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Descriptively, Dahl's definition encompasses the typical focus amongst developmental psychologists studying morality, who have largely relied on similar definitions for the past half-century. Research articles in moral psychology seldom offer a definition of the scope of the word "moral" - that is, a rationale for claiming that the phenomenon under consideration falls into the moral domain. Greater clarity in the definition of individual moral phenomena should not necessarily lead to a single definition of morality across phenomena. [Extracted from the article]

What is the relationship between religious affiliation and conceptions of the moral domain? Putting aside the question of whether people from different religions agree about how to answer moral questions, here we investigate a more fundamental question: How much disagreement is there across religions about which issues count as moral in the first place? That is, do people from different religions conceptualize the scope of morality differently? Using a new methodology to map out how individuals conceive of the moral domain, we find dramatic differences among adherents of different religions. Mormon and Muslim participants moralized their religious norms, while Jewish participants did not. Hindu participants in our sample did not seem to make a moral/non-moral distinction of the same kind. These results suggest a profound relationship between religious affiliation and conceptions of the scope of the moral domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What causes people to change their beliefs about right and wrong? Coherence-based interventions can change people's moral beliefs about abstract moral principles (Holyoak & Powell, 2016), but it is unclear whether these interventions would be similarly effective for everyday moral beliefs that can impact routine behavior. In the present research, we examined whether coherence-based "memes" highlighting the moral similarities of pigs and dogs can shift moral beliefs about consuming meat. Across three preregistered experiments (N = 2281), we found that self-reported beliefs about the permissibility of eating some animals can be subtly shifted by brief coherence-based interventions which highlight morally relevant capacities (e.g., intelligence, emotional capacities) of an animal that is frequently eaten in Western society (pig) and an animal that is typically considered forbidden to eat by Westerners (dog). We discuss the implications of these findings for psychological and ethical theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can social communication alter children's preexisting inclinations toward equality-based or merit-based forms of resource distribution? Six- to eight-year-old children's (N = 248) fairness preferences were evaluated with third-party distribution tasks before and after an intervention. Study 1 indicated that stories about beavers dividing wood had no impact on children's fairness preferences, while Study 2 indicated that brief, direct testimony was highly influential. Study 3 matched storybooks and testimony in content, with each discussing a situation resembling the distribution task, and both formats exerted a significant impact on children's fairness preferences that persisted across several weeks. There were some indications that interventions preaching the superiority of equality-based fairness were particularly effective, but there were no differences between reason-based and emotion-based interventions. Overall, storybooks and testimony can powerfully and enduringly change children's existing distributive justice preferences, as long as the moral lessons that are conveyed are easily transferable to children's real-world contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Immoral actions can elicit a wide array of responses, ranging from pugnacious confrontation to passive distancing. What leads onlookers to react so differently to various violations? Across four studies (N = 2085), we investigated how responses vary depending on whether moral transgressions are committed by adults or by children. Findings reliably demonstrated that adult participants were more likely to avoid adult transgressors, and more likely to instruct child transgressors about why their actions were wrong. These patterns arose from varying cost-benefit structures, derived in part from asymmetries in interpersonal power between adults and children, rendering adults' direct confrontation of children both less costly and more beneficial. Although adults' transgressions were judged to be relatively more wrong, participants had greater anxiety about the negative consequences of confronting adults, and they viewed adults' personalities as less malleable, thus diminishing the effectiveness of confrontation. In contrast, 4- to 9-year-old children did not differ in their willingness to avoid or instruct adult and child transgressors. Across studies, the content of transgressions (e.g., being harmful or impure) mattered little for determining the nature of responses. Overall, diverse responses to moral transgressions were uniquely tailored to the different costs and benefits associated with confronting adult and child transgressors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]