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We examine and test the logic that outbidding among insurgent groups results in more suicide terrorism specifically and more terrorism of any type, which has become a popular argument in recent years. A global analysis of terrorism from 1970–2004 provides scant support for the notion that outbidding increases suicide terrorism. An extension of the argument to all types of terrorist attacks provides even less support. The logic of outbidding has received considerable attention in academic and policy circles in recent years. Similar to the argument that democratic occupation increases suicide terror, our lack of empirical support suggests that considerable cross-national work is still needed to understand suicide terror adequately. We suggest some reasons why this may be the case, drawing particular attention to the problem of overgeneralizing from a limited set of cases. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Most scholars believe that rumors spark ethnic violence around the world, yet political scientists have been slow to understand the dynamics of these rumors, including whether they emerge and survive as a matter of course or require certain preconditions. Because empirical observation cannot readily answer this question, we use agent-based modeling to explore whether rumor survival depends on selected group follower and leader characteristics. Our first set of experiments assumes one group. They show that violence-promoting rumors are not inevitable, nor are group leaders necessary for their propagation. But rumor survival peaks when leaders espouse extreme beliefs and interact frequently with their followers. Our second set of experiments assumes rival groups whose members interact on a limited basis. Some of the experiments confirm the one-group conclusions. Others reveal that when one group's leaders persist in advocating moderation, rumor propagation remains low in both groups. Finally, when rival leaders try to outbid each other, rumor survival increases markedly in both groups. By way of conclusion, we consider the policy implications of these findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses a puzzle of how conflicts characterized by significant power asymmetries often play out much differently than dominant powers expect. We adapt the notions of institutionalized peace and riot systems from the literature on ethnic violence to identify ways in which social institutions attenuate collective action dilemmas, thereby increasing capability for a less-powerful group. Dominant groups often miscalculate the true nature of capability relationships by failing to account for these group-specific institutions that operate in the face of exogenous threats. We illustrate our model with two episodes of Chechen mobilization in the 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]