates some of the difficulties. This observation leads us into a broader exploration of the medicalisation of men's transition to fatherhood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most academic papers on ethics in pandemics concentrate on the duties of healthcare professionals. This paper will consider non-professional healthcare workers: do they have a moral obligation to work during an influenza pandemic? If so, is this an obligation that outweighs others they might have, e.g., as parents, and should such an obligation be backed up by the coercive power of law? This paper considers whether non-professional healthcare workers—porters, domestic service workers, catering staff, clerks, IT support workers, etc.—have an obligation to work during an influenza pandemic. It uses data collected as part of a study looking at the attitudes of healthcare workers to working during a pandemic to suggest the philosophical arguments explored. These include: being in a position to do good, the ethics of work, competing obligations to family members and in particular to children and the obligations of citizens in a state of national emergency. We also look at whether compulsory measures are justified to support a national health service during a health emergency. We conclude that even if they are, compulsion should not be restricted to non-professionals who happen to be working in the health service at the time. Rather, compulsion involving a larger pool of people with the relevant skills and abilities is more equitable. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper responds to the commentaries from Stacy Carter and Alan Cribb. We pick up on two main themes in our response. First, we reflect on how the process of setting standards for empirical bioethics research entails drawing boundaries around what research counts as empirical bioethics research, and we discuss whether the standards agreed in the consensus process draw these boundaries correctly. Second, we expand on the discussion in the original paper of the role and significance of the concept of 'integrating' empirical methods and ethical argument as a standard for research practice within empirical bioethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]